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  Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better. 
   Samuel Beckett  
 
 
I have believed for as long as I can remember in an afterlife within my own    
life – a calm, stable state to be reached after time of troubles. When I was a 
child, that afterlife was Being Grown Up. As I have grown older, its content 
has become more nebulous, but the image of it stubbornly persists.  
Donald A Schon (1971) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
   ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis is a post-structuralist – ‘logics’/discourse analytic – account of the 2006-
2011 struggle over plans to make the Health Professions Council (HPC) statutory 
regulator of the field of counselling and psychotherapy. I contextualise the plans in 
relation to the Government’s parallel Improving Access to Psychological Therapies 
(IAPT) programme and the Skills for Health (SfH) project to map competencies within 
the field. These projects, along with HPC regulation, promised to render practice 
safe and effective. However, the HPC plans were seen by some as a threat to 
diversity within the field and were met with resistance from the (especially formed) 
Alliance for Counselling and Psychotherapy Against State Regulation. 
I assess these competing evaluations and argue that the HPC plans would have 
advanced a ‘transactional’ orientated regime, in which the field would have been 
assimilated to a more ‘consumerist’ and ‘transactional’ mould, and that in contrast, 
the Alliance were seeking to defend a more ‘contextual’ and ‘relational’ 
conceptualisation of practice in which expertise tends to be seen as co-created 
between client and practitioner. The HPC adopted a series of bald strategies to 
marginalise opposition voices, conditioned in part by structural features of the policy 
making process and supported by a ‘problem minority’ narrative in which inherent 
uncertainties about what counts as good and effective talking therapy are eclipsed 
from view by a near-exclusive focus on a minority of unethical and incompetent 
practitioners. The Alliance, for its part, I argue tended at times to espouse a position 
close to talking therapy ‘exceptionalism’, thus eclipsing similarities with more 
contextual healthcare imaginaries. Policy implications for regulation and policy-
making process are drawn out. More broadly my account contributes to literature 
which questions both the democratizing credentials and the often supposed 
‘inevitability’ of the highly calculative forms of regulation and audit which are installed 
across the health and social care professions and which have constituted the so-
called rise of the regulatory state in recent decades.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The plot comes straight from a campus novel: splenetic academics; a government hell-
bent on reforming their discipline; sexual impropriety, whispering campaigns and 
litigation threats. The narrative practically writes itself. But this is not a David Lodge tour 
de force; this is the bitter, increasingly public, war ripping through the UK's "talking 
therapies". If psychotherapy were on the couch right now, it would not be short of 
issues. (Doward and Flyn, 2010).  
The field we know as counselling and psychotherapy is so diverse, so rooted in 
relationships and places, so firmly fixed amongst ordinary people that the wish to 
legislate it into a neat standardised package should rather be written into [the] next DSM 
as a sectional mental illness’ (Low, 2008).  
New rules don’t ‘enslave’ therapists or make types of practice illegal – they’re an 
acknowledgement of the reality of abuse (Coe, 2009).  
 
 
This thesis provides an account of the 2006-20011 struggle over plans to 
make the `Health Professions Council (HPC) the statutory regulator of the 
field of counselling and psychotherapy. I extensively contextualise this 
struggle in relation to the broader healthcare regulatory reforms in which the 
HPC plans were embedded, as well as the Skills for Health project (SfH) to 
map the competencies - the so called National Occupational Standards 
(NOS) - of counselling and psychotherapy, and the Government’s Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapies programme (IAPT). The Chief Executive 
Director of the British Psychoanalytic Council (BPC), Malcolm Allen, 
described the HPC plans, together with the SfH and IAPT projects as 
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constituting a ‘new zeitgeist’ for the field of counselling and psychotherapy.1 
By mid-2006, once the possibility of HPC regulation of the field became seen 
as a serious possibility, a group of mainstream professional associations 
within the field, including the two biggest - the UK Council for Psychotherapy 
(UKCP), and the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy 
(BACP), spearheaded by the British Psychological Society (BPS), put 
together an alternative proposal for a specialist regulator called the 
‘Psychological Professions Council’ (British Psychological Society, 2006).  
They were chiefly concerned that the HPC, as a multiple-professional 
regulator, focussed on the health professions, would lack adequate specialist 
knowledge of the field. The BPC and the British Association for Behavioural 
and Cognitive Psychotherapies (BABCP), however, positioned themselves in 
favour of the HPC plans from the outset.   
The Government rejected the alternative proposal, and in February 2007, 
tucked within the Government White Paper Trust, Assurance and Safety – 
The Regulation of Health Professionals in the 21st Century (Department of 
Health, 2007a), was the Labour Government’s announcement that it intended 
to push ahead with HPC regulation of psychologists, psychotherapists and 
counsellors ‘following [the HPC’s] rigorous process of assessing their 
regulatory needs and ensuring that its system is capable of accommodating 
them’ (Department of Health, 2007a:85).  
Perceiving the plans to be the only politically viable possibility for statutory 
regulation, the UKCP and BACP did an about turn and joined the BABCP and 
                                                          
1 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014. See 
Appendix A transcript p.457. 
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the BPC in broadly committing themselves to supporting the development of 
the HPC plans. In December 2008 the HPC held the first meeting of its 
Professional Liaison Group (‘Liaison Group’ as shorthand) for counselling and 
psychotherapy and included representatives from all the main professional 
associations within the field, and was given the remit to develop the ‘nuts and 
bolts’ of the plans, as Michael Guthrie, the HPC’s Director of Policy and 
Standards, put it.2 ; as opposed to a wider remit of considering the more 
fundamental policy parameters of whether statutory regulation of the field is 
desirable, and, if so, by what kind of regulator. The HPC also conducted wider 
consultations within the field, beginning In July 2008 with its ‘Call for Ideas’, 
followed by a fractious ‘stakeholder meeting’ held in Manchester in March 
2009, and another written consultation on the draft recommendations, made 
by the HPC’s Liaison Group to the HPC’s Executive,  on the ‘proposed 
statutory regulation of psychotherapists and counsellors’.  
Two key frontiers within the struggle over the HPC plans emerged. The first 
was within the HPC’s Liaison Group itself; that is to say there was a division 
among supporters of the HPC plans. This was a strong cleavage within the 
group over the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the plans, namely on the issue of 
‘differentiation’: whether or not the register should distinguish between 
counselling and psychotherapy, each with its own distinct entry levels and 
standards of proficiency. The HPC plans had become the latest locus of a 
pre-existent ‘turf war’ within the field, and the HPC plans intensified anxieties 
over how this turf war might be settled. Most parties within the Liaison Group 
supported differentiation. However, the BACP, by far the largest organisation 
                                                          
2 Michael Guthrie (Director of Policy and Standards, HPC), interview by author, June 2014. 
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within the field, was resolutely opposed to differentiation, and each side of the 
division accused the other of abandoning the public interest in pursuit of their 
own organisational interests. A key feature of the struggle over the ‘nuts and 
bolts’ of the plans was the tendency for the ‘differentiation’ camp to push 
(somewhat to their own discomfort) the characterisation of psychotherapy in a 
psychiatric orientated direction in order to secure a distinction from 
counselling. 3 
The second frontier is that between the HPC and its proponents on the one 
hand, and those opposed to the HPC plans in their totality on the other. The 
HPC’s wider consultations, including a fractious ‘stakeholder meeting’ held in 
Manchester in March 2009, failed to produce any palpable rapprochement 
between the HPC and its opponents. Whilst the HPC firmly pushed forward 
an agenda which focussed on developing the ‘nuts and bolts’, many within the 
field attending the meeting pushed for a resolute and total rejection of the 
HPC as prospective regulator of the field, demanding that the HPC address 
the fundamental ‘whether and by whom’ questions (Low, 2008), (Postle, 
2012).    
In frustration of the character and direction of the consultation and policy-
making processes, a group of practitioners from a diverse range of schools 
within the field formed the Alliance for Counselling and Psychotherapy 
Against State Regulation. One of its key founders, the Jungian Analyst, 
Andrew Samuels, characterised the Alliance as ‘not the great and good of the 
                                                          
3 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
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psychotherapy world, but [the] troublesome bolshie of the psychotherapy 
world’4. Other founding and key members included the Lacanian 
psychoanalyst, Darian Leader, the humanistic counsellor, and long term 
campaigner against ‘the professionalisation’ of counselling and 
psychotherapy, Denis Postle, and the Jungian analyst, Paul Atkinson. I have 
interviewed all of these actors as part of this research.5  
The HPC and the Alliance made radically different interpretative and narrative 
accounts of the HPC plans. Proponents claimed that the plans were a 
‘neutral’ or ‘light touch’ way of dealing with a ‘problem minority’ of practitioners 
within the field, and that therefore the plans were not a threat to the diversity 
of practice, or to the vast majority of practitioners. Enthusiasts, conversely, 
saw the projects were seen by many as together helping to ensure that 
practice and services were safe and cost-effective, as well as more widely 
available.  IAPT for instance was set to create an army of new therapists to 
deal with what the Depression Report called an ‘epidemic of depression’ 
(Layard et al, 2006). The projects were, in short, seen by policy makers as a 
long overdue move to improve the quality and availability of psychological 
services, and as a means of protecting the public from unscrupulous 
practitioners in a hitherto inadequately regulated and governed field.  
However, for many within the field the emergent character of the SfH and 
IAPT projects heightened their concerns about the HPC plans. The SfH 
project was initiated with the express intention of informing the development 
of standards within the HPC regulatory plans, and was predominantly led by a 
                                                          
4 Andrew Samuels (Chair of UKCP 2009-2011), interview by author, June 2014 
5 Darian Leader(Lacanian psychoanalyst, Alliance co-founder), interview by author, June 2014 
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relatively narrow faction within the field, namely academics and practitioners 
from the Department of Health Psychology at the University College, London, 
and practitioners associated within the BPC (Arbours Association et al, 2009). 
The project adopted the contentious ‘experimentalist’ research paradigm, 
valorised by the National Institution for Clinical Excellence (NICE) 6 and the 
so called evidence based practice movement, as the foundation upon which 
to develop the NOS for four modalities of talking therapy, namely cognitive 
behaviour therapy, psychodynamic psychotherapy, systemic family therapy, 
and humanistic psychotherapy and counselling. Despite strong assurances 
from SfH that it was inclusive, the project quickly ran into deep controversy, 
most psychoanalysts, for instance, viewing the NOS developed for 
psychoanalysis as unrecognisable, and as incommensurable with their 
practice, and with all psychoanalytic literature, with the exception of 
mentalisation based therapy (MBT) developed by the psychoanalyst Peter 
Fonagy at the UCL (Arbours Association et al, 2009). 
Similarly the IAPT programme was contentious within the field, largely as it 
was restricted to therapy packages ‘proven’ to be cost-effective through 
experimentalist controlled trials. This tended to favour cognitive and 
behavioural based therapies (for a range of reasons), and many practitioners 
from other schools regarded the research evidence as flawed, with some 
holding that the experimentalist paradigm is incommensurable with many 
forms of counselling and psychotherapy, contending that talking therapy 
cannot be standardised in the way required by such research. SfH and IAPT 
therefore raised the temperature within the field and fuelled suspicion that the 
                                                          
6 In 2013 NICE was renamed the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. 
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HPC plans were part of a bid of certain factions within the field, drawing on 
both the strength and demands of the state, to ‘take over’, or radically 
restructure, the terrain of the counselling and psychotherapy field (Arbours 
Association et al, 2009), (Postle, 2012).   
In short the Alliance saw the HPC plans, along with the SfH and IAPT 
projects, as a threat to diversity within the field and to the freedom to practice 
particular forms of talking therapy. The Alliance characterised the projects as 
a medical and consumerist encroachment upon a field in which many 
practitioners foreground the importance of the contextual and emergent, and 
therefore the unique, character of each therapeutic relationship. To attempt to 
delineate and guarantee the qualities or outcomes of therapy in advance of 
the therapeutic relationship, whether through medical rationalisation of the 
process, or through a consumer contract, is, the Alliance contended, to 
destroy the process before it has even began. Closely related to this was the 
Alliance’s characterisation of the plans as a threat to therapies which seek to 
provide a space in which alternatives to dominant values within society can 
be freely explored (Arbours Association et al, 2009). 
Despite consultations which were a standard part of the HPC’s procedures for 
taking on board new professions as well as additional meetings between HPC 
personnel and members of the Alliance, the gap between the parties 
remained stubbornly unbridged. Opponents sought to stall and derail the 
implementation of the HPC plans through attacks on three key fronts. In 
October 2009 several psychoanalytic organisations launched legal action 
against the HPC, challenging the legality of the both the content of the HPC 
plans and how the HPC had conducted the policy process. Simultaneously, 
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with the 2010 General Election and a possible change of Government was on 
the horizon, members of the Alliance lobbied the Conservative Party, the then 
Official Opposition within the House of Commons. In the third key front, there 
was mounting vocal opposition to the HPC plans among many members of 
the main professional associations within the field, especially the UKCP and 
BACP, and a pivotal point within the struggle was the surprise election of 
Andrew Samuels to the Chair of the UKCP on an ‘anti-HPC ticket’ in late 
2009.  
In the meantime the HPC sought to resolve the differentiation issue through a 
second wave of Professional Liaison Group meetings; ones not originally 
scheduled. Additionally the Psychological Professions Association Group 
(PPAG) was established, comprised of the professional associations around 
the HPC’s Liaison Group table, in an attempt to make headway on the issue 
and thrash out a position acceptable to all. It came up with a more nuanced 
position on differentiation as far as minimum levels of qualification and 
training required was concerned, which acknowledged that some counselling 
trainings are as advanced, or as in-depth, as psychotherapy trainings.  But 
differentiation between counselling and psychotherapy within the structure of 
the register, in its totality, still remained unacceptable to the BACP; a fact that 
was reflected within its members’ responses to the HPC’s consultation, in 
autumn 2009, on the Liaison Group’s proposed recommendations to the HPC 
Executive regarding the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the planned regulation.  
In December 2010 the High Court gave the go ahead for a full Judicial 
Hearing, and the HPC was ordered, unusually, to pay some of the legal costs 
of the plaintiffs. In 2011, following the 2010 General Election and the 
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formation of the Coalition Government, the Government published a 
Command Paper ‘Enabling Excellence: Autonomy and Accountability for 
Healthcare Workers, Social Workers and Social Care workers’ (Department of 
Health, 2011)  in which it indicated its intention to shelve the HPC plans, 
along with a number of other regulatory projects. Government Minister, Anne 
Milton, told Andrew Samuels that the Alliance ‘had won the argument’.7 The 
full Judicial Review therefore did not go ahead. The Government announced 
plans for the Assured Voluntary Regulation for counselling and 
psychotherapy, in which the Professional Standards Authority accredits 
voluntary registers within the field.  In response to unofficial communications 
from Government, the Alliance said that it would not campaign against the 
assured voluntary scheme. 8 
The HPC, however, still submitted its recommendation to Government that 
HPC regulation of the field of counselling and psychotherapy was feasible. 
This was despite the fact that the Professional Liaison Group had not been 
able to reach a consensus on the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the plans, and in fact 
remained deeply divided on the issue of differentiation and how this might 
impact the structure the field and the main competing organisational players 
within it (Health Professions Council, 2011c).  
This is the basic synopsis of what happened. But in what ways does it 
deserve our detailed attention? 
 
                                                          
7 7 Andrew Samuels (Chair of UKCP 2009-2011), interview by author, June 2014 
8 Ibid. 
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Why the HPC struggle matters: One might contend that the HPC struggle, 
as a feature of the past, is ‘water under the bridge’, and that the counselling 
and psychotherapy field is a minor, even obscure, part of the economy and 
regulatory field, and so not worthy of detailed attention. There are four main 
points I want to forward in defence of the struggle as warranting careful 
scrutiny. The first is that the HPC plans could potentially be revived. A 
government paper, Promoting professionalism, reforming regulation’, 
published in October 2017, looks towards the reform of the system under 
which registers for counselling and psychotherapy are currently accredited 
(Postle, 2018). Some within the field of counselling and psychotherapy are 
reportedly enthusiastically pushing for it (ibid). But even if there were not any 
moves to revive the plans, there is nonetheless– and this is my second point 
– the basic tenant of doing history, consonant, in a sense with many forms of 
talking therapy, that understanding our past helps us to better shape our 
present and future. As Foucault states, the aim of doing research critically is 
‘to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the 
possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are’ (Griggs and 
Howarth, 2013:50).  So understanding the recent past of regulatory struggle 
within the field has an important contribution to make in our understanding of 
the present, and any possible future steps for the field within the regulatory 
arena.  
My third point is that the HPC struggle is a significant event in the ‘life and 
times’ of the field of counselling and psychotherapy in the UK, and that the 
field plays a significant role within society, constituting a significant element of 
what many refer to as the ‘psy-complex’ (Miller and Rose, 1988). Questions 
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and concerns about the extent to which talking therapies embody dominant, 
and perhaps dominating, forms of practice within society, and to what extent 
they are, conversely, avenues of counter-cultural practice which contest forms 
of domination, are largely what make the question of regulation both an 
interesting and difficult one.   How this field is (re)shaped or influenced by the 
introduction of new forms of regulation, whether through force, nudging, 
seduction, or persuasion, therefore matters. But the significance of this case 
study arguably also goes beyond the shores of the talking therapies. This is 
my fourth point. It may help us to further understand the so called rise of the 
regulatory state and its accompanying forms of (de)professionalization more 
generally, especially, though not exclusively, within the healthcare 
professions. By the ‘regulatory state’ I mean the rapid growth of regulatory 
practices, namely audit, within the professions, and the increased forms of 
marketization which often accompany it, as explored  by researchers with a 
diverse range of takes on it, including Moran (2003) and Power (1999) . 
Professional ‘shelter’ from the market and independence from government 
agencies have both been eroded in recent decades, hence why some writers 
characterise the process as ‘deprofessionalisation’. Simultaneously, there has 
been a proliferation of occupations becoming ‘professions’, in accordance 
with more regulatory and market orientated norms of organisation and 
practice. In this sense there can be said to have been a wave of 
professionalization across many sectors of the economy.   
It is perhaps two interrelated exceptional elements which make the HPC 
struggle, as a case study, most interesting to the general regulatory picture. 
The first is that talking therapy, or at least many forms of it, could be regarded 
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as ‘contextual’ and ‘relational’ practice par excellence, in which the relatively 
open ended relationship is regarded as the means of the therapeutic 
‘treatment’ itself. This exceptional character of the talking therapies could 
throw the contextual characteristics of other professional practices, including 
healthcare ones, into sharper relief. The second exceptional element is the 
fact that it is relatively rare for a wide-cross section of a field, with nascent 
and some established professional elements, to both vociferously, and in a 
highly organised fashion, resist the increased status and power that  
becoming a statutory profession is often argued to afford. Added to this, in 
many senses the Alliance could be said to have been somewhat unusual in 
its degree of success in achieving its aims in engendering considerable 
opposition within the field to the HPC plans, as well in its dogged optimism 
about the capacity of practitioners to resist and change government policy. 
The HPC saga also arguably has some of the hallmarks, even if it is not a 
clear cut case, of what King and Crewe (2013) refer to as a ‘policy fiasco’, by 
which they mean instances in which policy has failed predominantly because 
of failure of policy makers to achieve adequate foresight of likely problems. 
Because of this there are possible lessons to learn from the case study about 
the policy making process. This still stands, incidentally, even if one were to 
take the view that the fall of the HPC plans was more to do with broader 
tectonic shifts in the political landscape than with the specific interventions of 
the Alliance.  
Let me now say a bit more about the specific aims and the approach of this 
research.  
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Aims and approach: Overall this case study seeks to contribute to our 
understanding of regulatory issues within the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy, as well as also contribute to our understanding of the policy 
making culture and structures involved within the HPC struggle. This may 
also help illuminate regulatory issues and policy making cultures and 
structures within wider fields, especially, though not exclusively, the 
healthcare and social professions.  
I have adopted the innovative ‘logics’ research approach developed by 
Glynos and Howarth (2007), built partially upon the post-structuralist work of 
Laclau and Moufe (1985). As Howarth (2005) puts it, the ‘kernel of this 
research programme centres on the idea that all objects and practices are 
meaningful, and that social meanings are contextual, relational, and 
contingent’ (317). This approach is therefore significantly ‘contextual’ in 
orientation – a qualitative, as distinct from quantitative, form of research – and 
seeks to incorporate and foreground both the importance of the self-
interpretations and values of the participants as well as the ‘situated 
judgement’ and values of the researcher in the construction of an account of 
the phenomenon under investigation. The approach I have adopted therefore 
has strong affinities with what I refer to as the more ‘contextual’ 
conceptualisations of talking therapies forwarded by the Alliance in which the 
character of a therapy is seen as emergent within the practitioner-client 
relationship. There is also strong affinity between a Lacanian psychoanalytic 
element within the ‘logics approach’ and some psychoanalytic actors and their 
framing of the HCP struggle. There is a shared notion of the subject as 
constitutively ‘fractured’ (as suggested within the Maresfield Report) (Arbours 
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Association et al, 2009) and incomplete (a ‘subject of lack’ as characterised 
by Laclau) and predisposed to seek ‘fullness’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). 
The subject is therefore seen as predisposed to idealise particular objects as 
inhering the promise of a ‘fullness’ to come once they have been 
acquisitioned. In pursuit of maximum market success, consumer and market 
logics are seen as particularly prone to appeal to the subject’s tendency 
towards the idealisation of some objects, and simultaneous denigration of 
others which are thought to be obstructing the subject’s path to ‘fullness’. 
However, contra a tendency within the Alliance towards a position near to a 
talking therapy ‘exceptionalism’ (where the association of talking therapy with 
healthcare tends to evoke strong reactions)  the logics approach, given its 
view that all practices are discursively mediated, arguably has affinity with a 
scepticism towards any strong demarcations between the talking therapies 
and other forms of professional practice, including healthcare ones, as well as 
strong demarcations between professional and non-professional/community 
based ways of organising talking therapy services. Rather, the logics 
approach lends itself, so to speak, to an emphasis upon both continuities and 
discontinuities between contextual and acontexutal/transactional practices 
and norms across both the healthcare and talking therapy fields.  
These predispositions within the approach, and its affinities with different 
elements and ‘sides’ within the struggle, obviously raises significant concerns 
about the objectivity and impartiality of this research. Indeed, rather than 
adopt the pretence of a God’s eye view of the research problem – a claim to 
absolute objectivity – I foreground this thesis as an ‘intervention’, of a sort,   
within the HPC struggle, in the form of an account of it, which is not (and 
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could not possibly be) entirely above the political ‘fray’. Social scientific 
research, whatever its design, is always necessarily an interpretative activity, 
and therefore always contestable. I take the view that attempts to entirely 
banish the subjective judgement of the researcher from the research (a 
practice often evident within more positivistic forms of research) only serves 
to mask the subjective judgement, and, therefore, make it less available to 
robust scrutiny. In such instances research tends to be rather more 
‘objectifying’ than objective. Acknowledging and foregrounding subjective 
judgement and values of the researcher and their centrality to the research 
process avails them more easily to scrutiny, and therefore, arguably, 
facilitates the production of more robust and properly objective research 
accounts, which seek to contribute to democratic deliberation in the definition 
and addressing of problems, rather than ‘settle’ or foreclose a matter through 
false or misleading claims to complete objectivity or neutrality.   
I produce a narrative account of the HPC struggle, encompassing a critical 
understanding of the competing  ‘stories` that constituted and shaped the 
campaign stalls of the pro and anti-HPC camps. I have sought to produce a 
representative account by drawing on a rich and diverse range of sources, 
including extensive HPC documents, government policy papers, blogs, 
newspaper articles, online commentary, letters of exchange, solicitor letters, 
court submissions, as well as over fifteen hours of material from interviews I 
carried out with over fifteen key actors within the struggle and prominent 
members of the field.  
My narrative account has two key facets and aims. The first is a descriptive 
and critical analysis of the character of the policy proposals and of the 
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competing characterisations made of them by the pro and anti-HPC camps. 
The second is an analysis of the political dynamics of the struggle; how the 
pro and anti-HPC camps sought respectively to implement and derail the 
HPC plans. Additionally I contextualise my account in relation to existing 
literature, both on the HPC struggle and broader literature on the professions, 
seeking to scrutinize and build upon existing accounts. There is a tendency 
within much of the literature on the professions towards a polarisation 
between public and private interest accounts in which the professions often 
tend to be seen as either embodying the successful pursuit of the truth and of 
the public interest through the exercise of science and reason, or, conversely, 
as the pursuit of private interests (either their own or those of the capitalist 
elite) through the exercise of ideology and power.  Whereas public interest 
accounts tend to characterise the professions as ameliorant and progressive, 
private interest accounts tend to emphasise the problem of ‘professional 
dominance’, where government and clients are seen as getting a ‘bad deal’ 
out of the professions. Ivan Illich (1975) for example, back in the 1970s, in his 
private interest-based account, described the profession of medicine as the 
most serious modern threat to health.  
In decades since the 1970s, the rise of the regulatory state, the marketization 
of the professions, encompassing the ‘evidence based practice movement’, 
are the central ways in which government and the professions have sought to 
address the dangers posed by professions. I explore and draw on both 
celebratory and critical accounts of these ways of seeking to address this so 
called problem of professional dominance. I also (largely in the concluding 
chapter) seek to draw out the implications of my account for policy advice, 
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namely on how the talking therapies should be regulated, as well as 
recommendations on the policy-making process itself. I also draw out the 
broad implications of my account relating to how these policy aims might best 
be strategically achieved. I also suggest that this case study illuminates 
aspects of broader health and social care regulatory regimes that are in need 
of urgent reform, chiefly (though not exclusively) concerning regulatory failure 
to address problems relating to the dominance of healthcare by the 
pharmaceutical industry and the prominent role played by the profit motive 
within the latter. I draw on the work of Healy (2013) and others in this 
analysis.  
Before briefly outlining the main research questions and my overarching 
thesis let me first say something briefly about the motivation behind the 
research.  
 
Motivation for the research: I began the research in 2010 whilst the 
regulatory struggle over the HPC plans was still in progress. Regulation can 
perhaps, to appropriate Wittgenstein’s comment on the relation of rationality 
to passion, seem, when compared to talking therapy itself, like ‘cold grey ash 
covering the burning embers’. Regulation is not, self-evidently, the heart of 
professional practice. This is perhaps one reason why so many people within 
the field were relatively disinterested in the HPC struggle as reported, for 
example, by the then Chair of UKCP James Antrican. 9 Conversely, however, 
                                                          
9 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
 
 
25 
 
opponents of the HPC plans felt that there was a real danger that HPC 
regulation, if implemented would not be easily kept at a distance in daily 
practice, but would in fact insidiously implant itself as the heart of talking 
therapy.  
My personal motivation has partially stemmed from my experience of 
regulation within my work as a support worker within a range of social care 
institutions, including a therapeutic community. There is a tendency, in my 
experience, towards accountability as audit, in which, to put it in a slightly 
pejorative fashion, the regulator places an emphasis on imposing upon an 
institution a complex of audits and  ‘paper trails’, which the institution then 
checks itself again, rather than holding institutions to account in more direct, 
contextual, and relational ways. I have, along with many colleagues, often 
had the sense that regulatory demands and the interests of clients, though 
often converging, too often do not do so adequately, and that audit and 
regulatory practices too often become the primary focus of an organisation, 
excessively distorting practice and wastefully draining work-force resources. It 
is perhaps due to my interest partially arising out of a social care context that I 
have been alert to and interested in the broader significance of regulatory 
struggle within the talking therapies for other arenas of professional 
regulation, especially within health and social care. Given, as noted above, 
talking therapy is a highly relational and contextual practice, an examination 
of the HPC struggle holds the attraction of throwing into sharp relief issues 
within the regulation of other occupations and practices with less, but still 
significant social, indeterminate and relational elements. By this I mean each 
new situation within such professional work presents significant unique 
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elements (it is contextually very variant), and that consequently, in keeping 
with the views of Power (1999, 2004) and Schon (1983), such work cannot be 
heavily proceduralised without detracting substantially from the quality and 
effectiveness of the work. These motivations have to an extent informed my 
research questions and how I have delimited the research, especially in 
regards to the broader contextualisation of the HPC struggle in relation to 
healthcare reforms, as well as in relation to a wider body of literature on the 
social professions more broadly, and the rise of the regulatory state. Let me 
now briefly set out the key research questions which helped frame and which 
also partially emerged in the course of the research.   
 
KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
I have approached the HPC struggle with two overarching questions. First, 
what are the characteristics, norms and values of the competing policy and 
policy-making imaginaries that were at play? And second, what political and 
rhetorical strategies were used by the pro and anti-HPC camps in their 
respective attempts to install and derail the HPC plans? These questions 
have been partially shaped by the prism of the ‘logics approach’ (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007) I have adopted (more on this below). The first question steers 
towards a ‘thick description’ of the HPC plans and of the associated IAPT and 
SfH projects, and towards a value-critique of their key characteristics and 
potential (and sometimes actual) impacts on the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy. I adapt a comparative analytic ‘nodal’ framework developed 
by Glynos and Speed (2012) and Glynos et al (2014) to help identity, across 
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different nodes of the field, the assemblage of norms embodied within the 
HPC plans, the IAPT and SfH projects, as well as the broader healthcare 
reforms in which these were situated. The key nodes I delineate are 
governance and regulation, education and training, provision and distribution, 
and delivery. I also compare and contrast these with the assemblage of 
norms embodied within the counter-policy imaginary of the Alliance.  In this 
analysis I seek to assess competing characterisations by the pro and anti-
HPC camps of the HPC plans and the associated SfH and IAPT projects. This 
task entails, among others, addressing the following key questions. What did 
the HPC regulatory plans presuppose about the nature of talking therapy 
practice, and how does this compare to the myriad of conceptualisations of 
talking therapy existing within the field? To what extent was there some 
incongruence between the HPC plans and existing forms of talking therapy, 
and, if so, was this, as the Alliance contended, a legitimate cause for 
concern? Or, conversely, as the HPC contended, did the HPC and the 
Alliance in fact essentially share the same values and aims – the apparent 
differences a consequence a  mere misunderstanding of the facts? 
This brings us to the second overarching question, which relates to the 
political dynamics of the struggle; a dimension of the critique that I refer to as 
ethico-ideological. A key aim of this analysis is to highlight ways in which what 
I take (drawing on the work of Laclau and Mouffe) to be the fundamentally 
and radically contingent nature of the HPC plans, was, to an extent, hidden 
from view by the pro-HPC lobby, partially rendering (or seeking to render) the 
plans an ‘inevitability,’ or as part of an apparently inexorable policy trend.   
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The focus on the more political and rhetorical dimension of the struggle also 
entails the following key question: how did the pro and anti-HPC discourse 
acquire ‘affective grip’? In other words I seek to account for the role played by 
fantasy within the regulatory and policy discourses. In the context of this case 
study my analysis of the ‘fantasmatic’ narratives at play tends to focus on 
seeking to account, at least in part, for the persuasive ‘force’ of the HPC 
plans, despite what I contend to be the relatively threadbare political 
discourses and analysis forwarded by the HPC seeking to legitimate them 
(more on this in a moment). Here significant presuppositions within the 
theoretical approach I have adopted, namely an emphasis upon the 
fundamental contestability of knowledge claims, and the fundamental 
vulnerability of the subject/individual, come together with key empirical 
material of the case to produce this account.        
Ultimately, in the political and rhetorical dimension of my analysis, I seek to 
account for how the policy terrain was initially shaped in favour of the 
emergence, and near-implementation, of the HPC plans, and how the policy 
terrain later changed, leading to the shelving of the plans.  
By approaching and scrutinising a wide range of sources and empirical 
material with these questions, I craft an account of the struggle which 
identifies the role played by competing organisational interests - the ‘turf war’ 
at play -  and the competing policy imaginaries, encompassing rival values 
and norms, which, at least in part, constituted these organisational interests.  
Let me now forward a sketch of my account.   
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THE OVERARCHING THESIS  
The HPC plans were understood by the HPC to be an ‘approach neutral’ (my 
phrase) attempt to regulate the field, as highly distinct from the SfH and IAPT 
projects, and as more than capable of regulating non-healthcare practices. 
Conversely, the Alliance tended to construe the HPC plans as an attempt, 
along with IAPT, SfH, and NICE, to assimilate the field of the talking therapies 
to a consumer ethos, and to the broader healthcare regime, which the 
Alliance contended are sharply incongruent with most talking therapies.  
Whilst for the HPC the policy dispute was based on a misunderstanding (the 
HPC and the Alliance in fact shared the same values and aims), for the 
Alliance it was a struggle over practice and regulatory values, and HPC style 
regulation was seen by them as an existential threat to many forms of talking 
therapy.  
In my account I seek simultaneously to critically assess the veracity of these 
contrasting accounts, as well as delineate and identity the rhetorical and 
political strategies used by each camp to forward their respective positions.  
Overall, I characterise the HPC policy dispute and the broader professional 
reforms in which it was situated as a struggle between what I refer to as a 
‘transaction’-based regime of practice and regulation on the one hand, and a 
more ‘contextual’-based regime of practice and regulation on the other. In a 
normative description and critique, I argue that the contemporary 
‘transactional’/’acontextual’ orientated practices of governance and regulation 
predominant across the healthcare professions - which were consolidated 
and deepened within healthcare and psychological services by the 2006 and 
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2007 White Papers, ‘Our health, our care, our say: A new direction for 
community services’ (DoE: Feb 2006c) and  ‘Trust, assurance and safety – 
The regulation of Health Professionals in the 21st Century’ (DoE: 2007a) – 
and the transactional/acontextual norms within the SfH and IAPT projects, all 
embody an emphasis upon the exercise of a calculative rationality in which 
there are quite ‘fixed notions’, to borrow from Fook’s work (2000) in the field 
of social work - ‘of desirable outcomes’ derived from the legitimacy of 
professional knowledge’ (Fook, 2000). In short, expertise is seen in relatively 
simple terms as something preformed and applied to a client. In contrast, the 
more contextual orientated regime and policy imaginary places an emphasis 
upon pluralism within ‘services’ and the processual and relational qualities of 
talking therapy, healthcare and regulatory practices. To borrow again from 
Fook’s (2000) analysis of social work, ‘practitioners often engage in a mutual 
process of discovery with service users, in which, together they create and 
experience the conditions which assist the person, and at the same time, 
engage in their own process of self-discovery’ (2000:115). Whilst in the 
transactional regime there is a pronounced hierarchy between the production 
of expertise and its delivery, within a more contextual regime, the site of 
‘delivery’ – the practitioner-client relationship – is itself a central site in which 
expert-knowledge is produced.    
As regards counselling and psychotherapy, therapeutic expertise or 
knowledge, and the ‘outcome’ of the therapy, are seen as a ‘product’ of the 
relationship between the practitioner and client. The difference between 
transactional/acontextual and contextual practice, when formulated in terms 
of evidence paradigms, concerns a tension between what is referred to as 
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‘evidence based practice’, in which a highly quantitative and predictive 
approach to knowledge production /expertise is valorised, and what is often 
referred to as ‘practice based evidence’, in which knowledge/expertise is seen 
as produced in each new practice context.  
I argue that the HPC plans were less intensely transactional/acontextual in 
character than IAPT, SfH and NICE, and that there was a considerable lack of 
clarity about the character of HPC regulation, especially regarding the kind of 
evidence the HPC requires an applicant profession (or one under its 
jurisdiction) to have in relation to the requirement for it to demonstrate the 
safety and effectiveness of its practice (see Chapter Six). The HPC does not 
require professions to demonstrate the efficacy of their practice through 
experimental trials, but they do expect quantitative ways of measure and 
demonstrating efficacy, such as through client questionnaires before and after 
treatment. I find that the HPC plans were broadly ‘transactional’ in character 
and dovetailed with IAPT and SfH in their attempts to assimilate the field of 
the talking therapies to a more transactional mould already strongly 
established across the healthcare professions.  
As regards the character of the policy making process itself is concerned, I 
argue that a similar norm of transactionality was at play. In short, the policy 
structure of a sharp institutional demarcation between the government and 
the HPC (between policy maker and administrator/low level policy maker) 
served to increase, rather than decrease, the ‘top-down’ determination of the 
policy parameters, radically diminishing the possibility for policy makers to 
learn from the experience of people on the ground, namely HPC 
administrators and practitioners within the field.  
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As regards the political dynamics of the struggle (i.e. the more ideological 
dimension), drawing on existing accounts and discourses within the struggle, I 
argue that the HPC plans were advanced an extensive way along the policy 
path to implementation, despite widespread opposition within the field (most 
of the main professional associations within the field were opposed to the 
HPC plans when they were first seen down the pipeline), through a complex 
of strategies which marginalised opposition voices. These were mainly forms 
of aggressive agenda setting and ‘stonewalling’ within the policy making 
process, including the plans being ‘swept along’ within wider healthcare 
regulatory reforms (see Chapter Five). I argue that the HPC’s central strategy 
(reinforcing its more bald strategies of marginalisation) was its assertion of its 
‘approach neutrality’, coupled with a ‘problem minority’ narrative, in which risk 
to the public tends to be exclusively individualised (the threat of the 
incompetent or ‘rouge’ practitioner) and the contours of the ‘transactional’ 
regime left outside the scope of critical and regulatory scrutiny. Additionally, 
for those unconvinced by the virtues of the plans, the pro-HPC camp tended 
to see and project them as nonetheless ‘inevitable’, or as part of an 
inexorable policy trend towards multi-professional regulators (see Chapter 
Six).  
Opponents of the HPC plans, I argue, advanced their resistance to the plans 
by construing the HPC plans as an existential threat (often overegged) to 
many forms of talking therapy, i.e. essentially by identifying a clash of values 
and norms. I say often overegged because, although there was, in my view, a 
strong clash of values, HPC regulation would have been by ‘title’ rather than 
‘function’, and therefore (as Alliance members often acknowledged) any form 
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of talking therapist would have been able to continue to practice legally 
outside of the jurisdiction of the HPC, even if nominally restricted in terms of 
what they might have been able to call themselves. The Alliance also tended 
to contest the ‘inevitability’ of the plans in positioning them as a metonym of a 
broader contingent political ‘settlement’ - namely neo-liberalism – or of the 
consumerism of late capitalism, or bureaucratisation.  
Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), I also 
seek to address how the HPC’s regulatory discourse, with its key motif of 
public protection, and the Alliance discourse, with its key motif of a ‘space’ 
free from the dominant norms of society, inhere an affective appeal for both 
their purveyors and some of their audience. I argue that the ‘affective grip’ of 
the HPC’s discourse stems largely from a tacit promise to eradicate anxiety 
about what I take to be the fundamentally uncertain, interpretative, 
contestable, and emergent nature of psychological expertise. In other words I 
argue that the HPC tended to deny these fundamental characteristics of 
counselling and psychotherapy (many of which are also shared by health and 
social care professions) and therefore seeks to quell anxiety related to 
uncertainty by offering, to borrow a phrase that Power (1999) applies to audit 
culture more broadly, ‘false assurance’. The Alliance, for its part, I argue, 
tended at times towards a tacit fantasy or promise of a therapeutic position 
outside of history and society, so to speak, where ‘therapy’ is seen as 
speaking truth to power from a position entirely free of power. In the case of 
the Alliance this discourse is far from clear cut and much less evenly present 
across different documents and members than the ‘fantasmatic’ discourse 
within the HPC camp. It is partially for this reason, and that the HPC plans 
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themselves are the focus of attention, in addition to reasons of scarcity of 
space, that the analysis and critique of the fantasmatic dimension of HPC 
position is more developed within this thesis than the fantasmatic dimension 
within the Alliance.     
Broadly, my account of the HPC struggle challenges two key elements within 
existing literature on both the HPC struggle and on professional and 
regulatory struggles more broadly. The first is the tendency, within both 
broader literature on the regulatory state (e.g. Moran, 2013, Maltby, 2008) 
and some existing literature on the HPC struggle and the SfH and IAPT 
projects (Waller and Guthrie, 2012), to see the rise of the regulatory state and 
the projects as a form of democratisation: as a triumph of reason, science and 
the public interest over dogma, tradition, professional oligarchy and private 
interests. My account draws upon and has greater consonance with accounts 
of the so called rise of the regulatory state (Power, 1999, 2004), (Mol, 2008) 
which see it, and the marketization of public and professional services which 
often accompanies it, as, in fact, broadly detrimental to the capacity of public 
services and professionals/practitioners to engage with and respond 
effectively, in more context-sensitive ways, to problems facing their clients 
and the broader communities in which they live I argue that this HPC case 
study supports a view that the regulatory state (as currently configured) tends 
to supplant professional dominance with regulatory dominance (arguably 
another kind of professional dominance), rather than, as regulatory rhetoric 
and ideology would have it, truly eradicating the problem of professional 
dominance.  
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My account of the HPC struggle suggests that the regulatory state, contrary to 
being above the political ‘fray’, tends to help constitute, and then serve, 
particular interests within the broader ‘neo-liberal’ political settlement. This is 
broadly consonant with the analysis made by the Alliance. The two 
professional associations in favour of the HPC plans from the outset – the 
BABCP and BPC – both embraced, to varying degrees, the ‘evidence based 
practice movement’, thereby arguably making themselves more attractive to 
the current policy regime, and in turn more likely to benefit from government 
contracts. Drawing on the work of others, which I review in Chapter Two, I 
argue that the kind of experimental and quantitative based research which 
underpinned IAPT and SfH are not above the ‘political fray’, but are in fact 
often shaped, and sometimes crudely distorted, by institutional interests. In 
this case both the Government and factions within the field of the talking 
therapies seem to have consolidated and deepened the ‘sway’ of the 
evidence based practice movement within the field through a feedback loop: 
the government and policy makers’ predisposition towards experimentalist 
trial evidence, as established through NICE, and factions within field, namely 
(though not exclusively) CBT, lobbied the government for recognition of the 
effectiveness of their practice (in contradiction to other factions within the 
field) by subjecting and, to an extent, reshaping their practice through the 
framework of the evidence based practice movement. This is often despite 
considerable, and even deep scepticism, about the effectiveness of the 
evidence based practice movement.  
As regards the HPC plans, my thesis contests the main academic account put 
forward in support of the plans by Waller and Guthrie (2012). I contest the 
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tendency of their account to eclipse the transactional-orientated norms within 
the HPC plans - which exaggerate the difference of the HPC plans from the 
IAPT and SfH projects – and I thereby foreground the particularism, as 
opposed to the supposed universalism or neutrality, of the plans. My account 
also seeks to counter what is arguably Waller’s and Guthrie’s tendency to 
assume that the HPC plans were, and are, despite the shelving of the plans, 
part of an inexorable policy trend. In short their account seems to imply that 
the implementation of the plans is inevitable, and that ultimately there is no 
viable alternative.   
Another key critique forwarded within this thesis, albeit less developed, is the 
tendency of the Alliance, I argue, to espouse a position close to a talking 
therapy ‘exceptionalism’, in which similarities between counselling and 
psychotherapy and more contextual healthcare imaginaries tend to be 
eclipsed. In short, the central argument often forcefully forwarded against the 
HPC plans by the Alliance was that counselling and psychotherapy is 
fundamentally incommensurable with healthcare practices. In the light of 
critiques of highly ‘acontextual’ approaches to medicine I am neither 
convinced that such a strong demarcation is normatively credible nor that it is 
strategically desirable.   
Finally, I seek to explore the more general implications of the substantive and 
critical analysis offered within this thesis for regulatory policy, the policy 
making process, and politico-hegemonic strategy. Broadly speaking I 
advocate that more ‘contextual’ (in counter-distinction to transactional/ 
acontextual) approaches and norms should be adopted in the practices and 
structures of regulation and governance across the different nodes of the field 
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of counselling and psychotherapy as well as the policy-making processes and 
structures in which these practices are developed. More specifically, I argue 
that the so called ‘practitioner full disclosure list system of statutory regulation 
(Postle, 2003), (Arbours Association et al, 2009), forwarded as an alternative 
to the HPC by the Alliance, meets many of the demands of the different 
constituencies and stakeholders within the struggle, and should be given 
serious consideration by policy makers. As regards the policy making 
process, my account echoes concerns made by others, namely King and 
Crewe (2013) and Du Gay (2000), that the sharp institutional demarcation 
between higher level policy making i.e. Government Department and lower 
level policy making/ administration (e.g. the HPC) is problematic in that it 
diminishes the ability to learn lessons in the process. In other words the policy 
structure (compounded by other aspects in the HPC case) is calibrated too 
much towards getting a policy to statute come what may. As regards 
implications for politico-hegemonic strategy, my analysis, given that it tends to 
foreground the frontier between acontextual and contextual practice (e.g. 
between evidence based practice and practice based evidence) across both 
the talking therapies and healthcare practices, is suggestive of a hegemonic 
strategy whereby strategic collaboration is sought by counsellors and 
psychotherapists with healthcare and other professionals (such as social 
workers) who wish to see a radical or significant shift towards conditions 
which support deeper contextual regimes of practice. This is to an extent 
contra the position taken by some institutions within the field of the talking 
therapies that have started to remould practice and services in accordance 
with the principles of the evidence based practice movement and its 
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valorisation of efficacy trials. It is also contra the position of Postle (2012) and 
House (2003) who tend to foreground, and in my view exaggerate, the 
differences between the ‘professional’ expert and the supposed ‘non-expert’ 
within the community – thereby underestimating the possibility of radical 
improvement within the sphere of state sponsored provision of talking 
therapies (as well as healthcare and other professional services).   
Let me now look provide a brief sketch of the structure of the thesis.  
 
STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
In Chapter Two I critically explore a diverse range of literature on the HPC 
struggle, as well as on the regulation of the professions, and the so called 
‘rise of the regulatory state’ more broadly. I examine a range of literature from 
a rich array of research and theoretical traditions, including structural 
functionalism, neo-weberianism, Marxism, political science, and post-
structuralism.  The chapter is structured into three main sections. First, there 
is an examination of key existing accounts, namely those offered by Waller 
and Gurthrie (2012), and Postle (2012). Given that these authors were central 
antagonists within the struggle, it is unsurprising that their contributions not 
only contribute important insights into the struggle, but that they also bear 
significant resemblances to the discourses at play within the struggle In fact 
Postle’s book is an anthology of material published during the course of the 
struggle. An examination of this literature therefore gives a significant flavour 
of both the key discourses at play within the struggle, and what I regard to be 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these discourses.  
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In the second and third main sections of the chapter, I seek to contextualise 
and deepen the understanding of these accounts by reviewing wider literature 
on the professions and on the so called rise of the regulatory state. This helps 
to intellectually contextualise the HPC struggle in relation to a broad set of 
theoretical and empirical problems and questions raised and addressed within 
the literature. This includes normative-orientated questions about the 
desirability of both archetypal professionalism and of the regulatory state: can 
either or both, for instance, be said to act in the public interest? Does the new 
regulatory state, including the closely allied ‘evidence based practice’ 
movement, constitute an Enlightenment revolution proper, supplanting 
privilege, dogma, and private interests supposed to be endemic within 
professions, with reason, merit, and the public interest? Or does the new 
regulatory state, in the name of particular styles of reasoning, science, and 
practices, in fact promote particular factional values and interests? I also 
examine literature which addresses pressing questions about what kind of 
norms of practice are best adopted by organisations and individual 
professionals, as well as clients, when approaching the professional-client 
relationship. In this chapter I also seek to elucidate literature which addresses 
questions that are focussed more on the political dynamics (what I refer to as 
the ethico-ideological dimension) of professional and regulatory struggles: for 
example, what strategies are used to promote different professional, 
organisational and regulatory forms?  
Overall, my critical review of existing literature partially orientates my 
approach to the HPC struggle in two significant ways: first, towards 
scepticism of celebratory accounts of the regulatory state, and the evidence 
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based practice movement, and a concomitant positive regard for more 
reflective and open ended ways of framing professional practice; and, 
second, it orientates my research towards scepticism of any strong 
demarcations between ‘community’ and professional forms of organisation.     
In Chapter Three I go onto set out the broad ontological coordinates – the 
basic assumptions made about reality – of the post-structuralist logics 
approach I have adopted, and how this helps address some of the 
explanatory deficits of other accounts and approaches explored within 
Chapter Two. Whilst elucidating the broad contours of the approach I seek to 
address questions of the objectivity of my research (already mentioned 
above) which are raised by affinities between this ‘qualitative’ research 
approach and the emphasis placed by the Alliance on the importance of 
‘relationality’ and ‘contextuality’ within the practice of the talking therapies, as 
well as affinities between the Lacanian conceptualisation of the subject within 
the logics approach and with some Lacanian conceptualisations of the subject 
by Alliance members in contesting the HPC plans. In the second main part of 
Chapter Three I seek to provide an exposition of the research process: how I 
‘applied’ the logics approach to the case of the HPC struggle. I set out what 
methodologies, or norms of research, guided how I went about both gathering 
and analysing the data, including the sourcing of material, and I address the 
issue of the balance of material, why I chose a semi-structured technique of 
interviewing, as well as address how I went about identifying within the data 
what are, to use the terminology of the logics approach, the key ‘social’, 
‘political’, and ‘fantasmatic’ logics at play within the struggle.  Overall, in 
Chapter Three I seek to spell out how the logics approach helps provide a 
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‘problem driven’ account which avoids two (often interrelated) explanatory 
weaknesses; namely excess idealism or theoreticism, in which the account is 
too far abstracted from the ‘real’ world to seem to be of much use; and an 
excess descriptivism and/or fatalism, in which the ‘performative’ aspects of a 
research intervention-cum explanation are eclipsed from view. Following the 
work of Glynos and Howarth (2007) I elucidate the approach  I have taken to 
the HPC struggle in counter-distinction to a critical understanding of more 
positivist ways of framing social phenomenon, such as the postulation of  
‘laws’, which are seen as independent of human interpretation, discourse and 
the act of representation.  
In Chapter Four I provide a historical contextualisation of the HCP struggle. In 
other words it outlines the key historical antecedents of the HPC struggle, 
including ones that are internal and external to the field of the talking 
therapies. This helps us to identify the rich tapestry of historical struggles and 
contestations that were interwoven within different facets of the HPC struggle. 
In the first main section of the Chapter we chart the emergence of 
psychoanalysis and its key concepts, and the proliferation of different forms of 
talking therapy throughout the twentieth century within the ‘psy-complex’, 
paying particular attention to issues relating to concerns about the role and 
the governance of the talking therapies within society. In the second main 
section I examine the context in which the first Government linked calls for 
statutory regulation of psychotherapy were made in the UK, following 
concerns about the cult and practice of Scientology, and chart the various 
developments and responses within the field to these calls, including failed 
attempts to introduce statutory regulation of the field, and, more crucially, the 
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changing landscape of the professional associations, as well as counter-
professional movements, within the field, which were important conditions of 
the terrain in which the HPC struggle was played out. The first two sections 
also seek to furnish my account - through an exposition (albeit limited) of 
some key talking therapy ideas and concepts - with an historical 
understanding of why a healthcare/medical association with the talking 
therapies jarred so strongly for many within the field. In the final main section 
of Chapter Four I focus on the more external antecedents of the HPC plans, 
which helps to understand what led to the Government’s novel interest in 
strongly pursuing the statutory regulation of counselling and psychotherapy, 
as well as understand the broader historical context of the healthcare reforms 
in which the HPC plans were embedded, including New Labour’s enthusiasm 
for the ‘science’ of the evidence based practice movement, and how this fitted 
in with the Government’s broad political frontier between anti-modernisers 
and  modernisers.  
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven present the main empirical case study, 
covering the period between 2006 and 2011. Each chapter follows the same 
broad structure, beginning with an ‘overview of events’, which includes a 
summary of the key ‘problematisations’ of the struggle made by the central 
actors within it. I then go on in each chapter, under the heading of ‘competing 
policy imaginaries’ to dig deeper into these problematisations, describing and 
critiquing the key assemblage of norms at play within the competing policy 
imaginaries forwarded by the pro and anti-HPC camps. These sections 
largely pertain to the normative dimension of my analysis. In the third main 
sections of these chapters, under the heading of ‘political and rhetorical 
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strategy’, I focus on the political dynamics of the struggle – essentially 
foregrounding the political contingency of the HPC plans – and seek to carve 
out an understanding of the key strategies adopted by the pro and anti-HPC 
camps in their respective attempts to install and derail the plans. In each 
chapter this section includes an examination, drawing on Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, of the ‘fantasmatic’ narratives which arguably gave the pro 
and anti-HPC discourses ‘affective grip’.  
In Chapter Five we examine the period between mid-2006 and February 
2007, focusing on the immediate context in which the HPC plans emerged, 
namely reforms to the regulation of healthcare, and, within the field of the 
talking therapies, the emergence and fruition of the IAPT and Skills for Health 
projects, as well as initial responses, in the form of the proposal of a 
‘Psychological Professional Council’, within the field of the talking therapies, 
to strong indications that the HPC plans were in the pipeline. An examination 
of the key norms of practice at play within the healthcare regulatory reform 
signalled within the 2007Trust and Assurance White Paper, indicates a 
consolidation and deepening, of what I refer to as a ‘transactional’ regime 
within healthcare, encompassing greater hierarchy between a research and 
managerial elite on the one hand, and ‘rank and file’ practitioners on the 
other, as well as an enhanced delivery of healthcare in accordance with 
‘guidelines’ and protocol. I identify this as being contra to a deeper 
‘contextual’ imaginary of healthcare, as set out, for example, by Mol (2008) 
and Healy (2013).  A close examination of IAPT and SfH indicates that they 
significantly sought to assimilate aspects of the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy (IAPT successfully, and SfH much less so) to the strongly 
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‘transactional’ orientated regime of healthcare. I go onto examine the key 
political ‘logics’ though which the regulatory reforms and the IAPT and SfH 
projects were implemented. These include bald strategies of marginalisation 
or exclusion of deep ‘contextual’ imaginaries of practice, supported by a 
tendency to focus on a ‘problem minority’ of abjectly unethical or incompetent 
practitioners, rather than on concerns about the very practices of governance 
and regulation – including so called evidence based medicine and practice – 
supposed to render practice safe and effective. Overall, Chapter Five serves 
to give us a clear characterisation of the IAPT and SfH projects, and therefore 
forms an important part of the jigsaw in my assessment of the HPC plans and 
their relationship to these projects.  
In Chapter Six we move to the heart of the HPC struggle, covering much of 
the year 2007, through to late 2009, charting responses to the announcement 
of the HPC plans in the White Paper, namely the HPC setting forth with the 
establishment of the ‘Professional Liaison Group’ to develop the detail of the 
HPC plans, and the formation of the Alliance for Counselling and 
Psychotherapy Against State Regulation. I focus on the two main frontiers 
within the struggle: the struggle between the HPC and the Alliance over the 
totality of the plans, and the struggle within the HPC’s Liaison Group over the 
‘nuts and bolts’ of the plans, namely the structure of the register as regards 
differentiation between counselling and psychotherapy. In this Chapter I 
conduct a forensic examination of the HPC plans, drawing on critiques made 
by the Alliance, allowing a critical assessment of the level of ‘family 
resemblance’ between the HPC plans and IAPT and SfH projects. I go onto 
explore the key political logics deployed by the pro and anti-HPC camps. 
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Extensive focus is given to the HPC’s bald strategies to marginalise 
opponents within the process, namely attempts to restrict the policy 
consultations to a narrow ‘nuts and bolts’ agenda, and a construal of the 
plans as a ‘neutral’ intervention, supported by a fantasmatic narrative of a 
‘problem minority’ of practitioners.  
In Chapter Seven we cover the period from late 2009, when the legal action 
against the HPC was initiated; when the ‘leadership’ stance in favour of the 
HPC plans within the UKCP and BACP was transformed or placed under 
increased pressure by members; and when the Conservative Party was 
wooed by the Alliance. It is in Chapter Seven that I pay particular attention to 
the competing legal interpretations of the policy process through which the 
HPC plans were advanced, as well as the competing imaginaries of the policy 
making process allied with these interpretations: I explore symmetries 
between the transactional policy content of the HPC plans and a 
transactionality within the policy making process, on the one hand, and 
symmetries between the Alliance conceptualisation of talking therapy and 
policy process in more contextual terms.     
In Chapter Eight I bring together the various strands of the thesis, providing a 
synopsis of the broader regulatory policy contours and dilemmas which the 
HPC struggle both embodied and speaks to, namely what form(s) of 
democratisation of practice and services are the most effective way to 
address the problem of ‘professional dominance’.  I go onto summarise my 
account of the HPC struggle, drawing out and together the key normative, 
political, and economic strands of my account which led to the rise and fall of 
the HPC plans. Then, explicitly revisiting the literature review, I draw out more 
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explicitly what my account contributes to the existing body of literature, both 
on the HPC struggle and on the rise of the regulatory state more broadly. `I 
then go on to explicitly to draw out some of the policy implications of my 
account, namely the regulation of the talking therapies, as well as how this is 
suggestive of policy issues that need to be addressed as regards the 
regulation of other professions.  
Finally, I would like to cover a few terminological and ‘delimitation’ issues, 
which hopefully will help clarify what the thesis is trying to do, and what is 
peripheral within it or outside of its scope.   
 
TERMINOLOGY AND OTHER ISSUES  
The 2007 Trust and Assurance White Paper (Department of Health, 2007a), 
and the HPC, both refer to the HPC as planning to regulate the field of 
‘counselling and psychotherapy’. Other government papers and the IATP 
programme tend to refer to ‘psychological therapies’. Generally, though not 
always, I have opted for the term ‘talking therapies’ as an all-inclusive term 
that refers to all forms of counselling and psychotherapy. This is partially as 
short hand, but also because the meaning of the distinction between 
counselling and psychotherapy is variably contested across the field. I do not 
wish to imply a strong commitment to differentiation between counselling and 
psychotherapy and a view of the structure of the field that this may imply. My 
use of the term ‘talking therapies’ is not without its problems however. The 
term emerged initially in relation to psychoanalysis being dubbed the ‘talking 
cure’ (Milton et al, 2014). Some practitioners and theorist therefore tend to 
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see the term as referring exclusively to those therapies that involve the 
unravelling of psychological or psychosomatic symptoms through the 
revelation of their unconscious meaning to the patient. My use of the term as 
‘all-inclusive’ is partially driven by the Foucauldian tendency to view all forms 
of therapy as ‘technologies of the self’ (Rose, 2003). All modalities of 
counselling and psychotherapy are, at least partially, in my view, forms of 
discursive practice which to an extent ‘perform’ or construct the realities they 
reveal, and encompass ‘talking’ as central to practice. This tends to be a 
challenging proposition for ‘depth’ talking therapies given that there is an 
emphasis upon revealing ‘underlying’ personal truths. The status of the 
concepts and phenomena of the unconscious and of transference in relation 
to the notion of reality as discursive is a fascinating one, but is outside the 
scope of this research.  
This thesis is not primarily an assessment of the relative merits and strengths 
of different modalities of therapy – between for example psychodynamic and 
cognitive behavioural therapies – or between diagnostic and non-diagnostic 
approaches to ‘mental health’ difficulties. Rather, the primary focus is on 
issues of regulation and governance, and what particular forms of regulation 
and governance presuppose about the nature of therapy.  In the case of the 
HPC struggle, to repeat one of my key research questions: were the 
presuppositions the HPC plans made about therapy congruent with those 
made by the talking therapies themselves? And if incongruent, what is the 
significance of this? However, my thesis is not simply a taxonomic exercise, 
setting out a typology of therapies and regulatory systems. Rather, I seek 
simultaneously to describe and critique competing policy imaginaries. This 
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thesis is in part motivated by a concern and sense, shared by many, that the 
government driven attempts to increase the accountability of  professionals 
and practitioners, across many occupational sectors, through a combination 
of audit and consumer logics, are weighted excessively in favour of conditions 
conducive to fostering acontextual/transactional forms of practice and 
regulation, which arguably diminish the ‘dialogic’, democratic, and creative 
character of practice, and which ultimately undermine its effectiveness. Given 
that my focus is on the projected influence of the HPC plans – as opposed to 
a focus on an existing regulatory regime – this case study does not afford the 
opportunity to explore how a regulatory system functions when actually 
already in place, and how such a regulatory regime is or can to an extent be 
resisted or subverted by practitioners (either to the benefit or the detriment of 
client and public interests) in everyday practice. As regards the IAPT 
programme and the SfH project to map the National Occupational Standards 
for counselling and psychotherapy my primary aim is not to conduct a detailed  
assessment of their effectiveness, though it is interesting to note that SfH 
were unable to direct me to any places where the NOS for counselling and 
psychotherapy have been used since the completion of the project, and when 
I asked Malcolm Allen, who was involved within the project, in what way NOS 
for counselling and psychotherapy had been put to use, he responded 
emphatically: ‘no [.. ] I might be wrong, but I’d be amazed if more than ten 
people have looked at those Skills for Health competencies in the last six, 
seven, eight years’.10 My primary aim at looking at the IAPT and SfH projects 
is to furnish an understanding of the immediate context of the HPC plans.  
                                                          
10 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014. See 
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The more ethico-ideological dimension of my analysis, concerning the political 
dynamics, is motivated in part by a sense of frustration by the fact that across 
many professions and occupations, especially social and healthcare ones, 
more context sensitive ways of working – such as ‘practice based evidence – 
and of regulating, are often side-lined, not only on the basis of the perceived 
superiority of transactional ways of working, but also, sometimes even 
exclusively, on the basis of perceived political and economic inevitability of 
‘progression’ to more acontextual ways of working – that there is no viable 
alternative.  
Now let us turn to the existing literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Appendix A transcript p.457. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
THE REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS AND TALKING THERAPIES: 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
          
The primary aim within this chapter is to review and critically assess existing 
accounts of the HPC struggle, as well as wider literature on the sociology of 
the professions, and literature on the rise of the regulatory state, including 
audit practices and ‘market logics’, and the ‘evidence based practice’ 
movement. I also look at very selective aspects of the body of literature on the 
policy-making machinery, which will help illuminate in further chapters 
aspects of the policy-making process within the HPC policy dispute. I aim to 
identify the key strengths and weaknesses within current explanatory 
accounts of both the HPC saga and regulatory struggles more broadly. This 
paves the way for identifying, namely in Chapter Three, how the ‘logics 
approach’ can help address some of the explanatory deficits of accounts 
addressed here. Not only will this literature thereby help further illuminate the 
HPC struggle but also provide key grounds upon which this case study can 
illuminate the broader body of work on the regulation of the professions. The 
latter is drawn out within the concluding chapter. To put it in a slightly different 
way, in this chapter I seek to place the existing literature on the HPC struggle 
within an overarching intellectual narrative of the broader literature. To an 
extent this touches upon the history of the regulation of the professions given 
that theoretical and research approaches are enmeshed within the same 
socio-historical conditions as the shifting terrain of professions they seek to 
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understand. I draw on intellectual approaches to the professions broadly, but 
pay particular attention to medicine, for two main reasons. First, it is heavily 
researched, and second, there is a strong intersection between the HPC 
plans, the IAPT and SfH projects, and the healthcare professions. In other 
words, engagement with the debates on the regulation of healthcare 
professions will help to illuminate the context and character of the HPC plans 
and the allied SfH and IAPT projects.  
 
I present two overarching arguments in this chapter. First, ‘interest-based’ 
accounts (namely structural functionalism, neo-Weberianism, Marxism, and 
‘political science’ approaches) of the professions and of the rise of the 
regulatory state tend to see interests and identity as overly ‘fixed’ and do not 
offer sufficiently nuanced and contextualised accounts of regulatory struggles. 
They tend tacitly towards an historical determinism, as well as excessively 
polarised views of the professions and/or regulator as either uniformly ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ as regards the ‘public interest’, which itself tends to be seen as a 
given. Discourse orientated approaches tend to provide more nuanced 
accounts, the socio-political character of professions and regulation seen as 
variable in accordance with the contexts in which they are articulated. They 
also tend to illuminate the political and rhetorical strategies which build, install 
and defend professional and regulatory regimes, rather than a tendency 
towards a tacit historical determinism. However, I argue that the discourse 
orientated literature tends not to set out clearly different facets of their 
analysis and that they also tend to fail to account for why particular 
professional and regulatory discourses have ‘affective grip’.  
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The chapter takes a ‘pyramid structure’ – going from the particularity of the 
HPC struggle out towards broader considerations – and is split into three 
main sections. Examination of the broader literature is split into two main 
sections. First I focus on literature on ‘archetypal’ professions (i.e. those 
‘sheltered’ from both the market and external regulatory control), and, second, 
I focus on accounts of the deregulation/regulation of the professions, namely 
increased external regulation and the introduction of logics of the market. This 
structure helps to bring into focus a delineation that was at least tacit within 
the Alliance during the HPC struggle, between those that tended to see 
professionalization of the talking therapies as a problem as such and those 
that did not see professionalization as necessarily a problem as such but saw 
the HPC as bringing a specifically problematic form of professionalization.  
 
ACCOUNTS OF THE HPC STRUGGLE  
Let me begin with Waller and Guthrie (2013). This is the main academic text 
in favour of the HPC plans, and was written by the two principle leaders of the 
HPC project to develop the ‘nuts and bolts’11 of the HCP plans to regulate 
counselling and psychotherapy. I therefore look at this relatively short paper 
in considerable detail. Waller and Guthrie seek to make sense of the HPC 
struggle, including why the field of counselling and psychotherapy resisted 
what Guthrie and Waller describe as the benefits conferred by statutory 
regulation, namely ‘enhanced status and increased recognition’ in exchange 
                                                          
11 Michael Guthrie (Director of Policy and Standards, HPC), interview by author, June 2014.  
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for ‘a pledge that the profession must put protection of the public above 
narrow professional interest, through adherence to agreed standards and 
increased accountability’ (ibid:12). Their main target is the research approach 
of structural functionalism and its assumption that professions are, or must 
be, entirely homogeneous, and they ague that this false assumption pervaded 
the struggle, leading to the misunderstanding that the HPC plans were a 
threat to diversity within the field. Drawing on the ‘process model’ of Bucher 
and Strauss (1961), Waller and Guthrie quote them as saying professions are 
‘loose amalgamations of segments’ (Waller and Guthrie, 2013:5) which are 
‘more or less held together under a common name for a period of time’ 
(ibid:5). Segment here can be understood as ‘faction’ or ‘section’. In short, 
professions are comprised of a competing number of factions or segments. 
Waller and Guthrie describe ‘segments’ as “‘jockeying for position’ in a battle 
for prominence, in this case [the HPC struggle], motivated by a perceived 
threat that the standards or other arrangement for regulation would favour 
one segment over another’ (ibid:10). They continue, ‘this is mirrored in those 
areas of conflict between the professional bodies during the PLG 
[Professional Liaison Group] process, particularly the question of a distinction 
between psychotherapists and counsellors, with the positions adopted by 
each group necessarily reflecting the approaches of those organisations’ 
(ibid:10). Holding the statutory regulation of the Arts Therapists up as a 
success story, they suggest that, given time, the professional bodies within 
the talking therapies (around the HPC Professional Liaison Group table) 
would have reached a compromise position.  
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Another key target in Waller and Guthrie’s paper is what they argue is the 
overegged sense of collective professional autonomy and identity embodied 
within Larson’s (1977) view of the professional ‘project’. Waller and Guthrie 
write: ‘a “project” suggests a discrete set of activities with clear objectives in a 
predetermined direction and infers a defined lifespan - for example, that the 
professional project ends with the achievement of regulation and that the 
profession (as a whole) are willing and active participants in this endeavour’ 
(Waller and Guthrie, 2013:6). Perhaps the key target here is the perception 
within the HPC struggle of some organisations (e.g. the BACP prior to its 
considerable change of heart) that HPC-style regulation is unattractive 
because it would diminish the field’s collective control and autonomy over its 
future direction (see also Chapters Four and Five).   
 
Waller and Guthrie raise a number of pertinent and difficult issues and 
themes. Their observations about a tendency within structural functionalism, 
as well as within Larson’s more ‘conflict based’ approach, to overestimate the 
autonomy and ‘discreteness’ of professions seems to me to be broadly an 
important and accurate one (more on this in relation to discourse approaches 
to the professions below). But I think the conclusions they draw are 
considerably off kilter. There are in my view a number of problems within the 
paper. First, the ‘success’ of the HPC regulation of Art Therapists seems 
rather more asserted than demonstrated. As far I can tell there is to date 
scant, if any, academic literature which addresses HPC regulation of Art 
Therapy. 
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Perhaps more importantly, Waller and Guthrie tend to overly conflate the fact 
that professions are made up of competing segments of expertise with 
conditions of possibility that are conducive to the thriving of pluralism within a 
field. Early in the paper they acknowledge that the HPC’s criteria for ‘aspirant 
groups’ to join the HPC were influenced by the Benson regulatory principles 
(named after Lord Benson) and the concept of a ‘mature profession’, in which 
it is seen that there is and must be homogeneity across a profession (ibid:5). 
Waller and Guthrie later go onto to critique the concept of the ‘mature 
profession’ for misleadingly implying that regulators like the HPC could not 
accommodate diversity. Perhaps the question that should be formulated, 
arising from Waller and Guthrie’s ‘segment’/conflict based approach, more 
explicitly, is what degree of erosion of autonomy and influence and control 
any particular segment or segments within a field are willing to cede, in return 
for what degree of broader gains made through statutory regulation (such as 
increased status, being part of a field more firmly constituted as a collective 
‘power’). The ‘process model’ and ‘segment’ approach adopted by Waller and 
Guthrie seems to me to be a strong contender for not only explaining, but also 
perhaps legitimating, the resistance to the HPC plans. Related to this is the 
fact that Waller and Guthrie do not address the degree to which the HPC 
plans, along with the IAPT and Skills for Health Projects (SfH) were perceived 
to be (and to a significant extent were) dominated by particular segments and 
‘political groupings’, as the Maresfield Report put it (Arbours Association et al, 
2009:33), within the field, namely those centred around the BPC and BABCP 
(this is explored in Chapters Five and Six). The degree to which the HPC 
56 
 
plans became unfairly assumed to favour these political groupings by mere 
association with IAPT and SfH is also explored within Chapters Five and Six.   
Another key problem is what is arguably Waller’s and Guthrie’s tendency to 
take what might be referred to as the ideology of the regulatory state, namely 
as guarantor of the public interest and safety (more on this below) at face 
value. They state that regulatory policy ‘in recent years indicates a shift in the 
dominant model, away from a focus on the claims of an individual group to be 
regulated, with all the associated inference of self-interest this entails, 
towards a focus on what is necessary to ensure the protection of clients’ 
(Waller and Guthrie, 2013:11). This is arguably a false dichotomy, and an 
assertion, through a sleight of hand, that the ‘new’ regulatory state is 
unambiguously conducive to public protection. They are arguably rather too 
quick in their tacit dismissal of what they refer to earlier in their paper, citing 
Friedson (2001), to be professions responsibility to the ‘larger public good’ 
(Waller and Guthrie, 2013:6). Waller and Guthrie do not even mention the 
contention that Government has a broader set of interests (in addition to the 
one of public protection) in pursuing statutory regulation. They do refer to the 
HPC as ‘multiple’ and ‘non-hierarchical’ regulation, but they do not say what 
they mean by the latter. It may pertain to the view that the statutory regulation 
of healthcare professions traditionally supplementary to medicine helps ‘level 
the playing field’ between healthcare professions, helping to further diminish 
the profession of medicine as an alternative source of power and authority to 
that of the Government. This may have been a key motivation of the 
government’s pursuit of statutory regulation, but these potential political 
interests are left unacknowledged. My final criticism is that Waller and Guthrie 
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in the paper do not seem to properly register that the HPC plans were 
shelved. For example, they concluded that: 
The shift away from the instigation of the regulatory process by a group itself indicates a 
new paradigm in which the ‘maturity’ of a group, and the benefits it forsees in its own 
regulation, is very much a second order consideration to the primary objective of 
statutory regulation – public protection (ibid:12). 
 
This statement reads as if HCP regulation had been introduced. It does not 
take into account the fact that the plans were ‘shelved’: that the newly formed 
Coalition Government claimed that the Alliance ‘had won the argument’:12 or 
that the attempt to impose HPC regulation (initially against the will of the 
majority of the major professional associations) was legally strongly 
contested.  There is arguably a tacit prescriptive judgement in this statement 
masquerading as a descriptive claim about policy trends; that the 
abandonment of the HPC plans was a policy mistake, and that the plans 
should be reintroduced at a later date.  
 
Moving now to key literature which argued against the HPC plans, Denis 
Postle (2012) provides an extensive ‘narrative account’ of the HPC struggle in 
an anthology of his articles he wrote during the struggle; consequently 
forming a significant part of the empirical scene, so to speak, and I return to 
them as a rich resource throughout the thesis. My main aim here is to provide 
a critical overview of the approach taken by Postle (2012), as well as others 
writing in the same humanistic tradition (House, 2008, 2003; Mowbray,1995), 
rather than in detail to their accounts. Postle’s account is within a tradition 
against statutory regulation and professionalization of the field to emerge 
                                                          
12 Andrew Samuels (Chair of UKCP 2009-2011), interview by author, June 2014 
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following the Sieghart  Report’s (1978) recommendation that psychotherapy 
should be regulated and tends to see counselling as a social movement 
working towards an emancipatory transformation of society (more on this in 
Chapter Four). Postle’s work has both distinctly normative and ideological 
dimensions. The former is focussed upon how the HPC plans were 
incongruent with the field of talking therapies, both in terms of the interests of 
the individual client and the wider public interest as envisaged by the Human 
Potential Movement. Postle also reiterates an articulation of a counter-
regulatory regime – the full practitioner disclosure list system – a system of 
regulation promoted as non-hierarchical, non-bureaucratic, and as de-
centralised (Postle, 2012, 2003). I explore this further in Chapter Six as it 
became an important focal point of agreement between a diverse range of 
members of the Alliance for counselling and psychotherapy against state 
regulation. The ideological dimension is focussed on the strategies used by 
the pro and anti-HPC camps in their respective attempts to install and derail 
the plans. Postle tends to frame the HPC saga as a David and Goliath style 
struggle between an oppressive and stultifying state sponsored bureau-
profession on the one hand, and a creative and benign community/’psy-
commons’ on the other. Diametrically contra the view of Waller and Guthrie, 
the HPC plans are seen as an overwhelming threat, namely in the form of 
medical and bureaucratic domination, to the diversity of the field of the talking 
therapies (Postle, 2012). The motif of public protection is seen by Postle, 
following on from the seminal work of Mowbray (1995) – ‘the case against 
psychotherapy registration’ - as a political ruse for state sponsored 
bureaucracies to gain control of the talking therapies. He tends to see the 
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HPC plans, and professionalization more generally, as driven by the interests 
of the big professional associations (e.g. the UKCP and BACP), which have 
embraced what Postle (2012) drawing on the work of Scott (1998) calls the 
state’s tendency towards ‘techne’ rather than ‘metis’. Whilst techne involves  
government, ‘top-down’, centralised policy programmes, which force 
contextual diversity (the particular) into abstract and general administrative 
systems, and in so doing enacting much violence or distortion, metis, refers to 
systems and ways of life constructed from the ‘ground up’ which respect 
diversity and particularity (Postle, 2012:180, 2007:226). Professions, Postle 
argues, create ‘scarcity’ of psychological knowledge within the community or 
‘psy-commons’, keeping it within the ‘walls’ of the professions, fostering a 
learned collective helplessness among the public, as well as creating a sharp 
divide between ‘ordinary wisdom’ which gets us through the ups and downs of 
daily life and ‘mental illness’ (ibid:31-39). Postle’s work is within the tradition 
of the work of Ivan Illich within the sociology of the professions (more on this 
below) in which there is a tendency to make sharp demarcations between 
professions and community knowledge. The distinction between contextually 
sensitive and insensitive approaches to organising social life and services 
(metis versus teche) is, in my view, a very useful and insightful one, but 
Postle arguably maps with excessive neatness this binary of techne and 
metis onto a binary between bureau-professional and community forms of 
organisation. A tendency to dichotomise the professions/community into a 
bad/good binary seems evident for example within his claim that  ‘copious 
amounts of deference’ within the pursuit of PhD’s and within training 
institutions supports professional dominance (2012:135). Postle has strong 
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confidence, however, in the capacity of community organisation and non-
professional forms of talking therapy to avoid, as he puts it, ‘power over’, as 
distinct from than ‘power with’,  communities and clients (ibid) (more on this 
below). Postle also importantly seems to suggest, through his concept of 
‘trance induction’ that affect played a significant role within the HPC struggle. 
Trance induction is described as a type of hypnotic phenomenon which ‘short-
circuits discrimination and closes down thinking’ (ibid:308). Postle suggests 
that it is due to a ‘trance induction based on the claim of ‘client protection’ and 
that state regulation was “inevitable”’. The notion of trance induction as used 
by Postle appears to be more of a persuasive and descriptive metaphor than 
an explanatory concept, attesting that people were lulled into a state of ‘false 
consciousness’, but not theorising, beyond noting the material interests of 
professional associations served by statutory regulation, how this state of 
false consciousness is constituted.  In short it does not address how or why 
many people within the field were ‘hood-winked’, as Postle seems to claim, 
into believing that the HPC would be beneficial for the field or the public 
interest. Whilst the concept of ‘trance induction’ seems to attest to what we 
might, following Glynos and Howarth (2007), refer to as the ‘affective grip’ of 
HPC regulation discourse (more on this in the next chapter), it does not offer 
an explanatory account of how the HPC plans, or ‘techne’ more generally, did 
or can acquire ‘force’ or ‘affective ‘grip’.    
 
There are other significant and interesting reflective and exploratory accounts 
of the HPC plans which were presented either just prior or during the course 
of the struggle, most notably within chapters by a number of authors within a 
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booked edited by Ian Parker and Simona Revelli (2008), which offers a 
diverse range of accounts. Whilst many present psychoanalysis as a marginal 
practice under threat, Chris Oakley (2008) in contrast offers a different angle 
in his suggestion that the embracement of the HPC plans by many 
psychoanalysts and others may have been driven by a self-sabotaging attack 
on a broader cultural hegemonic status of psychoanalytic ways of framing and 
viewing and experiencing the world. Adopting a Foucauldian slant Oakley 
links psychoanalysis to Western individualism and the demand that we come 
to know the secret of who we are, via the myth of interiority, and that 
psychoanalysis has in this sense become a super-power – ‘it saturates our 
world and we are kidnapped by it’, he states, and ‘no one can avoid having 
destructive fantasies towards any power that has become hegemonic to such 
a degree’ (Oakley, 2008:43). This is a useful reminder that the marginal 
status and the emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis, or of any form of 
talking therapy, should not be assumed, and that there are no easy 
delineations between practice that is social control/socialisation and that 
which is emancipatory, or even any easy delineation between that which is 
marginal and that which is dominant. Whilst I think this is a very interesting 
dimension, it is not one that I focus on in this thesis as it did not become a 
central discourse within the struggle. The general principle or observation of 
the difficulty of making such distinctions – however important they are to 
make – does, however, inform my broad thesis analysis.  
 
Let us now look at the broader literature.  
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CONTEXTUALISING LITERATURE 
 
I have structured the examination of this literature into two main sections, 
‘archetypal’ professions and the rise of the regulatory state. This helps to 
delineate two key sets of themes, processes and historical junctures, at play 
within the HPC struggle. The first pertains to the character and desirability of 
‘archetypal’ professions and significant levels of professional autonomy, whilst 
the second pertains to an argument over the desirability of the rise of the 
regulatory state and the concomitant erosion of collective and individual 
professional autonomy (though, as we see below, the degree of this erosion 
is contested). 
 
 
‘ARCHETYPAL’ PROFESSIONS 
 
 
Interest based approaches 
 
The descriptor ‘interest-based’ approaches encompass diametrically opposed 
views on the professions. Baldly put these are as an engine of societal 
progress and purveyor of the public interest, versus the view of professions 
as driven by private interests and as detrimental to the public good. Let us 
start with structural functionalism, a ‘public interest’ account, followed by neo-
Weberian and Marxist approaches, which are ‘private interest’ accounts.   
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Structural functionalism 
Structural functionalism (SF) was the predominant approach to the 
professions within sociology during the 1940s, 50s and 60s, arguably the 
heyday of the professions. Structural functionalism is close to the professions 
own ideology (Saks, 2012).Baldy put structural functionalism tends to 
contribute to the legitimation of professions as self-regulating and statutorily 
protected forms of organisation which serve the public good (Evetts, 2003).  
Structural functionalist accounts tend to see and welcome professions as 
engines of modernity and social progress,13 and the capacity of professions to 
act in the public good seen as resting on their capacity and autonomy, namely 
by virtue of its ‘shelter’ from the market and independence from government, 
to act in accordance with scientific truth. A system of self-regulation and set of 
statutory protections, which protect professions from market competition and 
‘failure’ are seen as securing the public interest. Parsons claims that within 
medicine ‘commercialism [is seen to be] the most serious and insidious evil 
with which it has to contend’ (Parsons, 1951:43). Additionally, Parsons 
contends that individual professionals are no more or less altruistic than other 
workers, but the emphasis upon cultural rather than monetary indices of 
success lead to more altruistic outcomes (Macdonald, 1995). This seems to 
me to be an insightful observation given a current backdrop tendency at times 
to idealise healthcare professionals (more on this in Chapter Five).  
 
                                                          
13 Parsons (1951) argued that people’s behaviour is governed by five underlying set of 
‘pattern variables’ relating to role definitions. Professions, Parson’s argues, emphasise the 
values of affective neutrality, self-orientation, universalism, achievement, and specificity, 
whilst tending to disfavour each of their contrasting norms, namely affectivity, collective-
orientation, ascription, and diffuseness (Parsons,1951:43). 
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From the SF’s consensus-driven perspective professional expertise tends to 
seen as an ‘organic’ outcome of scientific progress, which tacitly tends to be 
assumed to be uniform and linear in its development, hence partially why a 
profession tends to be seen as internally homogeneous. Partially because of 
this, the asymmetrical nature of the doctor-patient relationship (one in which 
the doctor is dominant) is regarded as benign. Parsons wrote that the sick 
persons’ ‘combination of helplessness, lack of technical competence [relative 
to the doctor’s], emotional disturbance, as well as a degree of medical 
uncertainty (of diagnosis and prognosis) make him a peculiarly vulnerable 
object for exploitation’ (Parsons, 1951:300) . This means that a patient cannot 
choose the best between two doctors ‘if he were fully rational he would have 
to rely on professional authority, on the advice of the professionally qualified 
or on institutional validation’ (Ibid:297). This view of the profession as a 
relatively benign normative system of values seem tacitly held by some 
members of the Alliance who framed the prospect of HPC regulation as the 
latest political thread that began with ‘Thatcher’s attack on the professions’14 
Similarly Janet Low talked of ‘running’ from audit culture within the university 
(Low, 2008), and of it now catching up with her within the field of the talking 
therapies. These comments imply archetypal professionalism is not so much 
a problem as the rise of the regulatory state and audit culture (more on this 
below). 
 
Let us now look at Marxist and strong versions of neo-Weberian approaches, 
often referred to as ‘conflict-based’ approaches. The neo-Weberian approach 
                                                          
14 Thorne (2009) Key note speech, Inaugural Conference of the Alliance for Counselling and 
Psychotherapy Against State Regulation.  
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of Ivan Illich (Macdonald, 1995) is particularly relevant given similarities to 
Postle’s account (2012) explored briefly above. These approaches take an 
antithetical view of the professions as driven by private interests.  
 
 
Professions as driven by private interests: Neo-Weberian and Marxist 
approaches   
 
If for SF professions supplant power with truth, then for some Marxist and 
Neo-Weberian approaches, professions do the inverse, they supplant truth 
with power: in short professions are seen as anti-Enlightenment. Weberian, 
neo-Weberian and Marxist theories in sociology emerged during the 1960s 
and 70s, and are ‘conflict theories’ in so far as they characterise societies as 
divided, socially stratified and structured by relations of power, dominance 
and inequalities. Some Marxist and neo-Weberian approaches both contend 
that professions act in accordance with private interests. For neo-Weberian’s 
this is mainly professions acting in their own interests, and for Marxists acting 
in accordance with the interests of their capitalist masters (Macdonald, 1995). 
In both cases the public and clients are seen as harmed. In medicine a 
tendency towards an individualist aetiology of illness is seen as problematic. 
For Strong (1979), for example, it strips ‘problem’ behaviours and 
phenomenon of their social meaning, which Illich refers to as cultural 
iatrogenesis i.e. the medicalization of social and political problems. For Illich 
medical intervention tends to radically diminish ‘personal responses to pain, 
disability, impairment, anguish and death’ (Busfield, 1986:117). Cultural 
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iatrogenesis is encouraged by the form of medical knowledge - what Brante 
(1988) refers to as the ‘myth of technology’ - whereby ‘professionals tend to 
comprehend their social role through the philosophy of technological 
reductionism [in which] other factors, such as political relations, and 
ideological currents, are reduced to epiphenomena’ (ibid:130). 
In Marxist approaches, medicine and psychiatry are seen as serving the 
ruling class by legitimating the view that what are in fact politically, socially 
and/or environmentally caused problems are simply an innate physical or 
mental illness within an individual (ibid). Cohen (2016) notes, for example, 
that an inordinate number of black men were diagnosed with schizophrenia 
and were ‘institutionalised for violent behaviour’ during the civil rights protests 
during the 1960s and 1970s (72). As another example, the rapid proliferation 
in the number of conditions defined by the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders) such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) and Social Anxiety Disorder is analysed as a means of cultivating, 
through institutional and professional intervention, particular personality 
characteristics suitable for the demands and needs of advanced capitalism. 
Social anxiety disorder for example is interpreted as a medicalization of 
shyness; the latter seen as at odds with an increasing need for ‘workers to be 
conversive, outgoing and assertive’ (ibid:73). The Marxist, Navarro (1980, 
1983), similarly argues that medical science within capitalism eschews the 
real causes i.e. social relations, that produce illness. He claims that the 
industrial revolution and the emergence of capitalism gave rise to a form of 
medicine that viewed disease as a consequence of oppressive social 
relations, but once capitalism had ‘won its hegemony’ another form of 
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medicine was adopted,  one ‘that would not threaten the power relations in 
which it [capitalism] was dominant’ (Navarro, 1980:539). In this reductive and 
positivist medicine, disease was seen ‘not as an outcome of specific power 
relations, but rather a biological individual phenomenon where the cause of 
disease was the immediately observable factor, i.e. bacteria’ (ibid:540).    
However, a central problem with a Marxist orientated approach, given its view 
of the economic ‘base’ as determining, is its difficulty providing a convincing 
account for actions within the superstructure that seem out of step with the 
interests of the capitalist elite. For example, the creation of the NHS and 
welfare state in the UK following the Second World War was ‘hard won’ by the 
working classes; it was not handed over by the capitalist elite on a plate. The 
Marxist approach is therefore arguably an unconvincing way of addressing 
the agency-structure dichotomy (more on this below).   
 
Hegemonic/discourse approaches both highlight and address some of these 
weaknesses within interest-based accounts. Let us now briefly look at how 
hegemonic approaches frame archetypal professionalism. 
 
 
Hegemonic approaches to the professions 
 
The Foucauldian approach: professionalism as government ‘at a distance’ 
 
The Foucauldian ‘governmental approach’ (Rose, 1988) is a significant 
approach within the sociology of the professions literature and has been 
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largely developed through an analysis of the so called ‘psy-complex’. Fournier 
(1999), drawing on the work of Foucault, argues that the professions were 
central to the emergence of liberal government and society. Liberalism is of 
course critical of sovereign power (as for example in a police state) and 
therefore seeks to ‘reconcile freedom with social control’ (283). Fournier puts 
it succinctly: ‘the main rationale of liberalism (in its various forms) is to govern 
through freedom’ (ibid:283). Expertise is a key way in which liberal 
government acts on subjects to make them act appropriately as ‘free’ citizens 
and free ‘workers’. Professions are both the ‘governor and the governed’ 
(Ibid:283). That is to say professions are a means of working ‘at a distance’ 
on both individual citizens, whole populations, and the worker, and are a 
central means by which expertise gains authority and legitimacy.  Crucially, 
the autonomy of the individual citizen is seen as something constituted and 
shaped by forms of expertise. Subjects are incited to think about themselves 
and act in accordance with the view of themselves as autonomous. For 
Foucault ‘autonomy’ is not a ‘first cause’; the subject is not ‘naturally’ and 
‘wholly’ autonomous, but rather autonomy is constituted through a ‘repertoire 
of discursive practices’ (ibid:1999). As a form of occupational control, 
professions produce ‘professional subject positions’, shaping how 
professionals should conduct themselves, and so professionalism in this 
instance tends to be seen as a means of governing workers in roles where 
there is a high indeterminate to technicality ratio; in short where it is difficult 
for an employer to monitor or directly police employee behaviour. Fournier 
(2000) and Evetts (2003) tend also to critique the tendency of consensus and 
conflict-driven approaches to overegg the professions as highly ‘discreet’ 
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projects. Rather, the collective ‘autonomy’ of the profession (including 
archetypal professions like medicine, even during the ‘heyday’ of self-
regulation) is dependent upon professions seeking legitimation and approval 
from other actors in the ‘liberal network’, including the state, clients and other 
sponsoring elites, which are themselves heterogeneous entities. This helps 
resolve the explanatory polarisation between public and private interest 
accounts, essentially by regarding professions as sites of contestation, 
intersected and constituted by competing discourses, demands and interests. 
Tensions and contradictions in theory (between public and private interest 
accounts) are relocated, so to speak, within the terrain of social reality itself.  
Fournier (2000) also stresses that professions do not simply engage in ‘turf 
wars’ over pre-existing fields of expertise and ‘objects’ of concern, they 
actually actively constitute them. For example, subjectivity is shaped and 
produced by professional interventions, not simply liberated, ‘crushed’, or 
distorted.  Fournier’s view is also consistent with Brante’s (2011) ‘ontological 
model’ approach to the professions which places an emphasis upon how 
professions, through particular models of truth construct the ‘objects’ upon 
which they act.15 The ‘process model’ used by Bucher and Strauss (1961), 
                                                          
15 The way in which in which an object is constructed by science and a profession partially depends upon their 
shared ‘ontological model’ (or what Foucault calls ‘archaeology’). The ontological model is the basic, often 
implicit, template of a discipline or sub discipline – what are assumed to be the basic elements and relations of 
reality.  They are the presuppositions that make theory and practice possible. There are often different 
explanatory theories of the same constructed object based on different ontological models. In the constructed 
object of ‘madness’ for example there are different explanatory theories based on different ontological models, 
including sociological, psychoanalytic, psychological, biomedical and neuro-psychiatric. Brante writes: ‘These 
ontological models, indicating that the field is multi-paradigmatic and characterised by struggles over truth 
priorities, make entirely dissimilar types of observational evidence “significant”; introspection and dreams, 
cultural factors and social environments, rational and irrational choices, physiological properties. Each model is 
supported by its own paradigm and its own theories, and is match with its own facts’ (Brante, 2011:858).    
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which Waller and Guthrie (2013), to recall from above, base their defence of 
the HPC plans upon, is consistent with Brante’s (2011) emphasis upon 
pluralism within professions. A pluralism of ‘ontological models’ essentially 
means that science does not operate outside of socio-political and cultural 
relations, or above the political ‘fray’, and therefore cannot be used to 
definitively settle policy disputes: values are always at play within any 
deployment, scientific or otherwise, of facts. It also essentially means that 
professions, as Fournier puts it, do not simply involve a process of ‘divisions 
of labour’, but a ‘labour of division’ (thus contesting the SF sense that 
professions are simply a ‘natural’ outgrowth of linear technological and 
scientific development). As regards the psychological therapies, Rose (2003),  
adopting a ‘governmental’ approach, argues that all talking therapies are 
forms of ‘technologies of the self’, which incite people to experience 
themselves in particular ways, broadly in tune with the needs of liberal 
society. This is consonant to an extent with claims that the psychoanalytic 
way of viewing the world deeply structures our cultural outlook (Parker, 
2009c). Overall, the Foucauldian approach tends to soften and complicate the 
demarcation between ‘social control’ and ‘emancipation’, which should 
perhaps (as I have already noted above) make us cautions about strong 
demarcations between talking therapies which ‘speak truth to power’ and 
those that are seen as bald instruments of social control.  The Alliance 
arguably had a tendency to do this in its sharp demarcation between 
psychological therapies within the so called ‘mental hygiene movement’ and 
those talking therapies seeking to provide a space free from the dominant 
norms within society (see Chapter Six), (Arbours Association, 2009:12). This 
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reflects the tendency of Foucauldian and poststructuralist approaches more 
generally to see power and truth as a nexus. For this approach truth and 
power are closely intertwined and one can never supplant the other (Bacchi, 
2012): power is always implicated in the constitution of a ‘regime’ of truth. It is 
worth noting, however, that Rose (2003) acknowledges that there are 
probably significant political differences between different forms of talking 
therapy.  Additionally, Schon (1983) questions the sharp demarcation made 
by theorists, like Illich, between community and professional/bureaucratic 
organisations, and highlights that the former as forms of expertise often carry 
many of the hallmarks of their ‘professional’ counterparts. He writes: ‘there is 
something inconsistent about a demystification of professional expertise 
which leads to the establishment of a breed of counter-professional experts’ 
(Schon,1983:342). In a liberalist defence of bureaucracy, Du Gay (2005) 
warns against the hasty dismissal of the value of bureaucracy. Claiming that it 
has its own distinct moral ethos, and has been a hard fought for achievement 
within liberal democracies, he critiques what is a tendency within many 
critiques of bureaucracy to overly valorise the unified rational subject, where 
personal affect and the thought of the subject must be united in her or his 
action. The bureaucrat is seen as a lesser, incomplete moral form of person. 
But Du Gay argues that in fact it a distinct moral form of comportment which 
seeks, in a pluralist society, to ensure some fairness in government and the 
meeting of competing demands.16. Du Gay’s approach encompasses a 
pluralist view of organisational forms, as well as different forms of 
personhood, which have distinct qualities and different sets of achievements 
                                                          
16 The ‘banality of evil’ thesis is often the strongest one levelled against bureaucracy, but Du 
Gay argues that the first thing that Hitler did was to dismantle the German civil service. 
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in different contexts, each with distinct demands and problematics. Another 
important, closely related angle on the professions is the question of the 
authenticity of expertise. To recall from above, structural functionalist 
approaches tend to presuppose that expertise is the product of rationally 
grounded scientific research, whereas private interest accounts of the 
professions tend to see expertise as an ideological way of forwarding the 
interests of powerful elites to the detriment of the public good. There are 
mixed positions within discourse analytic research on this. Let me briefly spell 
out two of these now.  
 
 
On the question of the ‘indeterminate-tech’ ratio and the basis of the 
legitimation of professions  
 
The first view is, forwarded, for example by Fournier (1999), claims that 
professional work is not genuinely indeterminate and could in fact be more 
fully codified and routinized. Professions use concepts such as ‘talent’ to 
obscure the fact that it could be rationally codified, and to obscure the 
concomitant possibility that others could do the work with minimal training and 
for less remuneration. This view is consistent, for example, with the IAPT 
programme’s ‘protocolisation’ of practice, and its training of non-experienced 
therapists in the skills for particular tasks, diminishing the requirement to 
employ more experienced and qualified counsellors and psychotherapists 
(see Chapter Five). This claim, however, seems inconsistent with the general 
temper of the ‘government at a distance’ approach, which rests on the 
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contention that professionalism is a means of exerting some control over work 
that has significant indeterminate qualities i.e. is so contextually variable and 
complex as to bar complete routinisation. There is of course the possibility, 
however, that professional discourse, even if dealing with indeterminate 
objects (i.e. high contextual variability), may conjure a misleading belief that 
so called ‘lay’ people cannot respond just as adequately, or even better, than 
professionals to a situation at hand. In other words, taking the view that much 
professional work is inherently indeterminate and cannot be routinized, does 
not by itself settle questions regarding the authenticity and use-value of 
professional practice vis a vis so called amateur or paraprofessional practice.  
 
Schon (1983), in contrast to Fournier, and more in keeping with the theory of 
professionalism as a meaning of governing indeterminate work ‘at a distance’, 
claims that ‘technical rationality’, namely the application of general scientific 
laws to specific cases (within the professional’s case load), tends to side-line 
‘artistry’ and ‘craft’ in the process of professional practice. For Schon (1983) 
and Fook (2000) professions are (at least traditionally) legitimated on the 
basis of a ‘scientistic paradigm’, where highly rationalist, technical, and 
objective conceptualisations of knowledge dominate. This model of 
legitimation produces a strong hierarchy: ‘the role of the 
researcher/academic/theoretician becomes privileged over that of the 
practitioner and service user, since it is assumed that only knowledge 
generated and used in this way is valid’ (Fook, 2000:110). Furthermore, 
‘professional expertise is thus defined as that which is generalizable 
(acontextual), developed by scientific method by researchers, and applied by 
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practitioners to service users’ (ibid:110). This is arguably similar to Postle’s 
(2012) position (as described above) and his characterisation of government 
programmes as ‘techne’, which subsumes diversity and particularity. 
However, contra Postle, Fook tacitly contends that the ‘acontextual’ framing of 
practice is not a necessary feature of professions when she juxtaposes the 
top-down, dominating forms of social work with the work of some experienced 
social workers within her research. She writes:  
Rather than entering situations with superior and fixed notions of desirable outcomes, 
derived from the legitimacy of professional knowledge, practitioners often engage in a 
mutual process of discovery with service users, in which, together they create and 
experience the conditions which assist the person, and at the same time, engage in their 
own process of self-discovery (Fook, 2000:115).  
 
Contra the view of House (2003) and Illich (1975), Fook contends that the 
professional does not necessarily ‘use specialised knowledge or expertise to 
legitimate a powerful position, but rather to create a situation for mutual 
benefit’ (2000:116). Schon (1983) is similarly critical of technical rationality 
and proposes an alternative epistemology of practice, and therefore, like 
Fook, leans forwards a relatively optimistic view of the emancipatory potential 
of professions. He delineates a ‘knowing-in-action’: a ‘know-how’, which is an 
intuitive ability to do something, especially after repeat performances. He 
states that there ‘is nothing in common sense to make us say that ‘know-how’ 
consists in rules or plans which we entertain in the mind prior to action’ 
(1983:51). When a professional encounters similar ‘cases’ over and over, his 
‘knowing in practice tends to become increasingly tacit, spontaneous, and 
automatic, thereby conferring upon him and his clients the benefits of 
specialisation’ (ibid:60). Specialisation, however, can lead to two key 
problems Schon argues. First, ‘subspecialities [..] can break apart an earlier 
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wholeness of experience and understanding’; within medicine, for example, 
where the patient is treated for ‘particular illnesses in isolation from the rest of 
the patient’s life experience (ibid:61). Second, the practice of the professional 
can become overly spontaneous and over-learned, so that they become 
‘selectively inattentive to phenomena that do not fit the categories of his 
knowing-in-action’ (ibid:61). Schon contrasts this to what he calls ‘reflection-
in-action’, where the professional seeks to think more consciously about what 
she is doing. Similarly to Fook (2000), Schon argues that the reflective 
practitioner is context sensitive and responsive: ‘when someone reflects in-
action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context. He is not dependent 
on the categories of established theory and technique, but constructs a new 
theory of the unique case’ (Schon, 1983:68). Schon claims that, whereas for 
the professional that sees themselves as a technical expert, ‘uncertainty is a 
threat; its admission is a sign of weakness’, for the reflective practitioner, 
uncertainty is seen as an important part of practice, linked to ‘the scientist’s 
art of research’ (ibid:69). Fook’s and Schon’s accounts of professional 
practice do raise questions about both the suitability and accuracy of what we 
might refer to as a ‘scientistic’ base for the legitimacy of the professions. This 
perhaps helps to explain the apparent anomaly between the paradigm of 
technical rationality often thought of as the basis for professional practice and 
the lamentation by  Thorne (2009b) and others within the field of talking 
therapies of the ‘Thathertite attack’ on the professions, suggesting that there 
was something laudable about professions being attacked. Fook’s 
contextual/acontextual binary is very useful for our purposes here as it helps 
(in further chapters) to avoid what I argue can be the misleading  binaries 
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between healthcare and talking therapy practice, as well as between 
‘community’ and ‘professional’ social organisation (more on this below). This 
also raises questions about changes to the way that professions have been 
legitimated in recent years.  
 
So far I have bracketed off the rise of the regulatory state from consideration, 
which has been useful because it helps to be clear on different perspectives 
on the professions prior to the so called regulatory state – perspectives which 
are still at play within research on professions, and within professional life 
itself, and within various stakeholder responses to it.  I want now to focus on 
the ways in which the regulation of professions has changed in recent years 
and decades, as a result of ‘the rise of the regulatory state’ (Levi-Faur and 
Gilad, 2004), the ‘audit society’ (Power,1999), or, more simply, the erosion of 
professional autonomy and  the increase in external control of professions.  
The rise of the regulatory state has in some senses changed the ‘animal’ of 
the profession.  
 
 
THE RISE OF THE REGUALTORY STATE AND SUPPOSED EROSION OF 
PROFESSIONA AUTONOMY  
 
Literature on the rise of the regulatory state is obviously relevant because the 
HPC plans were an aspect of the rise of the regulatory state. Also, some of 
the discourses within the struggle bear some family resemblance to the 
academic discourses on the rise of the regulatory state, so it follows that an 
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analysis of the academic literature will inform the analysis of the discourses 
‘at the scene’. For example, Malcolm Allen’s critique  of the professions 
during the 1950s and 1960s as abusive and unaccountable17, and of 
psychoanalytic associations ‘closing ranks’ against complaints of poor or 
abusive practice, has strong affinity with the legitimation of the rise of the 
regulatory state (more on this in the concluding chapter). Let us first look at 
Moran’s (2003) political science account of the regulatory state, followed by 
neo-Weberian and discourse analytic accounts.  
 
Celebratory accounts of regulation/de-regulation  
Some academics from political science (e.g. Moran, 2001, 2003) have quite 
strongly and broadly welcomed the ‘rise of the regulatory state’, which began 
in the 1980s and ‘took off’ during the 1990s, and which has been consolidated 
and developed further more recently. The so called ‘audit explosion’ (Power, 
1999) occurred in conjunction, following the emergence of the New Right, 
with ‘de-regulation’ / economic liberalisation across most sectors of the 
economy, including the introduction of quasi-market competition within pubic 
services. For the New Right, and for ‘public choice’ theory within academia, 
state intervention was ‘criticised for undermining economic efficiency and 
investments as well as debilitating the enterprise culture through promoting 
welfare dependency’ (Exworthy and Halford, 1999:19). This ‘new 
managerialism’ was continued under New Labour in the guise of 
‘modernisation’ (ibid:19).  
                                                          
17 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014.  
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The New Right’s characterisation of professions as ‘producer monopolies’ - 
given their ‘shelter’ from the market and relative freedom from government 
control - and its rhetoric of rolling back the frontiers of the state (ibid:19) has 
considerable commonality with Illich’s critique of the professions. However, a 
key insight of Moran’s is his critique of the claim that under successive neo-
liberal governments there has been a ‘hollowing out’ of the state i.e. that the 
state has been in retreat. Moran (2003) and Levi-Faur and Gilad (2004), on 
the contrary, argue that the ‘deregulation’ (i.e. privatisation) of aspects of 
services has entailed, through the rise of the regulatory state, the 
inauguration of a period ‘high modernism’ in which the state, albeit ‘at a 
distance’, has extended and deepened its reach. The regulatory state is seen 
essentially as a means of dealing with market failure within services such as 
the utilities of gas and water that are too important to risk failure.  Moran 
(2003) and Levi-Faur and Gilad (2004) highlight how liberalisation and 
managerial reforms that are often supposed to ‘hollow out the state’ are in 
fact ‘intimately coupled with the rise of multi-layered regulatory institutions 
and formalisation of codes of behaviour at the corporate, state, and 
international levels’ (2004:106). Moran argues that ‘far from being a reaction 
against utopian projects of large-scale interventionism, it [the new regulatory 
state] has its own utopian ambitions, and these ambitions are entirely 
congruent with Enlightenment modernism’ (Moran,2003:7). For Moran (2003) 
the rise of the regulatory state is primarily driven by the need for public 
protection in response to adverse events within the public services, ensuing 
lack of public trust, as well as fiscal crisis. In relation to the professions the 
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new regulatory state is seen as the true social revolution, enabling the proper 
fruition of the modernist values identified by Parsons (as identified above). 
With the dawn of the new regulatory state professions are now kept on the 
‘straight and narrow’, guided and forced to act in the client and public interest.   
Descriptive aspects of Moran’s historical analysis are very helpful. He draws a 
broad historical distinction between a system of ‘self-regulation’ (dubbed ‘club 
government’), dominant across all economic sectors of society throughout 
much of the 19th century up until the 1980s, and the ‘regulatory state’, gaining 
dominance since the 1980s. Moran’s evaluation is, in my view, rather more 
problematic.  He draws a stark contrast between the two regulatory systems. 
Opacity, informality and cronyism are seen by Moran to be characteristic of 
self-regulation, whereas codification, transparency and meritocracy are 
positively seen to be characteristic of the (new) regulatory state. 
Quantification, standardization and formalisation are closely intertwined with 
democratisation, according to Moran, transforming ‘tacit knowledge of 
insiders into public knowledge available to all’ (Moran, 2003:7). Moran tends 
to see the regulatory state as an unalloyed form of democratisation, and 
resistance and objection to it as essentially ‘old’ elites – professionals of the 
welfare state, academic elites and elites in the civil service – seeking to 
preserve their vested interests: ‘the club system privileged precisely these 
elites—and its replacement by something more open and modern threatens 
their independence from popular control’ (ibid:8). So those that were once 
‘quintessentially modern’ – the professionals and state elites that wrestled 
power from the aristocracy- themselves are seen as having become the 
privileged resistors of modernisation. Maltby (2008), in her critique of Michael 
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Power’s scepticism towards the regulatory state forwarded in his book ‘The 
Audit Society’ (1999) (more on this below), similarly expresses:  
 
The audit society and its progeny, Power’s own papers and wails of unhappy academics 
and doctors and civil servants, are ultimately not a protest about the creation of an iron 
cage round society. They are a stifled chorus of fury at being made accountable (Maltby, 
2008:397).  
 
 
Moran’s and Maltby’s position therefore shares with structural functionalist 
perspectives a confidence in expertise, only the placeholder of the values of 
neutrality and objectivity have shifted from the profession towards the 
regulator (or at least towards professions that are strongly overseen by 
regulators). As far as Moran is concerned the regulatory state attempts to 
restore public confidence in professions are substantive, genuine, and do 
succeed.  
 
Whilst Moran and Maltby in effect apply a sceptical neo-Weberian-style 
analysis to the professions, they seem to apply a ‘rose-tinted’, structural 
functionalist-style analysis to the regulator. In the light of critiques (see below) 
of aspects of the regulatory state, Moran and Maltby do not, in my view, 
adequately justify this stark demarcation between the profession and the 
regulator (see below). Rather, they tend to displace the problem of 
polarisation present between public and private interest accounts i.e. the 
tendency to see professions broadly, almost a-priori, as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
when it comes to serving public and client interests. In Moran’s account, the 
polarised positions, rather than present within two theories, are displaced into 
a single poorly integrated theory. The regulator in effect becomes seen as the 
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‘good other’ of the profession. In further Chapters I argue that the HPC case 
study helps illuminate the motivations for such idealisations of the regulator.  
 
Other accounts of the apparent erosion of individual and collective 
professional autonomy in recent decades are either less celebratory in tone, 
or are stridently critical. Those which tend to fall in the former camp are the 
deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation theses, and, for our purposes, the 
more pertinent restratification thesis. More strident critiques I consider are by 
Michael Power (1999) and Mol (2008). Let us look at each in turn. 
 
 
The deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation theses 
 
In 1973 Haug developed the deprofessionalisation thesis of medicine, 
claiming that medical autonomy was being increasingly eroded by the 
codification and standardisation of medical knowledge and practice 
(Chamberlain, 2010:77). An increasingly educated public was also narrowing 
the knowledge gap between patients and doctors, which along with increasing 
public concern about medical malpractice, contributed to the diminishment of 
public trust in and deference towards doctors (Hewitt and Thomas, 2007:5). In 
the same year Oppenheimer inaugurated the proletarianisation thesis and 
similarly argued that scientific medicine was becoming routinized i.e. medical 
practice was becoming more reducible to a set of rules and procedures: 
complex processes could be broken down into a succession of simple tasks. 
The division of the profession into increasing medical specialism reduced the 
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autonomy of medics, Oppenheimer argued, and reduced the distance of the 
medic from the end ‘product’; medics increasingly resembling workers on a 
factory line Oppenheimer claimed (Chamberlain, 2010:78). As the 
indeterminacy of work turned increasingly into technicality, medical work 
would increasingly be able to be carried out by less qualified workers, driving 
down costs.  In 1985 McKinlay and Arches developed this further by claiming 
that doctors, like factory workers, suffered from false consciousness: 
contending that the true nature of doctors’ employment relations are hidden 
from them by the rhetoric of their supposed elite status (Hewitt and Thomas, 
2007:7).  A strong objection to these theses is the fact that the number of 
occupations undergoing some kind of professionalization in recent decades 
has proliferated. However, such professionalisation could be regarded as 
mere rhetoric, suggests Evetts (2003), hiding the opposite state of affairs; 
essentially keeping professionals in a condition of false consciousness (see 
below). Freidson (1984), who tended to seek a middle path between 
celebratory and sceptical accounts of the professions, was not, however, 
convinced by the deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation theses (Hewitt 
and Thomas, 2007).  
 
The restratification thesis 
Freidson (1984) argued that even with advances in technology and a more 
educated public, there was still a very significant knowledge gap between 
doctors and patients, and that doctors are still gatekeepers of information and 
the main interpreters of it (Hewitt and Thomas, 2007:7). Elston (1991) 
differentiated between economic, political, clinical and technical medical 
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autonomy, drawing a more uneven and differentiated picture of trends in 
autonomy. For example, whilst doctors in the UK since the inauguration of the 
NHS, in becoming salaried employees, have less economic autonomy (no 
autonomy over their own pay), Elston claimed that their political and clinical 
autonomy has increased. She also distinguished within ‘medical dominance’ 
between ‘social authority’, relating to ‘medical control over the actions of 
others’, and ‘cultural authority’, relating to ‘the acceptance of medical 
definitions of reality and therefore medical judgments being accepted as valid 
and true’ (Chamberlain, 2010:81). Friedson’s restratificaiton thesis (1984) 
contends, however, that the retention of a degree of collective clinical and 
political autonomy comes at a significant price, namely that professions are 
reborn in a more hierarchical form, in which there is greater cleavage 
between the elite of profession and their rank and file members (ibid). This 
analysis seems very pertinent to the HPC struggle, given that, although 
initially most of the field opposed the HPC as regulator to be, once the 
government had more strongly asserted its will, the field became more 
differentiated on the issue: significant divisions for example opened up within 
the main professional associations of the BACP, UKCP and to a lesser extent 
the BPC, between the leaderships and many of their rank and file members. 
Although the latter pertains to the restratification of the field within the struggle 
over policy development, this would likely have solidified into a more 
permanent state of affairs had the HPC plans been installed.   According to 
the restratification thesis, the profession retains, through the co-optation of 
elite members, overall autonomy (Chamberlain, 2010).  Gray and Harrison 
(2004) point out that government ambition to simultaneously cut costs and 
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raise standards requires the professions to cooperate (Chamberlain, 
2010:83). However, the restratification thesis is suggestive of a degree of 
ambiguity to what extent professionals are successfully co-opted.  The co-
optation by the government and regulators of an elite within professions to 
exert greater control over rank and file members might suggest that the 
overall autonomy retained is rather more symbolic than substantive, perhaps 
invoking the charge of those individual professionals joining the research and 
regulatory elites as ‘selling out’. However, Friedson (1985) also suggests that 
co-opted doctors do sustain more loyalty to their clinical colleagues than their 
‘corporate masters’ (Chamberlain, 2010:83). Similarly, within the field of social 
work, White (2009), points to ways in which social workers often in effect 
resist and subvert government policy ‘on the ground’ by covertly refusing to 
fully or ‘properly’ administrate it where they see policy to be contrary to the 
client and public interest. The failure of regulatory directives and governance 
to always ‘work all the way through’ - that regulation and governance meet 
resistance in everyday practice – is an interesting area, but, as noted in the 
introductory chapter, given that my focus is on the political dynamics of 
attempts to install and derail the HPC policy initiative, rather than on how an 
already existing system of regulation and governance ‘runs’, it is largely 
outside the scope of this thesis18. I point this research out, however, as it is 
important not to equate formal policy and procedures entirely with what 
happens ‘on the ground’. It is perhaps this potential for resistance which may 
have been one reason why some counsellors and psychotherapists were 
inclined to accept the HPC plans despite their own significant reservations. 
                                                          
18 I am, however, to a significant extent focussed upon how the projections of how the HPC regulation 
would likely have impacted the field/’worked’ had it been installed.  
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Julian Lousada, Chair of the BPC, for example, was regarded as having taken 
the view that HPC regulation would bring benefits to the field (such as an 
increased role within the NHS), and that practitioners would be able to ignore 
or circumvent any aspects which would otherwise prevent them from, as they 
see it, working in the best interests of clients and the broader public 
(Musgrave, 2009d). 
 
Before looking at discourse approaches to the rise of the regulatory state, I 
would first like to briefly examine literature on the evidence based practice 
movement. This is because it plays a central role, implicitly within the 
healthcare regulatory reforms, and more explicitly within the IAPT and SfH 
projects within the field of psychological therapies, in which the HPC plans 
were embedded (see Chapter Five). The rhetoric of evidence based practice 
also played a direct role, if a rather obscured one, within the HPC policy 
dispute (see Chapter Six).  
 
 
The evidence based practice movement  
 
Pro-evidence based practice literature 
 
As we shall see in Chapter Four, the evidence based practice movement has 
played a central role in the policy reforms of the public services since the 
initial emergence of ‘evidence based medicine’ in the 1990s. The latter has 
been a significant feature of ‘clinical governance’. Basically it is set of criteria 
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of subjecting literature and sources of evidence on a topic to ‘systematic 
review’ (Hjorland, 2011).The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
has been instrumental in establishing its widespread use within medicine. 
There is some disagreement among proponents, however, over the exact 
nature of ‘evidence based medicine’. Sackett et al (1996) for example 
emphasise that it is an integration of ‘individual clinical expertise and the best 
external evidence from systematic research’ (71). They argue that neither 
individual clinical judgement nor external evidence are alone enough: ‘without 
clinical expertise, practice risks becoming tyrannised by evidence, for even 
excellent external evidence may be inapplicable to or inappropriate for an 
individual patient’ (Ibid:71). They expressly argue against evidence based 
practice being an assault on individual clinical judgement, or as a 
manualisation of practice: ‘clinicians who fear top down cook books will find 
the advocates of evidence based medicine joining them at the barricades’ 
Sackett et al state (ibid:71). Other researchers tend to equate evidence based 
medicine with what Sachet refer to as ‘external evidence’, but similarly argue 
that evidence based medicine/external evidence cannot adjudicate between, 
or entirely ‘trump’ other sources of evidence (Hammersley, 2005). In contrast, 
others, such as Chalmers (2003), tend to have stronger ambitions for 
evidence based medicine, regarding it as having the capacity to adjudicate 
between different sources of evidence and definitively signal or determine 
what is best practice (Hammersley, 2005). Evidence based medicine is 
defined as practice based on the evidence procured from a systematic review 
of different studies. It is based on the premise that individual doctors 
sometimes cause harm to patients because their practice is not based on the 
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most up to date research, and therefore seeks to radically diminish subjective 
error by ensuring that doctors act in accordance with the evidence of the 
efficacy of treatments. Chalmers also claims that it helps prevent ‘human and 
financial costs arising from failure to perform systematic, up-to-date reviews 
of randomised controlled trials of healthcare” (Hammersley, 2005:94). The 
latter speaks to the hierarchy of evidence established by the Cochrane Centre 
– a network of researchers - and adopted by NICE, in which the conclusions 
of random control studies are given greatest weight in a systematic review, 
and conclusions garnered from qualitative research less weight, and 
practitioner observations within clinical practice are given the least weight 
(ibid). Chalmers’ (2003) view that evidence based practice can adjudicate 
between different sources of evidence, accords with Schon’s (1994) 
description of what he describes as the ‘policy science’ approach to policy 
making. He draws a distinction between ‘policy disagreements’ and ‘policy 
disputes’. A policy disagreement is relatively superficial in the sense that it is 
a disagreement about facts: the disagreement is essentially resolvable 
through an appeal to facts because there is broad agreement about the terms 
that constitute the relevant facts. The evidence based medicine and practice 
movements tend to assume that all policy controversies are, to use Schon’s 
terminology, policy ‘disagreements’. The sharp delineation of evidence based 
medicine as the pursuit of science, reason and best practice, from the 
dogmatic and ideologically prone subjective judgement of doctors, is arguably 
consonant with what Wells (2007) refers to as the ‘expert driven’ model of 
evidence based policy making - the view that expertise actually does, or at 
least should, lead the policy-making process. A tendency towards a 
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technocratic ideal of expertise delivering policy above the ‘fray’ or ‘muck’ of 
politics is arguably present within this model. The technocratic ideal, or what 
Schon (1983) refers to as technocratic rationality, was also arguably present 
within New Labour’s emphasis upon ‘what counts is what works’ (Wells quote 
of Tony Blair, 1997) as sharply distinguished from ‘dogma’ and ‘outdated 
ideology’ (Wells, 2007:22). It is not clear, however, to what extent ‘evidence 
based policy making’ simply means the adoption of findings from systematic 
reviews of evidence based practice, and to what extent it is at times also 
much more loosely meant, with a more ad-hoc criteria of what counts as good 
evidence. Because of the strong confidence in levels of objectivity of evidence 
based medicine as being ‘above the political fray’, Chalmers (2003) and other 
proponents tend to dismiss critiques of the movement as merely ‘polemical’, 
‘ideological’, and as ‘ignoring evidence’, or as ‘failing to confront reality’ 
(Hammersley, 2005:93). Let me now briefly examine the kind of critiques, 
both of evidence based medicine and evidence based practice more broadly, 
and of the use of empiricist controlled trials within the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy, which Chalmers is quick to dismiss. 
 
 
Critiques of the evidence based practice movement 
 
Within the literature there are four main interrelated critiques of the evidence 
based medicine and practice movement. The first relates to the claim that 
evidence based practice removes practitioner error by eradicating the need 
for subjective judgement. Hammersley (2005) claims that subjective 
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judgement is not, and cannot be, eradicated.at both the level of professional 
practice and research. Let us look briefly at each in turn. At the level of 
practice the professional must evaluate a diverse range of sources of 
evidence, which are often incommensurable in kind: 
Knowledge from personal experience and from new research evidence must each be 
evaluated in its own terms, and then combined some way that takes account of their 
distinctive characteristics as sources of knowledge (ibid:88).  
 
Where evidence based practice is dominated by, and sometimes even 
equated with, RCT/experimental research, and is coupled with a tendency to 
believe that it can adjudicate between different forms of evidence, e.g. that it 
trumps practitioner experience, or what the practitioner sees in front of their 
eyes, significant problems arise. The literature points to significant limitations 
of random control trials/experimental research. Hammersley for example 
states that there are ‘problems concerning how one applies research 
evidence about aggregates to particular cases’ (ibid:88). Contextual variables 
are simply too great to be able to predict precisely the impact of a treatment 
applied to a particular patient or client. Samples studied may not for example 
be representative of the relevant population and therefore it is not possible ‘to 
tell what works for whom, or about the incidence of side effects’ (2005:90). 
Additionally, Healey (2013) points out that RCT’s often establish a significant 
percentage incidence of strong harmful side effects, such as increased risk of 
suicide in the case of some antidepressants. The guideline industry within 
medicine does not enable practitioners to adequately contextually assess the 
needs of a particular patient, and instead strongly protocolises the 
prescription of particular drugs in particular broad types of cases. He argues 
for example that the manner in which anti-depressants are prescribed is akin 
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to a game of Russian roulette, where a drug has a devastating impact upon a 
percentage of patients (ibid).  Although it is within the power of the individual 
doctor not to adhere to clinical guidelines, there are powerful institutional 
incentives for him or her not to stray from them e.g. financial rewards and 
being fired. Healey states that ‘clinicians worldwide are increasingly faced 
with managers enquiring about their compliance with guidelines and more 
and more are getting the sack’ (ibid:153-4). So the advisory status of 
guidelines is close to being in name only.  
 
Hammersley also points out that researchers exercise judgement during the 
establishment and course of RCT/experimental research:  
It is important to recognise that like all other forms of human practice, research itself 
necessarily relies on judgement and interpretation: It can never be governed, but only 
guided, by methodological rules (Hammersley, 2005:89).  
 
 
Hammersley is in effect pointing towards an inherent limitation: they do 
involve subjective judgement. Another target of much of the research critical 
of the evidence based practice movement is on the quality of the judgement 
often exercised in such research. The quality of scientific work is undermined 
by unthinking or inappropriate judgement within research when it comes to 
the construction and application of methodological rules. Whilst Hammersley 
talks of methodological rules being applied ‘unthinkingly’, other researchers 
point to all too systematic and deliberate ‘misjudgements’ in order to over 
inflate the efficacy of particular treatments. Shedler (2015) critiques a major 
NIMH (National Institute of Mental Health) study. He claims that the way that 
subjects are selected to take part does not reflect ‘real’ clients; the inclusion 
criteria of the study excluding two thirds of patients with the diagnosis in 
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question and seeking treatment. They are usually excluded because of co-
morbidity (having more than one diagnosis): yet the ‘two thirds that get 
excluded are the patients we treat in real-world practice’ (ibid:52). Two thirds 
are excluded before the study has started. Of the remaining one third 
included, sixteen percent ‘show improvement’, only eleven per cent overall 
get well, and only five percent get well and stay well (ibid:52). Another key 
way by which positive results are inflated is through ‘sham’ control groups 
(ibid). An NIMH 2010 funded study on the efficacy of CBT, for example, used 
psychodynamic therapy as the control group. The latter was delivered by 
graduate students (committed to CBT) who had been given two days training 
in psychodynamic therapy. Those delivering the psychodynamic therapy were 
forbidden to talk about the trauma that had brought the patient to therapy; ‘if 
anyone practiced like that in the real world it could be considered 
malpractice’, Shedler claims (ibid:54). Shedler contends that this is not a local 
but a widespread problem, referring to Wampold’s (2011) systematic review 
finding that of twenty five thousand studies only fourteen studies “compared 
evidence based therapy to a control group that received anything 
approaching real psychotherapy’ (Shedler, 2015:54). Another weakness of 
the RCT/experimental research, closely related to that of the problem of 
representative sampling, is that some practices lend themselves less to being 
standardised and therefore subject to trial. Hammersley (2005) for example 
claims that teaching practice cannot be standardised because a key 
requirement of effective teaching is responsiveness, as opposed to rote 
behaviour, to the unique circumstances presented within the classroom. 
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The same claim is also made of talking therapies, given the uniqueness of 
each therapeutic encounter. In this sense the RCT or experimental trials are 
not neutral measurements of practice, but in fact moulds practice, through a 
process of routinisation and standardisation, in the process of seeking to 
merely measure it.    
 
In addition to such internal weaknesses, the findings of studies are often 
misleadingly represented. Some studies are presented as providing strong 
support for the effectiveness of a particular treatment, yet the ‘statistical 
significance’ between CBT and a sugar pill in one NIMH study, for example, 
was 1.2 difference. Shedler (2015) argues that the ‘1.2 point difference is 
trivial and clinically meaningless. It does not pass the “so what?” test. It does 
not pas the “Does it matter?” test. It does not pass the “why should anyone 
care?” test’ (ibid:49). Another central way in which the efficacy of a particular 
treatment is misleadingly presented is through what Shedler calls the ‘file 
drawer effect’: that is the suppression i.e. non-publication of studies with 
negative results. Cuijers et al (2010) found that publication bias has 
exaggerated the benefits of CBT by 75% (Shedler: 2015). Healey (2013) 
contends that this practice is also rife within the pharmaceutical industry, and 
also critiques the practice of the ghost writing of research studies where by 
the study is conducted by ‘in-house’ researchers within the pharmaceutical 
company, and then the name of respected academics added. Academics 
within medical research departments that have challenged such distorting and 
sham practices have in some cases lost their positions (Healy, 2013). 
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The overall result of these practices is that treatments are promoted within 
services as highly effective when in fact they are at best minimally so, and at 
worst, damaging. Wampold et al (2011) claims that ‘currently there is 
insufficient evidence to suggest that transporting an evidence-based therapy 
to routine care that already involves psychotherapy will improve the quality of 
services’ (Shedler, 2015:55). For Healey (2013) and for Goldacre (2013), 
there is not so much an inherent problem with RCT, but a problem with how 
they are currently conducted and interpreted. Healey (2013) refers to a 
‘conspiracy of good will’ between medicine, the pharmaceutical industry, 
patients and policy makers as regards the production of supposedly ‘wonder’ 
treatments. He identifies a complex of factors within the pharmaceutical 
industry that have led to its dominance of medicine, namely that a number of 
regulatory changes in recent decades have led to the emergence of ‘billion 
dollar’ markets for single drugs, producing a situation in which the profit 
motive is little constrained, and a situation in which the marketing 
departments within pharmaceutical companies have become the main driving 
force for the creation of new patented (and therefore hugely profitable) drugs, 
rather than driven by more robust and carefully assessed clinical need. 
Essentially, the tail, Healy claims, is wagging the dog (Healy, 2013).  Dalal 
(2015) similarly claims that ‘many of the great and the good’ (23) – 
governments and policy makers – have been gullible enough’ to believe in 
wonder treatments which have in fact often been fabricated by a complex of 
‘statistical malpractices’ (22).  In a critique of the more rhetorical aspects of 
the evidence based practice movement Shedler (2015) identifies what he 
defines as a ‘master narrative’ behind the evidence based practice movement 
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within the talking therapies: ‘In the dark ages, therapists practiced untested, 
unscientific therapy. Science shows that evidence-based therapies are 
superior’ (47). Given that IAPT and SfH are both strongly predicated on 
knowledge garnered through experimental trials I return, to an extent, to these 
critiques within Chapter Five. The latter analysis, and some of the more 
nuanced approaches to evidence based practice considered above, tend to 
recognise that there are different styles of reasoning and evidence. They tend 
therefore to be what we could describe as interpretative or discourse analytic 
in approach. These critiques of the evidence based medicine and practice 
movement, especially where RTC’s and experimental trials are valorised, in 
so far as they are important parts of the regulatory state and new forms of 
governance, undermine celebratory accounts forwarded by Moran (2003) and 
others, of the regulatory state as weeding out bad practice and bringing 
almost unalloyed objectivity and effectiveness to professions across many 
fields.   
 
Let us now consider hegemonic and discourse literature, which further 
critique the self-justifying ideology of the regulatory state.  
 
 
Hegemonic and discourse analytic approaches to the rise of the 
regulatory state  
 
In this section I first examine the literature which tends to focus on the impact 
of the rise of the regulatory state, namely audit and the market logics, on 
95 
 
professional practice and services. This helps redress a tendency within the 
re-stratification thesis and other approaches considered above to focus on 
changes to formal relations, within what Glynos et al (2014) call the node of 
governance, at the expense of looking at how practice has been impacted, 
within what Glynos and Speed (2012) and Glynos et al (2014) refer to as the 
node of delivery. In the second section I examine literature which focuses on 
understanding the rhetorical manoeuvres which help install and ‘naturalise’ 
more market/consumer-inflected regimes. Without an analysis of the political 
logics – of the contingency of particular regimes of practice – more purely 
normative critiques of regimes of practice can more easily be dismissed as 
excessively idealistic or unworldly: this alternative state of affairs would of 
course be nice if it were only possible or politically feasible in the real world.  
 
 
Critiques of the impact of the rise of the regulatory state on professional 
practice 
 
To recall from above, some political scientists, for example Moran (2003) and 
Maltby (2008), claim that the rise of the regulatory state is democratising. This 
is contested by others. Power (1999), for example, whilst he acknowledges 
that giving an account of one self to others is a part of everyday life, and that 
it makes little sense to make any a-apriori objection to audit, he argues that 
the audit regime as currently constituted becomes more of a substitute than 
an aid to democracy, in that the fact of being audited ‘deters public curiosity’ 
and diminishes the likelihood or conditions for public dialogue and 
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deliberation (127). Focusing on the impact of audit practices on the behaviour 
of organisations, Power (1999) argues that audit regimes often have perverse 
side effects whereby the whole process consumes resources and undermines 
the motivation of people who could otherwise be engaged in 'real work'.  
Du Gay (2000) similarly claims that organisations can become at the very 
least distracted from pursuing their ‘preferred objects’. Most audit reports and 
their related accounting statements function as labels which must be trusted 
claims Power (1999). He contends that these practices not only tend to deter 
curiosity by focussing on offering blanket assurance, but in fact much of the 
time fail to measure what they claim to do so, thereby tending towards, as 
Power puts it, ‘false assurance’. In further chapters I argue that this is a 
crucial notion in relation to the HPC struggle, effectively capturing the 
attraction of HPC-style regulation as well as the problem with it. Traynor 
(1999) similarly explores the negative impacts of managerial practices, such 
as the setting of organisational targets, within the profession of nursing. 
Focussed on the ‘deregulation’ side of the deregulation/regulation coin, 
Fournier (2000) claims that market criteria impact how professions must 
behave in order to legitimise themselves. She cites the example of 
accountancy, in which the emergence of market criteria within the profession 
has shifted the behaviour of accountants from a focus on ensuring that a 
company’s tax accounts are commensurate with the ‘public good’, towards a 
focus on finding ways to keep tax payable by a company as low as legally 
possible (via legal ‘loop-holes’). Sauder and Espeland (2009), in a 
Foucauldian analysis of the impact of the regulatory practice of the ‘ranking’ 
of American law schools, incisively highlight how regulatory technologies can 
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help create rather arbitrary markets, and in the process, radically diminish 
substantive differences and qualities between institutions, and therefore 
diminish, rather than expand, public choice. Law schools are ranked in a 
hierarchy against formulae that postulates:  
An abstract, ideal law school comprised of discrete, integrated components. By 
depicting how well and how poorly schools adhere to this abstraction, schools are 
encouraged to conform to this ideal’ (Sauder and Espeland, 2009:74). 
 
 
The apparently objective ‘measuring’ activity essentially imposes a particular 
set of motives, ideals, missions, goals, established by the judgement of those 
producing the ranking formulae, on all the schools. All schools must take the 
rankings seriously because other people do. One Dean is reported as saying 
‘I end up making decisions with an eye toward those ranking rather than – I’m 
overstating this to make a point – rather than what’s best for the school’ 
(ibid:70). Deans may be distracted from their preferred objects and attend to 
others in order to best assure the school’s place in the rankings: ‘because 
schools are often separated by miniscule margins, seemingly negligible 
changes sometimes produce dramatic shifts in overall rank’ (ibid:74). Given 
that the audience of the rankings ‘are remote from the messiness of their 
production’ the rankings appear to be value-neutral and objective 
observations, rather than significant interventions (2009:72).  
Similarly, in his analysis of risk management, Power (2004) argues that it 
tends to lead to ‘defensive practice’ within organisations in which the focus is 
primarily on producing an audit trail acceptable to the regulator, and guarding 
against litigation, rather than on the needs of a client or the public interest. 
This was a key concern about the HPC plans expressed by the Alliance; that 
the plans would discourage both individual therapists and organisations from 
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taking potentially beneficial risks, or from taking on complex or difficult clients 
who present a higher risk of litigation (Arbours Association et al, 2009), (see 
Chapter Six). Power (2004) focusses on how the effectiveness of an 
individual worker can be impacted by excess proceduralisation, suggesting, 
for example, that a procedural culture, including high levels of 
proceduralisation of high level risk and dangerous situations can diminish a 
worker’s confidence and capacity to think responsively in dangerous 
situations. Given that each dangerous situation is likely to be unique, or at 
least have unique aspects, the inculcation of worker preoccupation with 
procedure is a recipe for him or her being blindsided by procedure, rather 
than facilitated to respond in a discretionary way that s/he judges to be most 
helpful in the situation (ibid). This is similar to Schon’s (1983) claim, as 
outlined above, that excessively routinized practice - as a result at an 
individual professional level from strong familiarity with particular types of 
cases - can lead to a professional being ‘selectively inattentive to phenomena 
that do not fit the categories of his knowing-in-action’ (Schon, 1983:61).  
 
Mol (2008), in her study on the care of patients with diabetes by doctors 
draws our attention to how even technical orientated medical practice and 
treatments often appear more objective than they actually are. Mol’s work 
highlights how inherently ‘contextual’ and processual medical practice in fact 
is. Her work can therefore perhaps serve to caution us, in the context of the 
HPC struggle, against absolute or overly sharp demarcations between 
healthcare practices as such and the talking therapies and other less 
technical professional practices. Mol shares with structural functionalists, 
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contra Ilich, strong confidence in at least some medical expertise: diabetes, 
she notes, prior to medically produced insulin, simply used to be a death 
sentence. So medical expertise as such is not her target. For Mol, what she 
refers to as a ‘logic of choice’ within healthcare, is understood as a way of 
challenging patriarchal authority within medicine, as within the logic of choice 
patients are constructed as active consumers within healthcare. She sums 
the logic of choice up as ‘patient’s manage, doctor’s implement’ (Mol, 
2008:63). In this logic the doctor tends to be reduced to the technician – 
attending to his or her instruments and providing the patient with the 
information and facts, which the patient then uses to make value-based 
decisions about what to do. Mol contests the suitability of a market form of 
democratisation within the clinical setting, rather than contesting the 
democratisation of expertise as such: ‘as patients we are treated as objects 
and made passive. This is a bad practice that should be stopped’ (ibid:6). She 
contends that a market orientated logic of choice within clinical settings is 
inappropriate at a general level because ‘a market requires that the product 
that changes hands in a transaction be clearly defined’ (ibid:20). This, 
however, is not a good fit with the nature of disease: ‘diseased bodies are 
unpredictable. It follows from this unpredictability that care is not a well-
delineated product, but an open-ended process. Try, adjust, try again’ 
(ibid:20). Whilst a market requires that a product have a ‘beginning and an 
end’, in contrast, in what Mol calls the logic of care, ‘care is an interactive, 
open ended process that may be shaped and reshaped depending on its 
results’ (ibid:20). More specifically, Mol demonstrates that the logic of choice 
tends to assume that facts and values are easy to separate out, and that 
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medical practice is a relatively simple application of medical expertise to 
particular cases, and that treatment is a linear process. But Mol contends that 
it is not, but rather considerably contextually variable and non-linear. In the 
example of diabetes, excessively low and excessively high blood sugar levels 
acquire their significance from ‘their relation to a standard of the normal blood 
sugar level’ (ibid:45). But Mol argues that not even this is a simple given, but 
in fact varies from patient to patient. Medical practice and treatment therefore 
must proceed as a ‘trial and error’ experiment in order to meet the particular 
needs of each patient. Determining the right treatment for a patient requires 
interaction between the patient and doctor, not the simple application of pre-
packaged treatments. Mol also argues that the logic of choice is unsuitable for 
the clinical setting as it assumes that the patient is nothing more than a 
rational actor, whereas within the logic of care, our minds are not assumed to 
be entirely rational, but instead ‘full of gaps, contradictions and obsessions’ 
(ibid:25). In the logic of choice the doctor does not seek to engage with the 
patient in relation to these aspects, and the doctor acting in accordance with a 
‘logic of choice’ is less likely to discover from their patient, for example, that 
he or she refuses to keep regular tabs on their condition (e.g. measure their 
blood sugar levels or decline certain foods offered) because of 
embarrassment and anxiety about doing so in public. They are more likely to 
see the patient as having made a ‘rational choice’ which is simply to be 
‘respected’. There is some affinity between Mol’s conceptualisation of the 
patient here as emotionally complex and what many talking therapies tend to 
presuppose about clients. Like some talking therapies, Mol also questions the 
Western tendency to valorise independence and disavow our everyday 
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(inter)dependence. But in foregrounding the vulnerabilities and complexities 
of the patient, and in highlighting interdependence, Mol is not advocating a 
return to professional paternalism, but rather a different model of the 
democratisation of expertise, advocating a kind of practice and doctor-patient 
relationship which she seeks to capture by the concept of ‘doctoring’. This 
quite simply refers to a process whereby the treatment and decisions about it 
are regarded as a shared endeavour between doctor and patient, where 
asymmetries within the relationship are recognised, but where the voice of the 
patient is heard and is seen as inherent to the process of medical treatment. 
Neither the doctor nor the patient are presumed to be sovereign or in 
possession of a definitive or complete knowledge. Mol entreaties:  
Let us, somehow, share the doctoring. Let us experiment, experience and tinker 
together practically. This is far from easy. Shared doctoring requires that everyone 
concerned should take each other’s contributions seriously and at the same time attune 
to what bodies, machines, good stuff and other relevant entities are doing (ibid:56).   
 
 
This echoes Schon’s (1983), as explored above, stipulation that both the 
client and the professional need to be willing to engage within reflective 
practice in which the uncertainty of expertise and of the terrain of practice is 
foregrounded to a greater extent, as distinct from strong levels of paternalistic 
assurance, papering over, so to speak, the ‘trial and error’ and uncertain 
nature of practice.  
 
Before examining literature which focusses on the political dynamics of how 
new regimes of practice are installed, I want briefly to examine literature 
which critiques the institutionalisation, which has occurred over recent 
decades, of a sharp demarcation between policy making and its 
administration. In later chapters, as already noted, I argue that this critique is 
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particularly pertinent to understanding elements of the policy process within 
the HPC struggle. 
 
 
A critique of the policy making process: An esxcess demarcation between 
policy-making and its administration?  
 
The so called ‘next steps’ programme of reform of the civil service during the 
1980s created a sharp distinction between policy formulation and 
administration (Du Gay, 2000), in which the ‘administration’ of some key 
government responsibilities have been outsourced to quasi-autonomous 
agencies, such as the Child Support Agency (CSA) and the HPC, with these 
supposedly independent agencies charged with the task of implementing 
policy decided by ministers. However, the distinction between policy 
formulation and administration is not easy to make in practice, Du Gay claims, 
as policy is significantly developed during the course of its application or 
administration. This is because, Du Gay, notes, ‘what we have in legislation 
are statements of greater or lesser generality which become meaningful only 
in application to particular cases’ (Du Gay, 2000:90). Given that ministers can 
only deal with a small number of applications, and given the imprecise nature 
of original policy statements, officials are left with considerable discretion. It is 
arguably this inherent character of policy making which makes having policy 
making and its administration seated in entirely separate institutions 
problematic. It fosters what King and Crewe (2013) refer to as an ‘institutional 
disconnect’ between policy making and administration, and increases the 
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likelihood of ‘policy fiascos occurring. King and Crewe define the latter as a 
policy failure or farce that is universally regarded as having been avoidable.  
Institutional disconnect means that there is less feedback from administrators 
of the policy on the ground, so to speak, back up to the higher level policy 
makers. Something on the ground may suggest that the higher level policy 
needs modifying, or abandoning altogether, but with the institutional 
disconnect this is less likely to happen. The line of accountability is also 
obscured, so that the minister in practice tends not to be held wholly 
accountable for the whole process as any policy failure can be attributed to 
the agency in the name of an administrative error. This potential ‘get out 
clause’ for the minister makes it more likely that he or she will not be attentive 
to negative appraisals of how the policy might or is evolving on the ground. 
Du Gay (2000) and King and Crewe (2013) also argue that the cultural 
tendency towards ‘frank and fearless’ advice (Du Gay:146), which was 
traditionally the duty of the civil servant to a minister, has been largely 
replaced with a ‘can do attitude’ (ibid:92) in which the civil servant is expected 
to strongly promote ministerial policy objectives, rather than present any 
serious concerns about the administrative feasibility of policy plans.  
Now let us look at aspects of this literature and other literature which focusses 
on the political dynamics of how regimes of practice are contested, 
dismantled, installed, and defended.  
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Ideological critiques of the rise of the regulatory state 
 
A range of literature identifies how the ‘discourse of the market’ (Fournier, 
2000) and notions of ‘globalisation’, instability, and increased complexity and 
intricacy within the organisational environment are used to legitimate a range 
of institutional reforms across sectors of the economy, including the 
professions and government. Above, I have already looked at some literature 
which evaluates the impact of some of these reforms, including the 
introduction of multi-layers of audit and regulatory practices, on the 
professions and government, (e.g Moran, 2003), (Power, 1999, 2004), and of 
the introduction of quasi-markets into the professions (e.g. Mol, 2008). 
Fournier (2000) identifies three key areas of interrelated reform: (i) The 
introduction of quasi-markets within the professions: (ii) the making of the 
client as ‘sovereign consumer’, as opposed to ‘dependent’ client; and (iii) The 
breakdown of professional monopolies of competence, and of barriers both 
within and between professions. Instead ‘integration and flexibility’ are 
celebrated: ‘members of different occupational groups are now required to 
work in multi-functional teams’ (78). A key point suggested by a range of 
literature is that the ‘discourse of the market’ – defined by Fournier as ‘a 
broad range of discursive and material practices closely aligned with market 
liberalism and articulated around notions of flexibility, individual freedom and 
responsibility’ (ibid:77) – are recurrently presented as forces over and above 
the rest of society, directing and determining society from without. In this 
respect neo-liberalism has affinities with Marxism. Andrews (1999),  for 
example, claims that New Labour justified ‘welfare retrenchment, labour 
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market deregulation, the privatisations of public services’ (Bates, 2008:25) as 
necessary responses to changes in the global economy, itself characterised 
as ‘a self-regulating, implacable force of nature about which we can do 
nothing except look out of the window and hope for the best’ (ibid:21).  
Watson and Hay (2003) similarly contend that the globalisation thesis that 
there are profound and ineluctable moves towards a single world market is in 
fact not a reality, but in fact an ‘image of globalisation, [that New Labour 
appealed to], as a non-negotiable external economic constraint in order to 
render contingent policy choices appear ‘necessary’” (289).  The Leitzch 
Review (2006), which underpinned the Government’s Skills for Health project, 
including the project to map the National Occupational Standards of 
counselling and psychotherapy, couches the need for reform as regards skills 
sets in terms of an urgent national need to respond to globalisation. There is 
no sense in this report that New Labour played a role in shaping a particular 
form or vision of ‘globalisation’ (more on this within Chapter Four). Given that 
the discourse of the market partially underpinned the shift towards multi-
functional professional teams within the public services, it is reasonable to 
surmise that it also to an extent underpinned the shift towards multi-
professional regulators, like the HPC.  
 
Williams and Apperley (2009) in their paper on reforms to the field of public 
relations highlights ways in which New Labour tended to position itself as 
external to that which it was in fact helping to enact. Williams and Apperley 
(2009) flag up the following passage in a government paper (1998) on its 
‘continuous professional development strategy’:  
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We are in a new age – the age of information and global competition. Familiar 
certainties and old ways of doing things are disappearing […] We have no choice but to 
prepare for this new age in which they key to success will be the continuous 
development of the human mind and imagination. 
 
 
This policy document, Williams and Apperley claim, treats as extrinsic that 
which it is helping to enact. In other words the document has ‘an ideological 
function of masking that state of affairs’: what are in fact a contingent set of 
circumstances are presented as inevitable. The document in this respect is 
covertly prescriptive. Other key rhetorical strategies to render particular policy 
reforms apparently necessary or ‘natural’ are identified within the literature. 
These include what Clarke et al (2007) refer to as a tendency to ‘collapse 
spatial differences into time’, creating ‘one modernity’ assumed 
uncontrovertibly to constitute progress (12). Williams and Apperley (2009) 
note that there is a tendency to create a dualism between different forms of 
organisation or regime, and to rhetorically position a ‘new’ form of 
organisation against an ‘old staid’ form, and attribute the former with 
overwhelmingly positive attributes and prospects for the future, and the latter 
with negative consequences, such as company, organisational, or national 
decline. Modernity is assumed to be spatially   Williams and Apperley (2009) 
note that a sharp logic of inclusion and exclusion was set up by New Labour 
between the forces of conservativism, including ‘staid’ bureaucracy, on the 
one hand, and forces of modernity, ‘new’ professionalism, on the other: Blair 
stated that ‘what threatens the nation-state today is not change, but a refusal 
to change’ (Williams an Apperley, 2009).19 This dualism, coupled with what 
Clarke et al (2007) refer to as ‘collapsing spatial difference into time’ renders 
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the policy apparently on the side of the tide of history (12), and ideologically 
seeks to temporalize the heterogeneity within organisations i.e. competing 
values and forms of practice within an organisation are divided into those that 
are deemed to be on the side of progressive history and those that are 
antiquated, thereby attempting to make contingent and contestable policy 
decisions about what counts as ‘progress’ seem uncontroversial and un-
contestable (ibid). Similarly, Du Gay (2000) claims that contemporary 
management theory and practice are shot through with a quasi-religious 
ethos; a religious and romantic narrative in which enterprise will bring 
collective and individual salvation in the wake of the degradation wreaked by 
bureaucracy.  
 
Fournier’s (2000) argues that the client as ‘sovereign consumer’ has to an 
extent eroded the boundary or division between the professional and client 
(and therefore the dominance of the professional). But this does not take into 
account what is an apparent increase in the shoring-up of professional 
authority through highly contestable approaches to and representations of 
research, namely the ‘evidence based practice’ movement. I argue in Chapter 
Five that the ‘sovereign consumer’, or consumer choice within healthcare, are 
in fact strongly delimited by professional knowledge, or at least by the 
expertise produced by a managerial and research elite within professions (as 
explored above). 
 
Finally, another strategy to promote institutional reform of occupations is quite 
simply to promise professional autonomy and prestige, but actually deliver a 
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more controlling form of professionalism. Workers are attracted to what is a 
‘myth or an ideology of professionalism which includes aspects such as 
exclusive ownership of an area of expertise, autonomy and discretion in work 
practices and occupational control of work’ (Evetts, 2003:406). This ideal 
image better fits archetypal professionalism (our main focus in the first half of 
this chapter) as a normative system of values. The ideal image is used, the 
theory goes, to acquire consent for organisational change, but what workers 
often get is in fact very different from what they were promised. They get 
‘bureaucratic, hierarchical and managerial controls […] and budgetary 
restrictions and rationalizations: performance targets, accountability and 
increased political control’ rather than collegiate relations and increased 
collective and individual autonomy (ibid:407). For our purposes it is perhaps 
helpful to hold in mind that the idea of professionalism has considerable 
broad appeal to both workers and ‘customers’. 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter I have explored a diverse range of intellectual traditions and 
literature on professions and regulation. First I examined two key but 
contrasting texts on the HPC struggle. Waller and Guthrie (2013), drawing on 
a ‘process model’ approach to professions, contend that professions do 
embody diversity in the form of competing segments, and that a tendency to 
emphasise the homogeneity of professions fed into a misleading anxiety that 
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the HPC is a threat to diversity within the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy. I have argued that the ‘segment’ analysis could also easily be 
adopted to support the opposite view; that the HPC posed a significant threat 
to the autonomy and identity of some forms of talking therapy within the field, 
whilst offering greater opportunities to other segments within the field. I have 
also argued that Waller and Guthrie fail to adequately theorise the fact that 
the HPC plans were abandoned. 
 
In a very different approach, Postle (2012) provides though a collection of 
articles written during the course of the struggle a rich normative and 
ideological critique of the HPC struggle. The HPC is cast as a severe threat to 
diversity within the field, and as a metonym for medical domination and 
bureaucratisation. Postle draws on Scott’s (1998) distinction between metis 
and techne; the latter is a top-down administrative approach which does 
violence to specificity of that which it administrates, and metis is social 
organisation from the ground up, which respects diversity. Postle (2012) uses 
the concept of ‘trance induction’, conveying a sense that ideologies ‘grip’ 
people, but does not theorise how this occurs.  
 
In the second section of the chapter I examined broader literature on 
professions. We looked at contrasting private and public interest accounts. 
Structural functionalist on the one hand, and Marxist and neo-Weberian 
accounts like those of Ivan Ilich, present polarised and mutually exclusive 
account of professions, and yet each seems to capture important dimensions 
of the reality of professions. Whilst structural functionalist approaches 
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highlight the importance of norms, values, truth, and science in the 
constitution of professions, Marxist and neo-Weberian accounts tend to 
highlight the work of power and ideology in the construction and operation of 
professions. All of these approaches ultimately imagine an end to politics 
(where truth supplants power). In the case of structural functionalism this 
tends tacitly to be seen as already achieved by professions, and in Marxist 
and strong neo-Weberian approaches, there is a promise of an end to politics 
to come through a communist revolution or, in an Illich style analysis, a return 
to golden age of community unencumbered by state and professional 
bureaucracies. I have also highlighted deterministic tendencies, tacit or 
express, within these accounts, sometimes coupled problematically with a 
simultaneous postulation of a very strong subject/agency. The governmental 
Foucauldian approach effectively addresses these polarisations by displacing 
the contradiction in theory onto the terrain of social reality itself: professions 
are heterogeneous and made up of competing discourses and constructions 
of reality. Professions are foregrounded as both the governed and the 
governing. Fournier (1999), drawing on the work of Foucault, argues that 
professions are broadly conducive to the needs of liberal government and 
society, inciting and governing in the name of freedom. The talking therapies 
too are seen as broadly conducive to liberal government. This analysis 
thereby softens the demarcation between emancipation and social control.   
 
In the third section I have examined literature which focusses on the rise of 
the regulatory state and the simultaneous introduction of the logic of the 
market into public professions; all things that are often perceived to have 
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diminished the individual and collective autonomy of professions. Moran 
(2003) provides a useful historical and descriptive analysis of the general shift 
from a system of statutory self-regulation to the rise of the regulatory state. 
However, I have argued that Moran’s contention that the new regulatory state 
brings Enlightenment revolution proper is not adequately supported. Rather, 
Moran’s work embodies polarisation between public and private interest 
accounts in a single poorly integrated theory. Moran’s (2003) celebration is 
predicated on a putative objectivity and power-free status of the regulatory 
state, and an examination of literature critical of the regulatory state, including 
audit practices, and of the evidence based practice movement within 
medicine and the talking therapies, throws this claim into doubt. I have 
highlighted as particularly pertinent to the HPC struggle,  the restratification of 
medicine thesis, and its contention that the government co-opted research 
and managerial elites within medicine, creating greater differentiation 
between these and rank and file professionals. But whilst strong on identifying 
the relations within a profession, the approach tends to efface how regulatory 
changes have impacted the ‘content’ of medical practice. For this I have 
turned to the work of Mol (2008) and (Healey), who examine how logics of the 
market have diminished the capacity of doctors to be ‘attuned’ to the 
specificity of the patient as a complex subject. Fournier (2000) highlights how 
the logic of the market is at play within the professions in recent decades; 
how it is sometimes embraced and at other times resisted. She also provides 
for our purposes an important link between the ideology of globalisation, and 
the notion of complexity invoked in relation to it, and the emergence of multi-
functional/professional teams within the NHS. Finally, I have touched upon 
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relevant literature on the policy making process (Du Gay 2000), (King and 
Crewe, 2013); namely the shift in recent decades towards a sharper 
institutionalisation of the demarcation between policy making and its 
administration (or between high and low levels of policy making), for example 
between the Department of Health and the Health Professions Council. Whilst 
overtly designed to increase efficiency and sharpen the instrumental power of 
the democratically elected, Du Gay (2000) and King and Crewe (2013)  raise 
concerns that it has fostered an excessive ‘can do’ attitude within government 
and concomitant failure to subject policy proposals to adequate scrutiny and 
modification in the course of their development on the ground. I have also 
examined literature which addresses the political dynamics of how particular 
social and political regimes are installed; for example through the tendency of 
New Labour to depoliticise  the pursuit of particular economic policy by 
rhetorically rendering ‘globalisation’ an entirely external quasi-natural 
phenomenon over which we have no collective control (Watson and Hay, 
2003); and Clarke et al (2007)  and Du Gay (2000) have identified ways in 
which particular policy options out of a pot of possible ones become 
temporalized in a manner which rhetorically renders them the only viable 
option – as if only one select set of policies can successfully ride the wave of 
history. In other words this literature suggests ways in which the contingency 
of particular policy regimes are denied in an effort to diminish their 
contestation.   
 
In the next chapter I set out the contours of the theoretical and research 
approach I have adopted within my research. I set out some of the key ways 
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in which the approach draws upon some of the strengths identified within the 
existing literature, as well as how it helps to address some of the explanatory 
deficits of the literature reviewed here.  
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    CHAPTER THREE 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH STRATEGY  
 
In this chapter I set out the ‘blue prints’ of this research - that is the basic 
assumptions made by the ‘logics approach’ about the nature of social and 
political reality – as well as provide an exposition of the research process i.e. 
how I have ‘applied’ the research and conceptual tools of the logics approach 
to the specific case of the struggle over the HPC plans. I seek to address a 
number of interrelated questions and issues. These include what ‘added 
value’ the logics approach has over other approaches reviewed within the last 
chapter, as well as questions about the role of researcher judgment within the 
research process, and questions about the objectivity of this research, 
especially given that it is couched as an ‘intervention’. I also seek to address 
the question of replicability of this research within other similar contexts.    
I argue that the ‘logics’ plus ‘nodal’ approach, as a particular form of 
discourse analytic approach, shares many of the strengths of Foucauldian 
and discourse approaches considered within Chapter Two.  I argue that the 
‘logics plus nodal’ approach, however, has ‘added value’ in furnishing the 
ground for a more systematic and nuanced descriptive, explanatory, and 
critical account of regulatory struggle. As stated in the introductory chapter 
this includes a clear delineation between normative and ethico-ideological 
critique. An evaluation of what ‘is’ the case, how this has become the case, 
and how it could, and perhaps ‘ought’ to be otherwise are all within the scope 
of enquiry. The latter includes the theorisation and critical explanation of how 
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and why particular policy imaginaries often ‘grip’ people, thereby addressing 
the explanatory deficit in other accounts when it comes to the role of affect in 
regulatory policy and struggles. This three pronged approach to analysis, in 
which I address the normative, political, and affective dimensions of the 
struggle, helps to steer a path clear of a number of pitfalls (some identified in 
Chapter Two as evident within existing literature on the professions and 
regulation) in which lurk a myriad of explanatory excesses and imbalances, 
including determinism (akin to claims of ‘inevitability’); covert prescription 
within ‘merely’ descriptive literature; lack of normative critique; and a lack of a 
handle on the historical and political dynamics of the regulatory and policy 
controversy.   
Setting out the fundamental ‘assumptions’ - the ‘ontological presuppositions’ 
in the parlance of political theory - made within the logics approach, and 
providing an exposition of the research process, are part of a social scientific 
and political commitment to ‘openness’;  not only making the fundamentals of 
the approach, but also the specific reiteration, or ‘application’, of the approach 
within this case study more available to critique and further reiteration, or 
‘replication’, within similar research contexts. This foregrounding of the blue 
prints and the process of working out, so to speak, helps, as Bacchi (2012) 
suggests, to counter a tendency of many interpretative and discourse 
theorists not to set out the theoretical contours, or the methodological detail, 
of their research, leaving their work vulnerable to charges that it is ‘glorified 
commentary’, laden with ideological and researcher bias, in comparison to 
supposedly more ‘scientific’ and methodologically driven (i.e. quantitative), or 
‘merely’ descriptive approaches within social science.  
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As regards structure I begin by drawing out what we can assume, through the 
‘prism’ of the ‘logics’ approach, about the HPC regulatory struggle; that is the 
assumptions that are made about the nature of reality. I then go onto set out 
the key aspects of the ‘logics approach’, namely, the concepts of 
‘problematisation’, retroductive explanation, and the delineation of social, 
political and fantasmatic logics. I also examine how a nodal approach, as a 
comparative analytic framework, can assist in sharpening analysis of norms 
across the competing policy imaginaries. I then draw together the implications 
of this research oeuvre and ‘tool box’ of concepts as regards the objectivity of 
the research (with particular reference to the act of ‘situated judgement’) and 
normative and ethico-ideological critique. The central point is that both social 
reality and research are ‘discursively constituted’; research is therefore 
always a form of ‘intervention’ of sorts into a relatively fluid social reality. Or, 
in other words, one social reality (a research one) meets with another (the 
subject of enquiry). In the third part of this chapter I provide a more concrete 
exposition of the research process, seeking to make explicit how I went about 
putting the blue prints of the logics approach to work within the context of 
building my account of the HPC struggle, addressing how I gathered and 
analysed data, including interview technique, and how I identified social, 
political and fanatasmatic logics within the sea of documentary and interview 
data.  
 
THE ‘LOGICS’ PLUS ‘NODAL’ APPROACH  
As Glynos et al (2014a) state, the logics approach is:  
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Rooted in post-Marxist discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), a logics approach to 
critical policy analysis affirms the fundamental assumption that all social relations are in 
a constitutive and dynamic relation with structured fields of meaning marked by radical 
contingency (2014a:3). 
 
These are the ontological coordinates of the research approach: social reality 
is seen as discursively constituted and marked by radical contingency. It also 
means that social reality and practice is fundamentally contextual and 
relational. This combined with radical contingency means that the social 
phenomenon under investigation (e.g. a regulatory regime) is seen to be 
fundamentally unstable in its identity and therefore (to varying degrees) open 
to becoming other than what it is: a reordering of the fields of meaning in 
which it is positioned would change its identify and practice. Social practice is 
discursive: that is to say social practice is a discourse which is a form of 
saying and doing. Regulation, policy making, talking therapy, are all forms of 
discursive practice, and social scientific research itself is also discursive, 
rather than existing in some ontologically privileged domain outside of social 
phenomena, and as a social activity is therefore a relatively precarious 
‘intervention’ within the field under investigation, as opposed to an absolutely 
objective description or evaluation of it. This post-structuralist approach is part 
of the so called ‘linguistic turn’ across the humanities and the social sciences 
in recent decades, whereby language is seen as partially constituting, rather 
than merely describing, that of which it speaks (Glynos, 2011). Power and 
knowledge are seen as intricately and inextricably linked, and it is therefore 
not possible to speak truth to power from a position entirely free from power, 
since no truth or regime of truth can be fully rationally grounded. 
Poststructuralism is in one sense a step away from political idealism towards 
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the Machiavellian position – the realpolitik – in which powerful interests are 
seen as operating behind the back of political ideals: the latter seen as either 
tools of cynical manipulation, or as mere rhetorical dressing (epiphenomena) 
(Flybjerg, 2001). However, in another sense Laclau and Mouffe take a step 
back from both political idealism and realpolitik analysis in seeing interests as 
constructed within different discursive frames rather than as given or 
transcendent. Ideals, norms and values therefore play a role in constituting 
interests, rather than simply being tools of persuasion for ‘naked’ interests 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007). In post-structuralist parlance, interests are not 
pre-discursive, but are constituted and shaped through systems of meaning. 
For example, whether or not it is in the interests of an individual to pay ‘high’ 
levels of income tax is not a given, but rather is shaped by one competing 
discourse or another. The discourse of economic liberalism, for instance, will 
construct the interests of the individual considerably differently – placing them 
in a different field of meaningful practices – than a socialist discourse.   
Radical contingency, relationality, and anti-foundationalism within the logics 
approach afford important analytic and political advantages, but also present 
obvious challenges when it comes to questions of objectivity. I will address 
the latter below. But first I want to address some of advantages whilst 
providing a brief exposition of the logics approach developed by Glynos and 
Howarth (2007), based on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985).  
 I first examine key concepts and ‘steps’ within the approach, namely 
‘problematisation’, ‘retroductive’ explanation, and ‘logics’ as an explanatory 
category. ‘Logics’ are further broken down into ‘social, ‘political’ and 
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‘fantasmatic’ logics (Glynos and Howarth,2007), each facilitating an analytic 
focus on different facets of the HPC policy dispute and struggle.  
A first step in the policy analysis process is to identify and broadly delimit the 
policy problem or ‘anomaly’ to be addressed. This already involves some 
immersion within the ‘problematisations’ within, and of, the field in question.  
The term ‘problematisation’ is close in meaning to ‘view-point’ or ‘discourses’. 
Competing problematisations about the HPC plans, for instance, are 
essentially competing view-points and arguments about it, or competing ways 
of ‘framing’ it. However, the term seeks to capture and convey the constitutive 
nature of discourse and of ‘arguments’. The ‘problem’ and possible ‘solutions’ 
are not seen as ‘givens’, simply waiting to be ‘discovered’’, but are 
constructed as specific kinds of problem, which give rise to particular kinds of 
solutions. Griggs and Howarth (2013) cite Foucault’s (1997) definition of 
problematisation as ‘a movement of critical analysis in which one tries to see 
how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but also how 
these different solutions result from a specific problematization’ (Griggs and 
Howarth, 2013:41). 
As already noted within Chapter One, a broad ‘problematisation’ made of the 
field of the talking therapies in relation to regulation was that HPC regulation 
would deal with ‘a very small problem minority’ within the field which posed a 
threat to the public. Conversely, the Alliance ‘problematised’ the HPC plans 
as a severe threat to diversity within the field. In the main research chapters, 
five-seven, I start with an ‘overview of events’ which set out the main 
‘problematisations’ of the key actors within the struggle. In the case of the 
HPC plans, for example, this includes their characterisation of the ‘content’ of 
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the HPC plans, what their likely impact on the field was, as well as the more 
ideological and political dimension of strategies towards both the 
implementation and derailment of the plans. I then subject these broad 
‘problematisations’ to critical assessment and ‘re-articulation’ through the 
framework of the ‘logics plus nodal approach’. The concept of (re)articulation 
seeks to capture the fact that my account (and any account) is not simply a 
‘neutral’ description of events, but necessarily involves a critical 
‘reorganisation’ of key discursive elements at play within the struggle (more 
on this below). Before examining the explanatory category of ‘logics’, let me 
first give a brief exposition of the concept of retroduction.  
 
Retroductive-explanation 
The most important criterion for admitting a hypothesis as valid is that it 
accounts for the problem at hand (Griggs and Howarth, 2013). In the case of 
the HPC struggle a key criterion is perhaps to what extent the thesis gives a 
credible account of the existing multiple and contradictory 
accounts/problematisations of the ‘rise and fall’ of the HPC plans. Or in other 
words, to what extent does it provide a convincing account of the ‘rise and fall’ 
of the HPC plans whilst taking into account competing points of view (rather 
than, for example, ‘bracketing off’ key problematisations). The task within the 
retroductive operation is to establish a putative explanation and to then work 
‘backwards’, seeking to establish what must be true in order to account for the 
rise and fall of the HPC plans. Or more specifically, in Chapter Six, for 
example, I seek to give a retroductive account of what I contend to be the 
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HPC’s apparent failure to recognise its own plans as ‘transactional’ in 
character, and therefore their apparent failure to recognise how the plans 
were set to be a significant reshaping intervention within the field. The 
putative hypothesis/account is continuously reiterated and modified during the 
process of research through a continuous ‘to and fro’ movement between 
putative explanation, theoretical reflection, and discovery of empirical 
material. This retroduction is in counter-distinction to ‘theory-driven’ and 
‘method-driven’ approaches. Shapiro (2002) claims that in the former there is 
a tendency to seek to ‘vindicate a particular theory rather than illuminate a 
problem that is specified independently of the theory’ (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007:167). ‘Method driven’ research tends to be ‘motivated more by the 
techniques of data-gathering and analysis than by a concern with the 
empirical phenomena under investigation’ (ibid:167).  
Let us now look at the status of the main unit of analysis: the ‘logic’.  
 
Social, political, and fantasmatic logics 
The concept of the ‘logic’ as developed and used by Glynos and Howarth 
(2007) helps to tread a middle path between subsumptive explanations, in 
which the specificity of the phenomena under investigation tends to be 
effaced as it is placed under the category of a general category or law, and 
highly particularistic accounts, in which the phenomena under investigation is 
regarded as so unique as to make any generalisation worthless. An example 
of a subsumptive account is that of Waller’s and Guthrie’s (2013) tendency to 
subsume both art therapy and the talking therapies under the HPC as a kind 
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of universal regulatory approach:  they contended that the regulation would 
not, or does, not distort the fields it regulates. They do this, I contend, without 
adequate forensic examination of the norms embodied within either of the 
fields in question, or of the norms within the HPC regulatory regime.   A key 
contention within this research is that this account offered within and of the 
struggle contributed to an attempt to efface that the HPC plans, as a complex 
of regulatory practices, would themselves have been subsumptive, drawing 
diverse talking therapies under supposedly universal norms of practice, and in 
so doing would have exacted considerable ‘violence’ to the specificity of many 
talking therapies under its auspices. An example of an excessively 
particularistic account of the HPC struggle would be one that claimed that the 
field’s resistance to the plans was driven and constituted solely by practices 
and concepts entirely unique to the field and to the struggle, and would be an 
account that falls into the error of regarding the identity of any regime or set of 
practices as ‘hermeneutically sealed’ from the rest of the world (see below in 
relation to the Derridian concept of the ‘iterability’ of the sign).  
The concept of ‘logic’ helps forge a middle path in its counter-distinction from 
a ‘law’. In keeping with anti-essentialism ‘logics’ are not regarded as having 
an essence, but are understood as a ‘range of grammars in which ‘logic’ is 
uttered, articulated, implied […]’ whose identification as grammars of logic 
‘does not mean that we have to isolate a feature or set of features they all 
have in common’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 134). Rather, they have, in 
Wittgenstein’s terms, ‘family resemblances’. The concept of logic does not 
‘establish the logical essence of a practice, for this runs the risk of ‘subliming’ 
logic by conceding it a super-hard, transcendental status in relation to the 
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world of empirical propositions’ (ibid:135). Social logics concerns the 
rules/grammar determining what can and cannot be said, rules governing 
what combinations can and cannot be made. The concept of logic also helps 
to avoid an excess particularism, in which it is thought that the only way that 
social phenomenon can be properly understood is limited to a thick 
description of how it is understood by the actors involved. The Derridian 
concept of the ‘iterability’ of the sign helps capture how the concept of logic 
seeks to avoid both excess particularism and subsumption. Iterability refers to 
the contention that a sign is simultaneously the self-same and yet also 
modified when it is articulated in each new context. The meaning of a sign 
cannot be reduced entirely to the context in which it is articulated as the 
context is not entirely ‘closed off’ from the rest of the world. In this sense, 
strictly speaking, a purely hermeneutic account of a phenomenon is 
impossible. The iterability of the sign makes all research an intervention. But 
on the other hand, neither can the meaning of the sign be reduced to a 
meaning that is abstracted from all the contexts in which it is articulated. In 
other words a sign or concept is not transcendent of the contexts in which it is 
articulated, but nor are they reducible to the contexts in which they are 
articulated.   
More simply, social logics are the norms governing or framing - shaping 
rather than simply describing - practice. Formulated in Foucauldian terms 
social logics concern the ‘archaeological’ dimension of analysis, whereby the 
complex of norms governing a regime are identified and evaluated (ibid:207) . 
In relation to the regime of ‘transactionality’, for example, the analysis of the 
social logics of the projected HPC plans includes the ‘thick description’ and 
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normative evaluation of the plans, including the identification and evaluation 
of the complex of norms articulated within the plans, including 
standardisation, hierarchy, transactionality, and what I refer to as ‘pluralism-
lite’ as regards the structure of the field envisaged  It is important to note that 
social logics are ‘always contextual entities, arising in particular historical and 
political circumstances’ (ibid:137), and therefore always, to use Heidegger’s 
terminology, concern the ‘ontical’ dimension of the social world (ibid:15). 
Turning now to the so called political and fantasmatic logics, these concern 
how regimes are built, defended, contested and dismantled. Formulated 
within Foucauldian terms, political logics concern the ‘genealogical’ dimension 
of analysis (ibid: 207), and concern the identification of how particular social 
regimes have become ‘naturalised’ and their radical contingency hidden from 
everyday view, or, in other words, it concerns how the social relations and 
practices have become ‘hegemonic’. In addition fantasmatic logics help to 
address why particular discourses ‘grip’ subjects. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
identify two main political logics, the logics of equivalence and the logics of 
difference. Logics of equivalence refers to when elements within a ‘discursive 
entity’ (a system of meaning) are articulated together to form an equivalential 
chain, which, formulated in terms of a social group, predominate when 
differences within the group are de-emphasised and similarities are 
emphasised. However, the group does not cohere so much around the 
identification of a trait common to all members, but rather around an element 
of opposition, external to the group. Darian Leader for example when asked 
about conflict within the Alliance said that the HPC as a ‘common enemy’ 
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helped to unite the group (Glynos and Howarth, 2007).20.Logics of difference 
refer to when differences within a social group are emphasised, and are 
therefore more internally differentiated. In Chapters Six and Seven I explore, 
for example, how the pro-HPC camp remained significantly divided on the 
detail of the HPC plans, unable to unite more fully around a ‘common enemy’. 
Political logics have a ‘quasi-transcendental’ status in so far as they are 
necessary for the constitution of some form of social regime. The approach 
therefore tends to foreground antagonism as constitutive and irreducible, on 
the side of more Nietzschean and Foucauldian, rather than Habbermasian 
conceptualisations of rationality, and is sceptical about the possibility of full 
rational consensus (Flybjerg, 2001). In this respect the logics approach 
arguably tends towards a ‘tragic’ conceptualisation of social and political life in 
the sense that it tends to structure into its thinking the impossibility of an end 
to politics, or of an end to struggle. Given the levels of acrimony, antagonism, 
and deep pluralism within the history of regulation of the field of the talking 
therapies, as well as the failure of the HPC’s somewhat ‘rationalist’ policy 
approach (in so far as it claimed to identify universal standards of practice), a 
robust theoretical foregrounding of antagonism is arguably a ‘good fit’ with the 
phenomena under investigation.  
From the above we can already see elements of critique. There is the 
normative critique encompassed within the thick description and evaluation of 
the social logics of a regime, of which there are three distinct, though 
overlapping sources. First, an ‘immanent’ critique, in which a regime or policy 
imaginary is assessed against itself. In Chapter Six, for example, I highlight 
                                                          
20 Darian Leader (Darian Leader (Lacanian psychoanalyst, Alliance co-founder), interview by 
author, June 2014. 
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tensions in the HPC’s tendency to claim that the HPC allows professions to 
determine how it assesses the effectiveness of practice, whilst simultaneously 
claiming that the HPC itself guarantees the safety and effectiveness of 
practice. As another example, in Chapter Five, the actions of Skills for Health 
are subject to critique against its own professed inclusivity. Second, the 
counter-norms and the critique levelled by opponents of a regime are drawn 
upon. For instance, I draw on the material of the Alliance to critique the HPC 
plans, and vice-versa. Third, imported values and norms inform my critique, 
namely ones of democracy and pluralism. We can also discern that the 
political and fantasmatic logics help constitute and furnish a more ethico-
ideological critique, focussed on how the pro and anti-HPC camps sought 
rhetorically and politically to persuade, nudge, seduce, and/or force others to 
embrace, accept or be resigned to their respective policy imaginaries and 
aims. This ‘denaturalises’ actual and projected regimes, helping to avoid the 
deterministic tendencies, either express or tacit, of many approaches to 
regulatory struggle. To recall from the last chapter there is a tendency within 
much existing literature to tacitly reify regulatory trends as if they are an 
unfolding of the essence of history, or as if they are ‘over and above’ the rest 
of society, rather than contingently constituted through a complex of 
discursive practices and political choices. Another angle on this is that the 
logics approach provides a more nuanced way of dealing with the 
agency/structure problem, avoiding the reduction of the individual subject to 
subject positions within and determined by reified discourses or ideologies, 
whilst also avoiding privileging agency over structure ‘in which the subject is 
identified with a kind of textual dispersion and is considered to be as infinitely 
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malleable as the identities she or he constructs’ (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007:128). The logics approach, however, softens the demarcation between 
structure and agency, privileging neither. Glynos and Howarth quote Laclau at 
length and it is worth repeating this in this context:  
If the subject were a mere subject position within the structure, the latter would be fully 
closed and there would be no contingency at all. [Radical contingency is possible only] if 
the structure is not fully reconciled with itself, if it is inhabited by an original lack, by a 
radical undecidability that needs to be constantly superceded by acts of decision. These 
acts are, precisely, what constitute the subject, who can only exist as a will transcending 
the structure. Because this will has no place of constitution external to the structure but 
is the result of failure of the structure to constitute itself, it can be formed only through 
acts of identification. If I need to identify with something it is because I do not have a full 
identity in the first place (ibid:129). 
 
The category of fantasmatic logics is also an important part of the ‘added 
value’ of the logics approach, helping to address how a particular regime of 
social relations, despite considerable opposition to it, and despite its 
fundamentally contingent nature, often persists. In the case of the HPC 
struggle the focus is on how the competing policy imaginaries drew the 
affective support of - at least some - people. The concept of the fantasmatic 
logic is drawn from Laclau’s turn to Lacanian psychoanalysis, and helps to 
theorise responses to the radical contingency of all social relations (Ibid). For 
Lacan, uncertainty and contingency induce anxiety: uncertainty and 
contingency are so powerfully anxiety provoking for us that we are often more 
comfortable knowing that we face a terrible fate than being uncertain as to 
whether or not we face a good or terrible fate (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). 
Contingency can otherwise be expressed in slightly different ways as radical 
contextual dependency or uncertainty, fluidity, indeterminancy. In the face of 
anxiety induced by recognition of such contingency, fantasy steps in to bolster 
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the subject’s sense of ‘positive’ identity, or the ‘naturalness’ of the social 
regime in which they are embedded (or are to be embedded). In other words 
ideological fantasy produces a misrecognition about identity. A ‘positive’ 
identity (in a strict sense always only an imagined one) is essentially one not 
subject to the vicissitudes of history and cultural location. The inherent 
impossibility of such a full positive identity is turned into an empirical 
contingency through a ‘fantasmatic narrative’ in which the figure of the 
external ‘obstacle’ is seen as preventing the assumption of full identity, or else 
threatening its continued existence. The potentially damaging impact of this 
kind of narrative ‘operation’ can be clearly seen in the case of racism and 
xenophobia. The inherently relational, incomplete, and, in essence, 
‘undecidable’ nature of Englishness - articulated variably though history and 
cross culturally with no single ‘common’ feature shared by all variations other 
than the signifier of ‘English’ - for example, may be ‘imaginarised’ as a full 
identity through the construction of other national identities, through which 
Englishness is differentially defined, as an obstacle to a full English identity 
and which therefore is potentially an object of deep hatred. This is what is 
referred to as an ideological response to radical contingency – a ‘covering 
over’, or denial of contingency. An ‘ethical’ response in contrast recognises 
the fundamental relational and contextual quality of the identity of 
Englishness. Whilst an ethical response cannot eradicate the differential 
nature of the identity, it can ‘traverse the fantasy’ so that the ‘friend-enemy’ or 
antagonistic relation becomes an agonistic one, marked by an ‘agonistic 
respect’ and greater openness to the ‘other’ and the fundamentally relational 
and incomplete character of our identity (Glynos and Howarth, 2007).  In 
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other words, within an ethical response to contingency there is a propensity to 
recognise that, as Glynos and Howarth put it, ‘any form of identification is 
doomed to fall short of its promise’ (ibid:79). 
Below I draw out more explicitly how the logics approach robustly provides 
the basis for both normative and ethico-ideological critique. But first let me 
give a brief exposition of the nodal comparative analytic framework. Glynos 
and Speed (2012), in their comparative paper on the time-banking industry 
and the UK healthcare regime,  create a comparative analytic framework in 
which to situate and analyse how the principle or ‘social logic’ of ‘co-
production’ is at play across three different ‘nodes’ within the healthcare 
service chain, namely the node of production and distribution, pertaining to 
how the social logic of co-production is at play within how services are made 
available, and the node of delivery, which pertains to how the principle of co-
production is at play within how the practitioner-client relationship is framed, 
and finally, the node of governance, pertaining to how the social logic of co-
production shapes how the other nodes are evaluated and governed (ibid) 
(more on this below). 
So these are the contours of my approach to the HPC struggle. Before going 
onto a more concrete exposition of the research process I want to explore 
some of the ways in which the logics approach addresses issues of objectivity 
and critique.  
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Addressing concerns about objectivity and critique  
Baldly put, if power and knowledge are inextricably linked and social research 
is always already an ‘intervention’ marked by its own values and set of 
limitations, it may be tempting to think that the implication of the post-
structuralist approach is that objectivity goes out of the proverbial window,  
and that an ‘anything goes’ approach is legitimated, and that research is little 
more than mere opinion, motivated by political interest. This is one amongst 
the key charges, as noted by Glynos and Howarth (2007), sometimes levelled 
against post-structuralism (ibid:7). Let me briefly address concerns about the 
objectivity of my research in relation to some of the ‘inherent’ affinities 
between the research I have adopted and the different sides of the argument 
within the HPC struggle.  
 
It is broadly true that the qualitative research approach I have adopted, which 
places significant importance on garnering and incorporating the 
contextualised self-interpretations of actors involved, has affinity with more 
contextual conceptualisations of talking therapy, and professional practice 
more broadly, as well as more contextual conceptualisations of regulation and 
policy making processes, than more acontexutal or transactional ones. It is 
perhaps little surprise then that my research has leaned in favour of more 
contextual regimes of practice and regulation. This affinity is more clearly 
thrown into relief if we spell out how the ethico-ideological ontology of the 
logics approach folds into grounds for the normative critique and evaluation of 
competing policy imaginaries. The ethico-ideological coordinates of the 
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approach, as outlined above, give rise to the question as to what norms of 
practice, or what kind of professional, regulatory, and policy making regimes, 
and, indeed, research practices, help foster more ‘ethical’, rather than 
‘ideological’, responses to radical contingency. Which norms of practice help 
to foster an awareness of both the relationality and contingency of identity 
and social relations, and an enjoyment of more ‘open’ rather than more 
‘closed’ identities and social relations? And which norms of practice within 
professional practices and services, and policy making process, acknowledge 
and incorporate what is taken to be the inherent impossibility of a ‘complete’ 
rational or technical solution to a problem which is genuinely and entirely 
above the ‘fray’ of politics and of competing values? In this sense I seek to 
address which practices cut with rather than against what is taken to be the 
ontological grain of social reality, namely its fundamental contextual, 
relational, and contingent nature. The ontological assumptions of this 
research approach obviously incline my analysis to the view that more 
contextual conceptualisations of practice are likely to lead to more fruitful 
engagement and progress. Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
acknowledge that they import the values of democracy and pluralism: this is 
to an extent reproduced here. Again, this compounds an affinity with certain 
ways of conceptualising professional practice: for example Mol’s emphasis, to 
recall from Chapter Two, on finding ways of democratising the relationship 
between doctor and patient (Mol, 2008), and Healy’s (2013) recommendation 
that medical knowledge needs to be shaped more by practitioners on the 
ground than currently the case. Both Mol and Healy essentially claim that 
what we might characterise as more democratic ways of organising and 
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shaping medical practice is better suited to the nature of both illness and 
medical technologies than highly hierarchical or transactional ways of 
organising and framing it. Furthermore, the Lacanian inflection within the 
approach obviously shares sympathies, so to speak, with positions taken by 
Lacanian (and other schools) of psychoanalysts, as expressed for example 
through the Maresfield Report (Arbours Association et al, 2009), within the 
HPC struggle. There is a shared view of the subject as a subject of desire, as 
distinct, for example from being primarily a rational subject; and there is 
broadly a shared critical analysis of consumer capitalism. As briefly explored 
within Chapter Four, Lacan pitched his school of psychoanalysis against 
American ego psychology and its perceived tendency back in the 1950s to 
seek to overly adapt patients to the demands of consumer capitalism. As 
explored within Chapter Six, a key objection of Lacanian psychoanalysts to 
the HPC plans was that its consumer-contract style framework would negate 
the ability of the analyst to work with a client as a fractured subject of desire.  
So the coordinates of my research are to a significant degree predisposed to 
favour the Alliance over the HPC in so far as the former provides (as I argue) 
a much more robustly contextual conceptualisation of practice than the HPC, 
as well as additional affinities relating to a psychoanalytic-inflected world-
view.   
However, the ontological coordinates have also predisposed my analysis to 
be critical of the tendency of the Alliance at times towards what I refer to as 
‘talking therapy exceptionalism’ in which strong demarcations between talking 
therapy and healthcare practices as such are made. In so far as all discourse 
is in part ‘performative’, and help to create that of which it speaks, talking 
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therapies are, to adopt the Foucauldian phrase, ‘technologies of the self’ 
(Rose, 2003), and therefore shaping interventions. The ontological 
coordinates of the logics approach have also arguably predisposed my 
analysis towards scepticism of the near to apriori demarcations made by 
some Alliance members between professional and community ways of 
organising talking therapy services in which ‘community’ is necessarily seen 
as the good other of the ‘profession’.  As regards the Lacanian inflection of 
the logics research approach, the discourses of Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
other talking therapy schools of thought are not immune to critical analysis 
from a Lacanian inflected analysis. Strong contestation between strands of 
thought within Lacanian psychoanalysis and the field of the talking therapies 
broadly attest to this.  
To reiterate the broader point I am making here, the problem of imputation, in 
so far as it is a problem, occurs at least in part because at an ontological level 
there is always already a degree of imputation into the scene of enquiry by 
the researcher. As noted by Glynos and Howarth (2007) any research 
involves a redescription of phenomena in terms of one’s own presupposed 
ontology (230). Ontology is perhaps analogous to the attributes of an art or 
technological form taken to make a record of a scene. The technological and 
art form of photography, for example, inherently inscribe a scene differently to 
the way a pen and drawing does, or the way done so by audio recording 
equipment. This is not a problem peculiar to qualitative research however. As 
contended by literature reviewed within Chapter Two, quantitative research 
redescribes phenomena in terms of its own ontology, and, often coupled with 
shady executions of quantitative methodologies, produces results – 
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characterised as at the height of objectivity within scientific research - in 
favour of particular practices which on closer inspection amount to little more 
than fictions (as explored within Chapter Two), (see for example Shedler, 
2015, and Hammersley, 2005). There is in short, no matter the research 
approach adopted, no entirely neutral access to, or record of the research 
phenomena to be had. But notwithstanding this fundamental limit, how does 
the researcher avoid entirely imputing their own preformed judgements and 
fantasies onto the phenomena under investigation? Given that there are no 
‘laws’ for social scientists to identify which exist independently of 
interpretation, it follows that research necessarily involves subjective 
interpretation. Glynos and Howarth (2007) note that ‘subjectivity and 
judgement’ play ‘vitally important roles’ within the logics approach. They 
contend that: 
Because no universal rule or law is given – by which one can say – yes these cases are 
identical instances of this ‘law’ [..] if these cases are to be formed into a synthesis at all, 
then some kind of universal form has to be constituted by the power of judgement itself 
(2007:183).  
 
A norm cannot be ‘identified’ in a strict sense as a social, political or 
fantasmatic logic, but must rather be articulated as such through the 
researcher exercising their judgement. Glynos and Howarth (2007) argue that 
this should be done through the exercise of intuition, ‘situated ability’ and a 
form of expertise acquired through learning, practice and experience (84). 
This is against more subsumptive approaches ‘built upon a spurious logic of 
scientific operationalisation that sets out the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for ‘applying’ a concept to an object’. Rather, a researcher must 
‘first immerse themselves in a given discursive field consisting of texts, 
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documents, interviews and social practices, before drawing on their 
theoretical expertise to make particular judgements as to whether something 
counts as an x [….] They then have to decide upon its overall import for the 
problem investigated’ (2007:184). This is contra the cognitivist view that 
expertise can be reduced to a series of rules to be followed. (There are 
obvious affinities between this approach to research and Schon’s 
conceptualisation of reflective professional practice, as explored within 
Chapter Two). The singular retroductive explanation of the problematised 
phenomenon arrived at is to be judged in relation to how well it accounts for 
the problem at hand, and  how persuasive it is (2007:191). As Griggs and 
Howarth (2013) put it, ‘the ultimate “proof of the pudding” consists in the 
production of narratives explaining problematised phenomena, which in turn 
depends partly on the relevant community of critical scholars’ (2013:49). To 
the latter it is possible also to add practitioners within the field in question, as 
well as policy makers, clients and other stakeholders.  
Given the broad coordinates of the poststructuralist logics approach – that 
there is no unmediated or non-discursive access to reality – it perhaps comes 
as no surprise that hard and fast methodological rules tend to be eschewed. 
Laclau for instance rejects methodology as embodying the ‘positivist fallacy’ 
that the research object can be discovered as it is without any discursive 
mediation and independently of the subjective involvement and judgement of 
the researcher (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Method within the research 
process should accordingly be relatively contextual and emergent in relation 
to the specific and unique aspects of the phenomenon under investigation. 
The problem of excessively fixed method within social scientific research is 
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analogous to the problem within excess audit culture, as argued by Michael 
Power (see Chapter Two), where a practitioner whose thinking and action is 
overly shaped by established procedure, may well inadequately respond to 
unique aspects within new situations, sometimes with devastating 
consequences. However, whilst I have not adopted any hard and fast 
methodological ‘rules’, I have adopted some methodological ‘guidelines’. In 
focussing upon these I seek to give an exposition of how the research 
approach was ‘operationalised’ within this specific research context. Strictly 
speaking the research approach is ‘reiterated’ within, rather than simply 
‘applied’ to a new context.  
 
METHODOLOGY  
The research process: The structure of this thesis to a significant extent 
mirrors the research process. I began by surveying existing literature on the 
struggle, namely the collection of papers on psychoanalysis and state 
regulation (Parker and Revelli, 2008) and articles on the internet from 
eIPNOSIS21. These provided an overview of the emergent HPC struggle, key 
issues, themes and perspectives – the key ‘problematisations’ -  within the 
field of the HPC plans, and the IAPT and SfH projects, as well provided an 
overview of aspects of the history of regulatory struggle within the talking 
therapies. Together with the logics approach adopted, this picture helped me 
to begin to delimit the scope of my research and the key questions I wanted 
                                                          
21 See http://ipnosis.postle.net/. 
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to address (as outlined within Chapter One). As already outlined in Chapter 
One, these questions relate to the character of the plans and their associated 
projects, as well as to the political dynamics of how they were both promoted 
and resisted. Quite early in the process I provisionally delimited the research 
as relatively wide in scope in including the broader context of the HPC plans 
i.e. the inclusion of the SfH, IAPT projects and the wider healthcare regulatory 
reforms, as well as significant historical contextualisation, in order to draw out 
the broader antecedents and its broader significance. This is a key reason 
why I spent a significant amount of time critically reviewing a broad body of 
literature on the professions and the rise of the regulatory state, which helped 
to get a good picture of the broader regulatory context and history (some of 
which informed the historical contextualisation chapter). My interpretation and 
critique of the literature was broadly conducted through a post-structuralist 
theoretical prism. In this sense the research process is significantly informed 
from the outset by the post-structuralist theoretical approach adopted. In 
short, within Chapter Two, I have tended to critique the literature through the 
ontological assumptions of the post-structuralist approach, and, therefore, 
have partially sought to render aspects of existing literature and its insights 
compatible with my approach in order to contribute to an integrated and 
singular account of the HPC struggle.22  My initial analysis of existing 
literature tended subsequently to predispose me to look at the HPC and its 
associated projects along two key critical axes. The first was a critical outlook 
                                                          
22 In this sense the sequence within the structure of the thesis – the fact that I have placed 
the research chapter after the literature review – tacitly overstates the linearity of the research 
process: the reality is that the research approach adopted significantly informed how I 
approached the literature review.   
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on the evidence based practice movement and accountability as audit and a 
related tendency to look favourably upon more contextual and relational ways 
of framing professional practice and regulation. The second critical axis my 
critical review of the literature leaned me towards when approaching the HPC 
struggle is a scepticism towards any sharp demarcation between professional 
expertise and non-professional/community expertise. My critical engagement 
with the literature therefore to an extent shaped by engagement with the 
primary research data and material which I went onto gather. Within a 
qualitative research process the demarcation between data gathering and 
data analysis is recognised as partially heuristic in character, namely because 
the art of data gathering always already involves a degree of analysis: to 
contend otherwise is to fall into the empiricist fallacy that it is possible to gain 
unmediated access to the object under investigation (more on this below).   
However, the research broadly followed a process in which initial intense data 
gathering gave way gradually to an increased focus upon analysis. Let me 
briefly address each in turn.    
 
Data gathering:  
The ontology of the logics approach translates into a relatively open ended 
methodological approach to data gathering, in contradistinction to a highly 
generalizable method of hard and fast rules and procedures. Given that 
reality is seen by the logics approach as constituted by competing discourses, 
my data gathering focussed on collecting material from a wide range of actors 
within the HPC struggle using a range of methods and sources.  This was in 
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an effort to make my research more representative. Documentary evidence 
has ranged from the highly official – such as the Government’s White Paper 
on regulation, and the HPC’s consultation papers and minutes of its meetings 
– to more unofficial documents, such as newspaper articles, public letters and 
online blogs and comments. The HPC’s tendency to value a degree of 
transparency in its procedures and decision making was very helpful as it 
meant that minutes to its meetings and other documents were easily available 
to me online. This was less so in the case of IAPT and SfH. A key source of 
data came from the interviews I conducted. I adopted a qualitative, semi-
structured approach to these interviews. Potential participants were invited on 
the basis of their involvement in one of the projects, with my main focus on 
the HPC plans. In my selection there was a balance between the pro and 
anti-HPC camps. The letter of invitation I sent out to most interviewees can be 
found in Appendix C. This letter is quite generic and non-specific about the 
character of the research and reflects the emergent character of my research, 
but also my anxiety about putting potential interviewees off taking part, or 
excessively ‘leading’ responses (more on this below).  As far as the HPC 
struggle is concerned I was unable to secure an interview with anyone from 
the BACP. This is significant given that it is the professional organisation with 
a diverse as well as the largest membership within the field.  However, my 
interview with Fiona Ballantyne Dykes of the Counselling Central Awarding 
Body, and counsellor and psychotherapist, helped me address some 
questions about the BACP’s position within the HPC struggle as she has 
been closely involved with the organisation. As regards IAPT and SfH health, 
key players declined to be interviewed, including Richard Layard, Anthony 
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Bateman, and Peter Fongagy. SfH agreed to be interviewed and I drew some 
useful resources from it. However, SfH were, unlike the HPC and other 
organisations, exceptionally guarded, and although SfH treated me to 
overtures of friendliness and promises of help, they were in fact unwilling to 
engage in any reflection on the SfH project to map the National Occupational 
Standards of counselling and psychotherapy, mirroring the reported 
experience of some within the field during the development of the SfH project 
(see Chapter Five). I prepared an interview guide for each interview (see a 
sample guide within appendix B. This included information about their 
professional background as well as key questions across different areas I 
wanted to address. Whilst aspects of some of the interview guides had 
common aspects, each interview guide was in effect bespoke for each 
interviewee. Whilst the guides were structured to structure the interview, I did 
not follow these to the letter. In practice the interview discussions would ‘jump 
about’, with new questions emerging in the course of the interview, and 
questions were often asked and addressed in the order ‘dictated’ to by the 
unfolding discussion. At a minimum, however, the interview guide served to 
help me to ensure that I covered ground that I wished to do so, as I found it 
otherwise surprisingly easy to forget about some areas once immersed within 
an interview. A quick scan of the guide towards the end of the interview 
helped rectify this.  The interviews lasted between forty minutes and three 
hours: the node was about an hour. Being qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
in character, the questions were open ended and the interviews bespoke. I 
did not, for example, present participants with multiple choice questions, or 
even present a uniform set of open ended questions to all participants. The 
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data gather techniques were not intended to enable highly formalised 
comparative analysis of responses of the different respondents, but designed 
to illicit contextualised self-interpretations of the actors involved. This data 
gathering technique provides the respondent greater space and freedom to 
express what they think, and avoid the sense of being forced into picking – 
often rather arbitrarily – between different ‘boxed’ choices so to speak. As 
with the invitations to interview I was faced with the dilemma as to what extent 
to foreground the development of my own thinking and views within the 
interviews. Some interviewees at times sought to identify more expressly my 
own position and to challenge and engage with it. Generally I tried to avoid 
entering into fully forthright argumentation – partially because my own views 
and analysis were for most of the interviews in their early stages of 
development – but also because I wished to strike a more exploratory than 
argumentative tone so as to elicit a broad set of responses. Different types of 
source tended to yield different kinds of data. Official documents, 
unsurprisingly, were a good source for charting the development of the main 
and official policy positions of the Government, the HPC, and the Alliance. 
Less official sources, including the interviews, were good at identifying 
unofficial discourses within the struggle. Janet Low’s blog (Low, 2008) for 
example identified an unofficial discourse which contended that the HPC 
should reinvent the field rather than worry about the HPC Standards of 
Proficiency necessarily conforming to existing standards within the field – a 
position strongly contrary to the HPC’s official position that its standards were 
universal and very ‘light touch’ or neutral (Health Professions Council, 2008b). 
The interviews sometimes pointed me in the direction of important official 
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documents. For example Michael Guthrie highlighted the significance of the 
guidelines for applicant professions document. The less official sources 
tended to be key to highlighting the affective dimensions of the struggle. For 
example, my interview with a health scientist advisor to IAPT revealed a 
tendency towards a fantasy-imbued Enlightenment IAPT narrative in which so 
called evidence based practices are seen as supplanting ‘dinosaurs’ and 
people with ‘no sense’ within the field (see Chapter Five). Key sources of 
evidence of fantasy-imbued narratives within HPC regulatory discourses were 
found within online responses to newspaper articles, where the HPC tended 
often to be cast by zealous proponents as a wave of Enlightenment against 
individual and collective professional oligarchies and corruption within the 
field of the talking therapies (see Chapter Six).  
Now let me briefly set out how I went about the data analysis. As already 
mentioned, data analysis, at least in rudimentary form, is at play from the 
moment data gathering is started. In the interviews, for example, ongoing and 
emergent analysis by both the interviewer and interviewees shaped the 
discussions and data gathering process. The following exposition of the 
process of analysis therefore to an extent applies to the data gathering 
process, as well as to the deeper and more reflective analysis I conducted 
away, so to speak, from the empirical scene.   
 
Methods of data analysis   
I transcribed the interviews I conducted, as well as transcribed some of the 
video recordings available online of the speeches and seminars This meant I 
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could access them as ‘text’ in the same way as other documentary material, 
such as policy development papers. In keeping with the qualitative 
methodology I did not seek to formally codify the material, but rather, 
following an immersion in the material – close reading essentially – I broadly 
broke down the material into the broad analytic categories of the logics 
approach, namely the broad sweep problematisations of the competing 
camps at play within the struggle, and the social, political and fantasmatic 
logics. I set out the key problematisation of the main actors within the struggle 
prior to the interviews as this was part and parcel of preparation for the 
interviews and the very process of selecting potential interviewees. Following 
a sketch of the main problematisations of the struggle evident within a range 
of sources, I ‘mined’ these documents for the key social norms of practice 
(the social logics) and the political and fantasmatic logics. The identification 
and analysis of these different aspects was broadly a concurrent process as I 
went through documents identifying key logics and coded them in a relatively 
ad hoc and informal manner.  
I used and adapted, as noted above, the nodal framework (Glynos and 
Speed, 2012 and Glynos et al, 2014a) primarily as an aid to the analysis of 
the key social norms of practice within policy documents.  This helped to 
frame my research into and analysis of the HPC regime, its associated 
projects, and the counter-policy imaginaries of the Alliance. In addition to the 
nodes of provision and distribution, delivery and governance, I added the 
nodes of regulation and the node of education and training, in order to 
address the specific context of the HPC regulatory struggle, which is 
obviously centred on the HPC plans as a form of ‘external’ regulation, and 
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includes how this was projected to impact counselling and psychotherapy 
trainings. I have folded the category of regulation into that of governance. For 
heuristic purposes I divided the field up into the following four nodes:  
(i) Node of governance and regulation. This pertains largely to what 
we can call the node of governance through the axis of regulation. 
That is to say, how regulation contributes to the governance of 
practice. In the case of professionals situated within organisations 
this also refers to employer-led forms of governance. The latter are 
often in interrelation with regulatory requirements. The main facets 
of regulation are the establishment of standards of practice and 
training, and their enforcement through a complaints procedure, as 
well as more general practices of surveillance and audit, such as 
‘continuous professional development’.    
(ii) The node of training. This refers to the norms governing and 
shaping training, or more broadly, the acquirement of skills and 
knowledge.  
(iii) Node of service provision and distribution. This includes the 
planning, the design and the commissioning of services. It includes 
the kind of evidence of effectiveness is used within the public 
commissioning of services, such as ‘evidence based practice’ or 
‘practice based evidence’.  
(iv) Node of service delivery i.e. the therapeutic relationship/ how 
therapy is delivered e.g. protocolised or manualised therapy versus 
more highly contextualised exercise of practitioner judgement.  It 
concerns how expertise is conceptualised.  
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This provided an analytic-comparative framework in which I could  more 
clearly compare and contrast the following:  
(i) The continuities and divergence between the character of the 
HPC plans and the associated Improving access to 
psychological therapies and Skills for Health projects to map the 
standards of practice for counselling and psychotherapy.  
(ii) It will help compare the key norms of the government projects 
with the norms of counter-policy imaginaries proposed by 
opponents of these projects. In short it helps us to identify and 
articulate the differences between the ‘transactional’ and more 
‘contextual’ regimes.  
(iii) It helps us to pin point the differing priorities between competing 
actors within the struggle. For example in Chapter Six the 
framework helps identify that the professional liaison group 
tended to prioritise their concern for the likely impact of the 
plans on the nodes of provision and distribution (e.g. 
commission) than on the node of delivery.  Finally,  
(iv) The nodal framework also helps to highlight relatively hidden 
tensions between different norms within the same projected 
policy regime. For example, in Chapter Five I explore how the 
healthcare regime tends to valorise consumer choice cum 
autonomy within the node of provision, but, arguably, undercuts 
this severely within the nodes of delivery, governance and 
regulation.   
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I went through each of the salient policy documents (including counter-policy 
texts of the Alliance) and simply asked what does this document say (tacitly 
or expressly) about the node of provision and distribution, about the node of 
governance and regulation, about training and provision and about the node 
of delivery? This helped to systematise the analysis and help ensure key 
areas of interest were covered. As can be seen within Chapter Six, for 
example, this mining and systematic analysis of the documents was a means 
of ‘reality testing’ both pro and anti-HPC camp claims about the character of 
the HPC plans. The ‘reality testing’ however is not measured against some 
‘concrete reality’ to which I have gained unmediated access, but is rather 
measured against my own set of observations, critical interpretations, and 
values.  My account is therefore a form of articulatory practice, an intervention 
of a sort.    
 
Articulatory practice:  My analysis of the HPC plans and what they 
projected about the various nodes of the ‘service chain’, along with my review 
of a wider range of literature (as discussed within Chapter Two), galvanised 
the naming of two broad types of competing policy imaginaries at play within 
the struggle, namely the transactional regime and the contextual regime. This 
characterisation is itself an interpretative action and political intervention 
encompassing a judgement ‘call’. The naming of the HPC policy regime as 
transactional (or acontextual to borrow Fook’s term from her research in a 
social work context) is substantively contrary to the HPC’s claim to neutrality. 
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The naming of the regime as transactional/acontextual, as opposed to 
medical or healthcare, also places significantly different emphasis than that 
placed by much of the Alliance discourses and is contra its tendency towards 
a position near to talking therapy exceptionalism. In keeping with the 
emancipatory aims of the post-structuralist logics approach I have sought to 
strengthen the ‘voice’ of the marginalised ‘contextual’ policy imaginary by 
foregrounding the norms of the HPC, and by further helping make the 
rhetorical and political manoeuvres which marginalise more contextual policy 
imaginaries more visible.  
The identification of particular logics and practices as specifically ‘political’ 
logics stemmed from the thick description and critique of the competing policy 
imaginaries. It became, for example, a matter of identifying the ways in the 
HPC’s discourses rendered the transactional norms of its plans less visible, 
and how the Alliance conversely rendered them more visible (albeit they 
tended to characterise them predominantly as ‘medical’ and ‘healthcare’ 
norms incommensurable with talking therapy). The identification  of particular 
logics as political also stemmed from my analysis, largely drawn from existing 
literature (explored within Chapter Two), of a degree of commensurability 
between talking therapies and more contextual conceptualisations of 
healthcare practice and other forms of professional practice. In this instance it 
became a matter of identifying ways in which such potential commensurability 
was made less visible or underplayed by the Alliance.  My identification of the 
political logics that were used to make these dimensions less or more visible 
by competing actors therefore in one sense rests upon my ‘political’ re-
description and re-drawing of the elements constituting the social space 
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under investigation (i.e. my characterisation of the social logics of the policy 
regimes and imaginaries). Similarly, the identification of fantasmatic logics 
was predicated on my thick description and critique which shaped and 
constructed my understanding of the struggle between the competing policy 
imaginaries.  I was looking as to how, for example, the HPC’s claim to 
neutrality may have affective ‘grip’ and therefore render other critiques of it 
less visible or effective. I was not, for example (as a HPC proponent might 
have done so) looking for clues as to how the HPC’s neutrality was eclipsed 
or rendered less visible by an ‘affective grip’ within Alliance discourses. This 
is simply because in my view the claim that HPC was approach neutral or 
‘light touch’ was not grounded within credible evidence. I have, however, 
noted ways in which a tendency at times towards a ‘totalitarian’ fantasmatic 
narrative within Alliance discourses embodied a degree of ‘affective grip’ 
against the HPC plans.  
The identification of ideological constructions as imbued with fantasy is quite 
an intuitive process. However, there are some broad indicators, such as 
emotive and strong analogies (like Postle’s comparison of HPC supporters 
within the field with French Nazi collaborators within the Second World War), 
and where there seems to be an excess of affect, such as within the highly 
charged invective within some of the comments made online against Alliance 
members (explored in Chapters Six and Seven). As noted above, the singling 
out of certain elements of the struggle for focussed attention, and the 
(re)description of elements in terms of social, political and fantasmatic logics 
is not an absolutely objective or apolitical process. But my account is the 
product of an articulation produced by a constant to and fro between the 
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theoretical research approach I have adopted, theoretical perspectives drawn 
from elsewhere, the empirical evidence, and my emerging analysis of the 
social, political and fantasmatic logics. This to and fro between these 
complexes led to considerable modification of the hypothesis and the 
developing thesis over time, as well as the taking up of positions on which I 
was previously undecided. Modification of the thesis often regarded 
considerable changes in nuance; for example the recognition of significant 
differences between the HPC plans on the one hand and the SfH and IAPT 
projects on the other, differences which at first sight may lend strong 
credibility to the HPC’s overarching narrative of neutrality and its claimed 
fundamental distinction from IAPT and SfH. Indeed at moments during the 
research process I had a sense that my view might radically change. As 
regards the taking up of positions on which previously I was undecided: my 
thesis has to an extent been framed by a general scepticism towards strong 
demarcations between professional and non-professional forms of practice 
and organisation, as well as scepticism towards talking therapy 
exceptionalism. These were not positions upon which I was decided prior to 
the research and have therefore been fostered and shaped significantly by 
the research process itself.  
In one sense research is always unfinished since there can be no final word 
on an issue, and, as noted above, social scientific research is, or should be, a 
grounded and yet tentative and contestable contribution to a democratic and 
dialogic process in which policy can (or should) be continuously reviewed and 
(re)shaped. The delimitation of the research as regards the decision as when 
to bring it to a close was therefore a pragmatic, though not arbitrary, one. In  
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Table 1 showing actors interviewed actors and their roles 
Actors interviewed within the pro-HPC 
camp 
Name 
Role and background  
Diane Waller Professor of Art Psychotherapy. Chair of the 
HPC’s Professional Liaison Group for the 
Counselling and Psychotherapy. An Art 
Therapist and key figure in the struggle to get 
Art Therapy recognised as a profession, and 
regulated by the HPC.  
Michael Guthrie Director of policy and standards 
Julian Lousada Chair of the British Psychoanalytic Council 
(BPC) 
Malcolm Allen Chief Executive Officer of the BPC 
Fiona Ballantyne Dykes Counselling Central Awarding Body. She was 
within the Professional Liaison Group to 
represent the whole of the FE sector.  
James Antrican Chair of the UKCP, 2007-2009 
Graham Smith Physiotherapist and HPC registrant. One of 
number of non-counselling and 
psychotherapy field members of the HPC’s 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors 
and Psychotherapists.   
Jonathan Coe  Spokesperson for the charity Witness, which 
supports individuals who have abused by 
their therapists. 
 
Actors interviewed within the anti-HPC 
camp 
Name 
Role and background  
Darian Leader Lacanian Psychoanalyst. Member of the 
College of Psychoanalysis, and the Centre 
for Freudian Analysis and Research. Key 
organiser and leader within the Alliance.  
Andrew Samuels  Psychotherapist and Professor of Analytic 
Psychology, University of Essex. Key 
organiser and figure within the Alliance and 
the legal action against the HPC.  
Denis Postle  
Paul Atkinson  Jungian Analyst and member of the Alliance. 
Was involved with the development of 
competencies for psychoanalysis within the 
Skills for Health project.  
James Barrett  Psychotherapist involved within the Skills for 
Health Project to develop competencies for 
psychoanalysis.  
 
Other actors within the field interviewed  Role and background  
Nick Temple  Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst  
Interviewee A  Health Scientist Advisor to IAPT  
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short, I drew the research to a close once the explanation had more or less 
reached ‘saturation’. This is to say once it seemed that my account 
adequately accounted for what I set out to account for. In this sense 
discourse approaches do not seek to provide what one might refer to as false 
or misleading levels of closure, certainty, objectivity, or assurance, about the 
matter under investigation.   
 
SUMMARY  
In this chapter, drawing extensively on the work of Glynos and Howarth 
(2007), Glynos and Speed (2012), Glynos et al (2014a), and Griggs and 
Howarth (2013), I have set out the research ‘prism’ through which I have 
approached my empirical research on the HPC struggle. I have provided a 
brief exposition of the ontological coordinates of the logics approach as well 
as its more detailed conceptual research tools, namely the concept of 
problematisation and the analytic categories of social, political and fantasmtic 
logics. The ontology of the approach is that, as Glynos et al (2014a) put it, 
‘social relations are in a constitutive and dynamic relation with structured 
fields of meaning marked by radical contingency’ (3). Given that one always 
already redescribes a phenomenon in terms of one’s ontology, this research 
from the start is predisposed to be contra more deterministic accounts of 
regulatory struggle; for example those that expressly or tacitly see regulatory 
trends as a ‘natural’ progression of history, or as a response to economic 
shifts that are seen as ‘over and above’ the rest of society. 
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I have outlined how the approach not only attends to the political dynamics of 
how a policy imaginary is promoted, but also to the character of the policy 
imaginaries in question. This is the primary job of ‘social logics’; 
encompassing a thick description and normative critique. Key generic 
questions include, what are the key tensions within a particular policy 
imaginary and how do they measure up in comparison to counter-imaginaries 
at play? Political and fantasmatic logics are those which help build and 
defend or contest policy imaginaries. The two main political logics are those 
of equivalence and difference, which help provide a framework for 
understanding how the pro and anti-HPC camps are structured, and help 
pinpoint their relative hegemonic-strategic strengths and weaknesses (Glynos 
and Howarth, 2007). Laclau and Mouffe’s reconceptualization and 
revitalisation of the concept of ideology (as a denial of radical contingency) 
provides grounds for addressing the ‘affective grip’ of particular policy 
imaginaries, and how the pro and anti-HPC camps were each internally 
‘glued’ together. To recall from the last chapter this is a key explanatory deficit 
in many other approaches to regulatory struggles.  
As far as the status of research is concerned, I have argued that it cannot 
help but be an ‘intervention’ of sorts, and that subjective judgement of the 
researcher is, as Glynos and Howarth put it, a ‘vital’ part of the research 
process. Research cannot be tightly ‘operationalised’ in a series or complex 
of rules or procedures without losing much of the rich specificity of the 
phenomenon under investigation. Rather, a continuous ‘to and fro’ movement 
between theory, putative explanation and immersion in the ‘empirical scene’ 
is the most fruitful way to produce a robust narrative account of the struggle 
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which avoids the pitfalls of both theory and method-driven research. The 
value of this ‘intervention’ can only be assessed contextually by a relevant 
body of scholars and/or practitioners, clients and other stakeholders. There 
can be no fully objective or technical discernment of the reality of the HPC 
struggle, and there can be no fully objective or technical discernment of the 
value of any particular account of the struggle. Robust judgment, however, I 
have contended, involves a ‘situated ability’ and expertise. Finally, I have 
suggested that these ontological coordinates and research principles can 
partially form normative grounds upon which to assess different policy 
imaginaries, including how professional and regulatory practices are framed 
and governed: in short I have put forward the question regarding how well do 
practices cut with the ontological grain of reality – its fundamental contextual, 
relational and contingent nature.  
Having drawn the contours of our theoretical and research approach to the 
scene of enquiry, we can now, in the next chapter, take a more empirical turn, 
and look at the broad historical context of the HPC struggle, sketching the 
myriad of historical threads, both within the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy, and within the broader policy and regulatory context, which 
preceded the HPC policy dispute.  
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   CHAPTER FOUR 
HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALISATION  
 
In this Chapter I briefly chart the broad historical context of the HPC struggle. 
The multiple issues and tensions at play within the struggle did not appear ex 
nihilo, but have their own histories, going back years, decades, and in some 
instances, even more than a century. Sketching some of these originating 
contexts enriches the texture of our understanding of the HPC struggle. 
Throughout this chapter I quite expressly signal the significance of key 
elements within the history of counselling and psychotherapy to what was to 
become the HPC struggle: to borrow a popular phrase from Voltaire, ‘the 
present is pregnant with the future’. Whilst the logics approach I have adopted 
eschews any deterministic view of history, this phrase aptly captures the 
sense that the past shapes many of the conditions of possibility (at least ontic 
ones) for present socio-cultural events, and these in turn, for future events. 
This chapter sets out key antecedents of the HPC struggle, ones relatively 
internal to the field of counselling and psychotherapy, as well as more 
external ones. The chapter is structured into three main sections. In the first I 
examine the emergence and early days of psychoanalysis in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, and the proliferation of different forms of psychological 
expertise and their role within the growing ‘psy-complex’ within burgeoning 
liberal society and governance (Miller and Rose, 1988). This occurred within a 
broader context of a system of ‘self-regulation’ across sectors of the economy 
(Moran, 2003). Key issues to emerge during this period that were interwoven 
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within the HPC struggle include the practice and regulatory relationship of 
psychoanalysis to medicine, psychological expertise working ‘within and 
against’ existing provisions within healthcare services, as well as the 
formation of some talking therapies in counter-distinction to the ‘medical 
model’, and deep levels of pluralism within the field. In the second section I 
focus on a complex of responses within the field to recommendations by a 
government sponsored report in 1978 – the Sieghart Report (Sieghart, 1978) 
- that psychotherapy should be subject to statutory regulation. Many of the 
cleavages between organisations involved within the HPC struggle originated 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In the third section, our attention is turned to 
more recent developments which contributed to the greater active interest of 
government in regulation of the field, manifest within the HPC plans. In short, 
this section concerns the so called rise of the regulatory state and associated 
policy developments, namely the ‘evidence based practice’ movement and 
the institutionalisation of empiricist styles of reasoning and evidence within 
the establishment of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE).  
 
FROM EARLY PSYCHOANALYSIS, BEHAVIOURISM, THROUGH TO THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE ‘THIRD FORCE’: 1880s – 1970s 
Let me first briefly sketch key aspects of the history of the field from the birth 
of psychoanalysis onwards. Psychoanalysis is widely  seen as the first 
modern form of talking therapy, though it is predated by other practices which 
have significant family resemblance to modern conceptualisations, namely 
‘moral therapy’ during the 18th Century (Kennard, 1998) and, going much 
further back, ancient Greek philosophy, including stoicism, which has inspired 
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aspects of cognitive approaches to therapy (Evans, 2012). I take 
psychoanalysis as our point of departure, however, because key concepts to 
emerge within it have had significant influence on the shape of many different 
forms of talking therapy that have followed, and which played a significant 
role within the HPC struggle. I first briefly look at these concepts, followed by 
a sketch of some of the organisational tensions within early psychoanalysis, 
and then provide a sketch of the main contours of the field following the 
proliferation of different forms of talking therapy.  
 
The emergence of key concepts within early psychoanalysis   
Psychoanalysis was dubbed the ‘talking cure’ by ‘Anna O’, a patient of Breuer 
and Freud, after she gained some relief from symptoms by talking about 
some of her memories and associations around them. Psychoanalysis 
distinguished itself from the method of hypnotic suggestion developed by the 
Parisian neurologist, Charcot, through the method of ‘free association’, in 
which the patient, without censorship, says whatever comes to mind in 
relation to their symptoms (Milton et al, 2011:43). This was based on the 
belief that ‘the underlying elements of the neurosis formed a template deep in 
the mind, linked to the surface by chains of associative ideas, and that the 
truth would be bound to bubble up to the surface, given a change’ (ibid:43). 
Freud found, however, that it was not simply a matter of catharsis, since 
patient’s found it so difficult to express freely what came to mind; strong 
inhibiting affects or thoughts such as embarrassment and doubting of the 
relevance appeared to be frequently intervening. This led Freud to the notion 
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of ‘repression’ and the idea that symptoms are a replacement for an 
intolerable (repressed) idea (ibid:43). Cure of, or relief from, symptoms was 
therefore construed as involving substantial change of the patient’s psyche. 
Hypnosis was understood as frequently failing, or the relief from symptoms 
not enduring, because it failed to address the underlying meaning of 
symptoms to patients’, leading either to the return of the same symptom or 
the development of alternative symptoms; these new symptoms giving 
‘expression’ to the same repressed idea. As Milton et al point out, Freud also 
observed that: 
Not only did patients come to talk about their intense and disturbing memories, fears 
and passions to Freud, but they were starting to re-experience them in the room with 
him too. A version of the past seemed to be re-experienced in the present: that is, the 
transference was beginning to be noticed’ (ibid:44),(Italics added). 
 
These concepts remain fundamental features of many so called ‘depth 
psychologies’. As we shall see below, the concept of transference is a part of 
the psychoanalytic oeuvre that has been adapted by numerous schools of 
therapy and has played a significant role in regulatory debates and struggles 
within the field throughout the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Transference, 
if accepted as a real phenomenon, in the client-therapist relationship presents 
obvious potential difficulties for regulation and professional governance, as 
well as a consumer framework, since it means that the client’s perception of 
the therapist becomes deeply ‘clouded’ by their own unconscious motivations. 
This presents the risk of the analyst being unfairly accused of malpractice or 
malfeasance. But conversely it also presents the risk of real malpractice or 
malfeasance being dismissed as mere transference (more on this below). 
Another central feature of psychoanalysis, in contradistinction to hypnosis, is 
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its relative egalitarian rather than autocratic structure. Anna O, for example, 
as a patient, did much of the ‘imaginative work’ herself (ibid). Gay (1989) 
writes: ‘considering the importance that Freud would learn to attribute to the 
analyst’s gift for listening, it is only fitting that a patient should contribute 
almost as much to the making of psychoanalytic theory as did her therapist’ 
(64).Both this, and Freud’s related contention that psychoanalysis is 
ultimately more efficacious than hypnosis because it deals with the underlying 
issue (thereby preventing the development of alternative symptoms), were 
still active perspectives within the HPC struggle (see Chapter Six).   
 
Cultural and organisational tensions within early psychoanalysis  
Psychoanalysis emerged in the late 19th century at the same time as the 
family as centre of economic organisation was on the wane and monopoly 
capitalism and ‘mass’ society was starting to emerge (Zaretsky, 2005). 
Zaretsky characterises psychoanalysis as the ‘first great theory and practice 
of personal life’ as a cultural way of seeking to understand why, despite the 
emergence of opportunities for extra-familial identities, individuals were still 
strongly wedded to strong images of paternal authority (ibid:5). The ‘original 
historical telos’ of psychoanalysis, as Zaretsky puts it, was ‘”defamiliarisation”; 
the freeing of individuals from unconscious images of authority originally 
rooted in the family’ (ibid:5). The conditions of possibility of psychoanalysis 
can therefore be said to be liberal, and in turn, psychoanalysis can be broadly 
said to be conducive to liberal society.  
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I want now briefly to focus on the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
medicine. Although Freud’s practices and theories emerged within his private 
medical practice, his ambition was for psychoanalysis to be a ‘science of the 
unconscious’, with therapy as only one possible application of it out of a 
myriad of ones. He therefore sought a position for psychoanalysis within the 
university. At the time, however, the university was resoundingly ‘positivist’ in 
orientation, and it rejected psychoanalysis as unscientific (Schroter, 2004). 
This led to the eventual establishment of a system of independent training 
schools and a focus, as a means of financial and institutional survival, on 
psychoanalysis as a form of therapeutic intervention. Nurturing a close 
proximity to medicine helped procure patients, as well as helped draw on the 
prestige and respectability of medicine. However, medicine was not a great 
deal more accepting than the university. The professions themselves, like 
medicine, in order to gain a home in the university had to accept the positivist 
epistemology of practice and its technical rationality (Schon, 1983). As 
psychoanalytic associations formed within Vienna and then other countries, 
some associations strongly pursued the respectability ‘umbrella’ of medicine. 
The American Association for example, against Freud’s wishes, restricted 
psychoanalysis to those trained as medics in an attempt to avoid the field 
being swamped by ‘quacks’, especially given the strength of the popularity of 
psychoanalysis within the USA during the early 20th century, as well as a way 
of responding to public scandal caused by psychoanalysis and its 
practitioners (Schroter, 2004). Freud contended, writes Schroter (2004), that 
‘in psychoanalysis, the difference between the expert and the “quack” was 
determined by specialised analytic training and not by a medical diploma. 
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(169). Although admittance criteria varied between national associations, a 
‘tripartite’ model of training was broadly adopted, encompassing a theory 
course, a training (i.e. personal) analysis, and supervised analysis of patients. 
This system is still in place, with an emphasis on the personal training 
analysis, across many trainings today (Arbours Association, 2009).  
Interrelated with these tensions over the relationship to medicine and the 
question of ‘lay analysis’ were tensions over psychoanalytic doctrine. In the 
first generation of psychoanalysts two key divergences and splits came from 
Adler and Jung. They contested the prominence that Freud gave to the 
sexual aetiology of neurosis. Adler contended that individuals are driven to 
overcome an inferiority complex, and placed an emphasis upon the conscious 
ego. His theories came to be named ‘individual psychology’. Jung contested 
Freud’s claim that the libido is exclusively sexual and argued that 
unconscious motivations can come from collective unconscious archetypes. 
Such ‘defections’ inaugurated a tendency within psychoanalysis to analyse 
the person of the analyst;  Adler and Jung both being analysed as straying 
from Freudian orthodoxy because unable, psychically, to face its truth. Jung 
was characterised as having a ‘father complex’ (Makari, 2008:282) to which 
Jung countered: ‘I am forced to the painful conclusion that the majority of 
psychoanalysts misuse psychoanalysis for the purpose of devaluing others 
and their progress by insinuations about their complexes (as though that 
explained everything. A wretched theory!)’ (2008:278). This could be 
construed as an early manifestation of what Samuels later refers to as the 
‘sadistic hierarchy’ within the field (Samuels, 2009), and what Lousada and 
Cooper (2010) suggest, drawing on the seminal work of Menzies Lyth (1960) 
161 
 
on organisational dynamics within a hospital, has the hallmarks of a social 
defence system against anxiety i.e. psychoanalysts projecting their own 
deficiencies down the perceived hierarchy of modalities of practice (Cooper 
and Lousada, 2010:4). 
As the so called ‘psy-complex’ developed there were in effect many 
challenges to Freudian orthodoxy, both within the psychoanalytic field ‘proper’ 
and through appropriations of psychoanalytic ideas elsewhere. There was 
also the emergence of behaviourism, cognitive psychological and therapy, 
and the so call ‘third force’ of humanism (DeCarvalho R.J 1990), (Burton and 
Kagan, 2007). Let us take a broad sweep look at the proliferation in 
psychological expertise across the bulk of the twentieth century.  
 
Proliferation in psychological expertise throughout the 20th century 
Notable appropriations of Freudian orthodoxy include those made during the 
First World War in response to the phenomenon of ‘shell shock’ (which has 
some family resemblance with the more recent diagnostic category of post-
traumatic stress disorder). The urgency of the problem of the war effort being 
undermined by depleting numbers of soldiers able to return to the front line, 
coupled with the fact that soldiers from low and high classes were afflicted, 
undermined the organicist approach dominant within psychiatry at the time 
that contended that the illness was the result of hereditary degeneration and 
was therefore incurable (Stone, 1985). This gave psychoanalytic informed 
practices an opening. Rivers et al characterised ‘shell shock’ as an 
‘unconscious flight into illness’ caused by a conflict within the mind of the 
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solider between fear and duty (ibid). Rivers et al’s approach perhaps 
diminished the mental suffering of soldiers with ‘shell shock’, as well as 
helping them to avoid the ignominy of the label of ‘cowardice’, but it also 
increased their chances of being returned to the horrors of the trenches. This 
is perhaps one of the starkest examples of the pronounced ethico-political 
dilemmas involved when psychological expertise is enlisted or appropriated 
by an organisation or government to help meet specific, preordained, aims.  
After the First World War psychoanalysis enjoyed a rise in popularity within 
British society: ‘psychoanalysis spoke to a ‘post war’ concern with 
understanding the roots within human nature of that unprecedented collective 
trauma’ (Richards, 2000:187). Groups interested in psychoanalysis included 
students, medical professionals, teachers, educationalists, and the clergy; 
and ‘among fiction writers and many dramatists’, Richards notes, ‘some 
knowledge of Freud’s ideas was also de rigeur’ (ibid:197). Psychoanalysis to 
an extent was seen as commensurate with a counter-culture that sought 
reconnection with the non-rational against the ‘escalating success of 
materialist science’ (ibid:189). The ‘craze’ for psychoanalysis between 1920 
and 1925 prompted predominantly critical newspaper coverage and a ‘virtual 
moral panic about the dangers of quacks and charlatans posing as 
psychoanalysts’ (ibid:205). Concern was expressed that psychoanalysis 
‘dethrones the will’ and poses a threat to morality and decency. The Times for 
example, in 1925, reported the suicide of a young barrister who had been in 
analysis, and who had written of a ‘sense of degradation it had imposed on 
him’. The Times journalist called for an enquiry, claiming that the present 
situation is a consequence of the ‘neglect of psychology by the medical 
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schools of this country’ (ibid:215). The British Medical Association (BMA) was 
prompted out of its reluctance to be involved with psychoanalysis and created 
a psychoanalytic committee to look at this case and broader concerns that 
non-medical analysts were bringing the profession into disrepute. Rather like 
within the USA earlier, the popularity of psychoanalysis prompted closer ties 
to the medical establishment.  Psychoanalysis gained significant influence 
within mainstream medical psychiatry during the 1920s, but this receded 
somewhat, as the British Psychoanalytic Society became more insular, 
‘policing doctrinal developments and excluding outsiders from constructive 
participation’ (ibid:204). However, there was a proliferation of ideas and 
tensions among a second generation of psychoanalysts. The second 
generation included Melanie Klein, who built her theory to an extent on 
Freud’s own shift away from the sexual aetiology of illness with his 
introduction, in the wake of the traumas of the First World War, of the concept 
of the ‘death instinct’. Dysphoria during the Second World War made London 
something of a pluralist and active centre for psychoanalysis, especially given 
the presence of Freud, Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. The so called 
‘controversial discussions’ between the latter two and their advocates during 
the Second World War are an indicative example of extensive differences in 
ideas and dogma. Both Anna Freud and Klein based their theories based on 
their work with children, yet came to diametrically opposed positions on key 
aspects of theory and technique (King and Steiner, 1991).  
Klein’s ideas partially informed Bion’s work and the emergence of the 
‘therapeutic community’ experiments during and after the Second World War. 
The first experiment at Northfield military hospital in Birmingham was run by 
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Bion, who went onto develop innovative theories regarding group relations 
(Kennard, 1998). Bion challenged traditional conceptualisations of the role of 
the expert psychiatrist: the psychiatrist of the therapeutic community ‘had to 
give up his anarchical rights in exchange for the more sincere role of member 
in a real community’ (ibid:35). Bion, on the surface at least, refused total 
responsibility for disorder on the ward, and instead sought to facilitate patients 
to form their own understanding and to change their own conduct. Again, 
there is an emphasis upon the client or patient doing much of the creative 
work.   
Following the Second World War, there was a proliferation of progressive 
forms of psychological expertise which challenged organic approaches within 
psychiatry, many initiatives emerging from the Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations from the late 1940s onwards. This and the Tavistock clinic became 
important sites for the development and use of psychoanalytic ideas and 
other psychological and sociological approaches in the analysis of society 
and of a series of problems in peacetime Britain, including absenteeism from 
work, industrial productivity, leadership, the selection and training of 
personnel, and accident proneness (Miller and Rose, 1988). The group, 
rather than the individual, became the central unit of analysis; tensions and 
conflicts within groups were identified and analysed as underlying manifest 
individual and discrete problems. The Glacier Project for instance advocated 
that the ‘industrial relations model of “bargaining” be replaced by a 
psychotherapeutic one of “working through”. Processes of ‘scapegoating’ in 
the work place were identified and alternatives for a happier and more 
efficient factory were pursued (ibid:185). Psychological expertise inaugurated 
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a new concern with an attempt to align the internal needs of workers with the 
industrial aims of organisations, marking a shift towards the democratisation 
of the work place. This was part of the so called ‘positive mental hygiene 
movement’, and not only included the application of new forms of 
psychological expertise to the work place, but also to child rearing in the 
private sphere and within the education system. There was a new emphasis 
upon prevention of problems and early intervention to stop them from 
developing. The psychoanalysts Winnicott and Bowlby, for example, 
popularised new child rearing advice to help prevent ‘maladaptation’ to the 
environment and social problems down the line, and educationalists critiqued 
‘rote learning’ approaches, advocating instead that schools should regard the 
child as a whole person and focus on developing their personalities. Overall, 
a range of forms of psychological expertise were developed in a plethora of 
domains in an attempt to make peacetime Britain a more democratised, 
happier and more efficient nation (ibid:178).  
From the 1950s onwards Lacanian psychoanalysis also emerged. I highlight 
this because Lacanian psychoanalysts within the UK were key actors within 
the moves against the HPC plans. Lacan’s approach was developed in 
express opposition and counter-distinction to American ego psychology, 
where the capacity of the conscious ego to master the unconscious is 
emphasised, and where the central aim is for the good parts of the client’s 
ego to identify with the ego of the analyst. Lacan pitched his approach as 
‘against adaptation’, critiquing American ego psychology for seeking to adapt 
clients to the demands of mass production capitalism and the social 
conservativism of American mainstream society during the1950s (Turkle, 
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1979), (Whitebook, 1995). Indeed, American ego psychology of the 1950s is 
now widely agreed to have been excessively conservative (ibid). For example 
some psychoanalysts informed women patients who expressed an ambition 
to work (thereby breaching gender stereotypes during this US period) that 
they were suffering from ‘penis envy’ and that they should modify their 
ambitions accordingly (Zaretsky, 2005:377). Lacanian psychoanalysis, in 
contrast to the emphasis that ego psychology placed on ‘adaptation’ was 
framed as seeking to enable a client to follow their desire. Lacan focussed on 
the early Freud, who he saw as a thinker of ‘radical doubt and discovery’, and 
as one who continually renewed his ‘’own language, knowledge, and 
presumed basis for knowing’ (Turkle, 1979:99), and was critical of Freud’s 
shift from ‘meaning’ to ‘mechanism’ in his later work, and of Freud’s increased 
attempts to ‘codify’ his work and protect Freudian orthodoxy. Lacan lamented 
the shift in emphasis from theory and understanding to technique. He wrote 
that ‘meticulousness of detail is passed off as rigour, and rule confused with 
certainty’ (ibid:99). He saw this as antithetical to science and innovation, and 
argued that ‘no institution’, as Turkle puts it, ‘but only the analyst can 
authorise himself in the analytic vocation’ (ibid:99). Lacan is resolutely anti-
bureaucratic and anti-institutional, tending to construe the blind observance of 
orthodox technique as anti-scientific. A key example of Lacan’s stance is his 
innovation of the ‘variable length’ session, by which Lacan broke with the 
standard fifty minute analytic session and would cut sessions at points in the 
patient’s discourse where he felt that they would be partially jolted out of their 
routine ways of thinking. This outraged much of the psychoanalytic 
community (both in France and internationally), and it entered the public 
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imagination to wonder why Lacan’s variable length sessions were always 
shorter rather than longer (ibid). The invention of ‘the pass’ was another 
innovation which is indicative of Lacanian anti-routinisation so to speak. It is a 
procedure by which an analyst gives an account of their training analysis to 
others in the training school. Here the emphasis is not so much on assessing 
a candidate’s capacity to train or to practice, as to see if they have ‘reached 
the maturity needed to use his own analytic experience as research’ 
(ibid:124). A central point about Lacanian psychoanalysis to stress, for our 
purposes, is its emphasis upon Freud’s ambition for psychoanalysis to be 
primarily a science of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis is not seen as a 
‘quasi-medical technique focussed on “cure” but as a scientific discipline and 
a process of individual research and self-discovery that needs no further 
“therapeutic” justification’ (ibid:15). As we shall see in further chapters, this 
was one of the key orientations of opposition to the HPC plans. Lacan’s 
unorthodox practices led to his expulsion from the International 
Psychoanalytic Association in 1963. By the mid-1960s Turkle characterises 
Lacan and the Freudian School, however, as emblematic of the fundamental 
paradox within psychoanalysis: the need for institutional bonds in order to 
ensure survival, but which simultaneously the practice of psychoanalysis as 
science seeks to continuously dissolve. Many of Lacan’s anti-bureaucratic 
and anti-hierarchical practices in fact ended up producing informal 
hierarchies, reinforcing Lacan as a ‘maitre’ to be revered and obeyed. One 
analyst commented of the Freudian School within Paris: ‘debate was stifled 
just when it might have been most productive. Lacan sent out every kind of 
signal that disagreement was not welcome on the things that he considered 
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really important’ (ibid:126). Measured against Lacan’s own pronouncements, 
this is a sign of psychoanalysis failing, not thriving: in the realm of an analysis, 
schism rather agreement is regarded as more likely a good indication of 
success. This is another key underpinning reason for Lacanian opposition to 
the HPC’s consumer orientated ‘quality assurance’. A key aim of analysis is to 
challenge the ‘subject presumed to know’ – the idealised all-knowing other – 
and it is therefore for the client to come to their own view about the meaning 
or ‘quality’ of the analysis.  23 The Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research 
(CFAR) was established in the UK in 1985, establishing a significant Lacanian 
constituency within the British context. Internationally Lacanianism, however, 
has gone on to become the most widely practiced form of psychoanalysis 
within the world (Arbours Association, 2009).  
Back in Britain, during the second half of the twentieth century public services 
became increasingly dominated by behavioural, and later, cognitive forms of 
psychological expertise. Within the British Psychology Society there was, for 
example, a struggle between psychodynamic and experimental psychologists 
for prevalence. The Medical Section was strongly psychodynamic in 
orientation but was increasingly squeezed by an alliance between psychiatry 
and experimental psychology. Clinical psychology was emerging and seeking 
a stable role, whilst psychiatry was seeking greater credibility as a medical 
specialism (Burton and Kagan, 2007). The experimentalist approach of 
clinical psychology was a means to give scientific credibility to the diagnostic 
categories of psychiatry. This ‘classical humanism’ (Woolfolk and Richardson, 
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1984: 781) is a tradition of the Enlightenment that emphasises the primacy of 
a commitment to reason and science, believing that the latter strongly 
overcomes irrational authority and arbitrary privilege. The science upon which 
clinical psychology and psychiatry tends to be based upon, however, is a form 
of a-theoretical British empiricism, arguably with a tendency towards a hidden 
ideology of social Darwinism in which social problems are seen as rooted 
primarily within the individual rather than structures within society (Pilgrim, 
1997). There were counter trends to this ‘classical’ (sometimes referred to as 
‘scientific’) humanism, including moves from within the medical and 
psychiatric establishment, namely by the so called anti-psychiatry movement, 
spearheaded in the UK by a number of psychiatrists, including Laing and 
Cooper. It was an international movement, and Marcuse, Foucault and Lacan 
were all drawn upon to an extent.  They raised concerns that the more 
‘humane’ interventions, such as psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, may in 
fact be more subtle mechanisms of social control. Laing, for example, stated: 
In the best places, where straightjackets are abolished, doors are unblocked, 
leucotomies largely foregone, these can be replaced by more subtle lobotomies and 
tranquilizers that place bars of Bedlam and the locked doors inside the patient 
(Crosssley, 2006:884).  
 
 
Laing provocatively dubbed many psychiatrists as suffering from a new 
mental illness, ‘psychiatrosis’ (Laing, 1964:64).24 Mental illness was re-
described strictly in terms of social relations and ‘problems with living’, rather 
than through diagnostic categories. Broadly they tended towards a romantic 
conceptualisation of mental illness, characterising it as the good ‘other’ of a 
                                                          
24 Laing wrote: ‘It would now be an interesting experiment to study whether the syndrome of 
‘labelling’ others runs in families. A pathological process called ‘psychiatrosis’ may well be 
found, by the same methods, to be a delineable entity, with somatic correlates, and psychic 
mechanisms, with an inherited or at least constitutional basis, a natural history, and a 
doubtful prognosis’ (Laing, 1964:64). 
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sick society (Whitebook, 1996), and aimed not simply for a revolution in the 
treatment of the mentally ill, but a transformation of society. The anti-
psychiatry movement wanted to re-engage the conversation between the 
insane and the (rest of) society that existed in the Renaissance, which the 
‘classical’ strand of the Enlightenment had severed (ibid). This was similar to 
the aims of psychoanalysis within therapeutic communities, though the anti-
psychiatric movement tended to want to extend the analysis strongly against 
the organisation of society and not just the hospitals (Crossley, 2006).   Laing 
and a group of psychoanalysts, psychiatrists and social workers set up the 
Philadelphia Association in 1965, and a number of therapeutic community 
households, the most (in)famous of which was Kingsley Hall in London. The 
Philadelphia Association established a formal training in psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy which continues to this day. In keeping with a desire to 
engage in a broader critique of psychoanalysis, and to contribute to a 
transformation of society, the Philadelphia Association made critical 
philosophy a significant feature of its curriculum, stating, for example; ‘we feel 
that psychoanalysis has neglected the philosophical enquiry into its own basic 
presuppositions’ (Abram, 1992:143). The Philadelphia Association adopted 
Lacan’s innovation of ‘the pass’, and created less hierarchical institutional 
relations. This, however, is often purported to have created tensions of its 
own, one former trainee, for example commenting that ‘tyranny could still 
exist in an apparently equal system, because there is a mystique as to where 
the power lies’ (Ibid:143). The responses of patients and their families to anti-
psychiatry have been mixed: many schizophrenics for example identified 
Laing’s popular book, ‘The divided self’, as close to their own experience 
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(Crossley, 2006), whilst others, especially some family members of patients, 
expressed that they found the ‘romanticisation’ of mental illness, and the 
tendency to shroud mental illness in ‘chic’, singularly unhelpful in their 
attempts to live with and help their loved ones with their tortuous mental 
states (Turkle, 1979), (Crossley, 2006).  
Another counter-veiling trend to that of the classical/scientific humanism of 
behaviourism and experimental psychology was the ‘re-evaluation 
counselling’ movement which emerged from the USA. Founded by Harvey 
Jackins in the 1950s within Seattle, re-evaluation counselling developed 
entirely outside of bureau-professional structures.25  The movement practiced 
‘co-counselling’, and claimed that human distress is largely caused by past 
bad experiences that have not been properly ‘discharged’. Jackins was 
influenced by the so called ‘dianetics’ of the cult movement of Scientology 
and similarly opposed the use of psychiatric drugs, and contested, like many 
within the anti-psychiatry movement, the existence of mental illness. The 
British Human Potential Research Project founded in 1970 at Surrey 
University by John Heron emerged from re-evaluation counselling and was 
very influential in the development of a strand of humanistic counselling within 
the UK (Heron, 1980).The development of humanistic counselling – the so 
called ‘third force’ – (DeCarvalho, 1990) through Rogers and others was in 
large part due to frustration with the limitations of both psychoanalysis and 
behaviourism, namely its perceived aloofness, dogmatism and medical 
orientation. Like the anti-psychiatry movement the humanistic counselling was 
                                                          
25 Denis Postle (Alliance and IPN members, Humanistic counsellor and activist), interview by 
author, May 2015.  
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co-extensive with the 1960s counter-cultural revolution and an emphasis 
upon the inherent goodness of people, and the corrupting effect of unjust 
social structures. This has arguably underpinned an Illich-style valorisation of 
community organisation, unencumbered by bureaucratic or professional 
structures (as explored within Chapter Two) within the Human Potential 
Movement. This movement was one of the central pillars within the Alliance 
for Counselling and Psychotherapy Against Statutory Regulation.  
In summary so far, we have looked at the broad sweep of the history of the 
ideational and institutional contours of psychoanalysis and the proliferation of 
new forms of psychological expertise and forms of psychotherapy and 
counselling between the 1880s and the 1970s. Tensions were largely around 
two closely interrelated axes. First, within the emerging field itself, between 
the protection and institutionalisation of orthodoxy, namely Freudian 
orthodoxy to start off with, on the one hand, and scientific, conceptual and 
creative freedom and innovations made by the ‘rank and file’, so to speak, on 
the other hand. The second main axis is that between the field and the 
medical and psychiatric establishment, mediated and constituted by a 
complex of contingencies, including concerns about an influx of ‘quacks’, 
uncontrolled proliferation of ideas, survival, and the rejection of 
psychoanalysis  from the positivist orientated university. Whilst regulation 
through the medical establishment was an issue at play (in some countries 
medical status a requirement), and professional associations and training 
schools had been established, the question of what we now regard as 
external ‘regulation’ had not yet become a pressing issue in the UK. This was 
to change with the public ‘scandal’ concerning Scientology during the 1970s.  
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The Scientology scandal gave rise to calls for statutory regulation of 
psychotherapy, and, in turn, to a new distinct age in the life and times of the 
field in the UK. This was namely the development of a complex system of 
self-regulation, in many respects geared towards a longer term aim of 
statutory regulation, and which gave rise to a counter-movement against the 
professionalization and statutory regulation of the field (Totton, 1995). Let us 
now focus on this period.  
 
TOWARDS STATUTORY REGULATION AND COUNTER-VEILING 
MOVEMENTS: 1970S – 1990S 
The Foster Report (Foster, 1971) was a government response to public 
concerns about the growing international cult organisation, Scientology. 
Concerns were heightened when, for example, in 1965 a headmistress of a 
primary school in East Grinstead, who was taking a course in Scientology, 
reportedly ‘took pupils of hers aged between 7 and 11 through an exercise in 
which they were to imagine that they were dead and turning to dust, as a 
result of which one small boy was said to have fainted’ (ibid:3).26 An already 
existing Australian enquiry stated that Scientology is: 
                                                          
26 The Foster Review did not collect new evidence but reviewed evidence already in the 
public sphere. It looked for example at an Austrailian enquiry – the Anderson Report. 
Scientologists had approved the appointments to the committee and had expressed 
confidence that Scientology would be vindicated. The Anderson Report described 
Scientology as: 
In response a Scientology pamphlet argued that the Anderson enquiry constituted ‘a 
systematic and malicious attempt to belittle what knowledge concerning the human spirit 
there was, and to degrade decent, honest people whose only crime was that they were 
working to achieve a greater awareness of themselves as spiritual beings" (Foster, 1971:14). 
Furthermore the pamphlet argued that the Anderson finding was the product of the State of 
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A fabric of falsehood, fraud and fantasy […] Scientology is evil; its techniques evil; its 
practice a serious threat to the community, medically, morally, socially, and its 
adherents sadly deluded and often mentally ill (Foster, 1971:5). 
 
In Chapter Nine of the Foster Review, it briefly explores the characteristics of 
psychotherapy in relation to the concept and phenomenon of transference 
and the related vulnerability of the client, and recommends Parliamentary 
intervention to project the public (ibid:177). In the late 1970s a Professions 
Joint Working Party was established to examine the question of possible 
statutory registration of psychotherapists, which culminated in the Sieghart 
Report, published in 1978 (Sieghart, 1978).  Members of the Working Party 
were from various psychoanalytic training organisations and from the British 
Association for Behavioural Psychotherapy.  The Report broadly 
recommended the statutory regulation of psychotherapies based on the 
model of the regulation of medicine: a statutory council that would register 
practitioners and establish criteria for acceptance, standards of practice, a 
code of ethics, and deal with complaints. Sieghart presented the non-statutory 
regulation of the psychotherapies as an unwelcome anomaly. The report 
argued that: 
Medical practitioners, dentists, lawyers, architects, pharmacists, nurses, midwives, 
veterinary surgeons, opticians and dispensers of hearing aids have all achieved 
statutory regulation, and so have the “professions supplementary to medicine” – 
chiropodists, dieticians, medical laboratory technicians, occupational therapists, 
orthoptists, physiotherapists, radiographers and remedial gymnasts (Ibid:iv).  
 
Sieghart observed that he, in contrast, without training or qualification, could 
legally set up practice as any kind psychotherapist or psychoanalyst. Sieghart 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Victoria’s origin as a convict settlement; that it was indicative of ‘the inborn criminal and 
suppressive nature of Australian social and legal system (ibid:5).  
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stated that: ‘provided they were above the appropriate age of consent (16 for 
women, 21 for men) I could go to bed with them’ (ibid:iv). Sieghart argued that 
a patient has recourse to a civil court to demonstrate that ‘I’ have done them 
‘positive and demonstrable harm’, and if proved ‘I’ might ‘be ordered to pay 
damages, but even then no one could stop me from carrying on my practice’ 
(ibid:5). The report argued that statutory regulation of professions has two 
main benefits:  
First, it helps to protect the public from unscrupulous or incompetent practitioners who 
prey on it in the guise of “professionals”. Second, it helps to enhance the standards, and 
so the status, of genuine members of the profession itself (ibid:iv).  
 
The Foster and Sieghart reports promoted the need for statutory regulation on 
the basis of (potential) harm to the public, therefore requiring, not only the 
demonstration that psychotherapy might have some unscrupulous 
practitioners, but also that the public may be particularly vulnerable to them 
(otherwise the former would be a sufficient condition for any occupational 
practice to be state regulated). The Sieghart Report is consonant with 
structural functionalism (as explored within Chapter Two) in viewing the 
psychotherapist-client relationship as very asymmetrical, in which the client is 
particularly vulnerable. The report construed the public as vulnerable on the 
basis of a psychoanalytic understanding of the process of psychotherapy, 
specifically the phenomenon of ‘transference’, arguing that the ‘patient’ is 
vulnerable because of a strong sense of dependence that they develop on the 
psychotherapist, leading often to ‘idealisation’ that ‘clouds their critical 
faculties’ (Sieghart, 1978:19). Furthermore: 
A consequence of this psychological dependence is the transference situation. Early in 
the history of psycho-analysis Freud discovered that patients became emotionally 
attached to him and that they would behave both seductively and aggressively. By “not 
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attributing these phenomena to his own personal qualities” he created a treatment 
situation where the powerful human emotions of sexuality and aggression, of love and 
hate, could safely emerge and come into the area of the doctor/patient relationship 
(ibid:19) 
 
 
Not only is the ‘patient’ regarded as vulnerable, but, drawing on the work of 
the structural functionalist sociological work of Parsons, Sieghart argues that: 
The powerful feelings of the patient directed to the therapist cannot fail but affect the 
therapist, who is subjected to a pressure from the patient – be it seductive or aggressive 
– to respond to the patient’s feelings by acting them out […] In our view most unethical 
behaviour springs from the therapist’s failure to withstand the emotional pressure of his 
patient’s transference, a failure to master their own countertransference’ (ibid:19).  
 
The report does not explore the significance or potential problem, in terms of 
support for the proposals across the field, of the fact that it legitimates the 
need for statutory regulation on the basis of a psychoanalytic 
conceptualisation of transference. There was indeed considerable internal 
division within the Working Party between psychoanalysts and the behaviour 
therapists. Whilst the former were in favour of the official position of Sieghart, 
i.e. the establishment of a council that would set standards for practice and 
training, the British Association for Behavioural Psychotherapy (BABP) was 
against, arguing that there was currently insufficient evidence of what 
therapies were effective and whether training made any difference to 
effectiveness. The BABP were therefore at this time in favour only of statutory 
regulation that required practitioners to sign up to a code of ethics (ibid). The 
report was broadly in tune with the structural functionalist view and the self-
justifying ideology of the profession, and did not address more sceptical 
accounts of the professions emergent within sociology during this period, as 
explored within Chapter Two, and also voiced by counter-cultural movements, 
including, to an extent, Scientology itself. The need for statutory regulation 
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was broadly accepted on the basis of professional opinion, rather than any 
formal body of evidence. Paul Sieghart emphasised that the Working Party, to 
his surprise, was conducted in a very ‘good natured’ way (ibid:xi), but in 
reality his regulatory policy proposal did not amount to a workable 
compromise or consensus across the field. In addition to the behaviourists’ 
strong dissention, the committee had not consulted, or even considered, the 
growing field of humanists and counsellors.  
 
Responses to Sieghart 
Sieghart galvanized movement within the field towards a professionalised 
system of self-regulation, the Sieghart and the Foster Reports becoming for 
many authoritative points of departure in favour of statutory regulation of the 
talking therapies. The report also prompted a more marginal counter-
movement within the field against both professionalization and the prospect of 
statutory regulation. Let us look at each in turn.   
The so called United Kingdom Rugby Conference was established after the 
Sieghart Report in 1988 and was set up and hosted by the British Association 
of Counselling (BAC). Overall there was an attempt to unify the field and work 
out an agreement for regulation; the inclusion of the BAC and counselling 
setting the expectation that counselling should be subject to regulation as well 
as psychotherapy. Out of the Rugby Conference emerged the United 
Kingdom Standing Conference for Psychotherapy (UKSCP) (what became 
the UKCP), which later, in 1989, became the United Kingdom Council for 
Psychotherapy (UKCP) (Pokorny, 1995:415). The UKSCP/UKCP was a broad 
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church so to speak, encompassing a diverse range of schools of practice, 
including psychoanalytic organisations, humanistic, and behaviourist ones. 
However, the BAC declined to join the UKPC saying that the “BAC is a very 
large umbrella organisation and it would not seem sensible to place ourselves 
under someone else’s umbrella” (Aldridge, 2010:249). This thwarted attempts 
to unify the field under the umbrella of a single professional body, and also 
diminished the likelihood of a consensus being achieved within the 
mainstream of the field on what particular path should be taken, if any, 
towards statutory regulation. This was a significant cleavage within the field, a 
reiteration of which had a lively presence within the later HPC struggle. The 
UKCP’s quest to represent the whole field was further undermined by 
tensions between humanistic and psychoanalytic member organisations. 
Some psychoanalytic organisations, namely the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 
wanted a veto over any decisions that the UKCP committee made. This 
eventually led to an acrimonious break away of a group of psychoanalytic 
organisations, which formed the British Confederation of Psychotherapist 
(BCP), which later became the British Psychoanalytic Council (BPC) (Davies, 
2009b:39).To an extent the split both reflected and reinforced the informal 
cultural hierarchy within the field in which psychoanalysis had a tendency to 
see other therapies as inferior derivatives or distortions of psychoanalysis. 
They also had a tendency towards social and moral conservativism; for 
example not allowing admittance of homosexuals to training. The BPC was 
also active in seeking to restrict the use of the title ‘psychoanalyst’, claiming 
that only people trained by member organisations of the BCP could 
legitimately use the title (Arbours Association, 2009). Malcolm Allen described 
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the BPC as an ‘arrogant’ organisation when he first joined in the 2000s.27 It is 
against this background and history that the BPC was an early endorser of 
the HCP plans; its relative enthusiasm partially an effort to consolidate the 
shift away from the perception of it as arrogantly aloof (see also Chapters 
Two, Five and Seven). BPC member organisations tended also to have more 
extensive connections within the NHS. Other psychoanalytic organisations 
remained within the UKCP, including many that were later to oppose the HPC 
plans.  
Whilst various factions and organisations within the field both pushed for and 
fought over a possible regulatory crown, the field of psychological therapies 
did not hold significant strategic interest for the Thatcher Governments (more 
on this below), and although the Major Government’s initial response to calls 
from within the field for statutory regulation were not entirely unreceptive, it 
declined to pursue it on grounds of division within the field over what the 
character of any such regulation should be. Tim Yeo, the then Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, in January 1993, wrote to Michael Pokorny, Chair 
of the Registration Board of the UKCP that: 
I am very interested to learn of the commendable progress that the United Kingdom 
Standing Conference for Psychotherapy has been making towards a unified umbrella 
organisation for psychotherapy. The forthcoming register is of particular interest and a 
necessary step in progressing towards regulation. We will continue to watch closely the 
development of the Register over the next few years. Before official recognition can be 
considered we will need to be satisfied that it represents all the major psycho-
therapeutic approaches (Pokorny, 1995:415).  
 
                                                          
27 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014. See 
appendix A transcript p. 442. 
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This quietly stated reticence on the grounds of division within the field seems 
to have ‘turned’, not long afterwards, in 1996, into early indications by the 
Major Government that it may go down a different statutory route than that 
envisaged by the field (more on this below). Prior to this moment there was, in 
1981, an attempt though a Private Members Bill in the House of Commons to 
introduce statutory regulation of the field. And in 2000 Lord Alderdice 
attempted to introduce a Bill. Neither Bills, without Government baking, 
reached a second reading (Arbours Association et al, 2009) The Alderdice 
Bill, arguably rather wistfully, was limited to introducing statutory regulation for 
psychotherapists, as distinct from counsellors.  
Before looking at the regulation of the talking therapies in relation to the so 
called rise of the regulatory state, I want first to consider the significant 
counter-regulatory and professionalization movement that emerged during the 
1990s.  
 
Counter-regulatory and professionalization movement 
Mowbray’s 1995 seminal text ‘The case against psychotherapy registration: A 
conservation issue for the Human Potential Movement’ (Mowbray, 1995) 
included a critique of the Foster report, effectively claiming that it used 
Scientology as a bogeyman to justify the pursuit of statutory regulation. 
Mowbray argues that the scandal of Scientology was used to set in motion 
moves towards forms of state regulation and professionalisation that 
essentially constitute a medicalisation (medical domination) of the talking 
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therapies, and that those seeking to suppress Scientology did so in the 
private interests of medical domination. Mowbray writes: 
Hubbard set up the Church of Scientology in the early 1950s specifically to be free to 
explore the world of the mind without being subject to licensure and to defend his 
‘Dianetics: the modern science of mental health’ from the hostility of the American 
Medical Association which, in secret alliance with other members of the US 
establishment, was seeking to destroy the movement (Mowbray,1995:46).  
 
 
Mowbray also cites the journalist, Percy: ‘when Hubbard publicly denounced 
practices such as electroconvulsive shock therapy and lobotomy as crude 
assaults on the brain, the psychiatric establishment was outraged’ (ibid:46), 
leading, Mowbray claims, to a sustained and orchestrated campaign by the 
American establishment against Scientology. Mowbray, like the human 
potential movement more broadly tends towards a strong intellectual 
prejudice in favour of non-professional and non-bureaucratic forms of 
organisation, and argues that it is quite possible that constant harassment 
from the US authorities and medical establishment actually helped foster the 
cultish aspects of Scientology. In the UK, factions within the humanistic 
counselling movement organised against professionalisation and the prospect 
of statutory regulation, and the so called Cambridge Lectures, organised by 
the Norwich Collective, led to the emergence of the Independent Practitioners 
Network (IPN) in 1995 (Totton, 1995). Totton wrote: ‘I think we have 
registered that there are many therapists and counsellors who do not consent 
to the programme of the UKCP and BAC’ (ibid:32). The IPN offered both a 
critique of and an alternative to the system of self-regulation. They critiqued 
the supposed self-regulatory system as hierarchical, in which psychoanalysis 
dominated, which in turn was dominated by a medical model; and the IPN is 
set up in contra-distinction to the hierarchical and centrally organised 
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mainstream professional associations. Each practitioner within the IPN needs 
to find membership within a group of practitioners that will vouch for the 
integrity of their practice, and, in turn, that group must have links to other 
groups in the network that will stand by the integrity of the group as a whole. 
Accountability and involvement in each other’s work is described as 
extensive. The idea of the network is underpinned by the broader critiques of 
social injustice within society and by a conceptualisation of counselling and 
psychotherapy as a social movement, seeking to contribute to the social 
transformation of society. Totton for example writes: ‘what is starting to 
emerge is a sense of the Network as part of a wider social movement towards 
the restructuring of institutions of all kinds on a pluralistic and non-hierarchical 
basis’ (Totton, 1995:293). Humanistic therapists and activists from this 
tradition played a key role within the Alliance during the HPC struggle, 
forming a constituency that was not only opposed to HPC regulation but also 
to any form of professionalization: instead tending to see the talking therapies 
as a vocation or/and a social movement. To recall from Chapter Two, 
practitioners and thinkers within this movement tend to be against the 
professional hallmarks of credentialism, trainings and entry barriers to 
practice. Mair (1997), for example, in her paper ‘the myth of therapist 
expertise’, cites research studies which suggests that ‘paraprofessionals’ – 
‘educated people with no clinical training’ – produced either better than, or 
just as good, outcomes for clients as those produced by professionals who 
had undergone a formal clinical training in psychology, psychiatry, social 
work, or nursing when delivering a range of therapeutic treatments (107).    
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In this section I have identified some of the key organisational formations and 
divisions within the field that developed partially in response to calls for 
statutory regulation of the field. Concerns about doctrinal differences, as well 
as differences in training standards, constituted what might be referred 
somewhat irreverently as a ‘turf war’ within the field between organisations, 
and considerable anxiety between competitors for the crown as regulator of 
the whole field. Members of the Human Potential Movement and of the IPN 
launched their own ‘turf war’, from the outside so to speak, seeking a more 
ambitious telos, not of statutory regulation, but of the end of bureaucratic and 
hierarchical organisations within the field, and in their stead the institution of 
an IPN-like, non-hierarchical and pluralistic network of organisations within a 
broader network of non-hierarchical institutions across all sectors of society 
(Totton, 2006). In this section I have identified the broad discursive and 
institutional matrices, largely internal to the field, which seem partially to have 
prohibited government uptake of calls from both within and outside the field, 
galvanised within and by the Foster and Sieghart reports, for statutory 
regulation to be introduced.  
In the final section, let us look at the more external socio-political and policy 
drivers for regulation (relatively unpronounced until the late 1990s) within the 
talking therapies. My main focus is on the so called rise of the regulatory 
state. This helps contextualise the change in Government heart, within the 
space of a decade, from the gentle refusal or ‘stalling’ of calls for statutory 
regulation, to steely determination to implement a particular form of statutory 
regulation against the initial will of most of the field.  
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THE TALKING THERAPIES AND THE RISE OF THE REUGLATORY 
STATE 
The Sieghart Report had come, as it turned out, at the tail end of the so called 
post-war consensus, of which full employment, ‘cradle to grave’ welfare, 
cooperation between corporations and unions, and Keynesian economic 
policy, were the chief hallmarks (Kavanagh, 1992). The Thatcher 
Governments and the New Right inaugurated a climate of greater scepticism 
towards the professions, construing them as ‘producer monopolies’ and as 
driven by self-interest (Exworthy and Halford, 1998:19). Self-interest was not 
seen as a problem in itself, but rather that the ‘shelter’ of the professions from 
the market, and their strong autonomy from government, meant that self-
interest went excessively unchecked. The Thatcher Government’s 
inaugurated a number of ‘market’ reforms of the NHS, including the 
introduction of the purchaser/provider split, so as to diminish professional 
clinical autonomy over services; often referred to as the restratification of 
healthcare professions, as explored within Chapter Two (Chamberlain, 2010). 
The Thatcher governments, combining moral conservativism and economic 
liberalism to orientate its policy, tended to cast the professions, along with 
unions, blacks, gays, single parents, and the political left, as the ‘enemies’ of 
national renewal (Glynos an Howarth, 2007:173).  Market reform of the 
professions was accompanied with increased constraints on public spending. 
As noted within Chapter Two the rhetoric of liberalisation of the economy – 
the so called rolling back the frontiers of the state – making it smaller, was 
only part of the story: deregulation across economic sectors, including the 
privatisation of public utilities like water and electricity, was in reality 
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accompanied by the rise of multiple-layers of new regulation (Moran, 2003). 
As Moran and others have noted, this is not so much as government in retreat 
as a form of ‘high modernism’; or, as Rose would put it, government at a 
distance. In reality the government, through market and regulatory 
mechanisms, extended its reach and control over the economy in many 
respects. The mid 1990s also saw the emergence of the evidence based 
medicine movement, in which, to recall from Chapter Two, there was an 
increased population based approach to medicine, and greater use of the 
experimental random controlled trial in the shaping of practice. This was a 
significant part of ‘clinical governance’ of doctors and other healthcare 
professionals (Department of Health, 2006a). Significant changes in law as 
regards the pharmaceutical industry and regulation of its market, both in the 
UK and internationally, made it a ‘billion dollar’ business (Healy, 2013), which 
tended to shift power within pharmaceutical companies towards the marketing 
departments, Healy contending, for instance, that the marketing departments 
have become the tail that wags the dog: medical conditions were starting to 
be created by the pharmaceutical companies in order to primarily meet 
demands and new opportunities for colossal profits (ibid).  
The broader changes to healthcare were also mirrored within changes to the 
governance of psychological services within the NHS. The purchaser-provider 
split brought about a concomitant focus upon the ‘cost-effectiveness’ of 
treatments, through ‘evidence based practice’. The NHS Executive sought, 
not only to directly influence psychological treatments provided, but also 
influence the regulation of private sector provision of psychotherapy (Roth 
and Fonagy, 1996:74), largely because by 1996 nearly half of all Local Health 
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Authorities purchased psychological services in the private sector. The 
Department of Health’s 1996 review (Department of Health, 1996) of 
psychological services within the NHS expressed concern that ‘employers, 
including GP’s, should satisfy themselves that counsellors and 
psychotherapists are adequately trained and GP’s should not employ staff 
whose qualifications have not been scrutinized’ (Ibid:11). The review was 
followed by the publication of the first edition in 1996 of ‘What Works for 
Whom?’ (Roth and Fonagy, 1996). The review paper (Department of Health, 
1996) noted that the broader program within the NHS to improve clinical and 
cost effectiveness of services draws extensively on the UK Cochrane Centre 
in Oxford, and the York Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (Department 
of Health, 1996:41). There is an assertion in the report that treatments should 
be tested through randomised controlled clinical trials (RCT), and that, ‘much 
of current diversity is unjustified’, the provision of particular forms of 
psychotherapy often based on the personal preferences and allegiances of 
practitioners rather than evidence of their efficacy (ibid:43). The review set out 
‘equity’, ‘accessibility’, ‘acceptability’ (to service-users), ‘efficiency’ and 
‘effectiveness’ as the key criteria in audit of services 
The foreword of the 1996 edition of ‘What works for whom?’ (Roth and 
Fonagy, 1996) notes that ‘the accountability that reimbursement parties wish 
and the quality of services to which patients are entitled call for new methods 
of evaluating treatment implementation and patient progress’ (iv). It also 
claims that: 
Many, if not most, of the cherished beliefs of theorists and practitioners of particular 
methods of psychotherapy remain largely unsupported by the kinds of evidence 
preferred by those who control budgets of health care systems across the globe [and 
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that] there has been relatively little progress in developing an evidence base for 
psychodynamic therapies and for longer-term treatments’ (ibid:21).  
 
Furthermore:  
The eschewal of existing reliable and valid measures by practitioners of 
psychodynamic treatment is a regrettable fact which will only be corrected by a 
concerted effort on the part of psychodynamic therapists to identity, in a consensual 
and measurable way, the outcomes their treatment aims to bring about, and to validate 
these against criteria that other stakeholders (such as patients, funders, and other 
practitioners) see as important (ibid:21).  
 
It also states that treatments that are proved to be ineffective should be 
withdrawn, though asserts that lack of evidence should not itself be taken as 
evidence of lack of efficacy. Very strikingly the authors do not acknowledge 
that many within the field, to recall from Chapter Two, contend that 
quantitative research on efficacy are contrary to the values and norms of their 
practice. However, both reviews do acknowledge critiques of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), namely that its 
philosophical roots are within the now largely ‘discredited’ epistemological 
approach of logical positivism and operationalism:  
Leading philosphers (e.g. Polanyi, 1958; Kuhn, 1970) have demonstrated that scientific 
observations cannot be independent of theory to the extent that they represent 
theoretical constructs, and obtain their meaning through their placement in a network of 
concepts […] in fact the operationalism of DSM favours behavioural and biological 
orientations over other, potentially equally useful perspectives in the realm of 
psychopathology’ (ibid:27).  
 
 
Roth and Fonagy also warn against over-authoritative statements about 
which psychotherapies work: ‘overconfidence at this point carries with it the 
risk not only of penalizing under-researched (but possibly effective) therapies, 
but also of freezing therapeutic innovation’ (ibid:40). They argue, however, 
that the research on the efficacy of psychotherapy can feed back into 
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innovation in practice and service provision. The Department of Health review 
paper (Department of Health, 1996) observes that Roth and Fonagy (1996) 
summarise the arguments against using a diagnostic framework, but 
conclude that they find themselves “unable to identify a suitable alternative 
framework which would meet our objective of providing a scientific context of 
for recommendations regarding psychotherapy practice and training in the 
current NHS mental health services’ (48). Reading these texts somewhat 
against themselves, but nonetheless taking their own claims to their logical 
conclusion, this would seem to be an indictment of current mental health 
services. This is in the sense that they seem to be saying that it is less 
because of the scientific credibility that the approach is adopted, and more 
because of the particular organisational features and epistemological 
predilections of the mental health services and their sponsors. As central 
texts underpinning the government’s approach to mental health and 
psychological therapy services, they arguably offer extraordinarily lack lustre 
legitimation. Or more precisely, they seem to acknowledge that the research 
paradigm underpinning the development and assessment of talking therapies 
is inadequate. They seem to be saying, we cannot find a suitable alternative 
scientific framework, so let us act as if this one is valid despite the fact it is 
widely discredited. Here the lure of the promise of enhanced ‘predict and 
control’ capabilities, including the prediction of clear treatment outcomes, 
seems to supersede a concern for the scientific validity of tests, and, 
ultimately, the actual effectiveness of treatments. 
The proliferation of regulatory practices during the 1990s, or the ‘audit 
explosion’, as Michael Power (1999) puts it (as explored within Chapter Two), 
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had limited impact on the sphere of private practice of psychotherapy and 
counselling. However, there was a project by the National Vocational 
Qualifications programme to map the competencies of the field in 1996, which 
the BPC declined to take part in, claiming that a competency approach was 
not congruent with psychoanalytic practice. The UKCP in contrast embraced 
this project, and was one aspect of the UKCP’s attempt to broaden the appeal 
of psychotherapy. Former Chair of UKCP Emmy van Deurzen-Smith, for 
example, in 1995 stated that ‘in order to be taken seriously as a profession 
we have to be able to demonstrate that psychotherapy is a scientific discipline 
in its own right, or better perhaps, that it is a scientific art which has a 
significant contribution to make to the emotional well-being of Europe’ 
(Deurzen-Smith, 1995).    
Let us now look at the early years of the New Labour government and key 
antecedents to the HPC plans and the associated projects of the Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapies, and the Skills for Health project to map 
the National Occupational Standards of counselling and psychotherapy.  
 
The New Labour Years  
A series of ‘adverse events’ and public scandals hit the NHS during the 
1990s, including the Bristol Royal Infirmary cardiology scandal (1998), the 
Alder Hey Hospital organ donation scandal (1999), (Burke, 2008), the tumour 
diagnosis scandal in Birmingham, the MMR vaccine scandal (1998), as well 
as the serial killers Nurse Beverley Allit (1993) and the GP Dr Harold 
Shipman (1998) (Department of Health, 2006a), (Burke, 2008).  
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These scandals became closely fused with government rationales for 
regulatory reform, tending to be construed as central drivers of regulatory 
reform in government documents and the media. However, the extent to 
which government reforms were simply necessary responses to failures 
within the NHS is contested. Brown (2008), for example, writes: ‘The 
successful way relatively isolated cases were manipulated to construct an 
exaggerated fear of the possibility of widespread clinical malpractice within 
the NHS was crucial’ to pushing reform (350). It is widely accepted within 
medicine that some of the regulatory measures introduced, at least partially, 
to prevent another Shipman, would not actually do so.28 The crisis was 
therefore arguably used by the incoming Labour Government as evidence of 
the failure of public services and as justification of its programme of 
modernisation (Brown, 2008). New Labour seemed to construe the need for 
reform in order to re-establish trust in the NHS, which it implicitly 
characterised as mainly having been diminished by the perception of wide 
spread clinical malpractice. Other factors are also likely to have contributed to 
a diminishment in trust, including increased education and public access to 
medical knowledge (e.g. through the internet) and consequent development 
of ‘lay-expertise’, and a decrease in deference towards medical practitioners, 
conditioned in part by a broader cultural diminishment in deference towards 
authority and science, encompassed  within the ‘cultural turn’, including 
increased reflexivity, and ‘post-modern’ critiques of scientific knowledge -
including the intellectual and scientific ‘debunking’ of practices as wide 
                                                          
28 Nicholas Temple (Psychiatrist and psychoanalyst), interview by author, June 2014.  
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ranging as psychoanalysis (Gomez, 2005) and logical positivism (Roth and 
Fonagy, 1996:27)  - and a proliferation in competing knowledges and forms of 
expertise, as acknowledged and partially fostered in the intellectual sphere by 
works like Kuhn’s 1962 ‘the structure of scientific revolutions’, and 
Feyerabend’s ‘against method’ (Feyerabend, 1975). This thesis itself is 
based, as explored within Chapter Three, upon an anti-foundational ontology 
in which all claims to social and political truth are seen as within history and 
culture (i.e. contextual) and as contingent and contestable. It was against an 
arguably more pluralistic and tumultuous socio-cultural background, and a 
broad post-modern, if you like, challenge to strong claims to objectivity and 
certainty, that the New Labour Government placed an emphasis upon an 
instrumental view of trust: that is, the view that trust is primarily a product of 
the ‘system’, the ‘instrumental rational efficiency of the institution’ (Brown, 
2008) – rather than as primarily a product of ‘qualitative interpersonal 
communication’ between individual medical practitioners and patients. This 
dovetailed with the government’s emphasis upon the introduction of clinical 
governance, the increased bureaucratisation of medical knowledge, the 
instrumental control of medical practitioners, including the growth in the 
medical ‘guideline’ industry (more on the latter below) (Chamberlain, 2010). 
But rather like Moran (2003) and Maltby (2008), as explored within Chapter 
Two, New Labour, as with preceding and proceeding Governments, seemed 
to overestimate the objectivity of these technically framed interventions. 
These interventions restore or sustain trust in the professions in so far as the 
interventions themselves are trusted, but this highly technical and scientistic 
approach arguably attempts to address the ‘cultural turn’ – increased 
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education and ‘lay expertise’, and the proliferation of forms of expertise and 
contestation of knowledge – by shifting, to recall from Chapter Two, the 
guarantor of truth from the professional to the regulator, and in so doing, to a 
significant extent simply ‘shifts’ the problems, rather than robustly addressing 
them.   
 
The election of New Labour in 1997 did not so much bring radical changes in 
the direction of regulatory struggle within the talking therapies so much as an 
intensification of previous movements. Jumping forward to the HPC struggle 
for a moment, the fact that New Labour’s plans were essentially a 
continuation of Conservative Government policy perhaps gives credence to 
Executive Director of the HPC, Marc Searle’s view that the HPC plans were 
‘change of government proof’ in relation to the then forthcoming 2010 General 
Election  (see Chapter Six).29  
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was established in 1999 
by New Labour, and was a means of harnessing and expanding the use and 
implementation of evidence based medicine, and of providing the means to 
determine what medical treatments (in an arena of constant medical 
innovation and proliferation of medical technologies) are made available on 
the NHS, thereby helping to address the so called post-code lottery; that is 
the uneven availability of treatments available on the NHS across the country. 
To recall from Chapter Two, NICE adopted a ‘pyramid of evidence’ which 
placed forms of evidence for the efficacy of treatments within a hierarchy of 
value.  
                                                          
29 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
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The concept of the multiple-healthcare profession regulator - the HPC- was 
brought to fruition in 2003. To recall from Chapter Two this can be linked to 
the globalisation ideology of more complex services required for more 
complex interconnections brought about by it (Fournier, 2000). Whilst the 
evidence based practice movement and ‘what works’ initiatives within the 
previous Conservative Government arguably were quite quietly developed, 
they took a more central stage within New Labour’s ideology. This was 
namely a ‘beyond left and right’, beyond ideology ideology, whereby political 
and practice dogma are seen as overcome by a ‘what works’ pragmatism 
(Wells, 2007). This included a penchant for softening the demarcation 
between private and public sectors, seeking to involve the private sector 
within the NHS, encompassing a tendency towards extending regulatory 
reach within the private sector (Lousada, 2000). This ‘beyond left and right’ 
ideology perhaps partially helps explain why the government Skills for Health 
project and the HPC plans did not seem very cognizant of differences 
between NHS and private practice. The ‘friend-enemy’ relation of New 
Labour’s broad political frontier was between modernisers and anti-
modernisers: the professions and the unions as such losing their marked 
status. Rather, New Labour in seeking to meet the demands of its ‘heartland’ 
supporters, as well as those Conservative voters it had won-over, sought to 
reconcile the pursuit of greater social justice with market friendly policies. 
New Labour’s policy programme to increase national skills across economic 
and industrial sectors is both emblematic of and a key aspect of this 
approach. The Lietzch Review (2006) clearly put the case for the need to 
develop national skills within the context of globalisation. According to this 
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report, reflective of the broader rationale of the government, the best and only 
avenue to ensure better social justice (i.e. lifting more people out of poverty 
and increasing social opportunities and inclusion) is to pursue market friendly 
policies and for Britain to take its place as a winner within what the report 
construes to be the zero-sum competition between nations within the new 
globalised economic order (Leitch Review, 2006). A key rationale of the 
government’s skills programme, of which the SfH project to map the National 
Occupational Standards of counselling and psychotherapy was one aspect, 
was to seek to correct the claimed failure of educators and trainers to provide 
potential employees with the up to date skills that industry and employers 
really need. A key aim of the skills project was therefore to be strongly 
inclusive and consultative of a field in the process of mapping skills. However, 
this prioritisation of what the field thinks is strongly couched within the aim of 
national economic success within the global economy. The Leitzch Review 
stated: ‘”Economically valuable skills” is our mantra’ (ibid:2). The Report 
creates a sense of urgent need to develop skills in order to survive and 
succeed:  
Being world class is a moving target. It is clear from my analysis that, despite substantial 
investment and reform plans already in place, by 2020, we will have managed only to 
‘run to stand still’ […] the world will have continued to change and the global 
environment will be even harsher (ibid:2) 
 
 
From a hegemonic-strategic point of view the report sets out a sense of 
inevitability of the embracement of a particular form of globalisation by setting 
up something of a Hobson’s choice between national decline and national 
success, reinforcing a sense that the particular form of globalisation pursued 
by New Labour was an entirely external phenomenon, rather than the British 
government as a significant constitutive player within the developments: a 
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point made more broadly about New Labour by Watson and Hay (2003, as 
mentioned within Chapter Two.  As far as the healthcare services were 
concerned, New Labour, seeking to reverse the Conservative diminishment of 
the public services, injected massive amounts of funding. But this extra 
funding came with the requirement for reforms within the public services, 
including market ones. In 2006 the White Paper Our Health Our Care Our 
Say (2006c) for example announced plans to open NHS services further to 
profit and non-profit providers. The norm of competition was to come into play 
at both the level of commissioning i.e. competition between providers for 
contracts, as well as at the individual patient level, where patients are given a 
choice between providers i.e. competition between providers for patients. The 
sense of the patient as ‘consumer’ was therefore being significantly 
developed. Another key logic or rationale within the paper governing policy 
development is that of ‘preventative projects’, seeking to reduce higher 
financial and social costs that occur further down the road. An intention 
towards a programme to address mental health in this context for example is 
announced within the 2006 White Paper (Department of Health, 2006c). In 
one sense there was a resurgence in the belief that the government can 
significantly socially engineer, or lay the foundations for improved life-styles. 
This is arguably comparable to the so called mental health hygiene 
movement of the 1950s and 60s briefly discussed above.  
 
SUMMARY  
In this chapter we have briefly sketched the broad historical context of the 
HPC struggle and of the associated Skills for Health and IAPT programmes. 
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This has helped to identity the antecedents of the projects. We can see from 
this sketch the key axes around which regulatory and governance issues 
have coalesced. One key axis concerns the relationship between the talking 
therapies and the medical establishment; there frequently being a struggle 
around the extent of the relationship between the talking therapies and 
medicine. Freud was unable, because psychoanalysis was antithetical to the 
positivism of universities, to secure a place for psychoanalysis within the 
university, and, because of similar doctrinal tensions between psychoanalysis 
and psychiatry and medicine, the two mixed together precariously at times. A 
central driver for psychoanalytic closeness to medicine was a wish to protect 
orthodoxy and prevent a flood of ‘quacks’ from entering the field. At the same 
time psychoanalysis often distanced itself from medicine for the very same 
reason, to protect the purity of its development. Significant exceptions to this 
included responses to psychological trauma suffered by military personnel 
during the First and Second World Wars in which psychoanalytic ideas were 
either appropriated (by Rivers et al for example) or developed, for example by 
Bion in therapeutic community experiments. Doctrinally, a key element of 
talking therapies, from psychoanalysis onwards is an emphasis upon the 
notion of the client or patient doing much of the work themselves. However, 
new modalities of therapy emerged partially on the basis of strong 
disagreements, and new ideas about how the therapeutic relationship should 
be conceptualised. A key area of tension has been to what extent talking 
therapies do or should seek to ‘adapt’ clients to the dominant values within 
society, and bring about an alignment between the needs, aims and wishes of 
government and those of the individual, involving a reshaping of both (as, for 
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example, in the complex of programmes around the Tavistock Clinic and the 
Institute of the Human Relations) or, to what extent talking therapy is, or 
should be, a space in which the dominant values of society need not hold 
sway. Humanistic, existential, Jungian, and Lacanian schools are key 
examples of ones which emerged in express counter-distinction to what they 
regarded as the excess ‘medical’ orientation of other therapies, or their 
primary focus on adapting populations to the needs of mass market consumer 
capitalism. As we shall see in the chapters to follow, these are the very same 
constituencies within the HPC struggle which were most actively opposed to 
the HPC plans. To a significant extent the key tensions and struggles within 
the period following Sieghart and the development of the system of self-
regulation, which despite the Assured Voluntary Regulation scheme in place, 
is still largely recognisable today, provides us with a picture of the struggle to 
come within the HPC Professional Liaison Group over the ‘nuts and bolts’ of 
the plans. The vexatious issue of differentiation between counselling and 
psychotherapy and of ‘entry’ levels to the field have routes going back to the 
emergence of counselling and its role within the field and wider society. Many 
professional associations within the field formed were geared towards the 
telos of statutory regulation, but division within the field, in addition to lack of 
strategic Government interest, meant that the Government declined to pursue 
it. The final section of this chapter, focussed on the rise of the regulatory 
state, and to a large extent focussed on the policy developments which laid 
the conditions for a Government change of heart, namely its arguably 
aggressive pursuit of regulation of the field. New Labour to a large extent 
continued policy developments within the previous Conservative Government, 
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namely increased codification and governance of talking therapies provided 
through the NHS. New Labour’s more ‘natural’ political favour for the public 
services, however, along with a more overt drive for social justice, re-
invigorated a high-modernist belief in the power of the state to improve lives. 
The key constituencies, namely market logics coupled with technical 
expertise (marked by a strong calculative rationality) of this ‘high modernism’, 
as Moran (2003) refers to it, were set by previous Governments. Interventions 
were therefore set in the mould of the classical/scientific Enlightenment 
marked by economic liberalism. Let us now look, in the next chapter at three 
such interventions – the improving access to psychological therapies 
programme and the Skills for Health project to map the National Occupational 
Standards for counselling and psychotherapy, as well as the regulatory 
reform of the healthcare professions in which the HPC plans were embedded. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
THE HPC PLANS IN CONTEXT: HEALTHCARE REGULATORY REFORM 
AND THE IAPT AND SfH PROJECTS 
I think Peter Fonagy put it [mentalisation based therapy] together as something that 
would be [..] scientifically acceptable within the NHS, but of course NHS psychotherapy 
has been damaged a lot by IAPT […] It has robbed resources. 30 
I've spoken to CBT therapists, and have supervised them over the years. They'll often 
not do CBT in session. But then they'll fill in the reports or the assessment sheets to 
say that they've done CBT because that's what's being funded.31 
 
In this chapter I address the immediate context of the emergence of the HPC 
plans, covering the period from mid-2006 through to March 2007. Malcolm 
Allen referred to the interrelated SfH, IAPT and HPC projects as constituting a 
‘new zeitgeist’ for the talking therapies.32 By examining SfH and IAPT, as well 
as the broader healthcare regulatory reforms in which the HPC plans were 
embedded, I seek to understand both why statutory regulation shot up the 
political agenda and why and how the HPC became the government’s 
preferred regulator. To an extent I break with the historical chronology of the 
SfH project by including within this chapter a look at the project to develop the 
National Occupational Standards for psychoanalysis, which did not actually 
take place until 2008, but I address here for ease of incorporation into the 
overall structure of the thesis.    
 
                                                          
30 Nicholas Temple (Psychiatrist and psychoanalyst), interview by author, June 2014.  
 
31 Lisa Wake (Chair of UKCP 2005-2007), interview by author, April 2015 
32 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014.  
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My main thesis in this chapter is two-fold. The first concerns the description, 
naming, and normative evaluation of the competing policy imaginaries at play. 
I argue that the HPC plans were embedded within government policy that 
consolidated and deepened the ‘transactional’ form of scientific bureaucratic 
and consumerist organisation within the healthcare regime, including its 
further extension and sway, through SfH and IAPT, within the field of 
counselling and psychotherapy. My second main argument concerns the 
political dynamics involved in the introduction of the HPC plans and related 
projects. I argue that the HPC plans were rendered less visible by being 
‘swept along’ within wider regulatory reform of the healthcare professions, 
and that a ‘problem minority’ narrative helped to support a tendency to keep 
key characteristics of the reforms and the projects away from careful scrutiny.  
 
The main sources of this chapter are archival material, including government 
policy documents, namely the 2007 White Paper ‘Trust, assurance and 
safety: the regulation of health professionals in the 21st century (Department 
of Health, 2007b), and the two consultation papers leading up to it, ‘Good 
doctors, safer patients’ (2006a) (often dubbed the Donaldson review), and 
‘The regulation of non-medical healthcare professions’ (2006b) (often dubbed 
the Foster review). This helps to assess the broader character of the 
healthcare regime to which the field of the talking therapies was arguably 
being ‘hailed’.   I draw on key documentary responses made by key 
organisations within the field of the talking therapies to the main government 
consultations, and material published on the events by the online version of 
the Independent Practitioners Network’s journal, ‘eIpnosis’ (2012). I draw on 
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my interviews with Julian Lousada (Chair of the BPC),33 Malcolm Allen (then 
Chief Executive Officer of the BPC) and with Linda Mathews of the BABCP34. 
As key members of the ‘pro-HPC’ camp, I draw on these interviews to further 
an understanding of why these professional organisations supported the HPC 
from the outset. I draw on my interview with James Antrican (Chair of UKPC, 
2007-2009)35, as well as documents from the British Association of 
Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP), which help furnish an understanding 
as to why the UKCP and BACP initially opposed the HPC as regulator.  As 
regards the IAPT project, I draw on the Depression Report (Layard et al, 
2006) and other key documents, as well as my interview with a health 
scientist adviser to the IAPT programme. This interviewee is a strong 
supporter of the role of experimental and random controlled clinical trials 
within the provision and delivery of psychological services. I also draw on 
newspaper articles and other journal papers published at the time expressing 
both concerns about and support for the project. My interview with Lisa Wake 
(Deputy Chair of UKCP, 2003-2005, Chair, 2005-2007)36 also helps illuminate 
the IAPT project.  
As regards SfH, I examine the SfH’s documents for its initial consultation 
(Player and Mathews, 2007), including its summary of responses, and draw 
                                                          
33 Julian Lousada (Chair of the British Psychoanalytic Council, and member of the 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author, 
September 2014. 
34 Linda Mathews (Psychotherapist, representative of BABCP within the HPC’s Professional 
Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author.  
35 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
36 Lisa Wake (Chair of UKCP 2005-2007), interview by author, April 2015. 
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on my interviews with James Barrett37 and Paul Atkinson38 of the Council for 
Psychoanalysis and Jungian Analysis (CPJA), who  were involved in the SfH 
project to establish the National Occupational Standards for psychoanalysis. 
Material from the College of Psychoanalysts, which they obtained through a 
freedom of information request, is a revealing source as regards the political 
dynamics of the project (Arbours Association et al, 2009).  
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first I give a brief 
overview of the events during this period, setting out the broad 
‘problematisations’ made by different actors and stakeholders within the 
regulatory reform, and within the SfH and IAPT projects. In the second 
section – ‘competing policy imaginaries’ - I dig deeper into these events and 
problematisations, drawing out the assemblage of norms projected within the 
government projects across the various nodes of the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy. Deploying the nodal comparative analytic framework I assess 
the credibility of the main competing characterisations of the projects. In the 
third section I go onto to explore the political and rhetorical strategies that 
government agencies and key actors, as well as opponents of the projects, 
adopted in their attempts to promote and install, or derail, the policies. To 
recall from Chapter Three this largely concerns how particular norms of 
practice were made more or less visible, and therefore more or less available 
for contestation.   
 
                                                          
37 James Barrett (psychotherapist member of the CPJA and member of Skills for Health 
group developing competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015. 
38 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, member of the CPJA and member of Skills for Health 
group developing competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
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OVERVIEW OF EVENTS 
Regulatory reform of healthcare professions and early tussles over plans to 
regulate the field of counselling and psychotherapy  
By the time consultations were being held as part of the Foster Review  
(Department of Health, 2006b) in July 2006 (see diagram 1 for a timeline of 
this period) it had become common knowledge that HPC regulation of the 
talking therapies was on the cards39. The main professional associations 
within the field were on the Department of Health’s stakeholder list and were 
consulted as part of the Foster Review, but not the IPN, which enlisted the 
help of an MP to get it on the list after the Foster Review consultation was 
completed (Postle, 2012:144).  In an attempt to head off the HPC plans, a 
group of professional associations within the field, led by the British 
Psychological Society (BPS), put a counter-proposal called the Psychological 
Professions Council to the Government (British Psychological Society, 2006), 
which was broadly modelled on the General Medical Council and the style of 
regulator recommended by Sieghart back in 1978, as explored within Chapter 
Four. The BPC and the BABCP declined to partake in this proposal, and 
instead broadly welcomed the HPC plans. The proposal was rejected by the 
Government on the grounds that it no longer favoured, barring exceptional 
circumstances, single profession regulators for new professions (Department 
of Health, 2007c) and in February 2007 the Government’s White Paper on 
regulation announced that the HPC would regulate counselling and 
psychotherapy:  
                                                          
39 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014. 
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Psychologists, psychotherapists and counsellors will be regulated by the Health 
Professions Council, following that Council’s rigorous process of assessing their 
regulatory needs and ensuring that its system is capable of accommodating them. This 
will be the first priority for future regulation (Department of Health, 2007a:85). 
  
These Green and White Papers posed a number of policy problems and 
solutions to them. The overarching aim of the planned reforms was the 
improvement in public protection and an overall improvement in the quality of 
services. For example, the White Paper states that the ‘primary purpose of 
professional regulation is to ensure patient safety [and that regulation is a] 
vital component of the overall framework in the United Kingdom for ensuring 
the highest quality healthcare for the public’ (2007a:13). These constituted a 
further explicit response to Harold Shipman and other adverse events in the 
NHS40 
Key regulatory measures included the ‘revalidation’ of doctors and potentially 
also of other healthcare professionals. This is a periodic check of the capacity 
of an individual professional to meet threshold standards of practice. Other 
key measures included forms of audit; for example the measuring of both 
individual professionals and organisations in relation to one another through 
the ‘benchmarking’ of outcomes. As regards the regulation of regulators, a 
key proposal was the cessation of professionals electing fellow professionals 
to regulatory boards, and the introduction of parliamentary oversight of the 
regulator. This was in conjunction with the assertion that ‘professional 
regulation needs to sustain the confidence of both the public and the 
                                                          
40 The White Paper states: ‘the past decade has seen a series of high-profile and 
controversial cases which have sent shockwaves through both professional and public 
thinking about the future of professional regulation. However atypical their behaviour, names 
like Beverley Allitt and Harold Shipman are now fixed in the public memory. The mounting 
pressure of scrutiny from the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, Alder Hey, Neale, Ayling, and the 
Kerr and Haslam inquiries, and other cases, has led to growing doubt in the public’s mind 
about the adequacy of our arrangements for professional regulation’ (2007a:17).  
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professions through demonstrable impartiality’ and independence from 
professions, government and other interested parties (2007a:3). The White 
paper also implies that the new regulatory measures would not stymie the 
work of good practitioners: 
Most health professionals meet high standards routinely and have a lifelong appetite 
to be even better. That professionalism is an unquantifiable asset to our society, 
which rules, regulations and systems must support, not inhibit (2007a:1).  
 
The importance of ‘patient-centredness’ and of ‘good communication’ are also 
highlighted. The White Paper states that:  
Professional practice in healthcare is not simply about technical, scientific and clinical 
competence, but about a relationship between the health professional and the patient 
in which mutual understanding and trust provide the foundation for effective 
healthcare (2007a:72).  
 
Unlike the response to the HPC announcement within the field of counselling 
and psychotherapy, the regulatory proposals were broadly welcomed by the 
main healthcare professional associations. The main point of contention was 
the planned shift from a criminal to civil standard of proof within malfeasance 
and fitness to practice cases (Middlemiss, 2006).  
 
Table 1.  
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The Skills for Health project  
In the meantime the Department of Health brought in Skills for Health to help 
with developing standards of practice, or competencies, known as National 
Occupational Standards, for counselling and psychotherapy. This followed the 
Department’s first-hand experience of an acrimonious working relationship 
between UKCP and BACP in their joint report venture, funded by the 
Department of Health, on the regulatory terrain of the field. James Antrican 
described the BACP and UKCP as being ‘just at each other’s throats’ during 
this process, and the report as a ‘piece of crap’.41 Rosalind Mead, the lead 
civil servant within the Department of Health on the regulation of counselling 
and psychotherapy expressed that it had become clear that the BACP and 
UKCP could not command the confidence of the whole of the profession’, and 
that they had not produced competencies in sufficient detail. Mead also 
                                                          
41 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
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rebuked, in an open letter, the UKCP for publishing its own ‘report to the 
Department of Health’ on competencies within the field. In it Mead stated:  
Your publication of this report at this time is potentially very damaging. It may give 
the false impression that UKCP has been given the sole right to map the competences 
and standards of proficiency for psychotherapy, immediately before Skills for Health 
launches its wider consultation on a competence framework which will lead to the 
same outcomes (Mead, 2006b) 
 
The National Occupational Standards were also intended to be extensively 
utilised within the governance of counselling and psychotherapy services 
within the NHS and beyond: for example within job specifications, within the 
development of training and supervisory criteria (Skills for Health, 2010). SfH 
conducted an initial consultation in December 2006. Much of the field 
cautiously welcomed the project, though often with a caveat of considerable 
concern about its capacity to accommodate diversity within the field. For 
example, the ‘Analytic psychology, psychoanalytic, and psychodynamic’ 
section of the UKCP welcomed SfH’s ‘recognition of the dangers of a 
mechanistic model of psychotherapy’ and of the ‘diversity within the field’, and 
its decision to try to test the limits of the range of therapies currently being 
offered and to explore further what their similarities and differences may be’ 
(The analytical psychology, psychoanalytic and psychodynamic section, 
UKCP, January 2007:1). But it went onto conclude:  
It is hard to imagine at present that anyone trained via the SfH model could do 
psychoanalytic work; nevertheless, we look forward to further developments with 
interest (January, 2007:4). 
  
 
The BACP expressed its opposition to any ‘modality’ approach to the 
development of the competencies, claiming that the evidence supports the 
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view that the ‘active ingredients’ that make therapy effective are common to 
all modalities, and therefore, all therapies are seen as equally effective (Skills 
for Health, 2006). Others, including the BPC and the College of 
Psychoanalysts, welcomed the modality approach and the opportunity to 
differentiate in detail (ibid). SfH expressed awareness of the history of 
acrimony between different factions within the field, and offered strong 
assurances that the project was highly open and inclusive. SfH stated that it 
has a responsibility to ‘define standards or competences that carry the 
support of a wide range of interest groups’, and that they would seek as many 
contributions as possible, and ‘make sure that a wide range of evidence is 
used’ (Skills for Health, 2006:2).  
However, the project ran into deep controversy once it appointed the 
University College London’s (UCL) Department of Health and Clinical 
Psychology as the lead body in the development of the plans. Personnel 
appointments to the project, the adopted methodology for developing the 
NOS (more on this below), and the draft content of the NOS all became 
subject to deepening controversy across the field (The Arbours Association et 
al, 2009). A modality approach was adopted and separate groups were set up 
to develop NOS for four main modalities of therapy. These were cognitive 
behaviour therapy, psychodynamic psychotherapy, systemic family therapy, 
humanistic psychotherapy and counselling (Skills for Health, 2010). No 
Lacanian psychoanalysts were admitted to the 
psychoanalytic/psychodynamic modality group despite attempts by them to 
join, and promises made by SfH that they could do so (The Arbours 
Association et al, 2009). The two Jungian analysts within the group, Paul 
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Atkinson and James Barrett, attempted to guide the draft NOS in a direction 
that recognised the deeply ‘contextual’ character of psychodynamic practice. 
42 However, the development of the NOS, across all modalities, was based 
upon ‘manuals’ of practice derived from empiricist clinical trials (Skills for 
Health, 2010). The College of Psychoanalysts contended that ‘there are 
simply no manuals of psychoanalysis as psychoanalysis is not a treatment 
that can be applied, it is invented afresh in each case by the analysand and 
analyst’ (College of Psychoanalysts, 2008).   
Paul Atkinson described being on an ‘assembly line’ and put to the group that 
the ‘assumptions behind the assembly line are not being talked about’.43 He 
and James Barrett submitted a critical report (The Council for Psychoanalysis 
and Jungian Analysis, 2009) and shortly after resigned their positions.44 
Critics characterised SfH as exclusive, lacking in independence, and as 
dominated by people within, or closely associated with, two political groupings 
within the field, namely the BPC and sub faction within the UCL’s Department 
of Health and Clinical Psychology (The Arbours Association et al, 2009). In 
short, the SfH was dominated by clinical psychologists, namely Roth and 
Pilling, predominantly working within the cognitive and behavioural therapy 
tradition, and psychoanalysts, namely Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy, 
who were seeking to carve a place for psychoanalysis as an ‘evidence based’ 
and short-term ‘focussed’ talking therapy45. Fonagy and Bateman for example 
had developed Mentalisation Based Therapy (MBT) and were seeking to 
                                                          
42 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, and member of Skills for Health group developing 
competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
43 ibid 
44 ibid 
45 Nicholas Temple (Psychiatrist and psychoanalyst), interview by author, June 2014.  
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promote it within the NHS (Arbours Association et al, 2009:31).  All were 
committed to the development of talking therapies underpinned by empiricist 
clinical trials.  
 
Improving access to psychological therapies  
Running more or less parallel to these developments was the Government’s 
IAPT programme. It was based on the ‘Depression Report: a new deal for 
depression and anxiety disorders’, published in June 2006 (Layard et al, 
2006). It was billed as a programme to tackle a largely unaddressed 
‘epidemic of depression’ through significant new investment, and an ‘army’ of 
newly trained therapists. The report claimed that the programme would ‘pay 
for itself’ through the money saved from getting people off incapacity benefits 
and back to work. The report states: ‘At one time unemployment was our 
biggest problem, but we have done a lot to reduce it. So mental illness is now 
the biggest problem, and we know what to do about it. It is time to use that 
knowledge’ (ibid:1). Two demonstration sites were launched and ran between 
mid-2006 and mid-2007, one in Doncaster and the other in Newham. The 
Doncaster site encompassed a ‘stepped care’ approach whereby those with 
mild conditions would receive computerised self-help treatments, moderate 
cases would receive short-term CBT treatments, delivered by ‘low-intensity’ 
practitioners (often trained psychology graduates), and more severe cases 
would receive more complex treatments from  ‘high intensity’ practitioners 
(usually clinical psychologists or similarly experienced individuals).  From its 
launch onwards, only NICE-approved forms of talking therapy could be 
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delivered through IAPT. 46 David Richards (Director of the Doncaster site), 
pitting the Doncaster site approach against the Newham site approach (more 
on this below), argued that the Doncaster programme was a challenge to 
entrenched professional interests, and a means of getting a large number of 
people trained quickly and in a targeted way to treat particular conditions 
effectively (Richards, 2007). At a broader socio-political level IAPT was 
sometimes billed as a progressive force; the Guardian journalist, Polly 
Toynbee, for example, describing psychiatry as offering a ‘kick start’ to get 
people out of a vicious cycle of depression and poverty, and as a ‘quick win, 
an easy happiness hit’, against a background contention that ‘more money 
gives less extra happiness the richer we get’ (Toynbee, 2006). IAPT was not 
without controversy however. One key controversy was the initial plan to only 
provide CBT-orientated therapies through the programme. Lisa Wake (at the 
time a former Chair of the UKCP) threatened to launch a public campaign 
against IAPT just prior to its launch unless it agreed to include all NICE 
approved therapies.  This was eventually agreed, after initial threats coming 
from the Deputy Prime Minister’s office to banish Wake from ever working 
again in the NHS failed to deter her from pursuing her complaint. 47  
Others had more fundamental concerns, arguing that the programme was 
hubristic in its claims and unrealistic in its aims. One GP for example stated: 
‘The notion that a few weeks CBT will transform miserable people languishing 
                                                          
46 Lisa Wake (Chair of UKCP 2005-2007), interview by author, April 2015. 
 
 
47 Lisa Wake (Chair of UKCP 2005-2007), interview by author, April 2015 
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in idleness and dependency – at a rate of 50% - into shiny happy productive 
workers is embarrassing in its absurdity’ (Fitzpatrick, 2006:729). Philippa 
Garety, professor of clinical psychology at the Institute of Psychiatry, stated 
‘there is a danger that CBT is being oversold as a cure-all. But no treatment is 
a cure-all’ (Pid, 2006). Phil Richardson, professor of Clinical Psychology, 
stated: “While I am in no way against putting more money into mental health, 
the available empirical evidence does not support many of the claims that are 
being made for CBT […] There is a risk that those involved in delivering the 
psychological therapies will end up with egg on their face when the when the 
wild claims are shown eventually to have been false” (ibid). He also argued 
that ‘Layard’s big idea – the notion that it is possible to get depression people 
off incapacity benefit and back into work with up to 16 hours of CBT – is 
fundamentally flawed’ (ibid). Fitzpatrick, a GP, in an article entitled ‘A 
miscalculation of sublime dimensions’ in the British Journal of General 
Practice, argued that  ‘extravagant claims for the efficacy of cognitive 
behavioural therapy’ had been made ‘based on extrapolating from a number 
of small studies to the entire population’ (Fitzpatrick, 2006:729). Others saw 
IAPT as a barrier rather than first step to greater equality and social justice. 
Maloney, a counselling psychologist, for example, writing in the Guardian a 
couple of months later, critiqued the Depression Report as misguided in 
downplaying the significance of poverty, the growing gap between the rich 
and the poor, and the associated ‘erosion of communal ties’, in creating 
misery. Layard makes the false assumption, Maloney wrote, that ‘the causes 
of psychological distress lie in the way that we see the world, not in the way 
that it is’ (Maloney, 2006). He argued that CBT treatments are rationalistic; 
213 
 
that is, they assume that ‘rational insight will lead, magically, to beneficial 
change’. Rather evidence from neuroscience, Maloney argued, suggests that 
‘our actions are rooted not so much in our thoughts as in our [deeply 
embedded] feelings’, and are not subject to easy correction. He critiqued the 
‘preoccupation with happiness’ as a means of government at once appearing 
to ‘care’ whilst seeking to diminish social expenditure, and acts as a form of 
‘insidious social control, in which we are encouraged to look inwards (and to 
blame ourselves) for the cause of our troubles’ (ibid). Finally, he argued that 
‘psychic’ pain is potentially an ‘essential asset: one of the few clear signals 
that all is not well with our world’ (ibid).  
Having outlined the key events and painted the brushstrokes of the regulatory 
reforms and projects, I want now to identity and examine the key assemblage 
of norms of practice within them. This will enable us to assess some of the 
conflicting characterisations.  
 
 
COMPETING POLICY IMAGINARIES  
 
In this section I provide a ‘thick description’ of the healthcare regulatory 
reform in which the plans for HPC regulation of counselling and 
psychotherapy were announced. This will give us a clearer picture of the 
healthcare regime into which the talking therapies were arguably being 
assimilated, largely through IAPT and SfH.  I argue that the ‘transactional’ 
character of the healthcare regime was simultaneously being deepened. For 
example, in the case of medicine the shift away from individual and collective 
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autonomy was being further consolidated by the reforms. A significant feature 
of the reforms relating to the HPC plans was the shift towards a preference 
for multiple professional regulators for new professions (Department of 
Health, 2007a). I examine the norms and perspectives of responses within 
the field of counselling and psychotherapy to the Foster Review (Department 
of Health, 2006b) before the HPC plans were cemented within the trust and 
assurance regulatory White Paper (Department of Health, 2007a). I then go 
onto examine the Skills for Health and IAPT projects in some detail. 
 
A deepening of the ‘transactional’ healthcare regime  
Table 2 
 
I adopt the comparative analytic framework of the ‘nodal’ approach developed 
by Glynos and Speed (2012) and Glynos et al (2014a) as outlined within 
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Chapter Three, to help identify the assemblage of norms projected by the 
White Paper. In short I examine what the paper says about the nodes of 
governance and regulation, provision and distribution, and, finally, delivery.  
 
Node of governance and regulation  
I focus on two key facets within the node of governance and regulation, the 
first concerning the governance of healthcare through the axes of regulation, 
and the second concerning changes to the norms governing the regulators 
themselves. I look at each briefly at each in turn. The trust and assurance 
regulatory White Paper (2007a) included measures to reinforce ‘clinical 
governance’, namely embodying a standards approach to regulation. Put 
simply, the regulator establishes standards and puts measures in place to 
enforce these standards. Clinical governance also includes NICE guidelines 
and measures to ensure their implementation. The White Paper (2007a) and 
the Foster and Donaldson reviews barely mention NICE guidelines or 
‘evidence based practice’, but these were already central to ‘clinical 
governance’. By 2006 it had already been long clear that it was strongly 
expected that NICE guidelines are to be implemented in all but exceptional 
circumstances where express clinical reasons for must be given to justify 
departure from the guidelines. It is therefore reasonable to surmise that the 
reforms would (and indeed have) consolidated and expanded the 
implementation of NICE guidelines. 48To recall from Chapters Two and Four, 
                                                          
48 In 2004, in a legal academic paper on healthcare, Mykhalovskiy E and Weir L wrote: 
‘Trusts should facilitate the implementation of guidelines from NICE an audit their use through 
the framework of clinical governance. In the rare event that a trust should decide to positively 
diverge from such guidelines, it should do so only through a mechanism of due process that 
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NICE and the evidence based practice movement tend to produce a sharp 
top-down relationship between research and practitioner. These practices 
entail a degree of ‘hierarchy’, or at least provide further tools for management 
in an existing hierarchy. This is consistent with the observations made by 
Chamberlain (2010), to recall from Chapter Two, of an increased 
differentiation between rank and file professionals on the one hand and a 
managerial and research elite within the profession on the other. The node of 
governance and regulation can be said to embody ‘transactionality’ in the 
sense that what counts as best practice is largely determined and shaped by 
empiricist clinical trials and then ‘handed down’ fairly ‘wholesale’ for the 
practitioner to ‘apply’ to the patient (more on this below).  
Now let me turn to the second facet of the node of governance and 
regulation: the governance of the regulator. A number of changes were 
signalled by the trust and assurance regulatory White Paper, but the central 
one for our purposes, as mentioned above, is that of the cessation of rank 
and file professionals electing other rank and file professionals to regulatory 
boards. This was to prevent professionals from resisting or blocking 
regulatory changes. This sought to reinforce the independence of the 
regulator from rank and file professionals, and therefore arguably gave extra 
fortification against possible ‘professional capture’ of the regulator. This was 
coupled with increased parliamentary oversight of the regulator. Parliament, 
the White Paper argues, is more democratically representative than a faction 
of professionals engaged in electing board members. The paper states that it 
                                                                                                                                                                     
is required in public law for the accountability of the reasonableness of such a decision” 
(Mykhalovskiy E and Weir L, 2004).  
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is not ‘practicable’ to ensure that the electorate within professions is ‘broad 
and inclusive’ enough to ‘ensure confidence in the independence of the 
regulators. Parliament already represents that balance of interests and 
opinion across society’ (Department of Health, 2007a:27). The other key 
policy on the regulator was an express consolidation of a shift towards multi-
professional regulators for ‘new’ professions, which I consider this below. But 
first let us examine how the key norms within the node of governance and 
regulation, identified above, are articulated with norms within the other key 
nodes of the healthcare regime.  
 
Node of provision and distribution  
The White Paper does not focus on the nodes of provision and distribution, 
but to recall from Chapter Four, the 2006 White Paper Our Health, Our Care, 
Our Say (Department of Health 2006c) set out changes which deepened the 
operation of the norms of competition and patient choice. This was namely 
the increase in competition between providers for contracts, as well as 
competition between commissioned providers for individual consumer-
patients (ibid). This is consistent with the simultaneous policy of 
deregulation/regulation identified by Moran (2001, 2003) and others, as 
explored within Chapter Two, as a trend within regulation and governance 
across all sectors of the economy within recent decades.  Although the 2007 
White paper does not spell this out, it is reasonable to surmise that the 
tightening regulation is intended to prevent or deal with market failure, as well 
as help constitute the markets. Indeed the Donaldson Review (Department of 
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Health, 2006a) highlights that a significant consequence of increased 
competition between organisations is an increase in reputational risk, and 
therefore an increased incentive for organisations to brush any difficulties 
under the carpet. This is where the standards of practice, the NICE 
guidelines, and the norms embodied within these, come into play. They 
strongly delimit the norms of competition and patient choice: in short the 
patient is seen as being given a choice between services which meet 
minimum standards, including only the delivery of treatments deemed to be 
cost-effective. A transactionality within the framing of expertise – in which 
clearly defined treatment packages are framed as providing clear outcomes – 
dovetails with a transactionality within commercial and consumer-patient 
contracts, where the patient and commissioning bodies are given clear 
choices on the basis of detailed delineations of treatments and outcomes. 
The norm of standardisation encompassed within the minimum standards of 
practice, and protocolisation within NICE guidelines especially, also impact 
the node of delivery.  
 
Node of delivery  
Contra what one might expect given the significant degree of 
protocolisation/routinization of practice embodied within NICE guidelines, 
parts of the trust and assurance regulatory White Paper were actually, as 
noted above, rather suggestive of a demand for more ‘contextual’ forms of 
practice. In a further example, the paper states:  
Healthcare is a relationship, dependent on good communications, not simply on the 
delivery of a procedure or a prescription to a passive recipient. It depends on patient 
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consent to effective treatment based on a proper understanding of the clinical options. 
Those clinical options themselves depend on a proper understanding of the 
circumstances, aspirations and expectations of the patient (2007a:72).  
This may go somewhere towards what Mol (2008) refers to as ‘doctoring’ (as 
explored within Chapter Two), where the doctor takes a detailed history of the 
patient and seeks a contextual understanding of the patient’s illness and 
where the doctor is encouraged to be ‘attuned’ to the patient as a whole 
person (as distinct from only a ‘rational-consumer’ or ‘passive subject/object). 
The trust and assurance regulatory White Paper contextualises contemporary 
medical practice in relation to its history, stating that:   
Prior to the rapid advances in technical ability, the historic interactions between 
patients and health professionals were as much concerned with relationships, support 
and traditional bedside manner as they were with treatment (2007b:17)  
 
 
There is here, however, a tacit sharp demarcation between practices 
associated with ‘patient-centred’ practice on the one hand and ‘treatment’ as 
such on the other. This tacitly relegates the former to a rather ad hoc, even if 
important, feature of treatment. This is in contrast to a deeper contextual 
approach to practice. Again, to recall from Chapter Two, for Mol (2008), in a 
fuller form of ‘contextual’ medical practice, gaining a fuller picture of the 
patient is seen as intrinsic to the treatment. At times gaining a fuller picture of 
the patient is even intrinsic to the determination of what counts as an illness 
that needs to be treated. The White Paper does not address the fact that 
NICE guidelines are generally weighted against ‘practice based evidence’ and 
a framing of face to face medical practice as itself a form of research and 
precarious experimentation in-process.  
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The broad assemblage of norms across the nodes of the healthcare service 
chain constitutes what I refer to as a regime of transactionality. The norms of 
practice embodied within the node of governance and regulation – namely 
standardisation, routinization, hierarchy and a complex of audit practices - 
strongly delimit the norms of competition and patient choice within the node of 
provision and distribution. This means that only services and practices which 
conform to the minimum standards and norms of practice embodied within 
NICE guidelines are provided and distributed. In turn this means that the node 
of delivery is marked by transactionality: where there is an emphasis upon a 
pre-packaged treatment being applied to a patient that is tacitly 
conceptualised in rather simple terms as a rational consumer of healthcare. 
There is arguably a sense therefore that the stated ambitions within the paper 
for more ‘patient-centredness’ seem to be largely framed as ad hoc to what is 
seen as the real substantive part of medical practice.  
 
Government preference of multi-professional regulators  
Before comparing these to the norms of practice within the IAPT and SfH 
programmes, let us look at the trust and assurance regulatory White Paper’s 
pronouncements on its preference for multi-professional regulators. This was 
in an attempt to make regulation and standards more uniform across the 
healthcare professions and simpler for patients to use (2007a), and it was 
also multi-professional regulation for increased multi-professional team work 
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within healthcare services. 49 These were key reasons stated by the 
Department of Health for its rejection of the proposal to form a Psychological 
Professions Council (2007c).The latter proposal embodies a strong norm of 
‘specialist expertise’ whereas the HPC embodies a significant shift towards 
‘generic’ regulatory expertise, whereby the personnel of the regulator have 
generic regulatory expertise, rather than being drawn from the regulated 
profession.50 This shift towards multiple-professional regulation arguably 
forms a significant part of the restratification of the profession, reducing 
professional autonomy, and making professionalization a ‘new beast’. This is 
consistent with Waller’s and Guthrie’s (2013) claims that HPC-style regulation 
offered a profession less collective control over its future direction than 
historically the case. 51  My own view, drawing on the work of Mol (2008) and 
Healy (2013), as reviewed within Chapter Two, is that the diminishment in 
conditions conducive to deeper ‘contextual’ practice, or a more robust 
‘patient-centred’ practice, is detrimental to both public protection and the 
effectiveness of healthcare (I explore this further in the concluding chapter). 
Overall, the regulatory reforms consolidated and deepened the long 
established road away from the system of statutory self-regulation, and shift 
towards a regime of heightened transactionality, encompassing accountability 
                                                          
49 The introduction of statutory regulation of healthcare occupations traditionally 
supplementary to medicine, arguably reinforced the restratification of medicine, which 
traditionally tended to lead these occupations. By edging towards a more ‘level playing field’, 
this policy arguably reduced the sense in which these occupations are ‘satellite’ occupations 
of medicine, and thereby also diminished the role of medicine as lead professions and 
medicine as an alternative source of authority to government.   
50 Whilst the regulators like the HPC draw on profession-specific expertise (within both fitness 
to practice hearings and in drawing up some of the details of the regulatory practices, 
regulatory oversight and governance of the regulation remains with people who are either not 
drawn from any of the regulated fields, or from across the fields.  
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as audit.  Now let me consider IAPT and SfH, and assess the extent to which 
they constituted an attempt to assimilate the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy to this deepening ‘transactional’ healthcare regime.  
The Alliance, as we explore in the next chapter, tended to see the HPC plans, 
IAPT, SfH and NICE, as an institutional ‘block’ seeking to reshape the field of 
the talking therapies into an image of the government’s own liking (Samuels, 
2009). Critical descriptions of SfH and IAPT are therefore necessary (though 
obviously not sufficient) pieces of the jigsaw we need in order to assess this 
contention. Let us examine each in turn.  
 
 
Skills for Health 
The Skills for Health project to produce competencies (National Occupational 
Standards/NOS) for counselling and psychotherapy was in effect a resource 
for governance, intended, as noted above, to help inform various practices 
across the nodes of services. In the case of SfH I also add the node of 
training. To recall from Chapter Four, the broad aim of the government’s skills 
and training policy was to try and ensure that trainees were being trained to 
acquire the skills that employers actually need and want (Leitch Review, 
2007). The empiricist work which underpinned the project helped shape what 
the NOS/competencies tacitly say about the various nodes of the field. It 
seems clear that the decision to base the project so predominantly on 
empiricist work radically undercut SfH’s commitment to inclusivity and SfH’s 
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claim that the NOS would be based on actually existing practice across the 
breadth of the field (Skills for Health, 2006). Let us look at how this was so 
across the nodes of the field. The decision to take a modality approach to the 
NOS embodied a pluralist vision of the structure of the field, cementing the 
view that there are important differences between different modalities of 
talking therapy. To this extent SfH claims of inclusivity arguably stack up. But 
its inclusion of different modalities of counselling and psychotherapy was 
arguably strongly undercut by its adoption and continued commitment to an 
empiricist underpinning of the NOS. In adopting this research paradigm, SfH 
enacted a sharp demarcation and hierarchical relationship between research 
expertise and ‘frontline’ practice. In short in the shaping of the NOS, these 
manuals took precedence over practitioner experience, or ‘practice based 
evidence’, as well as over the distinct bodies of theoretical and case study 
literature within many traditions of talking therapy. To recall from Chapters 
Two and Four, (random) controlled /empiricist trials inherently involve the 
standardisation of practice in order to test the efficacy of a particular therapy 
‘package’ against a control group. There is an inherent notion of 
transactionality, as well as causality, in this process: the same ‘treatment’ 
applied under similar conditions to a similar set of clients in ‘real-life’ so to 
speak will ‘cause’ similar outcomes. In other words talking therapy as a 
deeply interpretative and attuned activity tends to be eclipsed and instead 
shifted towards being a series of pre-set procedures and protocols.  
As regards the node of training, the competencies, if adopted by education 
and training schools to shape their curriculum and approach, would reproduce 
the sense that ‘best’ practice is something handed down to them by a 
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research elite for them to ‘apply’ to clients. The emphasis upon competencies 
and skills rather than understanding is significant. I explore this further in 
relation to the HPC standards of education and training within the next 
chapter. As regards the node of provision and distribution, such as 
commissioning: if the NOS came significantly into play, then talking therapy 
services, and individual practitioners, that are orientated around the NOS 
competencies, and which take their lead from an empiricist research elite, are 
more likely to find the therapies they offer commissioned and distributed. The 
CPJA expressed concern that the competencies were geared towards work 
within the NHS, and the increasing necessity within the NHS to conform to an 
empiricist epistemological framework (as explored within Chapter Four). More 
specifically, the report contended that the draft standards promoted the style 
of work developed by Bateman and Fonagy’s Mentalisation Based Therapy. 
Furthermore, the CPJA felt that no amount of modification of the NOS 
statements, or rearrangement of the wording, would resolve the issue: the 
CPJA wrote that ‘we do not accept that the Skills for Health framework of 
competences based on manualised, RCT evidence-based psychoanalytic and 
psychodynamic work in the public sector can represent the professional 
practice of members of the CPJA’ (The Council for Psychoanalysis and 
Jungian Analysis, 2009:6).  A central concern was how the empiricist 
approach adopted by SfH fed through to the competencies in terms of how 
they conceptualised the therapeutic relationship, i.e. the so called node of 
delivery.  
Let us look in some detail at the draft NOS for psychoanalysis/psychodynamic 
therapy and what they tended to presuppose about the ‘delivery’ of it. Here I 
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focus on the critique that members of the College of Psychoanalysis and 
Jungian Analysis CPJA (organisational member of the UKCP) made of the 
psychoanalytic standards. The CPAJ was the largest representative 
organisation of psychoanalysts within the field 52 Below I focus on the 
strategies used by SfH to secure and push through the style of NOS which 
most psychoanalysts did not recognise as reflecting their practice. First let us 
examine the issue of their content. The CPJA expressed concern about 
specific standards as well as the overall approach in relation to how the 
therapeutic relationship was framed. Specific concerns were largely focussed 
on how the therapist-client relationship is conceptualised. For example: 
The framework is mechanical and instrumental. The therapist “does” competences to 
the patient/client. The fundamentally relational nature of psychotherapy cannot be 
expressed in this model’ (The Council for Psychoanalysis and Jungian Analysis 
(ibid:5).  
 
Similarly, the report states: ‘Almost all the NOS’s are formed of transitive 
verbs with the therapist as actor and the patient as acted upon’ (ibid:8). The 
CPJA’s report juxtaposes this against the view by most psychoanalysts that 
the ‘therapeutic relation is a profound meeting of subjectivities’. Both the 
psychotherapist and client are seen as agents within the process. This 
includes the ‘therapist’s capacity to be acted upon’ (ibid:8). The report also 
states that the competence of a therapist cannot be assumed once and for all, 
but rather ‘must be continuously established and re-established as a living 
experience throughout the work’ (Ibid:8). Some comments object to an 
apparent over simplification of therapeutic processes. For example Andrew 
Samuels cited an NOS which included the ability to understand the ‘meaning 
                                                          
52 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, member of CPJA, and member of Skills for Health group 
developing competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
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in latent communication’ (Ibid:10). Samuels writes that this is ‘either very 
utopian, or totally ignorant of the difficulties of establishing the nature and 
content of meaning, and of its shifts’ (ibid). Paul Atkinson objected to the draft 
requirement that the therapist is not to have any physical contact with a 
patient, such as shaking their hand53. Other concerns focussed on what the 
NOS left out, Samuels, for example, noting that there is little recognition of the 
‘creative (as opposed to the repressed or destructive) unconscious’ (ibid:12).   
Drawing on these critiques made of the SfH standards, and what their likely 
impact across the nodes would be, it seems that SfH’s pluralism is 
significantly nominal in character. We have seen that the programme to 
develop NOS for psychoanalysis ‘shoe-horned’ a diverse modality, as 
highlighted within Chapter Four, into what is arguably not only a particular, but 
also a new and highly controversial, conceptualisation of psychoanalysis. The 
NOS for psychoanalysis, given that the largest association of psychoanalysts 
within the UK did not recognise them as remotely reflecting their practice, 
stretch credulity as regards their psychoanalytic character. It also seems 
reasonable to surmise that they render SfH’s strong claims to inclusivity 
rather absurd. In short the ‘empiricist’ base of the SfH project assimilated the 
modality of psychoanalysis to a more ‘transactional’ framework and set of 
norms and the project was evidently dominated by the imaginary of a select 
few within the field.  
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
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What is perhaps most pertinent for our purposes is the fact that the NOS were 
passed off , or ‘signed off’, as Lyall put it,54 as representative of the modality 
as a whole, when in fact the largest professional body of psychoanalysts, the 
CPJA, emphatically rejected the approach taken by SfH. The project 
(whatever one’s particular view about the standards) had become, to use 
Laclauian terminology, ‘subsumptive’, or, by way of analogy, it had become 
‘imperialistic’. Overall, it seems clear, given SfH’s adoption of an 
RCT/evidence based practice base for the project, that the SfH project was 
an attempt to assimilate the field of the talking therapies (both public and 
private practice) to what I have called the ‘transactional’ healthcare regime. 
As in the healthcare professions a hierarchical relationship is established 
between research and regulatory elites on the one hand and practitioners and 
clients on the other. Both practitioners and clients are tacitly construed as 
relatively passive in relation to research and knowledge and technical know-
how ‘handed down’ from the laboratory so to speak. 
So far we have ascertained a strong family resemblance between the 
healthcare regulatory reforms and the SfH project. Whilst the healthcare 
regulatory reforms tacitly sought to consolidate the role played by empiricist 
research within healthcare vis a vis the implementation of NICE guidelines 
and increased clinical governance, SfH sought to shape the field of the talking 
therapies via the establishment of standards, themselves shaped by 
empiricist research and expertise. Before looking at the rhetorical and political 
strategies that were used to achieve these aims, let us first look at the third 
                                                          
54 Marc Lyall (Regional Director West of England, Skills for Health), interview by author, 
September 2014.   
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main project constituting the ‘new zeitgeist’ within the field of the talking 
therapies – the Improving Psychological Therapies programme.  
 
Improving access to psychological therapies (IAPT) programme 
In one sense IAPT quite transparently set out to bring psychological services 
within the NHS up to the standard of other services, namely through the 
implementation of NICE guidelines. I begin with a brief exploration of the key 
norms at play across the nodes of the IAPT service chain. Like the healthcare 
reforms, NICE guidelines were at the centre of IAPT, encompassing a sharp 
hierarchical demarcation between research and practice, between the 
researcher and practitioner, and, in turn, between the practitioner and the 
client. Payment by results is also a significant norm at play within IAPT – 
where some practitioners do not get paid for the first few consultations if a 
client does not return for further sessions55 This heightens the outcomes 
focussed nature of the service. IAPT was open, or at least became open to 
different providers, thereby encompassing the norm of competition and client 
choice within the nodes of provision and distribution. This was delimited, 
however, by NICE guidelines and other governance measures, thereby 
mirroring the broader healthcare regime. The nodes of training and provision 
and distribution were also shaped by empiricist research and its 
transactionality, evident within the fact that candidates with potentially no 
                                                          
55 Fiona Ballantine Dykes (Counselling Central Awarding Body, and member of the HPC 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author, June 
2015.  
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previous experience or training within the field were able to train to become 
‘low intensity’ practitioners relatively quickly (Layard et al, 2006).  This was 
made possible by the fact that practitioners delivering specific treatment 
packages for specific conditions are seen as requiring only a relatively narrow 
scope of expertise. This also allowed, as David Richard’s of the Doncaster 
site noted (Richards, 2007), for candidates to be drawn from the localities and 
cultural backgrounds of many of the target client groups i.e. where there were 
few trained and experienced therapists living. Let us refer to this as the norm 
of ‘cultural proximity’. Richards seems to suggest that the close cultural 
proximity of IAPT therapists to clients is significant, but does not make clear in 
precisely what way. But it does perhaps imply that the cultural proximity may 
improve the practitioner-client relationship in some way (more on this in a 
moment). Another key norm within the node of distribution concerns the initial 
targeting of people in receipt of work incapacity benefits, with the express aim 
of getting them well, off benefits, and back to work, and in the process helping 
the programme to pay for itself. 56 
As regards the node of delivery, the IAPT programme, given its adoption of 
NICE approved therapies, placed an emphasis upon short-term ‘focussed’ 
therapies,57  the programme broadly being a contestation of more open-
ended, long term, forms of therapy, such as psychoanalysis and many 
                                                          
56 This arguably is close to Yeatman et al’s (2009) analysis of the shift in norms in recent 
decades governing welfare provision –  from a ‘subject of right as self’ to a ‘subject of right as 
will’ as the basis of legitimating and guiding where public welfare provisions are made. The is 
essentially a shift from an emphasis upon seeking to ensure that an individual live as good a 
life as they are capable of doing so, to an emphasis upon ensuring that the individual is able 
to contribute to, and take part in, economic exchange. The subject of right as self is not in fact 
lost in IAPT, but the provision of psychological therapy becomes more strongly predicated on 
returning people to work. 
57 Lisa Wake (Chair of UKCP 2005-2007), interview by author, April 2015. 
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humanistic and existential forms of therapy (Layard et al, 2006). I do not here 
examine the differences between the NICE-approved talking therapies, 
though I think this would be an interesting exercise. Rather I make the more 
general point that all of them are NICE approved and are therefore to an 
extent shaped by an empiricist research design. This is intended to produce 
better outcomes and reduce the impact of practitioner ‘error’. Protocolisation 
is intended to diminish the ideographic or idiosyncratic characteristics of each 
‘treatment’, or at least ensure that the ‘active ingredients’ (tested within the 
clinical trials) are transmitted within each of the individual treatments. 58  
 
‘Family resemblances’ between the healthcare reforms, IAPT and SfH    
Before moving onto a closer look at the political dynamics, let me briefly 
summarise the most salient points regarding the character of the healthcare 
reforms, and the SfH and IAPT projects. From my analysis, based on close 
examination of policy documents and interview material, we can see that the 
IAPT, SfH, and the regulatory reforms (pertaining to the healthcare regime) 
have strong family resemblance. The healthcare regulatory reforms 
                                                          
58 The IAPT health scientist I interviewed made a distinction between manualisation, which he 
equated with a ‘cook book’ approach to therapy, and protocolisation. He stated: ‘protocol 
allows much more flexibility than a manual, but you need manuals to assist people when 
they're following a protocol.Manualisation is, you might think that term implies some kind of 
robotic cook book following of work, which is certainly the criticism of some of the more 
traditional psychotherapies give about CBT or guided self-help. But the skill level for CBT is 
absolutely no less, and the decision making is no less than in these other therapies, what 
they're doing is following a protocol that has been tested within clinical trials and shown to be 
more effective, than not doing so., We know that if we let therapists diverge, there's studies 
shows that if we let therapists diverge from the protocolised structure then you get worse 
outcomes, even though they think they're being kinder to their patients, they think they're 
being more responsive, what actually happens is that patients don't do so well. (Health 
Scientist advisor to IAPT, interview by author).  
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introduced measures that would reinforce the acontextual/transactional 
orientated NICE guidelines. IAPT expressly only allows NICE approved 
therapies, which tend to favour short-term, focussed therapies. IAPT only 
directly impacts NHS psychological services, but indirectly places pressure on 
any modality of therapy wishing to be on the IAPT ‘menu’ (to succeed within 
the NHS part of the node of provision and distribution) to submit to empiricist 
trials. Skills for Health on the other hand was arguably directed at assimilating 
the whole of the field of counselling and psychotherapy (i.e. both public and 
private practice) to a more acontextual/transactional framework, via the 
shaping of National Occupational Standards for each of the maim modalities. 
These transactional-orientated standards were then billed to help shape 
norms throughout various forms of governance within the field, including 
performance and training criteria and standards (Skills for Health, 2010). As 
regards the HPC plans we can already see that the government’s preference 
for multi-professional regulators for new professions was driven partially by a 
shift towards multi-professional teams within NHS services, overseen by 
increased ‘clinical governance’, encompassing a further shift in control to 
managerial and research elites.  
Now to the question of how these projects became significantly marked and 
shaped by transactional norms. To put it rather badly, the above analysis 
shows that this process did not occur entirely through rational, scientific or 
political consensus, and so it is to the rhetorical and political strategies 
deployed within these projects that I now turn.   
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POLITICAL AND RHETORICL STRATEGIES  
The overarching aim of this focus on the political dynamics is to understand 
how the HPC became named within the 2007 ‘Trust and Assurance’ White 
Paper as the regulator ‘to be’ of counselling and psychotherapy. To recall 
from Chapter Three, the post-structuralist ‘logics’ approach I have adopted 
makes the ‘assumption that all social relations are in a constitutive and 
dynamic relation with structured fields of meaning marked by radical 
contingency’ (Glynos et al, 2014a:3). Particular policy changes and 
imaginaries are not seen as some kind of ‘natural’ progression in the order of 
things, or determined by processes ‘over and above’ the rest of society, but 
rather are seen as hard fought for, and won or lost, in a struggle to shape 
what is fundamentally an open ended policy terrain.  On a more specific 
empirical plain, although it is important to note (as done so above) that 
opponents of the HPC plans were already articulating significant responses, 
these are the main focus of the next chapter. My main focus here is to 
understand how the government initially promoted the HPC as the preferred 
regulator for counselling and psychotherapy. This also to an extent furthers 
our understanding of why the government viewed the HPC as the best option.  
To a significant degree the regulatory issue of the talking therapies was 
‘swept along’ with the regulatory reforms of the wider healthcare professions, 
and so I examine the rhetorical and political strategies adopted to promote the 
healthcare regulatory reforms before going onto examine the strategies within 
the SfH and IAPT projects which got these projects up and running. But I also 
examine the strategies which dented their legitimacy, presenting in turn 
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problems for the legitimacy and reception of the HPC plans (to be explored in 
the next chapter). 
 
HPC plans ‘swept-along’ with healthcare reforms 
Legitimation of HPC regulation of counselling and psychotherapy within the 
Trust and Assurance White Paper (Department of Health 2007b) was both 
tacit and generic. Other than the one sentence announcing the HPC as 
preferred regulator, counselling and psychotherapy is not otherwise 
mentioned. This and the fact that it was not mentioned at all in the Foster 
Review document (2006b) in effect helped to marginalise opposition voices 
and ‘lock-in’ the HPC as choice of regulator early in the policy-making 
process. Nor did the Foster Review acknowledge that they were not 
mentioned. It was not until July 2007 that the Department of Health published 
a detailed critique of the proposal of the ‘Psychological Professions Council’, 
and a defence of the HPC as prospective regulator (2007c). To recall from 
Chapter Four, ‘restratification’ was already strongly established within the 
healthcare professions, including the evidence based practice movement. 
This obviously accounts for its consolidation and deepening passing relatively 
uncontested: though that is not to say political and rhetorical strategies were 
not at play. Indeed, as we can recall from Chapter Three, all policy and 
practice regimes are fundamentally contingent, however well cemented and 
taken for granted within the fabric of day to day organisation and work. They 
must still secure and sustain their hegemonic status with continuous political 
and rhetorical effort. Let us now look at the key rhetorical strategies by which 
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the ‘transactional/acontextual’ healthcare regime secured and deepened its 
position within the healthcare professions.  
To recall from Chapter Three a key criteria for calling a social norm of practice 
as also being a political norm is if it tends to make other norms either less or 
more visible, and therefore more or less available for contestation. Let us first 
recall the key norms of the regime. Drawing on the work of Healey (2013) and 
Harrison (2009) I have characterised the healthcare regime, and the SfH and 
IAPT programmes, as being a scientific bureaucratic regime, marked 
particularly by what I refer to as transactionality, and supported by increased 
differentiation, hierarchy, and a complex of audit and regulatory practices. 
Within the Government Papers, namely the Trust and Assurance White Paper 
(2007b), and the Donaldson (2006a) and Foster reviews (2006b), the 
consolidation and deepening of the transactional-orientated regime as the 
vehicle to achieving the overall aims, namely public protection and quality 
assurance, is itself largely left outside of the critical field of vision. In other 
words the practices being introduced and posed as solutions are not 
themselves subject to forthright analysis or qualification: there is, to recall 
from Chapter Two, as Fairclough (Williams and Apperley, 2009) would have 
it, an emphasis within the government policy documents on promoting policy, 
rather than robust analysis that would air potential problems. In short the 
Trust and Assurance White Paper tends to be hortatory. To place the thrust of 
the policy content outside the scope of scrutiny within the document is rather 
extraordinary, and was achieved, I contend, in the following key ways. First, 
somewhat paradoxically, in the Trust and Assurance regulatory White Paper 
the transactional-orientated system tends to be rendered rather invisible in so 
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far as it is a system without a name. Evidence based practice and the 
(random) controlled trial are little mentioned, a fact which probably reflects, as 
noted above, its already established hegemonic position.  As explored within 
Chapters Two and Four the evidence based practice movement and the 
strong valorisation of the (random) controlled trial is something which gained 
‘grip’ as a strong Enlightenment narrative. It is seen as supplanting power 
with truth: self-interested professional oligarchies are supplanted by 
treatments that are scientifically proven to work in the client and public 
interest. For the healthcare regime this narrative has already done its work in 
making the heightened ‘population-based’ and highly transactional system of 
healthcare the social and technical norm. To put it another way, the ‘evidence 
based practice’/transactional regime of healthcare becomes the healthcare 
regime as such. Giving it less ‘air time’ so to speak arguably helps the regime 
appear more ‘natural’, thereby reinforcing its status as a solid part of the 
‘natural fabric’ of healthcare, less visibility being likely to attract less 
contestation. 59 The ‘seams’ of the healthcare system are not foregrounded, 
as these seams would show it to be a particular ‘style’ among other possible 
ones. The visibility of an alternative regime – a more contextual regime – is 
also made less visible by not being named. To recall some of the norms that 
may comprise a more ‘contextual’ regime, and which the transactional-
orientated regime contests, are ‘practice based evidence’, historically 
couched within the system of self-regulation or significant levels of collective 
                                                          
59 This is not to say that there are no concerns about the overarching evidence paradigm adopted by public services. 
To recall from Chapter Four, even Roth and Fonagy in What Works for Whom, a central text in the government’s 
policy programme, makes a barely veiled critique of the philosophical approach to evidence – an empiricist one – as 
fundamentally flawed and widely discredited across many academic fields.   
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and individual professional autonomy, collegiate/ ‘horizontal’ relations, 
including a softer demarcation between clinicians and managers. But the 
government papers tend not to expressly name the norms of practice being 
contested60. More specifically, the Trust and Assurance regulatory White 
Paper does not acknowledge that the regulatory and governance approach 
taken diminishes the possibility of a deeper contextual/person-centred 
practice. There is no mention that diminished person-centred practice is a 
necessary price worth paying for what is claimed to be better healthcare 
outcomes procured by heightened protocolisation of practice through, as 
Chamberlain (2010) phrases it, the ‘clinical guideline industry’ (85) and 
measures to implement and enforce them.    
The 2007 Trust and Assurance White paper expressly states that: 
In order to assure respectful, compassionate, caring and clinically excellent care as 
the norm, it would be inadequate to focus solely on the regulation of individual health 
professionals (Department of Health, 2007a:13) 
 
It also focusses on the regulation of organisations and the healthcare field as 
a whole, through numerous measures, as we have seen above, including 
‘clinical governance’. But whilst individual practitioners are not the sole focus 
of attention, the measures introduced to render practice safe and effective are 
not themselves subject to critical scrutiny within the paper, nor are concerns 
about them acknowledged. The key point I am making here is not so much 
that individual professionals tend to be blamed within the White Paper for 
organisational breaches of good standards of practice, but that the 
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contestability – expert on expert contestation – of what constitutes good 
standards of practice and good norms of governance and organisation in the 
first place is eclipsed. In short, and more specifically, deep concerns about 
the particular manifestation of evidence based practice in which clinical trials 
have been strongly valorised, placing other sources of clinical knowledge, and 
forms of research, deeply in the shadows, are effaced.  This is also the case 
in relation to concerns about audit practice, such as the use of clinical 
‘targets’, as for example expressed by Traynor (1999). What some experts 
(e.g. Healey, 2013) claim are risks and harms associated with the more 
acontextual practices of ‘outcomes-based’, as opposed to a more contextual 
orientated ‘data-based’ healthcare (Healey, 2013), are not addressed. Healy 
for example claims that, in the case of many pharmaceutical medicines, 
patients are, often unbeknown to themselves, playing a game of ‘Russian 
Roulette’ whilst being strongly assured of their safety and effectiveness (ibid) 
Another way that the Trust and Assurance regulatory White Paper arguably 
makes such concerns less visible is through a problem minority narrative. The 
majority of professionals are cast as ‘extraordinary’ individuals in juxtaposition 
to a ‘problem minority’. The Paper states that ‘for every time that Harold 
Shipman and Beverley Allitt are mentioned, we must recall the hundreds of 
thousands of extraordinary individuals who dedicate themselves impeccably 
to their patients every day (emphasis added) (Department of Health, 
2007a:1). The White Paper does not spell out what it means by ‘extraordinary’ 
individuals, but it arguably connotes the capacity to exercise considerable 
autonomy, especially given that it is followed by the statement that 
‘professionalism is an unquantifiable asset to our society, which rules, 
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regulations and systems must support, not inhibit’ (2007a:1). The stark 
juxtaposition of the ‘horrific’ figures of Shipman and Allit on the one hand, and 
‘extraordinary’ individual professionals and ‘impeccable’ practice, on the other 
hand, is arguably suggestive of a ‘fantasmatic’ narrative  in which ‘horrific’ 
exceptions pose a threat to an otherwise ‘beatific’ group of professionals.  
This is arguably a worrying narrative in the sense that it may be contrary to 
cultural conditions conducive to critical and reflective professional practice 
and robust accountability. I return to this in the concluding chapter. The key 
point I am making here is that this fantasmatic narrative tends to distract 
attention from the specificity of ‘clinical governance’ being consolidated and 
deepened. The White Paper asserts that regulations and rules must assist not 
inhibit ‘extraordinary’ practice, but yet it does not even acknowledge any 
specific concerns about the erosion of clinical autonomy, or about the 
character of the current clinical guideline industry. The comments therefore 
take on the air of rhetorical ‘cover’ for what arguably in fact tends to be the 
deepening of the diminishment of the role played by clinical judgement of 
individual practitioners who are face to face with patients. We can reasonably 
surmise that these strategies helped shore up the consolidation and 
deepening of the ‘transactional’ healthcare regime (arguably spear-headed by 
the evidence based practice movement) and that this indirectly helped the 
HPC plans to be ‘locked-in’ early on along the road to statutory regulation of 
the talking therapies. As a counterfactual let us for a moment imagine that the 
healthcare regulatory reforms were met with deep hostility by the mainstream 
medical and nursing professional associations. In such a context the HPC 
plans would have been enmeshed within a wider terrain of contestation, 
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and.in such a scenario critics of the HPC plans within the field of the talking 
therapies would have been presented with the possibility of ‘bigger shoulders’ 
upon which to stand and amplify their concerns.   
I would like now to look at the political dynamics which helped install and 
defend the transactional-orientated character of the Skills for Health project to 
map the National Occupational Standards for counselling and psychotherapy.   
 
The ‘hegemonisation’ of the skills for health project as ‘transactional’  
It is reasonable to surmise that the ‘background’ strategies used to constitute 
and support the evidence based practice movement – namely claims to be 
objectively ‘above the political fray’ – were at play in the Department of 
Health’s decision to commission the SfH to develop standards of practice, 
and for SfH in turn, to commission the ‘empiricist’ work carried out by the Sub-
Department of Clinical Health Psychology Department of Health Psychology 
at the UCL (University College, London). In short the established confidence 
the government has in empiricist approaches is likely to have shaped these 
decisions. However, as noted within Chapter Four, the evidence based 
practice movement is not strongly established across the field of counselling 
and psychotherapy. Rather, its ‘sway’ over the field is limited to particular 
‘segments’,  presenting  a problem for SfH and its adoption of an 
empiricist/evidence based practice approach. It also to some extent cast a 
shadow, as we shall see in the next chapter, over the HPC plans. SfH were 
not overtly ‘gun hoe’ in their approach, but rather sounded strong assurances 
of the inclusive approach of the project. But these rhetorical assurances took 
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on a strong ‘promotional’, rather than analytic, quality as SfH did not attempt 
to square in any analytic detail its claims to inclusivity with the fact that it was 
basing the development of NOS for all modalities of therapy on ‘manuals’ of 
practice based on controlled trials. So despite the talking therapies not being 
‘natural’ ground for the empiricist approach, how did the NOS for the entire 
field come to be based upon empiricist clinical trials? The structure of the 
project (Skills for Health, 2007) partially helped to protect the empiricist base 
of the project from alteration, namely by splitting responsibility for the 
production of ‘competency frameworks’ for each modality from responsibility 
for turning these into NOS. This created a hierarchy which shielded the 
empiricist-based ‘competency frameworks’ (the foundation so to speak) from 
significant modification or overhaul in the light of problems and issues arising 
in the work of the ‘modality specific’ working groups, involving experts from 
the modality in question. This is a kind of ‘divide and rule’ strategy (see 
Diagram 1 below). Although a modality approach was welcomed by many 
organisations within the field (for example the College of Psychoanalysts), 
including those that went on to object to the transactionality of the approach 
taken, the splitting of the work into different groups to work on each of the 
modalities arguably diminished the possibility of an alliance – an ‘equivalential 
chain’ in  Laclauian terms – between practitioners across the modalities, who 
found the NOS counter to their own conceptualisations of practice, against 
the empiricist base adopted, from developing.  The administrative 
differentiation and hierarchy between the groups within the SfH project meant 
that differential relations within the project were emphasised. In the case of 
the development of the NOS for psychoanalysis, for example, the ‘divide and 
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rule’ strategy arguably helped prevent opposition voiced by the CPJA within 
the modality group from gaining traction within that group or within the project 
overall. The empiricist conceptual base of the NOS for psychoanalysis 
survived, however, only at the cost of the departure of the CPJA, the largest 
professional association of psychoanalysts, from the project 
Another key way that the empiricist research paradigm was installed was 
through a ‘problem minority’ narrative. The NOS were ‘aspirational’ rather 
than ‘minimal’ ones (2008b), and in this sense the SfH project was not directly 
orientated towards public protection or a ‘problem minority’ within the field in 
the way that the regulatory standards and reforms were (as discussed 
above). However, those, namely Lacanian psychoanalysts, who were the 
most vociferously opposed to any kind of move towards the manualisation or 
protocolisation of psychoanalysis 61 were excluded from the project altogether 
on the basis of being a ‘problem minority’ (my phrase) within the project and 
the larger field. Whilst the ‘official’ discourse of the SfH project was one of 
inclusivity (namely a promise to reflect diversity within the field), an 
‘unofficial’/private discourse within SfH legitimated the exclusion of 
representatives of Lacanian psychoanalysis within the SfH project. Internal 
SfH emails, acquired by the College of Psychoanalysts through a freedom of 
information request, show that when Marc Lyall of SfH sent a query to Peter 
Fonagy about the involvement of the College of Psychoanalysts and the 
Psychoanalytic Consortium, Fonagy  replied that the College:  
                                                          
61 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist and member of the Skills for Health group developing 
competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
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Is a largely Lacanian organisation (French psychoanalyst – Lacan – intellectual 
superhero but clinical and ethical problem, ultimately dismissed from the rank of the 
international psychoanalytic movement) (The College of Psychoanalysts, 2008). 
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Diagram 1 
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He then states that Lyall,  SfH’s overall lead on the counselling and 
psychotherapy project, has already appointed two members of the College of 
Psychoanalysts to the psychoanalytic working group (i.e. Atkinson and 
Barrett), and that ‘this is more than enough’ (ibid). He goes onto say that ‘they 
are deeply opposed and concerned about regulation’ and that ‘they are very 
much against evidence based practice and might try to sabotage the process’ 
(ibid). On March 19th 2008 Julia Carne and Darian Leader of the College of 
Psychoanalysts met with Marc Lyall and Nadine Singh of SfH: a meeting in 
which Carne and Leader highlighted the political makeup of the field, as well 
as issues around evidence within the field. As requested by Lyall, Carne and 
Leader forwarded articles and bibliographies, as well as information about the 
BIOS Centre (then at LSE), where work critical of the UCL grouping is 
undertaken (Arbours Association et al, 2009). Despite assurances from Lyall 
that the working group would be made more representative, the list of 
members remained the same.  The College of Psychoanalysts wrote:  
Representatives of the majority of psychoanalytic practitioners currently practising in this 
country have been excluded from the working party responsible for the draft despite 
written assurances that they would be included. There is thus an astonishing 
contradiction between the ethos which is supposedly at the core of the document and 
that which has in fact been operative in its construction (2008c). 
 
 
Paul Atkinson noted that SfH staff were helpful and engaging, but that it did 
seem that SfH had handed over substantive control of the project to the UCL 
and BPC-based personnel within the project, namely Anthony Bateman and 
Peter Fonagy.62 Malcolm Allen stated; ‘that maybe true […] they probably had 
a fairly tough and impatient stance on it […] they were fucked if they were 
                                                          
62 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, and and member of Skills for Health group developing 
competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
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going to be arsed around with, you know, a whole bunch of people who were 
just against the whole exercise’.63 SfH seem to have abdicated from their self-
professed responsibilities as regards inclusivity, and whilst it is plainly 
reasonable to surmise that James Barret and Paul Atkinson were always 
going to be opposed to an empiricist/manualised approach, they did not have 
an a-priori hostility to the SfH’s mapping exercise as such. Paul Atkinson for 
example commented that: 
James and I got quite interested for a while in the project of trying basically to name 
what we do (which is how the thing was sold in the first place): wouldn’t it be useful as 
a profession to be able to put into more layman, or sort of popular, or ordinary words, 
what it is we do. So it was quite an attractive project 64 
 
He contrasted this ambition to psychoanalytic literature, describing it as 
‘profoundly deep and bespoke and quite intellectual: most of us find it kind of 
delightfully exciting and exasperating at the same time’.65 
Overall, these strategies, including SfH professions and assurances about 
inclusivity, enabled Fonagy, Bateman, Pilling and Roth to successfully 
hegemonise the NOS in terms of what I have referred to as transactionality, 
arguably making the NOS more conducive to the NHS regimes as currently 
configured. However, they are strategies which tended rather more to rely on 
administrative force than on the winning of hearts and minds across the field 
and seems to have furnished ground for further opposition to the HPC plans, 
which were strongly associated with SfH (more on this in the next chapter).  
                                                          
63 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014. See 
appendix A p. 452. 
64 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, and member of Skills for Health group developing 
competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
65 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, and member of Skills for Health group developing 
competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
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And now to the political dynamics of the IAPT programme.  
 
The installation of IAPT  
The IAPT programme, broadly speaking, had two main constituencies that 
were potential obstacles to its installation. Rather problematically for IAPT 
these constituencies to an extent had competing demands. On the one hand, 
there were was a powerful constituency within the healthcare field, namely 
some pharmacologists, who were sceptical about the efficacy of talking 
therapies in comparison to pharmacological treatments and advocated that 
they should be subject to what they see as the rigorous testing of drugs 
(Science Daily, 2008). This view dovetailed with what is arguably a 
constituency, reported by Toynbee, within broader culture that tends to see 
the talking therapies as a ‘soft’ option, upon which expenditure - when it 
comes to tax payers’ money - is not warranted (Toynbee, 2006). The other 
constituency, as noted above, were those who were concerned that IAPT was 
a form of social control: for example by reinforcing striking and growing socio-
economic inequalities within neo-liberal society by de-linking poverty and 
depression (Pilgrim, 2008). Let us look in turn at how IAPT sought to 
persuade or appease each of these broad constituencies in its path to 
implementation.  
Whilst the evidence based practice base did little for the sense of legitimacy 
of the programme within much of the field of the talking therapies, the ‘hard 
science’ tone shored up the legitimacy of IAPT in the eyes of other 
stakeholders, helping to counter the often held view of the talking therapies as 
247 
 
a ‘soft’, inefficient and nebulous treatment option. Toynbee (2006) for 
example in a Guardian newspaper article about IAPT and Layard’s 
‘happiness programme’ wrote: ‘Happiness is a real, objective phenomenon, 
scientifically verifiable. That means people and whole societies can now be 
measured over time and compared accurately with one another […]. Causes 
and cures for unhappiness can be quantified’. The sense of IAPT as 
delivering ‘smart treatments’, i.e. ones that are precise in their character and 
that have honed ‘targets’, was arguably reinforced by decisions which 
strongly limited the pool of potential therapies from which IAPT could draw. 
Initially this was CBT only, and then was extended to all NICE approved 
therapies (still a small pool). The ‘smart’ character of IAPT-provided therapy is 
arguably overegged in two key ways. First, IAPT, in only choosing from a pool 
of therapies that have been actively tested against a placebo, ignored what is 
arguably the broad balance of empiricist evidence, as claimed, for example, 
by Wampold et al (1997) that all talking therapies are more or less equally 
effective as one another, supporting the so called dodo bird thesis (that all 
talking therapies therefore win prizes). Second, the measurement of IAPT 
success in action, so to speak, was seen by many as overegged by the 
‘cherry picking’ of candidates for treatment. Fiona Ballantine Dykes, for 
example, commented that: 
There are some staggering statistics around IAPT, something like forty percent of 
clients that present to IAPT, are regarded as unsuitable for treatment. Well, I worked 
as a counsellor within a GP practice and ninety eight percent of clients who presented 
for treatment are accepted’.66  
                                                          
66 Fiona Ballantine Dykes (Counselling Central Awarding Body, and member of the HPC 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author, June 
2015. 
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It also tended to measure outcome success on a short term basis, thereby 
excluding those patients who ‘relapsed’ after a longer period of time. The 
health scientist that I interviewed echoed the view that truths derived from 
empiricist trials are highly objective and unconstructed, 67 stating that 
‘experimental research is basically a neutral form of research’. Not unlike 
Moran (2003) in relation to professions and the regulatory state, as explored 
in Chapter Two, the health scientist applied a public interest-style account to 
this approach whilst applying a private interest style account of those that 
have serious misgivings about the empiricist methodology. For example, 
regarding the Savoy Conferences (formed of mainstream associations within 
counselling and psychotherapy), he stated that: ‘They’re stacked full of people 
with vested interests that don't like the fact that NICE didn't include their 
treatments and recommended treatment protocols for the NHS’.68 He referred 
to an instance where the Chief Executive of Nice was challenged on evidence 
based practice. He stated that: ‘these people are dinosaurs in a modern 
effective health care system. That is a conference that no sensible person 
would go to’.69 The tacit dichotomisation between ‘acontextual’ and 
‘contextual’ research practices arguably takes on a fantasmatic hue, with the 
empiricist research design a ‘beatific’ and unalloyed Enlightenment practice 
supplanting the dogma and ‘senselessness’ of ‘contextual’ research practices 
seen as driven purely by private interests.  
                                                          
 
 
68 Health Scientist Advisor to IAPT, interview by author, October, 2014. 
69 Ibid. 
 
249 
 
 
As regards the constituency critical of  the neo-liberal political settlement and 
the role of IAPT within it: Toynbee (2006) for example contended that IAPT, 
along with Layard’s broader ‘happiness’ programme, including an index of 
national success in improving levels of happiness, was  a sign of a New 
Labour’s shift, under Gordon Brown, away from neo-liberalism. Toynbee 
characterised the Depression Report as an ‘essential first step’ for a ‘new 
politics that [makes] happiness the goal’. She claimed that ‘inequality makes 
everyone unhappy, the poor most of all, and that is well within the remit of the 
state […] But start with step one: psychiatry can deliver the greatest release 
from misery - a quick win, an easy happiness hit’ (Toynbee, 2006). David 
Richards (Richards, 2007), architect of the Doncaster demonstration site, also 
sought to present IAPT in a favourable light, to counsellors and 
psychotherapists concerned about social justice, by quite bizarrely creating a 
very sharp frontier between two aspects of the IAPT programme. He creates 
a frontier between the Doncaster site and the transformation of the field and a 
more just society on the one hand, and on the other, the Newham 
demonstration site, a professional oligarchy within the field of talking 
therapies and an unjust society.  
Finally, Lisa Wake, with the help of Mind, by threatening public 
embarrassment to the Government near the public launch of IAPT, was able 
to open the programme up to non-CBT NICE approved therapies so that it 
was not entirely dominated by CBT. 70 
                                                          
70 Lisa Wake (Chair of UKCP 2005-2007), interview by author, April 2015 
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Again, as with the SfH project, the character and political dynamics around 
IAPT heightened anxiety among many in the field about the HPC plans.  
 
SUMMARY 
A lot of empirical ground has been covered within this chapter. In these 
concluding comments I want to further draw out how the analysis of the 
immediate context of the HPC plans helps contribute to an account of the 
HPC struggle. Through immersion within, and critical analysis of, key policy 
documents, we now have a clearer picture of the character of the broader 
healthcare regime to which the field of the talking therapies were being 
‘hailed’, and to some extent assimilated by the IAPT and SfH programmes. 
The 2007 trust and assurance regulatory White Paper on the regulation of the 
healthcare professions signalled the consolidation and deepening of a 
scientific bureaucratic regime marked by transactionality. At the centre of this 
regime is a raft of regulatory practices which enforce, not only minimum 
codified standards of practice, but also NICE guidelines. IAPT and SfH for 
their part constituted ambitious programmes, seeking to reshape the field in 
accordance with empiricist research evidence. Within its ambitious ‘mass’ 
therapy programme IAPT directly implemented ‘evidence-based’ therapies 
within the NICE guidelines, excluding other therapies: in many instances 
challenging their institutional survival and tenability. SfH was in a sense more 
diffuse, casting a net of NOS/competencies, underpinned by empiricist 
research evidence, over the whole field, including all major modalities of 
therapy. This included private practice.  
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Returning to changes to the regulation of healthcare professions, audit 
practices, like ‘benchmarking’, and ‘revalidation’, signalled the reinforcement 
of  restratification within the field, namely increased differentiation between a 
managerial and research elite on the one hand and rank and file 
professionals on the other. This included a heightened top-down relation 
between the researcher and the practitioner, a hierarchy which was 
articulated alongside, and was reinforced by, changes to the governance of 
regulators. One key measure here is the cessation of rank and file 
professionals electing other rank and file professionals to regulatory boards. 
More fundamentally, the confirmation of the Government’s preference for 
multi-professional regulators for new professions, I argue, consolidated a 
significant shift away from individual and collective professional autonomy 
through a shift from ‘specialist’ to more ‘generic’ regulatory expertise and 
oversight. In short the field of counselling and psychotherapy was ‘called’, so 
to speak, to constitute itself as a statutory regulated profession at the very 
same moment as the Government were seeking to soften the boundaries 
between healthcare professions, bringing them to an extent under the rubric 
of a common set of standards and regulatory framework. The HPC 
announcement of the plans was highly contentious in much of the field – and 
much of the field rallied around an alternative proposal, the ‘Psychological 
Professions Council’. The BPC and BABCP were notable exceptions and the 
BPC with links to Mentalisation Based Therapy developed by Peter Fonagy, 
and the BABCP with obvious interests in the promotion of CBT within IAPT, 
arguably had the most to gain from IAPT, SfH and HPC regulation going 
ahead.   
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In this chapter I have sought, through an analysis of the political dynamics, to 
explain how the HPC policy idea reached this milestone in a path to 
institutional hegemony. To a significant extent it was ‘swept along’ within 
wider healthcare regulatory reform, which itself had a relatively smooth path: 
the empiricist paradigm and restratification within the healthcare field already 
to a significant extent having ‘won out’.  I have identified a number of ways in 
which the sense of the heightened ‘acontextual’ regime as a ‘natural order’ 
was reinforced. Its ‘particularity’ was made less visible simply by not being 
named; NICE guidelines were for instance barely mentioned, and more 
contextual forms of practice mentioned – e.g. the importance of the 
professional-client relationship – but the significant tension between 
contextual and acontexutal approaches to practice within the regime by and 
large ignored. The motif of public protection, articulated within a ‘problem 
minority’ versus majority of ‘extraordinary’ professionals, arguably provided 
affective ‘grip’ for reforms and drew potential critical attention away from the 
regulatory practices, including heightened forms of acontextual medical 
practices dominated by the pharmaceutical industry. SfH and IAPT to an 
extent similarly cleared their paths to installation with ‘problem minority’ or, in 
the case of IAPT one could say ‘problem majority’, narratives. The 
marginalisation, and at times, simple ‘stonewalling’, of those advancing 
deliberative arguments against some of the key characteristics of these 
projects, seems to have gained legitimacy through a broad Enlightenment 
narrative in which there is strong confidence in the capacity of empiricist 
orientated research to intervene within the terrain of services and practices 
seen as darkened by dogma, ineffective practices and professional self-
253 
 
interest, and to supplant them with the light of cost-effective, and properly 
scientifically informed practices. It is within this ‘zeitgeist’ that concerns 
expressed by many counsellors, psychotherapists and psychologists about 
potentially harmful impacts of HPC regulation – both on the field and the 
public interest more widely - were largely swept to the side. It is to these 
concerns, and the HPC’s responses to them, that I now turn to in the next 
Chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
254 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
STRUGGLES OVER THE ‘NUTS AND BOLTS’ AND THE TOTALITY OF 
THE HPC PLANS 
 
We do not prescribe the nature of the therapeutic relationship for the professions 
we regulate now or in the future. The standards we set are broad enabling 
standards which do not affect the therapeutic relationship (Health Professions Council, 
2008b). 
 
If government persists in its wrong-headed move to control and regulate all therapy 
practice in an undiscriminating way [..] it can expect a concerted and highly organised 
campaign of Principled Non-Compliance with regulation in which a coalition of 
practitioner-organisations will combine to resist and subvert any attempts to impose 
state regulation upon the psy-field as a whole (House, 2008a)  
 
When you've got one common enemy it kind of brings people together (Darian Leader 
on the relative harmony within the Alliance). 71 
 
In this Chapter we move to the heart of the struggle. I examine the formation 
and work of the HPC’s Professional Liaison Group (abbreviated to the Liaison 
Group) for counselling and psychotherapy during its first wave of meetings, as 
well as key developments in the organisation of opposition to the plans, 
namely the formation of the Alliance for Counselling and Psychotherapy 
against State Regulation (abbreviated to the Alliance). A narrative overview of 
key events is followed by a critical analysis and description of the positions of 
the pro and anti-HPC camps. Then, developing the more ethico-ideological 
dimension of my analysis, I examine how each camp attempted to draw 
support for their positions.  
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I argue that the struggle was essentially a struggle between two competing 
regulatory imaginaries: on the one hand, a transactional HPC regime, 
encompassing psychiatric/healthcare and consumerist norms, and, on the 
other, a more contextual and relational Alliance regime, embodying norms of 
pluralism and more open ended practice. The HPC plans, though divergent in 
some aspects, had significant family resemblance to the IAPT and SfH 
projects. I then go onto explore key political and rhetorical strategies deployed 
by the HPC, and argue that the HPC’s main approach was to disavow the 
healthcare and consumerist orientation of the plans and to frame the struggle 
as a misunderstanding. The identification of a fantasmatic narrative, in which 
a ‘problem minority’ within the field is seen as essentially the only threat to an 
otherwise ‘beatific’ state of affairs, helps to understand the affective ‘grip’ of 
the HPC plans. Other, more marginal approaches taken by the pro-HPC 
camp are also considered, including Cooper’s and Lousada’s (2010) 
characterisation of the HPC plans as a potential political catalyst or means for 
the field counselling and psychotherapy to push for greater social justice 
within wider society. In contrast the main approach adopted by the Alliance 
was to characterise the detail of the HPC plans as healthcare orientated and 
therefore as largely incompatible with much of the field of the talking 
therapies. At times the Alliance also took a ‘wider’ hegemonic and political 
approach, positioning the HPC plans as metonym for excess 
bureaucratisation and/or consumerism within late modernity/advance 
capitalism, and, to an extent, construed the HPC plans to be part of a wider 
contingent political settlement, thereby tending to contest both the supposed 
‘progressive’ and inevitable nature of the plans.  
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As regards sources, I draw on the following key interviews: Michael Guthrie of 
the HPC: Dianne Waller, Chair of the Professional Liaison Group and 
registrant member of the HPC as an Art Therapist. She played a key role in 
the history of the regulation of Art Therapy.72 From the umbrella organisations 
and the liaison group I draw on interviews with Julian Lousada and Malcolm 
Allen (Chair and Executive Director of the British Psychoanalytic Council, 
BPC, respectively). Malcolm Allen came from a background of arts 
management, and was part of BPC’s quest to become what Lousada called a 
modern organisation. He was the first Chief Executive Director, and the first 
non-analyst to take a central role within the management of the organisation 
(and of other comparable organisations in the field) and was granted some 
autonomy from the Chair. 73 From the UKCP I draw on the interview with 
James Antrican (Chair). Lousada and Antrican both took the view that the 
HPC could potentially be sufficiently reformed from within in order to render 
the plans suitable for the field of counselling and psychotherapy. I also draw 
from my interview with the Liaison Group member Fiona Ballantyne Dykes of 
the Counselling Central Awarding Body, who was broadly against the plans 
but was engaging with the process in the hope of marginally improving the 
plans. From the Alliance I draw on my interviews with Darian Leader74, 
Andrew Samuels and Denis Postle. They were instrumental in setting up the 
Alliance and drawing in supporters.  
                                                          
72 Dianne Waller (Chair of the HPC’s Professional Liaison Group for Counselling and Psychotherapy), 
interview by author,  
73 Julian Lousada (Chair of the British Psychoanalytic Council and member of the HPC’s Professional 
Liaison Group for Counselling and Psychotherapy), interview by author,  
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Accounts within these interviews are triangulated with other sources, 
including Janet Low’s (a Lacanian psychoanalyst) HPC watchdog blog (Low, 
2008). Denis Postle’s documented and collated accounts (Postle, 2012), as 
well as official documentation from the HPC, namely its minutes of the PLG 
meetings and papers presented to the PLG.   
 
 
OVERVIEW OF EVENTS 
 
During 2007, following the announcement of the plans to make the HPC 
regulator of counselling and psychotherapy, the main professional 
associations within the field, including the UKCP and BACP, which were 
formerly opposed to the HPC, now, in the face of a the perceived inevitability 
of the plans, did an ‘about turn’. They set about making the best of what 
some, such as James Antrican, viewed as a less than ideal choice of 
regulator75. This was compounded by the British Psychological Society’s 
(BPS) decision to embrace regulation by the HPC, intensifying concern 
amongst opponents to the HPC within the field of the talking therapies. Denis 
Postle, for example, wrote:  
A sad day. Practitioners with claims to have insight into the human condition fight for 
market share and pole position in the psychopractice pecking order and invite state to 
define their ethical and occupational obligations. Who next? The psychotherapists? 
Then the counsellors? And lastly if ever, the psychoanalysts? (Postle, 2007b). 
 
Some across the field remained resolutely opposed and there was often a 
febrile atmosphere on the issue. For example executive Director of the BPC, 
                                                          
75 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014. 
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Malcolm Allen, and executive director of the HPC, Marc Searle, respectively 
heaped scorn upon, and took great exception to, Denis Postle’s comparison 
of those that made an ‘about turn’ in favour of the plans with French people in 
the Second World War Vichy Regime who collaborated with the Nazi’s during 
the occupation (Postle, 2012), (Allen, 2008).  The HPC carried out a ‘call for 
ideas’ – its initial consultation – from July to October 2008 (Health 
Professions Council , 2008a). Through the questions it posed the HPC 
framed the task as one of determining the ‘nuts and bolts’, as Michael Guthrie 
put it,76 of the HPC plans. The central and most contentious issue was how 
the register should be structured, namely whether it should differentiate 
between counselling and psychotherapy (Postle, 2012), (Health Professions 
Council, 2008c). Many within the field also objected to the HPC plans in their 
totality, arguing that the healthcare and consumerist orientation of the plans 
was incongruent with most talking therapies. Whilst the British Association of 
Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP), the BPC, and other major 
professional associations made ‘one voice’ submissions broadly in favour of 
the HPC plans, the UKCP, under the Chair leadership of James Antrican, 
allowed a ‘dissenting voice’ section within its submission, presenting the 
views of members opposed to the HPC plans (UK Council for Psychotherapy, 
2008). The main claim was that the HPC plans were healthcare and positivist 
in orientation, antithetical to the values and norms of many forms of talking 
therapies, and thereby a threat to diversity within the field. The complaints 
system was also critiqued as inappropriate for the field, especially in its failure 
to take into account the phenomenon of transference. This decision by the 
                                                          
76 Michael Guthrie (HPC’s Director of Policy and Standards), interview by author, June 2014 
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UKCP, which arguably gave an air of legitimacy to opposition reportedly 
invoked the ‘fury’ of Marc Searle.77   
 
The HPC set up and appointed members to its Professional Liaison Group for 
counselling and psychotherapy, which included representatives from all the 
major umbrella professional associations and the prominent art therapist, 
Professor Diane Waller was appointed Chair of the group. Under the critical 
gaze of opponents of the plans within the HPC gallery – such as the Lacanian 
analyst Janet Low - Diane Waller sought to steer the group away from 
controversy and away from the possibility of the group recommending ‘no’ to 
the plans (more on this below). A central task was to establish ‘profession-
specific’ standards for the field. The HPC had ‘generic standards’ already in 
place that apply to all professions under its auspices. A struggle within the 
liaison group ensued over whether the statutory register should differentiate 
between counselling and psychotherapy in relation to the profession-specific 
standards. Non-differentiation versus differentiation more or less 
corresponded to BACP versus the rest of the group. Given the majority status 
of the latter around the Liaison Group table, differentiation became the 
‘working position’ (i.e. provisional position) of the group.  Diagram 1 describes 
this and the other possibilities considered by the group at this time. As part of 
the HPC process, and its commitment to wider consultation, a ‘stakeholder 
meeting’ was held in Manchester in March 2009. Both the HPC and 
opponents were incredulous about the behaviour of the other side, Michael 
Guthrie, for example, stating that:  
                                                          
77 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
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Some people were very aggressive at that meeting; unnecessarily so, in terms of their 
body language and what they said. It wasn't very constructive, and it was a thoroughly 
unpleasant meeting to be involved in. 78 
 
In contrast, Janet Low painted a picture of a rather ‘stage managed’ 
consultation, stating, for example, that the presentation by two women 
representing the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists seemed 
aimed to ‘reassure the stakeholders in this new profession [counselling and 
psychotherapy] that all would be alright. Mary Smith kicked off with a power-
point presentation that many thought was pitched at the wrong level, and she 
went on to recount something akin to a fairy story’ (Low, 2008:63). A key point 
of conflict concerned the presentation by Jonathan Coe, spokesperson for the 
charity Witness, of a formerly abused client to the meeting, and Darian 
Leader’s claim that Coe was re-enacting elements of the original abuse 
suffered by the individual. This resulted in Coe issuing a threat of legal action 
against Leader79. Failing to make any significant impact within the HPC’s own 
policy-process, those individuals and organisations that were resolutely 
opposed to the HPC plans were galvanised by Andrew Samuels and Darian 
Leader and the Alliance for Counselling and Psychotherapy Against State 
Regulation was formed. It was comprised of people from across many 
sections of the field, including humanists ,such as Denis Postle, Richard 
House, who, to recall from Chapter Four, led a strong tradition opposed to 
professionalization and state regulation within the field. 
                                                          
78 Michael Guthrie (Director of Policy and Standards, HPC), interview by author, June 2014. 
79 Darian Leader (Lacanian psychoanalyst, Alliance co-founder), interview by author, June 
2014.  
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Table 1 showing key options considered by the PLG  
 
 
 
 
 
Differentiation 
Approach 
 
(Recommended by 
PLG to the Council 
in July 2009) 
Equivalence (non-
Differentiation) 
Approach 
 
  
Modality-Approach 
 
Key proponents  
 
UKCP BACP 
 
BPC, BABCP 
Structure of 
Register 
Psychotherapist  
 
Psychotherapeutic 
counsellor 
 
Counsellor 
One part of the 
register for both 
counsellors and 
psychotherapists 
Division of register 
into separate 
modalities – 
probably as sub-
sections of an 
overall division 
between 
psychotherapy and 
counselling.  
Protected Titles  ‘Counselling’, 
‘Psychotherapy’ both 
protected titles, and 
interchangeable: A 
practitioner could use 
either title 
Multiple and 
modality-specific 
protected titles.  
Proficiencies  One set of 
proficiencies, all of 
which applicable to 
both counsellors and 
psychotherapists.  
Separate 
proficiencies for 
each modality.  
Threshold Level of 
Entry 
(minimum level of 
qualification 
required for entry 
into the 
profession) 
 One threshold entry 
level applicable to 
both counselling and 
psychotherapy.  
Multiple Threshold 
levels of entry, one 
for each modality.  
 
The Alliance held two conferences, one in April 2009, and the other in 
October 2009. The first conference placed an emphasis on articulating 
rhetorical responses and critiques of the plans, and in the inaugural speech of 
the Alliance, Andrew Samuels challenged beliefs that the HPC was a good 
exception to an otherwise worrying policy terrain emerging within the field of 
the talking therapies. The following statement is indicative of the considerable 
unpopularity of SfH and IAPT in much of the field:  
People will say, HPC is ok you know, we understand your concern about Skills for 
Health or the National Institute for Clinical Excellence. Or the happiness system, 
improved access to psychological therapies. Yes those are all a croc of shit, but HPC is 
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good. This is naive and I think beyond belief that the government has actually created a 
four pronged drive to conform psychotherapy to what the government wants. How is it 
possible that three of these four planks are not good, but the fourth is good? (Samuels, 
2009). 
 
 
In the meantime the Liaison Group had continued its work developing the 
‘nuts and bolts’ of the plans, going through several drafts of standards: 
between June and October 2009 it put the latest out to consultation within the 
field as ‘recommendations to be made to the HPC Council (Health 
Professions Council, 2009c). I consider these recommendations below and 
the responses to the public consultation in the next chapter.  
 
Also during this period, in the face of mounting dismay across much of the 
field as to the character of SfH and IAPT, the HPC sought to rhetorically 
distance itself from the projects, strongly asserting its independence from the 
projects as well as its ‘diverse-friendliness’. The HPC stated: ‘we recognise 
that there are understandable anxieties at the moment about the links, if any 
between such projects [IAPT, SfH, and NICE] and regulation [….] There is no 
direct link […] the purpose of statutory regulation is firmly public protection – it 
is not to exclude or marginalise practitioners or to promote one modality or 
approach to practice over others’ (Health Professions Council, 2008b).  
The second Alliance conference in October 2009 focussed on planning a 
strategy of ‘principled non-compliance’ with HPC regulation in the event of it 
being introduced, and also discussed the ground work being done for legal 
action against the HPC (this legal action is considered in the next chapter). 
‘Principled non-compliance’ refers to the planned strategy whereby 
practitioners were to either use legally protected or non-protected titles whilst 
expressly dissenting from registering with the HPC (Samuels, 2009c). In 
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October 2009, the Maresfield Report (Arbours Association et al, 2009) was 
published by a number of psychoanalytic training and professional 
associations, and simultaneously a group of humanistic counsellors and 
psychotherapists published a collection of articles, ‘Compliance? 
Ambivalence? Rejection? ‘ (Postle and House, 2009). Both publications 
presented the HPC with a broad critique of the HPC plans, including its 
complaints system, as well as a forensic critique of the HPC’s generic 
standards and draft standards of proficiency for counselling and 
psychotherapy. The Maresfield Report included an outline of the alternative 
regulatory system, the practitioner full disclosure list system as developed by 
Dennis Postle, based on the work of Will Schutz (Postle, 2003). In this system 
all talking therapists must register and disclose their background and 
approach to practice, as well as disclose any legal sanctions made against 
them. The policy proposal includes a broad code of ethics, but no standards 
of practice (ibid).  The projected HPC plans were characterised as ‘state’ as 
distinct from ‘statutory’ regulation (though some within the Alliance also 
opposed statutory regulation) and Darian Leader in a letter to PLG members 
in January 2009 went so far as to claim that ‘the proposed process of HPC 
regulation will narrow the broad practice of psychotherapy, making much of 
what currently takes place in reputable psychotherapy consulting rooms 
illegal in the near future’ [my emphasis added] (Leader, 2009).This 
purportedly included ‘non market-based and non-healthcare orientated 
therapies which do not stipulate outcomes in advance. Richard House in an 
address to the second Alliance conference in October 2009 suggested that 
the HPC case raised serious constitutional issues. Drawing on the then recent 
265 
 
public controversy about the school regulator telling two parents that made 
private arrangements to babysit each other’s children were breaking the law, 
House made allusions that the HPC plans constituted a slide towards a 
totalitarian state (House, 2009), (Whey, 2009).   
 
Alliance interventions prompted some sharp responses from HPC 
proponents, including a member of the British Association of Art Therapists 
who wrote in a letter to the Guardian stating:  
What a PR coup for psychotherapy Lisa Appignanesi et al and Darian Leader make 
between them. "Paying for something without knowing what it is" is apparently good, 
whereas having "definable techniques with predictable outcomes" is a "serious 
misunderstanding". Would anyone care to purchase this very fine pig in a poke 
(Learmonth, 2009).   
 
The above overview of events during this period identifies the main competing 
problematisations of the HPC plans made by key actors and stakeholders 
within the struggle, namely the contention of the HPC as a ‘light 
touch’/approach neutral intervention within the field, versus the contention 
that the plans were a heavy handed intervention which posed a serious threat 
to diversity within the field, especially non-healthcare and non-market 
orientated forms of talking therapy. In the next section I begin to assess the 
veracity of these competing problematisations and policy imaginaries by 
digging a bit deeper, delineating the assemblage of norms embodied within 
them. 
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COMPETING REGULATORY IMAGINARIES  
In this section I deploy the nodal comparative analytic framework, adapted 
from the work of Glynos and Speed (2012) and Glynos et al (2014a), to assist 
in this task. I first set out the key characteristics and norms of the HPC’s node 
of regulation and governance and contrast these to the counter-regulatory 
and governance norms expressed by the Alliance. I then go onto look at how 
these norms within the node of governance and regulation were projected by 
the pro and anti-HPC camps to impact on the nodes of education and 
training, provision and distribution, and delivery. The next two diagrams show 
the contrasting interpretations of the likely impact of the HPC plans on the 
field.  
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The node of governance and regulation 
I distinguish between three key facets of the HPC’s node of governance and 
regulation: (i) The HPC’s broad norms and criteria governing collective 
acceptance of a profession to its regulatory ranks. (ii) The HPC’s standards 
approach, namely the establishment of generic standards (including generic 
education and training standards), and profession-specific standards. (iii) The 
HPC’s fitness to practice hearing system i.e. its complaints system. I look at 
each in turn, and compare each to the Alliance’s counter-policy, regulatory, 
and practice imaginary, which chiefly refers to the ‘practitioner full disclosure 
system’.  
Criteria of acceptance for new professions and overall aims of regulation: The 
two central and most controversial criteria of collective entry to the HPC is the 
requirement of a degree of homogeneity across a field, and the requirement 
that practice be ‘subject to research into its effectiveness’ (Health Professions 
Council, 2004:4). As we already know contention over whether or not the 
HPC’s generic and profession specific standards of proficiency represented 
an already existing commonality/homogeneity across the field of the talking 
therapies, or in fact threatened to impose homogeneity on an otherwise 
deeply pluralistic field, goes to the heart of the struggle. I address this below.  
But let me first address the question of the HPC’s general criteria regarding 
how professions should assess the effectiveness of their practice.   
 
The HPC’s guidance notes state that a profession must show evidence that it 
‘subscribes to the ethos of evidence-based practice, including being open to 
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‘changing treatment strategies when the evidence is in favour of doing so’ (my 
emphasis) (ibid:4). As we explored in Chapters Two and Four, the term 
‘evidence-based-practice’ for many denotes the NICE-style prioritisation of 
evidence of the efficacy of treatments drawn from random or experimental 
controlled trials. The HPC contended that this was actually a 
misunderstanding. Michael Guthrie, for example, stated that ‘in my 
experience it [the phrase evidence based practice] often means different 
things to different people. I know some people prefer “evidence informed” […] 
certainly within the organisation we don't take a positivist approach’.80 The 
HPC took it to be a much more generic phrase, meaning ‘evidence informed’: 
that practice must be informed by evidence of ‘some kind’. 81Furthermore, 
Guthrie also emphasised that it is the profession, not the HPC, which 
determines what kind of evidence paradigm is used to assess the safety and 
effectiveness of practice, and pointed to the following statement within the 
notes on criteria for new professions: ‘practice [should be] subject to research 
into its effectiveness. Suitable evidence would include publication in journals 
that are accepted as learned by the health sciences and/or social care 
communities’ (ibid:4). This statement suggests that aspirant and member 
organisations have considerable autonomy in this matter. However, the 
guidance notes also state that an aspiring applicant profession should have 
‘an established scientific and measureable basis for measuring outcomes of 
their practice’ (ibid:4). This statement is highly suggestive of a quantitative 
and ‘population-based’ approach to the question of effectiveness and 
                                                          
80 Michael Guthrie (Director of Policy and Standards, HPC), interview by author, June 2014.  
81 Diane Waller (Chair of the HPC’s Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and 
Psychotherapists, interview by author, June 2014.  
 
 
271 
 
governance. The Alliance system in contrast is deeply pluralistic and does not 
require registrants to frame their practice in relation to proofs about its 
effectiveness, or even necessarily the concept of effectiveness altogether. 
House stated that the HPC standards assume that ‘actual/phenomenological 
therapy experience/practice is amenable to nomothetic research findings, 
which many anti-positivistic practitioners and authorities completely refute’ 
(House, 2009:112). Many talking therapies eschew science and outcomes 
based approach and is contra the ‘case study’ approach and what might be 
referred to as the ‘practice based evidence’ tradition within many of the more 
professionalised talking therapies, in which there is a tendency towards an 
ideographic approach, and much caution as regards constructing 
generalisations (more on this below). Furthermore, the statement on evidence 
based practice cited above – that a profession must be ‘open to changing 
treatment strategies when the evidence is in favour of doing so’ (emphasis 
added) - implies that evidence only ever points in one direction. This is indeed 
suggestive of a singular epistemological plain, rather than suggestive of 
recognition on the part of the HPC that there are different paradigms of 
evidence, or different ‘evaluative perspectives’. Furthermore, many forms of 
talking therapy eschew the concept of ‘treatment’, or, in the case of 
psychoanalysis, at times, even the concept of therapy. For example the 
Maresfield Report claims that the ‘symptoms may disappear during therapy, 
but this is not the cardinal goal. Rather, therapy involves an exploration of 
human life, a journey (Arbours Association et al, 2009:15-16). To recall from 
Chapter Four, Lacanian psychoanalysis, for example, tends to regard 
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psychoanalysis as a science of the unconscious, requiring no further 
justification (Turkle, 1979).  
Guthrie’s claim that professions chose their own method of assessing the 
effectiveness of their practice also seems incongruent with a very general 
characteristic and aim of HPC regulation. That is its aim to strongly assure the 
public of the safety and effectiveness of practice, which necessarily entails 
that the HPC at least tacitly endorse how a profession assesses the 
effectiveness and safety of practice. In fact the Health Professions Order, 
which forms of the legal bedrock of the HPC, seems to state that the HPC is 
legally required to do so:  
In accordance with the provisions of this Order the [HPC] Council shall establish and 
maintain a register of members of the relevant professions. (2) The Council shall from 
time to time [..] establish the standards of proﬁciency necessary to be admitted to the 
different parts of the register being the standards it considers necessary for safe and 
effective practice under that part of the register’ [italics added] (Health Professions 
Order, 2001:5).   
 
In contrast the projected Alliance regulatory system makes no claims about 
the effectiveness or safety of the practice or practices of its registrants. 
Rather registrants must disclose and describe their approach. The practice 
itself is not assessed or endorsed by the register. I explore the reasons for 
this below. Another ‘architectural’ difference between the approaches is that 
whilst the HPC system is regulation by ‘title’, the practitioner full disclosure list 
system is by ‘function’. This simply means that, in the case of the HPC, only 
those that wish to call themselves by legally protected titles – to be decided 
through the work of the Professional Liaison Group – fall within the auspices 
of the regulation. It remains the case that anybody can practice any form of 
therapy under non-protected titles. In contrast, within the the Alliance system, 
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anybody that practices talking therapy, regardless of what title they use, must 
legally register. The HPC system therefore tends to create a sharp frontier 
between the ‘safe and effective’ HPC registrant, and the non-HPC registrant. 
In summary so far, we can say that from the HPC’s own criteria of acceptance 
for new professions there is considerable incongruence between the HPC 
regime and the conceptual outlook of many talking therapies.82 The overall 
aim of regulation within the HPC plans is to offer strong assurance as regards 
the safety and effectiveness of registrants and their practice. In contrast, the 
Alliance proposal offers no such assurance: in the practitioner full disclosure 
list system there is a tendency to highlight the inherent risks and 
unpredictability of talking therapy (more on this below) and, rather than 
provide assurance, the system seeks to provide information and aims to 
educate and engage with the public (Arbours Association et al, 2009). Let me 
now move from the broader architecture and processes of the HPC to the 
more specific regulatory features planned for the field.  
The standards approach: The ‘standards approach’ is at the centre of HPC 
regulation and, as noted above, is the establishment of universal threshold 
standards and their enforcement, largely through the fitness to practice 
system. As noted within Chapter Five the multiple-professional regulator 
arguably marks a shift towards greater generic regulatory expertise, as 
distinct from specialist regulatory expertise. Each profession within the HPC 
must adhere to these common standards. There is therefore, prior to any 
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specific content, so to speak, a significant amount of ‘power sharing’ with 
other professions and the HPC as regards the definition of the basic ‘building 
block’ standards of proficiency. Profession-specific standards must be 
consistent with the generic standards and consequently there is a degree of 
hierarchy. In contrast the projected Alliance system, to reiterate, does not 
embody any specific standards of practice, but rather a broad code of ethics, 
namely regarding financial, sexual exploitation and abuse (Arbours 
Association et al, 2009). In not setting any standards of practice, the full 
disclosure list system is deeply pluralistic and inclusive: a broad code of 
ethics can, it is claimed, apply across this pluralism so to speak. Darian 
Leader for instance stated: there is ‘no reason why you can't have the same 
regulation for all the therapies, you just need to think very carefully about 
what that regulation will consist of. And I think the main things which are - 
sexual and financial exploitation are covered by nearly, I think all, the codes 
currently in existence’. 83 In contrast the HPC’s standards, in keeping with the 
HPC’s admittance criteria considered above - namely the requirement of 
considerable ‘homogeneity’ across the field and the requirement of a scientific 
way of measuring efficacy and outcomes of practice – tend to embody 
healthcare and consumer norms in the way it conceptualises talking therapy 
practice, as well as within the norms to enforce these norms. I focus on the 
issue of enforcement/governance now, and the conceptualisation of practice 
below.  
 
                                                          
83 Darian Leader (Lacanian Psychoanalyst, founding member of the Alliance, and member of the 
College of Psychoanalysts), interview by author,   
275 
 
Many of the generic standards seemed to suggest that practitioners should be 
assessed against both a consumer ethos and an ‘outcomes’ model. That is to 
say the standards seemed to demand that a practitioner be able to self-
impose, or shape their practice in accordance with a consumer and outcomes 
framework. For example, one HPC generic standard states that a practitioner 
must ‘be able to evaluate intervention plans using recognised outcome 
measures’ (Health Professions Council, 2010:11). Another suggested that a 
practitioner must be able to use audit practices in order to help ensure that 
practice is of a certain quality and that it achieves particular outcomes: a 
practitioner must ‘be aware of the role of audit and review in quality 
management, including quality control, quality assurance and the use of 
appropriate outcome measures’ (ibid:9). Similarly, a practitioner must 
‘understand the principles of quality control and quality assurance’ (ibid:9). 
Other standards implied a hierarchy, and that the required ‘quality’ of practice 
is handed down to the practitioner within a bureaucratic system of 
governance. For instance one standard stated that a practitioner must ‘be 
able to keep accurate, legible records and all other information in accordance 
with applicable legislation, protocols and guidelines’ (ibid:8). Another standard 
stated that a practitioner must be able to ‘understand the need to use only 
accepted terminology in making records’ (ibid:8). Another standard would not 
be out of place within a text extolling the virtues of an approach to 
management: a practitioner must ‘be able to maintain an effective audit trail 
and work towards continual improvement’ (ibid:9). Overall these standards 
are suggestive of a consumer model in which practice is seen as a quality 
‘product’ with clearly delineated and assured ‘input’ and ‘outcomes’. This 
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dovetails with a heightened calculative rationality, in which the patient or client 
tends to be presupposed to be an object to be acted upon. These are, to 
recall from Chapter Five, rather characteristic of the consolidation and 
deepening of the restratification of the healthcare professions began in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, encompassing increased hierarchy between a 
regulatory, managerial, and research elite on the one hand, and ‘rank and file’ 
practitioners on the other.  In contrast the Alliance tends to emphasise that 
the authority concerning the character and evaluation of practice resides with 
both the client and the practitioner. Both The Maresfield Report (Arbours 
Association et al, 2009) and Postle and House (2009) contended that the aim 
of many talking therapies is to provide a space free from dominant societal 
norms, and to free clients of irrational social authorities. In his address to the 
Alliance conference Andrew Samuels spoke of the ‘third party’ that is always 
within therapy – whether that be society, culture, the regulator, the 
professional association, the family. The HPC as the potential third party 
evoked much anxiety (Samuels, 2009a). The Maresfield Report expressed 
that ‘many therapies today do not accept the basic concepts of mental health, 
of wellbeing, of normality, or even of expertise. These concepts, they argue, 
are part of a market based vision of human life, and not the spiritual, ethical 
journey of a therapy’ (Arbours Association, 2009:18). A similar critique of a 
tendency to assume continuous progression is found in a response to the 
HPC Standard of Proficiency that practitioners must be able to ‘understand 
both the need to keep skills and knowledge up to date and the importance of 
career long learning’.84 The Maresfield Report contended that for many 
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schools of therapy it is important to engage robustly with the ‘limits’ of human 
knowledge, and recognise the ‘vanity’ of human knowledge (2009:25) and 
linked the notion of continuous professional development with a 
‘market’/consumer orientated ideological vision of life in which the self can be 
continually ‘bettered’ through acquisition of new skills and knowledge (seen 
as packaged into ‘products’). 85 Members of the Alliance tended to highlight 
more processual and ‘horizontal’, rather than hierarchical, forms of 
governance. For example the Independent Practitioners Network advocates 
that talking therapists voluntarily scrutinize and vouch for each other’s 
practices within a community and network of groups of practitioners (House, 
2009b).  
The fitness to practice hearing/complaints system: Another important facet of 
the node of regulation and governance is of course the fitness to 
practice/complaints system. The HPC system is strongly marked by quasi-
legal and adversarial norms, to a significant extent mirroring the procedures, 
structure and culture of a law court. Articulated with a set of threshold 
standards of practice the HPC system seems intended to provide a clear cut 
way of dealing with breaches of its standards, whilst the Alliance, in contrast, 
advocated a system in which the norm of mediation predominates. The HPC 
system, given the establishment of fixed threshold of standards could be said 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
85 The Maresfield Report does not use the term, but essentially seems to be saying that the 
HPC regime (imbricated with a transactional-style sense of mastery, coupled with a 
consumerist ethos) tends to fail to facilitate what Joel Whitebook (1996) refers to as the 
political problem of fundamental human narcissism that any political system, culture or 
society, needs to address. Rather the HPC tends to fuel narcissism. In short the suggestion 
seems to be that the HPC regime tends to foster excess belief in the capacity of trainees, 
practitioners, and clients to ‘master’ whatever is the object of their concern. 
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to be quite transactional in so far as the process is seen as simply a matter of 
assessing whether the registrant has breached the standards or not i.e. 
whether or not they have broken the contract. In contrast we could say that 
the Alliance proposal is more processual in character, as mediation between 
the practitioner and client occurs without any fixed or precise notions – 
barring the broad code of ethics – about what the therapeutic relationship or 
the practice should be like. A key consequence of the transactionality of the 
HPC system is that a formal complaint, once made by a client or patient, is 
then either dismissed or goes to hearing, and, if a complaint goes to hearing, 
the findings then tend to be given in a binary guilty/not guilty style. The 
complaints process is held in public, thereby embodying the norm of 
transparency (Arbours Association, 2009:9). Proponents of the HPC plans 
claimed that this process would help address the problem of complainants 
feeling pressured within the process of mediation, which, managed entirely by 
the profession, tends often to be marked by practitioners ‘closing ranks’ and 
protecting each other from being held accountable for breaches of standards 
and codes of ethics.86 They argue that the concept and phenomenon of 
transference from the client to practitioner – where, for example, the 
practitioner may come to represent to the client an abusive partner – is often 
used disingenuously to dismiss cases where there are real grounds for 
complaint.  Malcolm Allen, for example stated that: ‘all psychotherapeutic 
organisations have a natural tendency to pathologise complaints: that's what 
they do’.87 The Alliance on the other hand tended to highlight a different set of 
                                                          
86 Michael Guthrie (Director of Policy and Standards, HPC), interview by author, June 2014.  
87 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014.  
279 
 
dilemmas; for example they point to the problem that the majority of 
complaints made to the HPC are dismissed at the first stage. In contrast the 
proposed Alliance system seeks to engage all complainants, emphasising the 
norm of mediation in relation to the phenomenon of transference in the early 
stages of a complaint, unless that complaint relates to serious misconduct 
that breaches the law. This ideally means that all complaints are explored in 
some detail and. in this sense the Alliance proposal (at least at an abstract 
level) tends to embody a stronger form of pluralism and focus on client 
experience. That is to say a client’s complaint is purportedly explored 
seriously regardless of its status vis a vis any external set of standards. 
Contra the HPC’s take on transparency the Alliance advocated some privacy 
within the individual complaints process in order to protect both clients and 
practitioners.  The HPC system, the Maresfield Report contended, ‘risks 
alienating potential complainants who do not wish to enter into such formal 
procedures, held in public with none of the confidentiality that a hearing may 
require’ (Arbours Association, 2009:9). As regards practitioners in relation to 
the HPC style fitness to practice hearing system, Darian Leader, for example, 
stated that:  ‘the human costs [..] the tragic breaking of lives that [the HPC] 
investigations can involve; even if the person is exonerated, it's difficult for a 
human being to recover from that’.88 Another fixed element of the HPC 
regulation is the standards of education and training which apply to all 
professions under the regulatory umbrella. Let us briefly look at this.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
88 Darian Leader (Lacanian psychoanalyst, Alliance co-founder), interview by author, June 
2014.  
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The node of education and training  
The training standards tend similarly to be marked by a norm of 
transactionality. There is a focus upon trainees acquiring a preordained set of 
skills and competencies which they can then go on to ‘apply’ in their practice.  
Learning tends to be seen as linear. In contrast the Alliance tends to 
emphasise the processual and non-linear qualities of learning. Learning 
spaces, whether training schools, or the more informal/community based 
spaces preferred by, for example, the Independent Practitioners Network, 
tend to be seen as sites of contestation – where ‘received wisdom’ is subject 
to critique. In the HPC’s standards of education and training there is a sense 
that knowledge is handed down as ‘received wisdom’ to trainees, its validity 
secured elsewhere. Parker (2010) for example argues that:  
Training is reduced to the logic of compliance to a programme of study. This problem is 
manifest in the attempt to ensure good practice in training by monitoring attendance at 
courses. What is important is that the trainee is seen to learn, not that they actually learn 
anything at all. This buys into the worst models of education that are now increasingly 
rife in the university sector in the UK in which ‘learning outcomes’ take the place of 
independent thinking by the student (Parker, 2010:33).  
 
Within the HPC system knowledge is seen as something ‘packaged’, and to 
be uncritically absorbed, and there is an emphasis upon ‘outcomes’:  what 
students learn should be predicted in advance, and there should be audit 
practices to assess and evidence that they have done so. The Maresfield 
Report also emphasised that many training schools, in contrast to the more 
transactional educational and learning imaginary, are centred around the 
‘personal therapy based paradigm’ in which exploration of unconscious, 
rather than conscious, knowledge is the primary focus. The report states that 
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many trainings are centred around personal therapy, and the notion of 
‘unconscious knowledge’ and profound personal change: ‘it is not about 
acquiring skills and knowledge, but rather about losing them, to open oneself 
up to another human being’ (Arbours Association et al, 2009:54).89 90 
Furthermore, it states:  
For many schools, there can be no linear path through a training, and since one’s own 
therapy is the central component of training, results can never be predicted in advance 
and, indeed, no standardised feedback can be given’ (ibid:24)  
 
 
Contrary to an emphasis on predicted ‘outcomes’, in which a goal is strongly 
fixed from the outset, some therapy trainings emphasise that they may not 
wish to finish their training or become analysts at the end. The HPC’s 
education and training standards make, as Parker notes, ‘no acknowledgment 
that  the learning process might include learning that one does not want to be 
an analytic practitioner or any kind of psychotherapist for that matter’ (Parker, 
2010:33).  
Let us now look at how these characteristics of the node of regulation and 
governance of the HPC were projected to impact, and would likely to have 
impacted, the node of provision and distribution.  
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Node of provision and distribution  
To recall from Chapter Three, the node of provision and distribution concerns 
the norms which structure the field, including the shaping of commissioning 
practices, what treatments are provided and in what circumstances. There 
were two pronounced frontiers within the policy dispute in relation to the node 
of provision and distribution: the first was between the Alliance and the HPC, 
as per the other nodes, and, a more pronounced one – a fault line - within the 
Professional Liaison Group in relation to how the plans would impact the node 
of provision and distribution. The latter pertained largely to the structure of the 
register and the planned differentiation between counselling and 
psychotherapy within protected titles and the profession specific standards. I 
look at each briefly in turn. 
A key concern for the Alliance was that an overwhelming number of the 
generic standards tend to assume that talking therapy is provided and 
distributed by health and social care organisations. Just to cite three: the 3a.3 
standard referred to the ability to ‘establish safe environments for practice […] 
including the use of hazard control and particularly infection control’ (Health 
Professions Council, 2009c). One sub-heading of a set of standards was 
entitled ‘identification and assessment of health and social care needs’, and 
another, ‘the formulation and delivery of plans and strategies for meeting 
health and social care needs’ (ibid). The standards unsurprisingly contained 
ones that are consistent with the key rationale for the establishment of multi-
professional regulators, as explored in Chapter Five, to assist multi-
professional team working within the NHS: Standard 1b.2 stated that a 
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practitioner must ‘to be able to contribute effectively to work undertaken as 
part of a multi-disciplinary team’ (Health Professions Council, 2009c). The 
contention of the Alliance was not only that these were not relevant to many 
talking therapies, but that both the generic and profession-specific standards, 
orientated towards healthcare and consumer norms, would render many 
forms of talking therapy illegal and therefore radically diminish public choice. 
The Maresfield Report for example stated that:  
By marginalizing and even making illegal those forms of therapy which follow a 
different model, HPC regulation would deprive the public of their free choice of which 
therapists to consult (Arbours Association et al, 2009:9).  
 
So whilst the HPC regime can be said to strongly delimit public choice by the 
technical practice of measuring the ‘efficacy of practice’, the Alliance tended 
to argue for a deeper public choice. In my view it is reasonable to surmise 
that the HPC plans if implemented may well have diminished the provision 
and distribution of ‘non-outcome’ based therapies within the NHS. It is rather 
less credible to suggest that the plans would have rendered certain forms of 
talking therapy illegal as the HPC plans were for regulation by title only, so 
anybody would be able to practice any form of talking therapy they wished, so 
long as they did not use any legally protected title. Being banned from using a 
tittle, or being excluded from employment within public services, though 
possibly negatively impacting, is substantively different from a legal or 
‘totalitarian’ ban on the right to practice a form of talking therapy as such.  
Let us now look at the profession-specific standards in relation to the node of 
provision and distribution.  
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The professional liaison group’s deep split on the issue of differentiation 
between counselling and psychotherapy predominantly reflected concerns 
about how the nodes of provision and distribution would be impacted. It 
seems reasonable to surmise that the BACP wanted the structure of the 
register to keep the ‘market’ open and non-differentiated: that is to say once 
an individual is over an initial universal entry level hurdle into the field, the 
BACP wanted the internal/closed market to be equally open to both 
counsellors and psychotherapists. The UKCP, BABCP and BPC, on the other 
hand, wanted a formally more differentiated ‘market’. Concerns of the latter 
grouping were focussed on differences in training standards set by them and 
those of the BACP.91 Contra BACP wishes, successive drafts of profession 
specific standards of  practice broadly differentiated between counselling and 
psychotherapy on the basis of level of client needs, essentially between more 
‘common’ and more ‘severe’ mental health difficulties. In the second draft 
(May 2009), for example, within the standards for counselling only, there was 
the statement that counsellors: ‘must understand and work with common life 
problems’ (emphasis added), and with ‘common mental health problems’ 
(Health Professions Council, 2009c).  Counsellors must be able to ‘recognise 
and, where appropriate, refer clients with severe disturbances’ (ibid). As 
regards the specific standards for psychotherapists the same draft stipulated 
that psychotherapists should not only be able to recognise but also work with 
                                                          
91 Fiona Ballantine Dykes (Counselling Central Awarding Body, and member of the HPC 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author, June 
2015.  
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‘severe mental disturbances in clients’ (Ibid) 92 The profession specific 
standards embodied what I refer to as ‘pluralism-lite’: that is, the field was 
projected to be structured by a distinction between counselling and 
psychotherapy where the former is aimed at life problems, and psychotherapy 
at more serious mental health difficulties. It is pluralistic is the sense that the 
HPC plans envisaged the provision of different forms of therapy – counselling 
and psychotherapy – for different levels or types of client need. It is ‘lite’ in the 
sense that it does seek to ‘ratify’ and institutionalise, through regulation, a 
contested view of the structure of the field, as well as a contested view of the 
character of talking therapy, especially relating to the concept of ‘mental 
health’ and ‘illness’ (more on this below). In contrast the full practitioner 
disclosure system makes no assumptions about the structure of the field: the 
system itself does not take a view on how the field should be structured, or a 
view on any of the arguments over the definition or character of different 
forms of talking therapy. We can therefore say that it can encompass a ‘deep 
pluralism’. It does not, however, force pluralism on the field: hypothetically if 
all practitioners within the field were of one modality of therapy then the 
register would simply reflect this.  
Let me now look more specifically at how the healthcare and 
consumer/market orientated standards of practice were projected to shape 
                                                          
92 The third draft (which went out for the July-October 2009 field consultation) in essence encapsulated 
the same differentiation, with some modification of language used. The fact that this was articulated with 
a differential entry level (level five for counselling and seven for psychotherapy) reinforced the sense the 
hierarchical relation between the two. For the BACP this did not accurately reflect existing structure of 
the field (many counselling training courses being at postgraduate level for example). 
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the node of delivery, or, to put this slightly differently, what did the standards 
of practice presuppose about the practitioner-client relationship?  
 
The node of delivery 
The tendency towards a hierarchy within the nodes of governance and 
regulation and within education and training between standards and research 
on the one hand, and the practitioner on the other, tends to be reproduced in 
how the node of delivery and the relationship between the practitioner and the 
client is tacitly conceptualised. That is to say the client is tacitly characterised, 
to a significant extent, as in passive receipt of the expertise of the practitioner, 
just as the practitioner is seen to be in passive receipt of standards of practice 
determined by a research and regulatory elite within the field. The field is not 
regarded as closed to innovation, but the innovation tends to be viewed as 
located within research activity as a sharply separate activity from practice. In 
short expertise is broadly framed as something that is ‘applied to’ or ‘done to’ 
a client. The client, however, does tend also to be constructed as an active 
consumer in so far as the practitioner-client relationship is tacitly 
characterised in terms of a consumer contract, whereby the client or patient 
should be clear about what outcomes are likely to be achieved. To recall from 
above, the stipulation that an aspirant profession should deploy a 
quantitative/scientific means of measuring outcomes is suggestive of the 
expectation that clients, or at least commissioners of the treatments, should 
be told with some accuracy what the outcome of their ‘treatments’ is likely to 
be.  
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In contrast the Alliance tends to emphasise a more contextual and relational 
view of practice where therapy is seen as a function of the relationship rather 
than something that is applied. The Maresfield Report (Arbours Association et 
al, 2009) stated for example that the draft standards of proficiency: 
Suggest time and time again the image of a patient as an object being described, 
assessed, evaluated and acted on by a team of experts. This view completely ignores 
the central feature of psychotherapy: the fact that it involves a relationship between two 
parties, and that the main work of the therapy is conducted not by the therapist but by 
the patient (2009:48).  
 
Given that expertise is not seen as something pre-packaged and ‘applied’, but 
as ‘co-created’ anew in each new and unique context, it cannot be predicted 
with certainty what the outcome will be. In a sense practice is seen to be a 
form of research and experiment in process. Rather like Healy’s (2013) call 
that medicines should be respected as poisons, and therefore as 
encompassing an inherent danger, many Alliance members emphasised that 
therapy involves inherent risks and has uncertain outcomes. The Alliance 
imaginary encompasses in effect a much softer demarcation between the 
node of governance and regulation and the node of delivery. Knowledge, 
expertise, insight are seen as being contextually created within the 
therapeutic relationship, and the character and the ‘standards of practice’, so 
to speak, therefore tend to be seen as being shaped from the ground up,  
rather than shaped by norms of practice entirely handed-down by the 
regulator, researchers, or by training schools. In short the therapy itself tends 
to be seen as a form of research and the client is often construed as the 
primary agent in the research process.  The Alliance contention is essentially 
that it is only through a refusal to allow a ‘third party’ to stipulate or definitively 
fix the character of the therapy that this is rendered possible.   
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Whilst the Alliance tended to either want, or were willing to concede, a deep 
pluralism within the nodes of governance and regulation, and provision and 
distribution, so as to achieve a more ‘open’ and ‘free’ therapeutic space, the 
primary focus within the Liaison Group seemed to be the potential impact of 
the node of governance and regulation, namely the issue of differentiation 
between counselling and psychotherapy, on the node of provision and 
distribution e.g. what the plans may have meant for access to jobs in the 
NHS. The UKCP for example tended to eschew medical conceptualisations of 
psychotherapy, yet it seemed more concerned to create regulatory 
differentiation between counselling and psychotherapy than it was about 
avoiding medical conceptualisations of psychotherapy. Malcolm Allen stated 
that the UKCP representative within the Liaison Group:  
As much as anybody argued for as much elimination of medical concepts as was 
possible. Equally, she also had to have in mind, if we had in mind something that was 
too indistinguishable from counselling she would have lost the argument she was much 
more passionate about, that there was still a distinction between psychotherapy and 
counselling 93 
 
It is noteworthy therefore that it was people within the field itself – around the 
Liaison Group table – which further pushed the HPC plans to a deeper 
healthcare/medical conceptualisation psychotherapy practice. At one level 
this affirms that it would be overly simplistic to say that the HPC was an 
entirely external ‘imperialistic’ power imposing a healthcare model on the 
field. However, having said that, it is also suggestive of the potentially deep 
impact of the general temper of HPC-style plans, namely in the sense that the 
HPC plans seemed to drive a key professional association within the field – 
                                                          
93 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014. See 
appendix A transcript p. 454. 
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the UKCP - towards cementing in regulation a psychiatric/medical 
conceptualisation of psychotherapy, with which they were significantly 
uncomfortable.  
 
From this analysis of HPC documentary material, and drawing on Alliance 
critiques, the Alliance claims that the HPC plans were a threat to the diversity 
of the field seem credible. The HPC plans were set to be a significant 
reshaping intervention within the field. The competing characterisations of the 
plans, and their likely impact, were part and parcel of the political and 
rhetorical efforts of the pro and anti-HPC camps to install and derail the HPC 
plans respectively. Let us now focus on the ‘political logics’ during this period 
of the struggle.  
 
 
POLITICAL AND RHETORICAL STRATEGIES  
 
Let us start with an examination of the key political dynamics of the pro and 
anti-HPC responses to the announcement of the HPC plans in the 2007 
White Paper (Department of Health, 2007a). It will be useful to structure this 
in broad accordance with the chronology of the history of the struggle during 
this period. First I focus on the broad strategies and actions which established 
the key ‘frontiers’ of the struggle, including bald forms of ‘agenda’ and ‘remit’ 
setting. I then go onto to look closely at how the pro and anti-HPC camps 
sought to ‘hegemonise’ the plans, and how their respective narrative accounts 
of the ensuing policy dispute provided the ‘glue’ for their policy aims. 
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Early responses to the White Paper announcement: setting the agenda  
To recall from Chapter Five the Department of Health had to a significant 
extent side-stepped any detailed policy engagement with concerns expressed 
across the field about the fundamentals of the projected HPC regulation of 
counselling and psychotherapy. The HPC in effect continued this through its 
focus on what Michael Guthrie referred to as the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the HPC 
plans.94 The Department of Health’s response to the Psychological 
Professions Council proposal in July 2007 (Department of Health, 2007c) did 
not address some of the concerns specific to the counselling and 
psychotherapy that had been expressed to an extent previously, and which 
was certainly expressed afterwards. The ‘nuts and bolts’ strategy was 
established through and within the ‘Call for Ideas’ (Health Professions 
Council, 2008a) and the ‘road map’ to regulation (Health Professions Council, 
2007). Many responses to the call for ideas did not stick to the parameters of 
the questions and expressed concerns about the fundamentals of the 
regulation: Musgrave (2008) and The College of Psychoanalysts (2008d) for 
example expressed concerns about a fundamental lack of congruence 
between the HPC and many talking therapies. The HPC in its document 
responding to submissions to the consultation acknowledged that many within 
the field opposed the HPC plans (as had the Foster review document 
response to submissions to it) and the HPC consultation process was in this 
respect transparent and open, as promised within the ‘road map’ document 
                                                          
94 Michael Guthrie (Director of Policy and Standards, HPC), interview by author, June 2014.  
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(Health Professions Council, 2007). But the HPC simultaneously tended to 
occlude the very points of view it relayed. This was largely done through its 
tendency towards ‘parrot listening’, by which I mean the tendency to simply 
summarise responses to the consultation, rather than provide an analysis of 
the material, or attempt to integrate the various demands with indications of 
possible compromises. So opposition comments were ‘aired’, but the lack of 
substantive engagement gave the HPC response a rather tokenistic flavour, 
as if to formally satisfy the requirement to consult, yet give the points made by 
members of the field no traction or role within the development of the HPC’s 
own thinking. For example the HPC summary of responses to its Call for 
Ideas (Health Professions Council: 2008c) in effect noted concerns 
essentially expressing that the HPC plans would make the node of 
governance and provision incompatible with the field i.e. it would reshape the 
nodes of provision and distribution, and delivery in accordance with 
healthcare and consumer norms. But it did not analytically engage with these 
concerns, but rather tended simply to make general assertions about it being 
diverse friendly (more on this below). The HPC’s ‘road map’ (Health 
Professions Council, 2007) document already included a hint of the ‘problem 
minority’ narrative to come in implying that those opposed to the HPC plans 
must either be unethical, or incompetent, and therefore be attempting to avoid 
accountability. The ‘road map’ states: 
 
There might be a small but vocal minority of individuals and organisations who may 
want to avoid statutory regulation for a variety of reasons.  They include: Unable to meet 
competence standards […] Their application would be rejected due to inability to meet 
ethical standards, for example a previous conviction or a determination by a statutory or 
non-statutory regulator (ibid:3).  
 
 
292 
 
Other reasons given also tend to connote self-interested motivations, such as 
‘reluctance to pay the registration fees’ and concerns about the ‘future 
financial viability of education and training programmes’ (ibid:3) The only 
statement within the HPC’s ‘road map’ which arguably relays more principled 
reasons for opposition to the HPC plans is that opponents may be ‘opposed 
to the concept of statutory regulation’ (ibid:3). The latter, however, equates 
opposition to the HPC plans with opposition to statutory regulation as such, 
thereby making opponents seem like a smaller group at the margins of 
opinion within the field. The HPC’s list of reasons also occludes those 
objecting to the HPC plans on the grounds that the plans would likely impact 
negatively on client and public interests. The phrase ‘opposed to the concept 
of statutory regulation’ may also connote the view that opposition to HPC 
regulation is rather abstracted from the lived realities of the problems at hand 
within the field, and that the concerns expressed are merely intellectual or 
philosophical. These manoeuvres, including allusions to opponents as largely 
a ‘problem minority’ helped to shore up the ‘nuts and bolts’ strategy and the 
marginalisation of fundamental concerns about HPC regulation.  
 
The ‘nuts and bolts’ strategy was reflected within the appointments to the 
professional liaison group: Diane Waller, the appointed Chair, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, was strongly pro-HPC regulation. No one that was appointed 
to the group was resolutely committed to opposing the plans. It was partially a 
narrative of ‘political realism’ permeated by an ‘inevitability thesis’ which 
shaped the turn-around of those professional associations and individuals 
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previously opposed to the plans. Fiona Ballantyne Dykes for example stated 
that: 
We would have preferred not to come under a regulated umbrella at all. I think we just 
thought that it was going to happen, and therefore we had to make the best of whatever 
it was that was put on the table in front of us (Fiona Ballantyne interview. 95 
 
James Antrican’s preferred form of regulation was a ‘licensing system’, such 
as the full practitioner disclosure system, but he stated: 
Who were we going to push. The government had made up its mind. We had had 
meetings with MPs, with bureaucrats with everybody, and this had been going on for six 
years by this time. [laughs]. There's a time you have to say well we've lost the battle.96  
 
There was however a considerable split between the leadership and a 
significant number of individual and organisational members within the UKCP, 
and the decision of the incumbent Chair, James Antrican, to allow a 
‘dissenting voice’ section within its document response to the HPC’s Call for 
Ideas (UKCP, 2008), was a compromise which allowed significant expression 
to opposition, but which simultaneously held the UKCP’s official and lead line 
in favour of the HPC plans.  
 
To return to the Professional Liaison Group, another crucial strategy used by 
the HPC to narrow the agenda still further was through the obfuscation of the 
liaison group’s formal right, if it so wished, to recommend that HPC regulation 
of counselling and psychotherapy is not feasible. Diane Waller regarded this 
only as a theoretical possibility. In my interview with her she stated: ‘it’s 
possible, if there had been no agreement whatsoever on any commonality, 
then it would have been very hard to see how it [HPC regulation] could have 
                                                          
95 Fiona Ballantine Dykes (Counselling Central Awarding Body, and member of the HPC 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author, June 
2015.  
96 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
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happened, so in theory, yes, it was possible. “97 However, it was Waller’s 
actions which partially headed off a ‘no’ recommendation as a serious 
possibility. The decision of the HPC not to deploy its ‘new professions 
process’ – assessing aspirant and applicant professions against the HPC’s 
broad admission criteria - was controversial among some members of the 
Liaison Group and when the issue was raised the meeting had become, 
reported Simona Revelli of the College of Psychoanalysts, who was sitting in 
the public gallery, ‘visibly tense’ (Low, 2008). When Brian Magee of COSCA 
(Counselling and Psychotherapy in Scotland) raised the issue of whether or 
not the Liaison Group was entitled to decide that the HPC plans were not in 
service user interests, Postle reported that Diane Waller gave a ‘somewhat 
perfunctory response of “no, that’s not what we’re here for … we will have to 
manage difference’ [  ] followed rapidly, much too rapidly by her 
announcement as chair that we would now break for lunch’. After lunch the 
question was not referred to again – Professor Fonagy was invited by the 
Chair to talk about SfH (2012:216). And despite the meeting having been 
scheduled to last until 3.30pm it was ‘suddenly brought to a closure at 1.30’ 
(Low, 2008). Opposition to the HPC plans had gathered a head of steam and 
as well as an organised intellectual force by the time of the Manchester 
Stakeholders meeting. This meeting was clearly a clash of agendas, the HPC 
seeking a ‘nuts and bolts’ agenda, and opponents seeking to address 
fundamental questions of ‘whether and by whom’. The HPC’s disseminative 
and hortatory approach (seeking to educate and assure its audience) failed to 
                                                          
97 Diane Waller (Chair of the HPC’s Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and 
Psychotherapists, interview by author, June 2014.  
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persuade opponents of its position, and failed to ‘smooth over’ differences. 
Equally, opponents failed to persuade the HPC to change its stance. The 
HCP understood, quite reasonably in some ways in my view, its role as that of 
administrator of the Department of Health’s instruction to implement HPC 
regulation of the field, and therefore did not see itself as being in a position to 
negotiate with opponents on the policy fundamentals (more on this in the next 
chapter) (Bircham Dyson Bell, 2009e). It was this incapacity, or unwillingness, 
of the HPC to consider the policy fundamentals that created the conditions of 
possibility for the emergence of the Alliance. So far I have focussed on some 
of the balder strategies of marginalisation and agenda setting in the policy 
process. Let us now look at how the pro and anti-HPC camps sought to build 
and legitimate their identities and aims. I start with the HPC and then move 
onto the HPC.  
 
 
The Alliance: building cohesion within a disparate group 
 
The Alliance was comprised of a diverse range of practitioners from a range 
of factions and approaches within the field. For example it included humanists 
as well as Lacanian and Jungian Psychoanalysts, and also a few CBT 
practitioners. 98 To recall from Chapter Four, Postle had described 
psychoanalysis as a different ‘world-view’ and as dominated by the medical 
model. Janet Low noted the humanist discomfort at the Lacanian use of the 
                                                          
98 Darian Leader (Lacanian psychoanalyst, A 
lliance co-founder), interview by author, June 2014. 
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terms ‘diagnosis’ and ‘subject’ (Low, 2008), yet the Alliance was able to unite, 
as Darian Leader put it, against the HPC as a ‘common enemy’. 99 
Differences within the group became de-emphasised, whilst similarities were 
emphasised. The HPC, along with SfH and IAPT, were seen as a ‘block’, or 
single frontier, and consequently the deep unpopularity of IAPT within much 
of the field (largely due, to recall from the last chapter, to its strong favour of 
CBT, and its healthcare and positivist orientation), and, to a lesser extent, 
SfH, carried over to the HPC, fostering a degree of guilt by association. As we 
have seen, the Alliance also critiqued the norms within the HPC regulatory 
system as healthcare orientated, and therefore as a threat to diversity within 
the field. Alliance members were broadly united around a ‘relational’, as 
opposed to a healthcare or transactional conceptualisation of talking therapy. 
In this respect the Alliance tended forward a position close to a talking 
therapy exceptionalism i.e. that talking therapies (or at least some forms) are 
fundamentally different to healthcare practices. That is to say that some 
talking therapies are totally incommensurable with healthcare practice (more 
on this in Chapter Eight). The Alliance conferences provided space which 
enabled the sharing of concerns and the facilitation of the development of 
conceptual arguments and ideologies against the HPC plans.  
The Alliance also had the advantage that the alternative regulatory 
programme proposed, the practitioner full disclosure system, was deeply 
pluralistic and so capable of absorbing differences between practices within 
the Alliance and not ring alarm bells about the field being structured according 
                                                          
99 Ibid. 
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to the view of any particular faction. 100 In other words the Alliance proposed 
system of regulation and governance did not make any presuppositions about 
other nodes of the field – training and education, provision and distribution, 
and delivery – other than that they may be mediated by a plurality of norms. 
The Alliance as a group was therefore more ‘organic’ than the pro-HPC camp. 
It is noteworthy, however, that there was not support for the practitioner full 
disclosure system across all of the factions within the field prior to the HPC 
struggle. Denis Postle, for example, claimed that psychoanalysts previously 
tended to be opposed to practitioner full disclosure on the grounds of 
disrupting the client transference onto the blank canvass, so to speak, of the 
analyst. 101 In a wider approach, Alliance members also tended to 
characterise this ‘block’ - the HPC, SfH, IAPT and NICE - as a metonymic 
aspect of the broader political regime of neo-liberalism, bureaucratisation, the 
regulatory state, and/or late modernism, and drew a frontier between this and 
talking therapies embodying a relational paradigm that offer an alternative 
space with alternative values e.g. open ended practice (Arbours Association 
et al, 2009), (Samuels, 2009b).  Opposition broadly characterised the 
government as motivated by a desire to use psychological therapies as an 
instrument of social control.  Some critics drew an equation between most of 
the talking therapies and the professions characterised as having already 
suffered from attacks from Thatcherism. Thorne (2009), for example, in his 
speech at the inaugural Alliance conference, claimed that teachers have 
flocked to the field of therapy, fed up with the inhospitable regulatory and 
                                                          
100 Postle noted however surprise that the psychoan 
alysts/Lacanians asccepted this given their tendency to want to not give anything away of 
themselves to clients and remain a ‘blank canvass’ upon which clients can project.  
101 Denis Postle (Alliance and IPN members, Humanistic counsellor and activist), interview by 
author, May 2015. 
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governance climate within teaching. In relation to university research the 
Lacanian Psychoanalyst, Janet Low, recounted at the Alliance conference:  
In the rest of my adult life I’ve been studying ethnographic research, sociology, and 
becoming quite skilled at hanging out watching what a tribe does and writing about it. 
It's the kind of research that has been squashed to death by the evidence based 
ideology that has been sweeping through the universities for at least the last ten years. 
And in fact I allowed it to squash me out of the universities in 2005, thinking well I’ll 
settle down with the psychoanalytic group that I’ve been studying with for the last ten 
years; only to discover three minutes later that it was coming to get me there. So that's 
when I discovered that I couldn't run any further (Low, 2009). 
 
 
To some extent the opposition drew a further frontier within the talking 
therapies between most of the field on the one hand and CBT and the 
Freudian tradition within psychoanalysis on the other, thereby characterising 
these to some extent as an enemy within the field of the talking therapies, put 
to work by malign political forces. For example, at times CBT seems to be 
ascribed this status by virtue of its intrinsic qualities – aimed at correcting 
‘faulty thinking’ (Leader, 2007, 2008): Darian Leader within the Guardian, for 
instance, stated that:  
 
Cognitive therapy was perhaps used most widely in the Cultural Revolution in China, 
where people were taught that depression was just wrong thinking. Separated from 
their families, unable to contact loved ones, subject to cruel punishments and witness 
to the murder or "vanishing" of those closest to them, millions of people were "taught" 
to devalue their reactions. The world should be thought about in a different way, and 
happiness and enthusiasm replace despair and despondency. Positive thinking should 
banish unhelpful negative attitudes (Leader, 2008). 
 
At other times CBT seems ascribed the ‘enemy within’  status based on a 
general tendency of the CBT community (namely through the BABCP) to 
uncritically accept the HPC plans, IAPT and SfH, and the tendency of the 
government to promote a flawed view of CBT as far more effective than any 
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other modality.102 Motivations of professional self-interest, namely the pursuit 
of securing jobs, were ascribed to both the CBT and Freudian traditions. The 
BPC’s support was seen as partially driven by support of Peter Fonagy’s 
Mentalisation Based Therapy (Arbours Association et al), (Low, 2008); the 
Alliance effectively drawing a sharp demarcation between the public and 
professional interest, arguing that the latter diverged radically from the former 
in the instance of the BPC ‘political grouping’ (Arbours Association et al), 
(Low, 2008), (Thorne, 2009). Overall the Alliance in effect sought to identify 
the political and motives and meanings which lay behind the HPC plans and 
their supporters, and in so doing the Alliance challenged the ‘inevitability 
thesis’: the belief that there was no (viable) alternative. The Alliance 
foregrounded the politically contingent nature of the HPC plans by pointing 
towards the broader political contours and the ‘ignoble origins’ of the HPC 
plans. This helped galvanise and legitimate more concrete plans to resist the 
HPC plans. The exploration of legal avenues (see next chapter) gave succour 
to the contention that the HPC plans were not inevitable. The possibility of the 
HPC plans reaching the statute book was still perceived to be a likely 
eventuality however. The contingency plan of ‘principles non-compliance’ was 
therefore regarded as central to the Alliance strategy and was the focus of 
much of the Alliance’s second conference.  
 
Fantasmatic narrative with the Alliance discourses: Now let me briefly 
focus on the ‘affective grip’ of the Alliance discourses: to recall from Chapter 
Three, this concerns an examination of what underlying fantasies may furnish 
                                                          
102 Denis Postle (Alliance and IPN members, Humanistic counsellor and activist), interview by 
author, May 2015. 
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the narrative with a strong affective appeal for subjects; essentially 
fantasmatic narratives which help quell the subject’s anxiety about their 
constitutive ‘lack’, or emptiness, and the radical contingency of their identity 
and any social relation, formation or regime in which they are positioned 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007). There are arguably two distinct but closely 
interrelated fantasmatic narratives which are discernibly at play within the 
Alliance discourses. The first relates to what I refer to as the ‘totalitarian 
narrative’ in which the HPC plans are characterised as an existential threat to 
talking therapies. The second relates to the tacit view that is arguably 
discernible within some Alliance discourses that talking therapies (or at least 
some modalities) transcends the discursive limits placed upon all other forms 
of communication. Let us look at each in turn.  
 
In the ‘totalitarian narrative’ the HPC is posed as an overwhelming existential 
threat to therapies which provide an ‘alternative space’, and alternative 
values, from mainstream society. There is a ‘David and Goliath’ quality to the 
narrative in which the HPC is seen as a monstrous threat and obstacle to the 
marginal spaces and practices of freedom which the practitioner must 
heroically defend. As noted above, HPC regulation would have been by title, 
not function, and therefore any practitioner would have been be able to 
continue practicing as before (at least in private practice) under any title other 
than those legally protected. The Alliance’s apparent ‘raising of the stakes’ – 
to an existential threat - seems likely to have helped galvanise interest in an 
area that most practitioners, as noted by James Antrican, have little active 
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interest in.103 In short a fight for the very right of a particular type of practice – 
a particular kind of social relation – to legally exist is likely to be affectively 
much more rousing than a fight for the right to be properly ‘heard’ or 
recognised within the regulatory sphere. Whilst the impact of the former is 
clear cut, the latter is rather more nebulous. By way of analogy the perceived 
certain prospect of an individual drowning is much more likely to invoke 
resistance in them to entering the water than if there is the vaguer, and more 
open ended prospect that they may get into some or severe difficulties. This 
fantasmatic narrative was not always at play however. Andrew Samuels for 
instance within the second Alliance conference made it very clear that 
practitioners would be able to legally continue practicing in their talking 
therapy under non-protected titles (Samuels, 2009c).  
 
The second element within this fantasmatic narrative is the tendency to allude 
to the view that talking therapies offer a position that is able to speak truth to 
power from a position entirely free from power. This is arguably tacit for 
example within the Maresfield Report’s drawing of a sharp demarcation 
between talking therapy as social control, in the form of the hygiene 
movement on the one hand, and on the other hand, therapy as emancipatory 
practice. The Maresfield Report states, for instance, that: 
 
Psychotherapy has, for the last 100 years, offered the patient a system of values freed 
from the moral judgments of social authorities. This has indisputably been the central 
characteristic of psychotherapy and what set it aside from the mental hygiene 
movement and from techniques of social engineering. Therapy provides a space for 
challenging received wisdom, social imperatives and norms of all kinds (Arbours 
Association et al, 2009:12).  
 
                                                          
103 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
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This statement is indicative of the report’s broader tendency to eclipse 
contentions made elsewhere (e.g Rose, 2003), (Parker, 2009) that all talking 
therapies and psychologies are forms of social control and socialisation, 
shaping the subjectivity of individual clients and broader populations. To 
eclipse this dimension is arguably to deny radical contingency and fails to 
address the problem that any talking therapy are built upon discursive ground: 
to recall from Chapter Three the normative parallax hypothesis, as Glynos 
(2014 puts it, ‘affirms the idea that one’s discursive position or identity shapes 
the way one understands and evaluates the world, including one’s own 
interests’, and that no particular discursive position or identity can be fully 
rationally grounded (185).  
Let us now look more closely at the HPC’s rhetorical strategies.  
 
Pro-HPC camp strategies  
A particular question I seek to address is the following one: if it is true that the 
HPC’s claim to ‘approach neutrality’ quite starkly lacked credibility, how did 
this position muster considerable support? I argue that the HPC tended 
towards a ‘narrowed down’ hegemonic strategy, drawing a ‘friend-enemy’ 
relation between the majority of good practitioners on the one hand and a 
‘problem minority’ on the other (a ‘very small minority’ as the HPC put it) 
(Health Professions Council, 2008b).  The ‘problem minority’ was seen as the 
primary concern in relation to the motif of public protection. This ‘problem 
minority’ narrative was key in making the HPC’s transactionality within the 
node of governance and regulation, and how this would likely have impacted 
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the nodes of education and training, provision and distribution, and delivery, 
less visible. This problem minority narrative supported, and was supported by, 
strategies that marginalised opposition voices from the main policy making 
arenas. 104  Simultaneously to the ‘nuts and bolts’ strategy, which excluded an 
examination of the policy fundamentals, the HPC also took the ‘it is just a 
misunderstanding’ stance, suggesting that the HPC and its opponents 
actually shared the same aims and values, only the opponent’s had a false 
understanding of the plans (Health Professions Council, 2008b).  This was 
coterminous with, and helped shore up, the HPC’s claim to ‘approach 
neutrality’, as described above, namely that the regulation would not 
significantly impact other nodes of the field, such as particular forms of talking 
therapy not being provided and distributed, or the therapeutic relationship 
within the node of delivery being reshaped in accordance with healthcare 
norms. It also did this by distancing itself from IAPT, SfH and NICE; to 
challenge the ‘resonance’ across some of the field that the HPC was ‘guilty’, 
so to speak, by its association with these controversial projects.   
 
One way that the HPC sought to achieve this disassociation was by 
emphasising its status as operationally independent from government, in 
contrast to IAPT and SfH’s more dependent status. In short the HPC 
highlighted that neither the SfH nor IAPT, nor the Government, could direct it 
as regards the specificity of the standards of practice for counselling and 
                                                          
 
 
304 
 
psychotherapy. I address the HPC’s somewhat paradoxical claims about its 
independence in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
 
Another way that the HPC protected its claim to ‘approach neutrality’, as I 
have phrased it, is through its non-engagement with the forensic critique of 
the standards of practice and of the overarching plans made by the Alliance 
(its ‘parrot listening’ as noted above for example). Such an engagement 
would still have been within the HPC’s narrow remit of addressing the ‘nuts 
and bolts’ of the plans given that much of the Alliance’s concerns were about 
the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the plans. There were moments when pressed in 
dialogue that the HPC seemed to avow the consumerist and healthcare 
values of the HPC standards. For example in late February 2009 a meeting 
was held between Darian Leader and Andrew Hodgkiss of  the College of 
Psychoanalysts, and Diane Waller, Michael Guthrie, and Marc Seale of the 
HPC. During this meeting, Marc Seale, Chief Executive and Registrar of the 
HPC, reportedly, in response to the claim that many talking therapies are 
incompatible with a healthcare and consumerist framework, stated that ‘if a 
practitioner receives money from a member of the public and does not offer a 
predictable healthcare outcome, they just shouldn’t be allowed to practise’ 
(College of Psychoanalysts, 2009a). However, the HPC did not expand on 
these comments, or seek to square them with what I have described as its 
overarching claim to approach neutrality. In other words the HPC did not seek 
to address broad inconsistencies in its own position.   
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As described above, the claim to ‘approach neutrality’ was most often 
articulated with the claim that the HPC would simply deal with a ‘problem 
minority’ of practitioners who did not meet what the HPC claimed to be 
universal minimum standards. This narrative, by definition, given my analysis 
above analysis of the character of the plans, played a significant role in 
‘skewing’ (for some) the recognition and visibility of the transactional 
character of the HPC plans. So let us look at this in some detail. 
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The ‘problem minority’ narrative and the individualisation of risk 
 
The ‘problem minority’ narrative along with the motif of public protection 
served to distract attention from the contested nature (both empirically and 
inherently) of the supposed universal threshold standards of practice. In other 
words the frontier between the ‘problem minority’ and the majority of safe 
practitioners turns the focus of attention on the inadequacies of individual 
practitioners rather than on difficulties in determining what is a ‘good enough’ 
approach to practice. In other words it helps shore up the HPC’s image of 
neutrality by dint of distraction. Furthermore this problem minority narrative 
seems to have a significant fantasmatic hue, furnishing the HPC plans with 
affective ‘grip’. The ‘problem minority’ tended to be neatly conflated at times 
with those vociferously opposed to the HPC plans, and there was a sense 
that to voice opposition or doubt about HPC regulation was morally and 
professionally beyond the pale (more on this in a moment). The claim to 
‘approach neutrality’ not only (in effect) made the ‘transactional’ nature of the 
HPC plans less visible, and therefore less available for contestation, it also 
arguably had an affective appeal in the form of assurance. To recall again 
from Chapter Three, according to Laclau, drawing on Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, recognition of ‘radical contingency’ causes the individual 
considerable anxiety, and therefore often, in an ideological response, s/he 
seeks to cover this over by ‘imaginarising’ a full identity (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007). The ‘imaginarisation’ of the HPC standards as genuinely universal - 
rather than imposed or ‘subsumptive’, or to put it less pejoratively, ‘reforming’ 
- helps quell anxiety about the radical contingency, and ultimately 
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‘indeterminate’ nature of ‘good enough’ practice. The ethical, in the Laclauian 
oeuvre, means that one must act with uncertainty about the ‘goodness’ of 
one’s actions, not least because one cannot be certain of the impact of one’s 
actions. Glynos for example states that ‘a deconstructive ethics of the political 
is one that privileges guilt, or at least a lingering doubt as to whether one has 
acted or decided in good conscience’ (Glynos, 2000). Let me reiterate and 
evidence these points further. My key argument here is that the HPC’s claim 
to universal threshold standards shields from view two things. First the de-
facto pluralism within the field, i.e. the fact that there are lots of different 
schools of thought, often with mutually conflicting views on what counts as 
basic good practice, and therefore also what counts as unacceptable or bad 
practice. To use the terminology appropriated by the logics approach, this 
pluralism relates to the ‘ontic’ level - the everyday empirical variation in and 
competing ways of defining and delineating practice. Second, the HPC’s 
claim to universality and neutrality arguably also hides the radical contingency 
that goes to the heart of any practice or world-view – the radical relationality 
and instability of all forms of identity. To recall from Chapter Three this relates 
to the ‘ontological’ level of pluralism: the fundamental fact that talking therapy 
(like any social practice) is without essence and must be hegemonised 
empirically in a particular way out of a myriad of possible ones, and is 
necessarily done so in a fundamentally precarious and incomplete way.  No 
empirical discourse can have the ‘final’ or ‘definitive say’ on the identity of a 
practice. To recall from Chapter Three, Glynos (2014b) states that the 
‘normative parallax hypothesis affirms the idea that one’s discursive position 
or identity shapes the way one understands and evaluates the world, 
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including one’s own interests’ and that no discursive position or identity can 
be fully rationally grounded (185).The HCP’s response to both this ontic and 
ontological pluralism and contingency was what we might call ideological-
cum- fantasmatic. Rather than seeing the question of what counts as basic 
good and effective practice as a difficult and in many instances intractable 
problem that goes to the heart of the limitations of knowledge production, of 
claims to truth and (professional) practice, the HPC denies the inherent 
‘threat’ - the inherent contingency and uncertainty - and instead tends to 
locate uncertainty-cum risk almost exclusively in a small minority of 
practitioners in the field unable to practise ‘safely and effectively’ according to 
a particular set of standards. In the fantasmatic narrative this minority 
becomes seen as something of an obstacle to an otherwise fully assured field 
of good and effective practitioners. They are constituted as the primary and 
pretty much essentially the only problem for a regulatory system. The HPC-
registrant therefore takes on something of a ‘beatific’ or idealised hue.  The 
‘problem minority’ narrative is evident, for example, within Jonathan Coe’s  
Guardian newspaper article where he states that ‘while many practitioners 
and the major professional associations have welcomed regulation, seeing it 
as essential to protecting the public and weeding out unsuitable people, a 
group is organising to oppose these developments’ (Coe, 2009). It is worth 
noting that Coe’s comments subtly imply a link between the ‘unsuitable 
people’ and those opposed to the plans. In many comments made by pro-
HPC supporters on the periphery of the campaign the fantasmatic hue 
becomes much stronger or evident. One online respondent, named 
‘Undercooked’, to Coe’s article, for example, characterised opposition to the 
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HPC plans as ‘the arm waving rhetoric of the quack practitioners [….] genuine 
and constructive professionals will work to bring this level of regulation about 
sooner rather than later’ (Coe, 2009). A few commentators made requests for 
a list of practitioners against the plans to be published. One, named ‘Lizbeth’, 
for example, wrote:    
All 2000 of them should have their names recorded so that unsuspecting clients can 
avoid them. They are the “creative” ones who think clients are playthings for the 
therapist’s amusement (Coe, 2009). 
 As another commentator within the same online thread suggested these 
comments imply that those ‘resisting the current regulation are resisting the 
notion of ethical practice and are somehow tainted, on the side of the 
abusers’ (Musgrave, 2009c). The issue of good, effective and bad practice is 
tacitly construed as a simple matter and the HPC tacitly celebrated as a body 
that can save the client from professional self-interests. At times professional 
expertise as such, or the counselling and psychotherapy field collectively, 
tends to become situated as the obstacle in the fantasmatic narrative. For 
example one respondent replied to a post sympathetic to the Alliance:  
So come on then, how about a bit of public disclosure, if you’re not a therapist what is 
your interest in these matters. Can’t wait to be ohhhh soooo impressed by your 
professorships (Coe, 2009).  
 
There is here a tendency to apply a public-interest model of analysis (e.g. like 
structural functionalism as explored in Chapter Two) to the HPC, whilst 
simultaneously applying a private-interest model of analysis to the Alliance. In 
these comments no consideration is given to the possible self-interests of the 
HPC (e.g. expansion of its jurisdiction, or the large increase in number of 
registrant fees to be gained, let alone possible broader links to interests within 
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the neo-liberal political settlement  where, as Pilgrim (2008) suggests, mental 
suffering and growing differentials in wealth tend to be politically delinked, or 
indeed the possible self-interests of the main professional associations that 
supported statutory regulation such as increased prestige and increased 
market share of NHS contracts.  Again, this uneven analysis was perhaps 
partially motivated and supported by a desire to quell anxiety about the 
uncertainty of what is good and bad practice, and, indeed, more widely, what 
is the ‘good life’, or a good political settlement.   
The Alliance was dubbed by one respondent as the ‘Alliance of self-interests’ 
(Coe, 2009). No consideration in these comments is given to the Alliance 
arguments that the Alliance was seeking to defend ethical practice, to be 
against HPC regulation was regarded as proof enough of lack of ethical 
commitment. As Richard House responded within the thread, HPC 
proponents often engaged in ‘ex cathedra gesture condemnation of people’s 
position without any attempt to engage with the substance of the argument’ 
(Coe, 2009). This uneven application of scepticism tacitly positions the HPC 
as a ‘beatific’ element that transcends, through the exercise of reason and the 
identification and enforcement of universal standards,  the ‘muck’ of politics 
which marks the (rest of the) terrain of institutions, organisations and 
practitioners. The anxiety regarding radical contingency, both ontic and 
ontological, can also perhaps be seen in the reply that Malcolm Allen donned 
to Postle’s ‘Vichy France’ letter in which Allen mocks opponents to the HPC 
plans for drawing on a plurality of intellectual approaches and traditions in 
their critiques of the HPC plans. Allen wrote: ‘in addition to neo-Foucauldian 
critiques of the state, appeals to chaos theory, and God knows what else, 
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they are now trying to don the mantle of the maquis’ (Allen, 2008).  Plurality 
here is cast as both a ridiculous and a dangerous obstacle to proper debate 
about the regulatory plans, rather than as a potentially enriching or essential 
aspect of such debate. But the ‘problem minority’ narrative coupled with 
marginalisation of opposition voices, were not enough to create what we 
might call an ‘organic’ unity within the HPC camp. As described earlier, the 
liaison group was deeply split on the issue of differentiation between 
counselling and psychotherapy, especially on its likely impact on the node of 
provision and distribution.  
So finally, let me briefly examine the political dynamics within the Liaison 
Group. To emphasise again, this is significant because the fault line running 
through the liaison group was a major problem for the credibility and feasibility 
of the HPC plans, and would have been even had HPC proponents been able 
to wish away the Alliance.  
 
 
Political dynamics within the Professional Liaison Group  
 
SfH had been brought in to help overcome acrimony within the field, arguably  
supported and partially driven by a tacit Enlightenment style confidence in the 
capacity of the ‘evidence based practice’ movement (embodied, in the case of 
SfH within the UCL Health Psychology Department) to be above the  
political fray, as explored in Chapters Four and Five). The HPC were now, 
only a short time later, in retreat from its identification with SfH, amidst the 
latter’s deep unpopularity. The HPC executive were making strong assertions 
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that it was diverse friendly and approach neutral, whilst simultaneously (and 
rather contradictorily) the HPC’s own Liaison Group were locked within what 
many members within the group saw as a struggle over the shape and 
character of the field. A semblance of unity was created within the Liaison 
Group through the adoption of a ‘working position’, a rather euphemistic and 
arguably misleading phrase given that the BACP, by far the largest 
professional association within the field , fundamentally disagreed with it.  
 
 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have considered the responses to the announcement 
within the White Paper of plans to make the HPC statutory regulator of 
counselling and psychotherapy. Responses constituted two key frontiers. The 
first was between the HPC and the Alliance, encompassing a struggle over 
the ‘totality’ of the HPC plans. The second was within the HPC’s Professional 
Liaison Group on the issue of differentiation between counselling and 
psychotherapy. As regards the character of the HPC plans I have argued, 
contra the HPC’s claim to approach neutrality and diverse friendliness, that 
the HPC plans were set to significantly reshape the field. This conclusion is 
after having taken into account the significant misunderstanding as regards 
the phrase ‘evidence based practice’. My contention is based on the following 
key grounds. First, a close reading of both the generic and profession-specific 
standards of proficiency and of the HPC’s criteria of acceptance for applicant 
professions reveals a significant leaning towards an ‘outcomes’ and 
‘population-based’ model of governance, regulation, provision, distribution 
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and delivery. This is contra the more ‘contextual’ orientated outlook of the 
Alliance, and contra the ‘deep pluralism’ of the proposed regulatory 
alternative of the ‘practitioner full disclosure list’ system’. But perhaps the 
most telling indication that the plans were set to reshape the field was the 
somewhat intractable struggle within the HPC’s own Professional Liaison 
Group over the issue of differentiation. Put simply not even HPC proponents 
around the liaison table believed the HPC plans were approach neutral or 
‘light touch’. I have also drawn on critiques of the HPC’s complaints system, 
and an incongruity between Alliance and HPC key norms governing their 
visions of a complaints system, namely a more contextual versus a more 
transactional one respectively. Whilst the former is marked predominantly by 
mediation and understanding, the more transactional system is marked 
predominantly by quasi-legal norms and a leaning towards the framing of 
conflict between the client and practitioner through a binary of the guilt or 
innocence of the practitioner vis a vis a fixed set of standards of practice.  
 
Exploration of the HPC’ assemblage of norms has revealed some tensions, 
and possible contradictions, between, on the one hand, the HPC’s rhetorical 
stance of providing strong assurance to the public about the safety and 
effectiveness of HPC registered practitioners, and the responsibilities of the 
HPC as outlined within the Health Professions Order – that the HPC itself 
must ensure the safety and effectiveness of practice - and, on the other hand, 
the HPC’s claims of approach neutrality, especially in relation to Waller and 
Guthrie’s claim that the professions choose their own methodology by which 
the safety and effectiveness of their practice is assessed.    
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Moving onto the more ethico-ideological dimension of my account of the 
struggle, I have identified a complex of bald strategies of marginalisation 
adopted by the HPC and its allies within the professional associations. The 
HPC adopted a strict ‘nuts and bolts’ agenda, excluding any robust 
consideration of the policy fundamentals - the so called ‘whether and by 
whom’ questions. This exclusion could be described as a key condition of 
possibility, or a key catalyst, for the emergence of the Alliance. I have argued 
that it was able to forge a united front against the HPC and the ‘healthcare 
model’ as a ‘common enemy’. Whilst some in the Alliance tended to adopt a 
relatively narrow hegemonic strategy - the relationship paradigm versus the 
medical model - others tended to broaden the horizon of the socio-political 
meaning of this dichotomy, making the HPC struggle a metonym for broader 
political struggle, between psychoanalysis and late capitalism (e.g. Darian 
Leader’s, 2007, 2008, analysis), or between the ‘psy-commons’ and 
bureaucratic/professional edifices (e.g. Postle, 2012). These critiques tended 
to contest, not only the HPC’s norms of practice, but also the perceived 
inevitability of the plans, by contextualising them to an extent as historically 
contingent. The ‘deep pluralism’ of the proposed alternative, the practitioner 
full disclosure list, meant that all groupings within the Alliance were able to 
subscribe to it; though, by some accounts, the threat of HPC on the horizon 
seemed to have galvanized an acceptance of this alternative proposal by 
psychoanalytic associations previously uncommitted to it. I have argued that 
the affective ‘grip’ of the Alliance discourse to some extent rested upon a 
sharp dichotomisation between talking therapy as social control and talking 
therapy as a practice of freedom.  This sharp dichotomy dovetailed with the 
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Alliance tendency, at times, to adopt a ‘totalitarian narrative’ in which the HPC 
plans were cast, somewhat misleadingly, as an existential threat to the right 
to practice certain forms of talking therapy, invoking a heightened David and 
Goliath narrative in which the talking therapies tacitly become cast as the 
beacons of ‘power-free’ practice.  
 
In this chapter I have also examined the HPC’s rhetorical strategy. I have 
argued that the ‘problem minority narrative’ at times took on a distinctly 
fantasmatic hue: the ‘problem minority’ within the field is seen as a threat to 
an already otherwise established (i.e. ‘imaginarised’) state of ‘harmony’, or, 
more specifically, a state of complete safety and effectiveness under the HPC 
umbrella. This fantasmatic narrative both supported, and arguably, partially 
drove, the lack of detailed analysis and engagement with the concerns of the 
Alliance about the HPC plans, helping to shield from visibility the 
contestability of the very measures e.g. the codification of threshold standards 
of practice, which the HPC claimed would help ensure public protection and 
effectiveness, as well as helping to shield from view the deep pluralism and 
contingency of what counts as ‘good’ practice across different, and even 
within, different schools of talking therapy. Obviously the HPC’s strategies of 
marginalising and of occluding opposition to the HPC plans within the official 
policy arena worked to a limited extent, given that the opposition grouped and 
redoubled outside, in less official arenas, in the form of the Alliance.  But the 
success of the HPC’s strategies also had limits within the narrower confines 
of the official policy path to implementation.  The acrimony and division within 
the field, which had acted previously as a barrier to statutory regulation (as 
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explored within Chapter Four), and which the Government had expected the 
HPC and SfH to overcome, was now in fact nestling, in a subdued yet 
persistent fashion within the HPC’s own Professional Liaison Group. This was 
to a large extent ‘covered over’ by the BACP’s willingness to ‘sit’ with a 
‘working position’ it seemed to otherwise wholeheartedly contest. In short the 
‘problem minority’ narrative, encompassing a friend-enemy relation between 
this minority and the majority of good practitioners worked to an extent, but it 
was not enough to overcome the major cleavage within the Liaison Group on 
the issue of differentiation. The HPC project was therefore significantly 
internally divided over significant details, as well as subject to strong 
contestation, in its totality, from the outside. Let us now look at how these 
tensions played out in the final stages of the struggle, represented in the final 
of the three main empirical chapters of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE FINAL STAGES: LEGAL AND OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE HPC 
PLANS 
 
What do you take as inevitable and what can you change. It's the political dilemma of 
life.105   
 
I don't think we'd reached an agreement even if we'd carried on forever.106 
  
 
In this chapter we move to the later stages of the struggle. On the part of the 
HPC and pro-HPC camp this includes the review of its generic standards of 
proficiency, concerted attempts to resolve the issue of differentiation within 
the Liaison Group, and an intervention from Lousada and Cooper (2010) 
seeking to widen the political appeal of the HPC plans. On the part of the 
Alliance the late stages of the struggle include ‘attacks’ on the HPC on 
several fronts,  including legal action, the courting of the Official Opposition 
party within the House of Commons, and the contestation of the leaderships 
within the main professional associations and their support of the HPC plans. 
In short this Chapter seeks to contextualise and understand the final stages 
and eventual ‘fall’ of the HPC plans. A key focus within this chapter is the 
character of the policy making process and competing visions of it in relation 
                                                          
105 Julian Lousada (Chair of the British Psychoanalytic Council, and member of the 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author, 
September 2014. 
106 Michael Guthrie (Director of Policy and Standards, HPC), interview by author, June 2014. 
Jonathan Coe (Member of Witness and PLG representative of service users), interview by 
author. 
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to different interpretations of the law. I argue that a transactional orientated 
policy imaginary of practice and regulation dovetails with a tendency of the 
HPC to see the policy making process in transactional terms. Conversely, the 
Alliance’s ‘contextual’ practice and regulatory imaginary dovetails with its 
more relational imaginary of the policy making process. In this Chapter I set 
out the myriad of events and discourses which led to the shelving of the plans 
by the Coalition in February 2011, including the Government’s overarching 
rhetorical and pejorative characterisation of much regulation across industrial 
and service sectors as part of a ‘nanny’ state. The key sources drawn upon 
within this Chapter include the ‘court bundle’ for the Judicial Review which 
was instigated by members of the Alliance. I draw from a range of the 
interviews I conducted, particularly my interview with Fiona Ballantine Dykes, 
which helps to illuminate the work in the final stage of the Professional Liaison 
Group and its endeavour to resolve the differentiation issue. As regards the 
structure of the chapter, I first sketch the key events and major 
‘problematisations’ reiterated and made during this period and I then critically 
assess these problematisations through documentary and textual analysis. 
Key problematisations include the claim of the pro-HPC camp that the 
changes to the generic standards made the plans more congruent with the 
field. And as noted above, another key focus is the competing 
problematisations of the policy process in relation to the law. I then go onto 
examine the political and rhetorical dynamics of the policy dispute during this 
period. A key focus is Andrew Samuels’ election to the Chair of the UKCP in 
2009 on an ‘anti-HPC ticket’, which seems to have been a key turning point in 
the struggle and evoked some vociferous responses from pro-HPC 
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campaigners. I argue that the latter responses reveal, and further evidence, a 
fantasmatic narrative at play, similar to the one articulated within Chapter Six, 
partially constituting the ‘grip’ and attraction – for some – of the HPC plans. 
 
OVERVIEW OF EVENTS 
The formation of the Alliance had galvanised opponents of the HPC plans, 
and they were increasingly on the front foot from October 2009. The Alliance 
made headway more or less concurrently on three key fronts: first, the 
contestation of the UKCP and BACP leaderships and their support of the 
HPC plans; second, the lobbying of shadow ministers in  
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the light of a possible change of government in the forthcoming 2010 general 
election; and third, the threat and initiation of legal action against the HPC in 
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the form of Judicial Review. However, the HPC remained steadfast in its 
policy course, not only defending its project but also continuing to develop the 
‘nuts and bolts’ of the plans through a second wave of Professional Liaison 
Group meetings. The HPC also conducted and completed a long scheduled 
HPC-wide consultation, independent of the work on counselling and 
psychotherapy, on a new draft of Generic Standards of Proficiency.  Let us 
look briefly at each in turn.  
The UKCP’s and BACP’s pro-HPC position came under increased pressure 
from its own rank and file members. In the case of the UKCP this was 
spearheaded by Andrew Samuels’, to the surprise of many, successful 
election to the Chair on an anti-HPC ticket, and was a significant turning point 
in perceptions within the field as regards the inevitability of the plans. Paul 
Atkinson for example expressed that:  
To have the chair of the UKCP in on all the committees that the national organisations 
were discussing going into HPC arguing against it was very powerful, very powerful. The 
two to one vote was very powerful. That shocked everybody, that really did alter the 
game [..] because it had all been, this is inevitable, this is the way society is going. 107 
 
 
There was also a backlash against the result. A TV television producer 
Howard Martin, for example, campaigned against Andrew Samuels, claiming 
that Samuels had strenuously supported the therapist Derek Gale, who Martin 
described as a ‘cult leader’, and that Samuels had lied about his own 
involvement with a HPC fitness to practice case involving Gale in his capacity 
as a registered HPC art therapist (Martin, 2009).  In an open letter to 
Samuels, Martin wrote:  
                                                          
107 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, and member of Skills for Health group developing 
competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
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In your manifesto videos you come across, in my opinion, as a person who is full of 
anger and vitriol against a system run by the HPC that you have taken no time to 
understand. Your personal attacks and open threats against Marc Seale as CEO of the 
HPC and his staff not only depict you as a vicious bully but also seem to represent an 
anger that does not stem from any justifiable doubts about the HPC but from a deep 
seated fear of loss of your power over your peers, clients and students (Martin, 2009)..  
 
The BACP, similarly to the UKCP, was becoming increasingly split on the 
issue of HPC regulation. The BACP leadership seemed increasingly opposed 
to the HPC plans: Samuels for example noting in his election campaign 
material that the BACP had come out against the HPC plans, citing the 
headline in the BACP publication Therapy Today: ‘BACP rejects HPC Plans’ 
(BACP, 2009). The BACP’s objections to the plans were quite 
comprehensive. Samuels took encouragement from this stating that:  
BACP is a well-organised professional body that fights hard for the interests of its 
members. If they can do this, then one wonders why it has been stated so passionately 
by my opponents as out of the question that the UKCP might? Most of the BACP's 
points are identical to what I have been saying for many months and in all my election 
messages (Samuels, 2009).  
 
However, although this headline implied a possible total rejection of HPC, the 
BACP remained committed to the reformist agenda, though by this stage 
many members were calling on BACP to completely withdraw its support of 
the HPC plans. For example in a letter to Therapy Today in November 2009, 
Paul McGahey stated that:  ‘There is now a window of opportunity available to 
strengthen the integrity of the organisation by providing a clear and decisive 
lead -- a rejection of a regulatory body (HPC) that is clearly unpopular and is 
simply not fit for purpose’. Similarly David Murphy warned that ‘getting caught 
up within the 'spin' of the debate regarding differentiation risks statutory 
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regulation being ushered through on the 'quiet' and with minimal opposition 
being voiced’ (Murphy, 2009).   
There was also an intensification of lobbying of policy makers during the 
period approaching the 2010 General Election. Lord John Alderdice wrote:  
While this Labour Government, with its over-centralizing approach, is committed to the 
HPC as the regulator, it would in practice be very difficult to get this on to the statute 
book before the upcoming election in 2010. It is entirely possible that a new incoming 
Government could be prevailed upon to take a quite different approach, and so those 
who do not want to have regulation through HPC ... should be lobbying their political 
representatives now, rather than simply assume that nothing can be done. Democracy 
is after all supposed to be about engaging in the debate (Samuels, 2009) 
 
There were suggestions, however, that there were also growing doubts in 
New Labour, the former UKCP Chair, Lisa Wake, commenting: ‘I am 
delighted that Andrew [Samuels] reports that all 3 parties are now having 
second thoughts’ (Samuels, 2009). Despite Marc Seale’s reported claim that 
the HPC plans were ‘change of government proof’, 108the general election by 
this time was close on the horizon, and opportunities to lobby the 
Conservative opposition, perceived to be more sceptical of regulation and ‘big 
government’, were seized upon. A three hour meeting between Anne Milton, 
MP and Shadow Health Minister, and all major stakeholders within the field of 
the talking therapies took place in November 2009. The meeting took the form 
of a panel and an audience, with the panel members making statements 
about their organisation’s position on statutory regulation, followed by 
questions and discussion. As panel members, Anne Milton and Earl Howe 
(then shadow Health Spokesperson in the Lords), were joined by Lynne 
                                                          
108 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
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Gabriel, then Chair of the BACP, Marc Seale, Chief Executive of the HPC, 
Colin Walker of Mind, and Darian Leader of the College of Psychoanalysts. 
Anne Milton reportedly stated that:  
She had not experienced the level of lobbying and volume of mail she had received in 
relation to statutory regulation. She believed that this set the regulation of counselling 
and psychotherapy aside from other professional groups taken/being taken into 
regulation and impressed upon the HPC that it must be cognisant of this difference 
(BACP, 2009c).   
 
Therapy Today characterised the Shadow Minister as having ‘repeatedly and 
firmly held’ the HPC ‘to account’ throughout the meeting (ibid). It was 
expressed widely among participants of the meeting that the HPC plans were 
not fit for purpose. For example the BACP reiterated its position that 
differentiation between counselling and psychotherapy was not acceptable 
(ibid). 
Plans to take the policy dispute to Judicial Review were also already afoot by 
this time. In October 2009, the human rights solicitor firm, Bindmans LLP, 
sent a letter on behalf of five psychoanalytic organisations (Bindmans LLP, 
2009a).109, to the HPC, stating that its planned act of recommending HPC 
regulation to the Government would in fact be illegal, and demanded the 
cessation of the plans (ibid). Following an exchange of solicitor letters, and a 
meeting between the HPC and the plaintiffs, in a failed attempt to resolve the 
issue out of court, Bindmans LLP initiated Judicial Review action against the 
HPC. To put it baldly the plaintiffs contended that the HPC had a legal 
responsibility to robustly and systematically address the ‘whether and by  
                                                          
109 The instructing psychoanalytic organisations were: The Association for Group and Individual 
Psychotherapy, The Association of Independent Psychotherapists, The Centre for Freudian Analysis 
and Research, The College of Psychoanalysts-UK, Guild of Psychotherapists, and The Philadelphia 
Association (2010a).  
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whom’ questions, and that it had failed to do so, whilst in turn the HPC 
contended that it had no such legal responsibility, and had, in any case, given 
significant consideration to these questions ‘in the background’ (2009d). The 
HPC claimed that it was simply following the directive of the Government and 
that the plaintiffs’ case should be taken to the door of the Department of 
Health (Bircham Dyson Bell, 2009e). Despite accusations by the HPC that 
preliminary soundings about possible legal action were merely a ‘publicity 
stunt’ by opponents (2009b), the preliminary hearing of the Judicial Review 
ruled favourably towards opponents, saying that it could go to a full Judicial 
Review, and ordering the HPC to pay part of the court costs. The latter is 
unusual in Judicial Review hearings (Postle, 2012:184).  
Policy ideas and deliberations continued to be exchanged between the pro 
and anti-HPC camps within less formal arenas, which unlike the Manchester 
Stakeholder (as explored within Chapter Six), involved but were not organised 
by the HPC; most notably at the ‘Confer Conference’ in January 2010.  A flyer 
for the conference characterised the field as being at a cross-roads between 
a reformist and a more ‘radical solution’ to the dispute. It stated:  
Until the transfer of qualified practitioners’ names to the HPC register there may be a 
narrow window of opportunity for the agreement on the HPC’s standards of proficiency 
and academic thresholds for qualification to be refined. A more complex model, with 
closer alignment to the professional community may resolve the problem of regulation 
for some. For others, a far more radical solution will be sought (Confer, 2010).  
 
In the meantime the Professional Liaison Group continued in its struggle to 
overcome the differentiation issue, meeting once in December 2009 following 
responses to the consultation on the draft standards of practice. It was 
confirmed that there would be a second wave of meetings, in addition to the 
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ones initially scheduled, in an attempt to overcome the dispute within the 
group over the details of the plans (Health Professions Council, 2009a). 
Meanwhile, in February 2010 the HPC published its summary of responses to 
its consultation on the Liaison Groups recommendations. A majority of 
individual respondents had expressed opposition to the recommendation to 
differentiation between counselling and psychotherapy in the structure of the 
register. A majority of organisations responding, however, favoured 
differentiation (Health Professions Council, 2010). Antrican argued that the 
BACP had conducted a well organised campaign to get its individual 
members to respond to the consultation.110 This second wave of meetings 
began in May 2010. The Liaison Group, in effect, sub-contracted the work on 
differentiation and standards to a group created specifically created for the 
task, named the Psychological Professions Association Group (PPAG), 
comprised of the main associations within the field and around the Liaison 
Group table. The debate was largely around the possibility of a level 5 and 
level 7 (of the National Qualifications Framework) training for counselling, and 
a level 7 training for psychotherapy. There was a debate over whether or not 
the level 7s should be interchangeable, or whether or not counselling and 
psychotherapy should still have separate sets of standards of proficiency at 
level 7. 111 
                                                          
4. James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
 
111 Level 5 of the NQF is equivalent to a HND/higher national diploma or a foundation degree, and 
level seven is equivalent to a post-graduate qualification, such as a postgraduate certificate or 
masters degree (https://www.gov.uk/what-different-qualification-levels-mean/list-of-
qualification-levels - government website).  
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During this period the HPC ‘reformist’ camp, including Julian Lousada and 
Malcolm Allen of the BPC, James Antrican of the UKCP, and Sally Aldridge of 
the BACP, drew encouragement from the fact that the HPC was due in 2010 
to review its Generic Standards of proficiency (applying to all HPC 
professions), which could lead to the proficiencies being less ‘healthcare’ 
orientated (Low, 2010). Lousada for example stated that: ‘my sense is that 
combination of robust opposition (to the HPC as regulator) and the sustained 
discussions that we’ve been having with them on the same issues have 
together resulted in their [HPC] acknowledgement that there will have to be a 
substantial rewrite (of generic standards of proficiency) in order to 
accommodate us’ (New Associations, 2010:2). Attempting to reinvigorate the 
pro-HPC camp in the face of mounting pressure Cooper and Lousada (2010) 
characterised HPC regulation as a vehicle for greater equality within the field 
of counselling and psychotherapy, as well as a means to facilitate greater 
social equality within wider society. Set against these broader political aims, 
they argued that:  
The objections of some to the feared intrusion of regulatory principles into the free 
associative space in which psychoanalytic psychotherapy takes place, appear abstract, 
philosophically self-indulgent and individualist (ibid:9). 
 
In May 2010 the seismic external event of the General Election intervened in 
the struggle. The newly formed Coalition Government was broadly of a 
different ideological bent in relation to regulation and announced a raft of 
policies rolling back regulation, including plans to abolish or reform a myriad 
of armed length government agencies; a policy raft which became dubbed the 
‘bonfire of the quangos’ (Walters, 2010). The Coalition Government consulted 
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Andrew Samuels, asking if an Assured Voluntary Regulation scheme would 
be accepted by the Alliance. It broadly drew the support of the Alliance and in 
2011 the government published a command paper ‘enabling excellence 
(Department of Health, 2011) announcing that the HPC plans were, along 
with a plethora of other regulatory plans, shelved.  They were to be replaced 
with the Assured Voluntary Regulation scheme. The HPC nonetheless 
completed and published its recommendations to the Department of Health. It 
recommended that the HPC would be able to accommodate the field, and that 
differentiation between psychotherapy and counselling to be incorporated into 
the structure of the register. It noted that these recommendations were not 
arrived at or supported by consensus. The HPC plans were then placed to the 
back of the shelf. Anne Milton, appointed as Parliamentary Undersecretary of 
State for Health in 2010, said in a private conversation with Andrew Samuels 
that the Alliance had ‘won the argument’. 112  
Let us now examine the key norms and policy-content and policy-making 
imaginaries embodied within the respective problematisations of the policy-
content and policy-making process made by of the pro and anti-HPC camps 
during the final stages of the struggle.   
Here I focus on two key aspects: (i) the struggle over the policy ‘content’, and 
(ii) the norms embodied within the struggle over the policy-making process. 
The former pertains to the character of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the plans – in 
relation to the struggle within the HPC’s Liaison Group between the main 
professional organisations  – as well as the overall character of the HPC 
                                                          
112Andrew Samuels (Chair of UKCP 2009-2011), interview by author, June 2014 
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plans  - the HPC versus the Alliance. Given that many (though not all) rhetoric 
on the content of the HPC plans were reiterations from earlier periods in the 
struggle (as explored in Chapter Six) my main focus here is on the struggle 
over the legal status of the HPC plans, as well as the struggle over the norms 
of organisation and decision making processes within the main professional 
associations.  
 
Competing policy-content imaginaries  
The increased role for profession-specific standards across the HPC arguably 
answered objections that the Psychological Professions Council Proposal 
(PPC) had raised, and which had advocated itself as a resolution to, in 2006, 
prior to the  formal announcement of the HPC plans (as explored in Chapter 
Five). To recall, the PPC proposal claimed that both the HPC structure and its 
‘content’ would be insufficiently cognizant of the (sub) specialisms within the 
field of the psychological therapies. This included an excess orientation 
towards healthcare practice. Those who had expected the HPC to modify 
itself to be more accommodation-ready for the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy (and other fields, such as social work) arguably were to an 
extent vindicated. For a start some of the overtly healthcare orientated 
Generic Standards of Proficiency were removed. To recall from Chapter Six 
the original generic standards included the ability to carry out the ‘formulation 
and delivery of plans and strategies for meeting health and social care needs’ 
(Health Professions Council, 2009a). The new Generic Standards removed 
the prior tendency to assume that regulated practitioners were working within 
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organisations and teams, as evident, for example, in the ability to ‘contribute 
effectively to work undertaken as part of a multi-disciplinary team’ (2009a). 
Also removed from the new Generic Standards was the more overtly 
managerial toned language, such as ‘effective self-management’ and the 
ability to ‘audit’ practice. As regards the Profession Specific standards, the 
HPC reiterated its claim that they were in effect ‘neutral’; that they would not 
impact upon the ‘therapeutic relationship’ or NHS commissioning. I explore 
the credibility of these claims in a moment. Antrican also claimed that there 
were indications that the HPC were willing to consider mediation as a 
possible first port of call in a complaints procedure. 113 Such a move would 
temper the tendency of the HPC to almost exclusively prioritise, to recall from 
Chapters Two and Six, a highly adversarial and quasi-legal approach to the 
fitness to practice hearings: a huge ‘sticking point’ for the Alliance.  
Having spelt out the broad changes to the generic standards, let me now 
address the question of how substantive the changes were. I have 
reproduced the new Generic standards below in table 1. They are 
considerably more generic and it seems likely that these generic standards 
would have engendered less opposition within the field had they been in 
place sooner. However, they are arguably still within a broad ‘language game’ 
(to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase) of ‘mastery’ or at least of a particular style 
of mastery incongruent with many talking therapies. Some of the problems 
raised within the Maresfield Report (Arbours Association et al, 2009) and 
within the Alliance’s collection of papers (Postle and House, 2009) about the 
                                                          
113 James Antrican (Chair of UKCP 2007-2009), interview by author, October 2014.  
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then existing generic standards still seem relevant to the new standards. The 
ability to keep administrative records, to assure the quality of practice, and to 
practice in a non-discriminatory manner, are all suggestive of a node of 
governance and regulation in which particular norms and standards of 
practice are set from ‘above’ and ‘handed-down’ to practitioners and clients 
alike. These standards perhaps at one level seem rather innocuous; but at a 
minimum I would contend that the new generic standards do not, despite the 
standard referring to the ability to ‘reflect on and review practice’, form a 
robust basis for highly reflective, critical or ‘contextual’ forms of practice. 
 
Table 1 showing the HPC’s draft new generic standards (2010)  
Registrants must  
 1. be able to practise safely and effectively within their scope of practice  
 2. be able to practise within the legal and ethical boundaries of their profession  
 3. be able to maintain fitness to practise     
4. be able to practise as an autonomous professional, exercising their own professional 
judgement  
 5. be able to practise in a non-discriminatory manner  
 6. be aware of the impact of culture, equality and diversity on practice      
7. be able to maintain confidentiality  
 8. be able to communicate effectively  
 9. be able to work appropriately with others  
 10. be able to maintain records appropriately  
 11. be able to reflect on and review practice  
 12. be able to assure the quality of their practice  
 13. be able to draw on appropriate knowledge and skills to inform practice  
 14. understand the key concepts of the bodies of knowledge which are relevant to their 
profession  
 15. be able to establish and maintain a safe practice environment. (Health Professions 
Council, 2011) 
 
There are multiple ways in which these standards could be said to speak to a 
particular form of mastery. The first generic standard - to ‘be able to practise 
safely and effectively within their scope of practice’ – for example arguably 
suggests that practice is not inherently ‘risky’, and presupposes that it is easy 
to evaluate the effectiveness of practice. To recall from Chapter Two, even 
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the testing of the effectiveness of treatments that are absolutely 
standardisable, namely pharmaceutical drugs, is an interpretative, highly 
contentious and tentative task (Healy, 2013). These standards suggest that 
the effectiveness and safety of practice, as such, is assured and constituted 
entirely prior to ‘delivery’, rather than something that must be tentatively 
assessed and sought in the ongoing process of work with a patient or client, 
as, for example, characterised in the case of medical practice by Mol (2008), 
as explored within Chapter Two.  Similarly, the ability to ‘assure the quality of 
their practice’ seems to speak to a fantasy that practice is only ever 
contingently ‘unsafe’ or of questionable quality, or that errors and mistakes 
can, in theory at least, all be avoided. Many of the standards are also still 
tacitly suggestive of practice as a form of expertise entirely possessed by the 
professional and ‘applied’ to a client or patient, rather than suggestive of 
expertise as partially co-created with the client or patient. So whilst the new 
generic standards are less exclusive to healthcare professions, they are still 
suggestive of a regime of transactionality, including standards which are 
suggestive of consumerist like guarantees about the quality and outcomes of 
practice (pertaining to the node of governance) and the relationship between 
practitioner and client as the application of pre-packaged forms of expertise 
applied to a relatively passive client, pertaining to the node of delivery.  
Let me now look at the profession specific standards, which were continuing 
to be reiterated during the second wave of the Liaison Group meetings.  
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The profession specific standards 
The norms within the profession-specific standards remained essentially the 
same. All  the drafts of Profession-Specific standards submitted to the Liaison 
Group, with one exception, continued to structure the field according to the 
norms of pluralism-lite, with counselling generally accorded the role of treating 
‘common mental health problems’, and psychotherapy with the additional 
capacity to treat severe psychological disturbance or distress. The one 
exception was the UKCP’s draft submission (United Kingdom for 
Psychotherapy, 2009), in which differentiation between counselling and 
psychotherapy tended towards an empty formalism, or at least a very vague 
set of differentiations. This draft included separate standards for 
psychotherapy at level 7, and for counselling at level 7. For example, one 
standard for counselling states that a practitioner must have the: ‘Ability to 
demonstrate knowledge and understanding of research methods relevant to 
major models of counselling, including ability to apply such knowledge and 
understanding’ (ibid). Its counterpart for psychotherapy reads that a 
practitioner must have the: ‘Ability to demonstrate knowledge and 
understanding of research methods relevant to major models of 
psychotherapy, including ability to apply such knowledge and understanding’ 
(ibid). Some standards are different in some detail, but they do not amount to 
a clear differentiation between counselling and psychotherapy. This perhaps 
reflected the UKCP’s strong ambivalence towards psychiatric norms, as 
evidenced in Chapter Six. Presumably this ‘formalistic’ approach did not hold 
much water with the HPC as differentiation within the structure of the register 
needed to be based upon substantive claims. Apart from this ‘empty 
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formalism’ submission no alternatives to the ‘psychiatric’ orientated 
differentiation were proposed within the PPAG and liaison group. Overall 
then, HPC claims as to the neutrality and inclusivity of the plans were still not 
supported by the draft profession-specific Standards, albeit these were 
developed by people within the field. The node of governance and regulation 
remained geared towards a significantly contested vision of the structure of 
the field of counselling and psychotherapy (pertaining to the node of provision 
and distribution) and to a contested view of the character of talking therapy, 
pertaining to the node of delivery. Considerable attempts at a rapprochement 
between the BACP demand for non-differentiation and the UKCP, BABCP, 
BPC and others’ demand for differentiation ultimately failed. However, the 
sands shifted to an extent towards a system of three stipulated titles and sets 
of standards: a training level’ 7 for psychotherapy, and a level 5 and 7 for 
counselling. Counselling at just level 5 would likely, at least nominally, have 
impacted the field as it would not have recognised the fact that many existing 
counselling trainings were equivalent to level 7 or above. And a level 5, rather 
than 4, for the FE (Further Education) sector was just about tolerable. 114 The 
UKCP, however, remained steadfastly opposed to the titles as 
‘interchangeable’ i.e. a level 7 for both counselling and psychotherapy, 
sharing the same standards of practice. 115 Overall, the changes to the 
generic standards and the profession-specific ones do not significantly impact 
                                                          
114 Fiona Ballantine Dykes (Counselling Central Awarding Body, and member of the HPC 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author, June 
2015.  
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my analysis made in Chapter Six. The HPC plans remained tacitly orientated 
toward a ‘pluralism-lite’ vision of the structure of the field and towards 
transactional-based norms within its vision of practice (i.e. the node of 
delivery). In short HPC claims that it was able to robustly embody diversity 
within the field continued to lack credibility.  
A new development within the struggle was the pro-HPC camp’s expansion of 
the socio-political meaning of the HPC plans.  
 
The HPC as facilitator of social justice  
Turning the tables on the Alliance, and focussing on the node of provision and 
distribution, Lousada and Cooper (2010) claimed the mantle of ‘social justice’ 
for the HPC plans, arguing that HPC regulation could become a spring board 
from which to challenge rampant inequality within society and the prevailing 
tendency to diminish the link between poverty and poor mental health 
(Lousada and Cooper, 2010). Their argument that the HPC plans would help 
talking therapy alleviate the suffering of a larger number of people through 
public provision self-evidently embodies a strong commitment to public 
provision of the talking therapies. They claimed that the BPC has placed itself 
within ‘a psychoanalytic tradition of radical social provision’. They go onto cite 
Freud:  
At present we can do nothing for the wider social strata, who suffer extremely seriously 
from the neuroses…the poor man should have just as much right to assistance for his 
mind as he now has to the lifesaving help offered by surgery out-patient clinics will be 
started to which analytically trained physicians will be appointed (Cooper and Lousada, 
2010:9).  
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So there was arguably quite a stark divergence between the Alliance and the 
BPC on the issue of public provision. This divergence, however, had a lot to 
do with sharp differences in view of the character of the HPC, and, or 
professions more generally. Darian Leader for example stated that he is not 
opposed to the provision of psychoanalysis within the NHS ‘if the conditions 
are right’.116 Denis Postle (2012), to recall from Chapter Two, in a more 
fundamental critique, identifies the professions as the main cause of the 
problem of ‘scarcity’ i.e. lack of psychological help, not the solution.  
Lousada’s and Cooper’s intervention, however, throws into relief what is, in 
my view, a relative weakness in the Alliance stance: its apparent relative 
abandonment of public provision, and a tendency to view it as either an 
irrevocably ‘lost’, or an inherently impossible, terrain (e.g. House, 2008) as far 
as progressive and emancipatory policy and practices are concerned (more 
on this in the final chapter).   
Before examining the political and rhetorical strategies used during this period 
let us look more closely at the policy making process. This became a key 
point of focus within the legal action against the HPC. The clash of views on 
the ‘content’ of the HPC plans fed into and was of course a key factor leading 
to the legal contestation of the policy-making process. 
 
 
 
                                                          
116 Darian Leader (Lacanian psychoanalyst, Alliance co-founder), interview by author, June 
2014.  
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Competing interpretations of HPC’s legal responsibilities  
As noted above the legal contestation centred on whether or not the HPC had 
a legal responsibility to robustly address the so called ‘whether and by whom’ 
questions. Essentially, Bindmans claimed that the only powers that the HPC 
could use in order to lawfully make recommendations on professions that it 
does not already regulate, and when the field in question has not requested to 
be regulated, is Article 3 (17) of the Health Professions Order (Bindmans LLP, 
2009f). This order states that the HPC must substantively address the 
‘whether’ and by whom’ questions i.e. whether the field should be subject to 
statutory regulation at all, and if so, then it should address whether or not the 
HPC is the most suitable body to do so. Bircham Dyson Bell in contrast 
claimed that the HPC had acted under Article 16 (1) of the Health Professions 
Order. The crucial difference between Article 16 (1) and Article 3 (17) is that 
the former would include a focus on the regulatory needs of counselling and 
psychotherapy in relation to the likely impact on the HPC’s current regulatory 
functions, whereas Article 3 (17) is wider in scope, requiring that the 
regulatory needs of the profession concerned are considered independently 
of any whether or not the HPC could feasibly regulate the profession in 
question. Dyson also claimed that the Government can use the Section 60 of 
the Order to introduce regulation without recommendations from the HPC 
(Bircham Dyson Bell, 2009b). Another central point of divergence was 
competing interpretations of the White Paper Statement. Whereas the 
plaintiffs contended that the White Paper had clearly asserted and settled the 
‘whether’ question (whether there should be statutory regulation) it had not 
settled the ‘by whom question’; this was only to be settled after an 
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assessment of the fundamental regulatory needs of the field of counselling 
and psychotherapy (Bindmans LLP, 2009f). In contrast Bircham Dyson Bell 
argued on behalf of the HPC that the White Paper clearly established the 
HPC as the regulator of the field (2009b).  
 
‘Transactional’ versus ‘contextual’ views of the policy-making process: some 
‘structural’ tensions  
Here I forward to key arguments. First, that the contrasting views of the HPC 
and the plaintiffs have the hallmarks of transactionality and relationality 
respectively. Second, that the structure and style of the policy-making 
process, as envisioned within each of the competing interpretations of the 
law, has distinctive weaknesses. It is important to note that although my 
arguments here are based upon differing legal interpretations, I am not 
assessing their respective legal merits, but rather I am assessing the 
character of the policy making process envisioned by the competing legal 
arguments. Let me start with the HPC side, followed by the plaintiffs.  
The HPC placed an emphasis upon the fact that its involvement in the 
process is just the middle stage of a three stage policy making process. The 
HPC pointed out the policy is subject to scrutiny both prior and after it has 
been through the HPC. Afterwards it is subject to review and scrutiny by the 
legislature (Bircham Dyson Bell (2009b).  The HPC seemed to contend that 
the parameters of the HPC’s involvement is largely at the discretion of the 
Government in so far as whether or not it were to address the fundamental 
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‘whether and by whom questions’. The view that the Government had not 
asked the HPC to consider the ‘whether and by whom’ questions (but rather 
the more HPC-centred ‘feasibility’ study), and that this was perfectly legal, 
entails quite a sharp demarcation between high level policy-making on the 
one hand and low level policy making/administration on the other: the 
government issues the policy directive and the HPC administrates it. This 
sharp demarcation between high and low level policy-making, cemented by 
the HPC’s operational independence from government, arguably has a 
‘transactional’ tone. This is in keeping with what Du Gay’s (2000) and King’s 
and Crewe’s (2013), to recall from Chapter Two, claim about the ‘next steps’ 
reform in the civil service back in the 1980s. The sharp demarcation is 
produced in order to increase what could be referred to as ‘democratic 
efficiency’: the minister makes the policy decisions and the civil service 
carries them out, thereby making the democratic ‘chain of command’ and 
responsibility from electorate to politician clearer. Political ‘meddling’ by the 
civil service in democratic decisions is thereby supposedly diminished. 
Drawing on the work of Du Gay (2000), and King and Crewe (2013), there are 
arguably two central problems emanating from this ‘structure’. One is that 
efficiency tends to be equated with effectiveness.  In the political sphere of a 
plurality of competing interests, inefficiency may be a necessary component 
of effectiveness. For example measures to prevent corruption often introduce 
considerable inefficiencies (Du Gay, 2000). The second problem is that it fails 
to recognise the ‘iterative’ nature of the policy making process. To recall from 
Chapter Three, I drew on Derrida’s concept of iterative nature of the sign; that 
the sign is simultaneously the self-same and different when articulated from 
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one context to another. A sign will therefore connote and even sometimes 
denote different meanings as it makes its journey through different contexts. 
In short a policy directive becomes significantly modified (and either 
expanded or diminished) in meaning as it is ‘translated’ from one context to 
another and into more concrete measures, i.e. as it is ‘administered’. 117 
Indeed the legal struggle over the meaning of the policy directive statement 
about the HPC within the 2007 regulatory Trust and Assurance White Paper 
is a good example of the possible ambiguity and contestability of policy 
statements. There is also the wider issue of diminished creative interplay 
between higher and lower policy-making/administration whereby the former 
becomes modified in the light of the latter. King and Crewe (2013) also claim 
that such a sharp demarcation can diminish the sense of ministerial 
ownership of a project making meticulous early planning less likely. Also, the 
overarching character of policy becomes ‘locked-in’ early in the process. 
Although it can be overhauled further down the policy path, for example at the 
Parliamentary scrutiny stage, by this stage a lot of time, money and energy 
have been put into developing the policy; and the dynamics of an ‘investment 
trap’ are therefore more likely to be at play and may diminish the willingness 
of ministers and administrators alike to robustly look for significant policy 
weaknesses.  Whilst I think the strong institutionalisation of the demarcation 
between the higher and lower policy making in this case – between the 
Department of Health and the HPC – did negatively impact the policy making 
process, the evident deleterious impact of deficiencies in how the ‘pre-HPC’ 
                                                          
117 The tendency towards the transactional within this ‘next steps’ approach arguably takes 
‘administration’ and its separation from ‘policy making’ too literally. It is a ‘regulative’ separation 
rather than an absolute one, and should be not institutionalised, as it has been, as if it were an 
absolute one.  
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consultations were conducted in relation to counsellors and psychotherapists 
should not be overlooked: for example the fact that the Foster Review 
(Foster, 2006b) paper did not even mention the regulation of counsellors and 
psychotherapists. And the Government’s paper critiquing (Department of 
Health, 2007c) and rejecting the alternative proposal of the single specialist 
regulator – the Psychological Professions Council – was pitched at quite a 
generic regulatory level, rather than attending to the specific regulatory needs 
of the field. This of course folds into the analysis of the political dynamics of 
the struggle, and raises the question as to what extent the consultations 
within the policy-making process shaded into ‘sham’. To recall from Chapter 
Five, a wide cross section of experts and their expertise within the field of 
counselling and psychotherapy seemed to be marginalised in order to push 
the HPC through to the Government’s choice of regulator for the field.    
Let me now examine the plaintiff’s view that the HPC should have taken a 
fuller role - that it should have explored and recommended on the ‘whether 
and by whom’ questions. This would presumably have brought the 
development of higher level and finer policy detail into greater proximity, since 
the HPC would have had a greater role as regards both the general policy 
and the policy detail. But this vision, or interpretation, of the law on the policy 
process/structure arguably embodies heightened conflicts of interests, namely 
the potential financial rewards and considerable increase in jurisdiction, at 
stake for the HPC. This problematic also arguably to an extent applies to the 
HPC’s capacity to conduct the narrower task of a ‘feasibility’ study as regards 
the capacity of the HPC to regulate the field. Indeed, to recall from Chapter 
Six, the HPC obfuscated the right of the Liaison Group to recommend ‘no’ to 
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the plans.  Against this conflict of interests argument one could say that such 
a conflict of interests is present in government as such e.g. the Department of 
Health, as observed by ‘public choice’ theory on government bureaucracy 
(Dunleavy, 1991). All government departments could be said to have intrinsic 
self-interest in expanding their own jurisdiction, not least in order to increase 
career paths and rewards for individual employees, encompassing both 
financial and more cultural indexes of success. But arguably in the case of the 
HPC, as an operationally independent agency, this is more honed. A 
department of government obviously as a broader brief and remit of 
responsibility:  it is ‘bigger’ and is better able to absorb ‘losses’ so to speak if 
it makes a decision not expand its jurisdiction in one particular direction, and 
118 it is likely to be subject to a more diverse range of influences, not least 
proponents of competing regulatory ideas from a range of organisations and 
agencies (including the HPC).   
Overall in relation to both the policy-content and the policy-making process 
the HPC tends tacitly to emphasise ‘transactional’ qualities. In policy-content 
the HPC Generic and Profession-Specific Standards of practice both 
continued to embody a strong ‘treatment application’ model.  In policy-making 
the HPC promoted a strong image of itself as operationally very independent 
from government, yet simultaneously as loyal administrator of the 
Government’s policy directive, encompassing a very sharp demarcation 
between higher and lower policy making, and therefore tending towards a 
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‘transactional’, ‘top-down’ model, as distinct from one in which there is more 
‘to and fro’ between the different levels of government and policy making, not 
only between the three main developmental stages of the policy process 
(initial policy formulation by the government, development of the ‘nuts and 
bolts’ by the HPC, review by Parliament) but also within each of the stages. 
Comments made in the exchange of legal letters about the extent of 
communication between the Department of Health and the HPC on the policy 
are illustrative of the competing expectations of the policy-making process at 
play, and ultimately of an apparent lack of ‘to and fro’ between the 
Department of Health and the HPC. Bindmans had requested that the HPC 
and their legal representatives disclose any instructions about the policy the 
Department of Health had given to the HPC. Bircham Dyson Bell responded 
that the only communication or instruction that the HPC had from the 
Department Health regarding the plans for counselling and psychotherapy 
was contained within the Trust and Assurance regulatory White Paper 
(Department of Health, 2007a) Bindmans were incredulous, responding in 
turn:  ‘plainly your response is unsatisfactory. We assume your clients were 
provided with rather more than a copy of the White Paper before embarking 
on a piece of work of this magnitude’ (Bindmans LLP, 2009c). Bircham Dyson 
Bell replied: 
The clear implication of all this is the suggestion that the HPC has lied or sought to 
mislead you. It has done nothing of the sort. Your assumption is not only wrong but also 
offensive […] The HPC has never received any instruction or other document of the kind 
you describe. In fact, the HPC even purchased its own copies of the White Paper 
(Bircham Dyson Bell LLP, 2009d).  
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In summary of this section: we have essentially examined competing 
‘transactional’ and ‘contextual’ assemblages of norms across different ‘sites’ 
or nodes, namely the policy-content of the plans, such as the HPC’s new 
generic standards and the ‘node’ of the policy-making process itself. The 
Alliance, either expressly or tacitly, tended to contest the value and norm of 
transactionality, both within the policy-content and the policy making process. 
Transactionality is seen as malnourishing both practice and the policy making 
process by diminishing the possibility of work from the ‘ground-up’ reshaping 
the parameters and overarching character of the policy. The HPC for its part 
did not so much contest the desirability of greater ‘contextuality’ as contend 
that its approach enabled greater democratic control of the policy making 
process, and that vis a vis the new generic standards the HPC had enabled a 
shift in balance towards the profession-specific standards of proficiency and 
therefore greater ‘context sensitivity’ to each of the professions it regulates.   
 
Now let us examine how the pro and anti-HPC camps sought to forward these 
competing characterisations. This includes, as seen during earlier periods of 
the struggle, strategies which seemed to occlude a forensic examination of 
the HPC plans altogether.  
 
 
POLITICAL AND RHETORICAL STRATEGIES  
As in Chapters Five and Six, the aim here is to understand the rhetorical and 
political strategies used by the pro and anti-HPC camps in their respective 
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attempts to install and derail the HPC plans. I focus here on the political 
dynamics of the events leading to the ‘fall’ of the HPC plans.  
Drawing from the above outline of key events during this period, the following 
were the key areas of contestation contributing to the ‘fall’ of the HPC plans:  
(i) The continued ‘intractability’ within the Liaison Group of the issue of 
differentiation between counselling and psychotherapy.  
(ii) Increasing pressure within the professional associations from 
members opposed to the HPC plans.  
(iii) The continued ‘noise’ from the Alliance against the HPC plans, 
including legal action, and the court decision to give the go ahead 
for a full Judicial Review.   
(iv) A change in emphasis in government regulation ideology, following 
the 2010 General Election, the departure of New Labour, and the 
formation of the Coalition Government. 
  
Let us look at each of these areas in turn, with a focus on the political and 
rhetorical strategies of the pro and anti-HPC camps.  
As regards the ‘intractable’ issue of differentiation, the professional 
associations remained focussed on their concern about the potential impact 
of the structure of the register on the nodes of provision and distribution. The 
arguments from both camps continued to be couched in terms of the public 
interest, as expressed in Chapter Six. I will not reiterate these arguments 
again here; suffice to say, the fact that neither the PPAG nor the Liaison 
Group were able to come to a compromise on the issue of differentiation, was 
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a significant weakness in the HPC’s recommendation to the Department of 
Health that HPC regulation of counselling and psychotherapy should go 
ahead. Malcolm Allen claims that the BACP ‘lost the argument’ 119 and 
therefore started to sway in tone somewhat against the HPC plans. But since 
the BACP are the largest professional association within the field and 
remained unpersuaded by the differentiation, it would seem a stretch to imply 
that the ‘differentiation’ camp had won the argument. Let us now look at the 
rhetorical and political strategies regarding the struggle within the professional 
associations.  
 
Struggles within the professional associations  
The rank and file within the BACP were becoming increasingly vocal. Letters 
to the BACP’s magazine increasingly contested the style of BACP leadership 
and its continued support of the HPC plans. In his letter to Therapy Today, 
Paul McGahey for instance contended that the faltering HPC plans presented 
‘a window of opportunity available to strengthen the integrity of the 
organisation [the BACP] by providing a clear and decisive lead -- a rejection 
of a regulatory body (HPC) that is clearly unpopular and is simply not fit for 
purpose’. He called for the BACP to hold a consultation and referendum, ‘only 
this way’, he wrote, ‘can the true meaning of democracy be re-asserted and 
the membership re-invigorated’ (McGahey, 2009). 
                                                          
119 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014. 
See appendix A P 459. 
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The vocalisation of these alternative positions was heightened by the fact that 
the BACP does elect its Chair (though elections were not on the immediate 
horizon). It seems clear, however, that the most dislocating event emanating 
from internal wrangling within the professional associations was the election 
of Andrew Samuels as Chair of the UKCP.  
 
The election of Samuels as Chair of UKCP  
Andrew Samuels ran on an ‘anti-HPC ticket’ (as Paul Atkinson put it), and his 
subsequent election, was a significant juncture within the struggle. Both 
Samuels’ candidacy and the election arguably exerted considerable influence 
on the struggle. To recall from Chapter Three, for the Laclauian post-
structuralist approach, representation, constitutively speaking, does not  
simply represent that which pre-exists it but actually partially brings what is 
represented into being (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Elections often help 
facilitate the production and deepening of ‘agonistic’ positions, encompassing 
the articulation of competing policy positions, acting in effect as a structured 
or planned ‘dislocation’ of the policy terrain. From this perspective it is easy to 
appreciate the significance of the relative absence and presence of the 
democratic norm among the professional associations. The norm was most at 
play within the UKCP during the struggle.  In contrast the BPC does not elect 
its Chair. However, Lousada and Cooper (2010) did seem to be seeking to 
address sceptics of the HPC plans within the BPC through their intervention 
with their paper ‘shock of the real: psychoanalysis, modernity, survival’ (more 
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on this below. As regards the significance of the election of Samuels to the 
UKCP Chair, Paul Atkinson expressed that:  
To have the Chair of the UKCP in on all the committees that the national organisations 
were discussing going into HPC arguing against, it was very powerful, very powerful. 
The 2 to 1 vote was very powerful. That shocked everybody, that really did alter the 
game, you know, because it had all been, this is inevitable, this is the way society is 
going. 120 
 
 
In his blog, the psychoanalyst, Christos Tombras, following Samuels election 
victory assessed that ‘a new wind is blowing’ (Tombras, 2009). The Chair 
election within the UKCP evidently helped engender the formal production of 
agonistic positions and the galvanisation of ‘already existing’ points of dissent, 
and helped to amplify and advance opposition to the HPC plans. The election 
of Samuels was a surprise (Atkinson interview), and was, to date, the 
sharpest rejoinder to what was hitherto supposed across much of the filed as 
the ‘inevitability’ of the HPC plans. Elements within the pro-HPC camp, 
however, made counter-offensive moves. Samuel’s was subject, as noted 
above, to vociferous critique by the television producer Howard Martin. Let 
me now look at this in more detail. 
 
 Howard Martin’s intervention 
In examining Martin’s intervention in more detail I do not primarily seek to 
assess the veracity of either Samuels’ or Martin’s claims and counter-claims, 
but rather to elucidate how Martin’s narrative helps to further account for the 
‘affective grip’ of the HPC plans.   
                                                          
120 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, and member of Skills for Health group developing 
competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
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In accusing Samuels of robustly and carelessly defending the practice of the 
much discredited practice of Derek Gale, both Samuels and the Alliance were 
sullied with the charge of being an abusive and reckless minority within the 
field, willing to close ranks and avoid accountability come what may.Samuels 
suggested that this was an attempt to sully his reputation through association: 
His [ Howard Martin’s] latest letter to the Trustees and Chief Executive of UKCP [..] 
accuses me(libellously) of 'supporting [Gale's] desire to carry on exploiting his clients'. 
Hence, I am alleged to be part of an abusive cult, as this is what Howard Martin alleges 
is what Derek Gale was operating (ibid). 
 
Furthermore, Samuels contended that this was part of an attempt to discredit 
the campaign against the HPC plans for statutory regulation: 
You don't have to be a conspiracy theorist to grasp that, by now, the issue has much to 
do with finding a new avenue to attack those psychotherapists who have doubts  
about HPC as the regulator. Not surprisingly, common ground had been made 
between Howard Martin and the supporters of HPC in the profession’ (Statement in 
Response to Howard Martin) (ibid).  
 
Martin’s public letter to Samuels in December 2009 is interesting for our 
purposes in one key respect. It embodies the drawing of a very sharp frontier 
between CBT and the HPC on the one hand and depth therapies and the 
Alliance on the other. The Alliance is dubbed a dogmatic and quasi-religious 
organisation, driven purely by self-interests (which are assumed to be entirely 
detrimental to the public interest) and the HPC characterised as ‘flawed’ but 
‘well intentioned’ (Martin, 2009). Martin seems to take the Gale case and his 
largely discredited practice as representative of non-CBT therapies as such. 
He states for example that people like Gale can: 
Control and manipulate people into unnecessary very long periods of very expensive 
‘therapy’. The public can be very confused by the differentiations in modalities between 
a psychotherapist or counsellor who will give them a very limited focus on objective 
goals to sort their lives out like a CBT counsellor, and someone else who calls 
themselves a psychotherapist but who leads them on some infinite ill-defined quasi-
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religious journey with no perceptible objective other than some sort of greater self-
awareness through a dictated life style and emptier pocket (ibid). 
  
Martin goes on to describe the Maresfield Report (Arbours Association et al, 
2009) as ‘some sort of higher belief gospel on which to hang your selfish 
opposition to the HPC’ (Martin, 2009).  He claims that the ‘Maresfield Report 
presents no corroborative evidence, no references, no original research, is 
factually inaccurate and offensive to victims of therapy abuse’ (ibid). He 
mockingly suggests that Samuels and his colleagues within the ‘anti-
regulation cult’ should be pleased to stop calling themselves psychotherapists 
ahead of HPC regulation, and operate completely outside of the HPC sphere: 
Where you would be happy to ply your unencumbered, untested, un-researched trade 
out there with the Tarot Card readers, psychics and other quasi-religious spiritualistic 
cults. Why don’t you swear allegiance to Maresfield, put up your brass plate and start 
calling in the vulnerable, misguided and true believers (ibid).  
 
Martin characterises Samuels and his colleagues as a throwback to a 
supposed period in the 1960s ‘when gurus and cult leaders were respected 
as deities instead of being exposed as charlatans’ (2009). To some extent 
echoing the position of Maltby (2008) in relation to critiques of audit culture, 
who, to recall from Chapter Two, claimed that Michael Power’s ‘the audit 
society’ (1999) and its progeny are the  ‘stifled chorus of fury’ of professionals 
at ‘being made accountable’ (2008:397), Martin comments that Samuels’ 
putative anger ‘does not stem from any justifiable doubts about the HPC but 
from a deep seated fear of loss of your power over your peers, clients and 
students’ (Martin, 2009).  The overall strength of invective evident within this 
intervention and narrative gives it a striking fantasmatic hue. The HPC tends 
tacitly to be cast as the position holder and guarantor and bringer of reason, 
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science and public protection, in a struggle with the ‘horrific’ obstacle of a cult 
of self-interested anti-regulators, mired in client and public harming dogma. 
This helps to account for the ‘grip’ of the narrative, as well as what is its rather 
‘black and white’ character.  Similarly to my argument within Chapter Six 
regarding the ‘grip’ of the HPC’s claim that its standards of proficiency are 
universal and uncontentious, the ‘black and white’ narrative of Martin’s here 
presents a rather grand Enlightenment-style narrative that unreason, self-
interest, and the ‘cultish’ elements of extra-rational factors within social 
organisation have more or less been banished from public regulation and 
service, except for the concrete threat posed by an obstacle which can – the 
fantasy goes – be removed. Although Martin expressly concedes that the 
HPC is ‘flawed’, his discourse does not overall suggest that this is so. In fact, 
the fantasmatic narrative seems in effect to serve as a distraction, or actually 
prevent, a forensic engagement with the plans and competing concerns about 
regulation. Key nuances and points of commonality also seem to be missed. 
For example Martin mentions in passing Samuels’ support of the practitioner 
full disclosure list system, and yet does not even raise, let alone critique or 
run with the possibility that this system may meet many of the demands of 
both the pro and anti-HPC camps. Furthermore, Martin’s sharp demarcation 
between CBT/short focused therapies and open ended psychoanalytic 
approaches – which is to an extent an inverse mirror of Leader’s mapping of 
this demarcation onto the Alliance versus HPC frontier – misses that a 
significant constituency within the Alliance, such as House (2003), also 
strongly critique long-term therapies as profession-centred and as deleterious 
to clients.  Martin’s intervention was an intensification of the HPC’s ‘narrow’ 
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hegemonic strategy of focusing on a ‘problem minority’ (or perhaps problem 
professional oligarchy) in the field alongside the motif of safety.  
Let us look at another tack taken by the pro-HPC camp.  
 
BPC and ‘the shock of the real’ text  
 
As noted in Chapter Six, the absence of routine elections within the BPC (a 
significant fact partially rooted in its point of origination, as briefly charted in 
Chapter Four) seems likely to have given less of a ‘platform’, and therefore 
less ‘oxygen’, to what Julian Lousada acknowledged to be concerns among 
some members of the BCP that the integrity of psychoanalysis was being 
excessively compromised. 121 Paul Atkinson also noted that there was 
considerable opposition within the BPC. 122  And perhaps Lousada and 
Cooper’s (2010) intervention is also indicative of considerable concerns. This 
text was arguably an attempt to expand the HPC plans’ socio-political horizon 
of meaning, thereby address the narrow, and arguably lacklustre ‘problem 
minority’ narrative, dominating the HPC’s official approach. In short Lousada 
and Cooper’s text provided what, in another context, Griggs and Howarth 
(2013) refer to as ‘ideological cover ‘. In other words Lousada and Cooper say 
and claim things about the HPC plans that the HPC as ‘administrator-
regulator’ could not say. The text is very difficult to decipher and oscillates 
                                                          
121 Julian Lousada (Chair of the British Psychoanalytic Council, and member of the 
Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and Psychotherapists), interview by author, 
September 2014. 
122 Paul Atkinson (Jungian Therapist, and member of Skills for Health group developing 
competencies for psychoanalysis), interview by author, June 2015.  
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considerably between various positions. I argue that this perhaps reflects 
ideological strategies and tensions within the wider BPC and pro-HPC 
position on HPC regulation. I look at it again below, but first let us look at how 
the struggle was shaped within the more ‘neutral’ arenas. 
 
Taking the ‘fight’ to more ‘neutral’ arenas 
The HPC were increasingly forced into policy arenas not of their own 
choosing; ones that were outside of the ‘road map’ so to speak it had set 
towards legislation. At the Confer-conference, at the offices of the Shadow 
Health Minister, and within the court, the HPC was unable to structure the 
debate or proceedings in the way it had hitherto done so. Given the Alliance 
tendency to  engage and contest the HPC plans in considerable detail, 
compared to the HPC’s tendency to eschew detailed debate (instead relying a 
lot on general assertion and a highly hortatory style), this shift arguably 
placed the Alliance at a distinct advantage. This increased the credibility of 
the Alliance, diminishing the sense that it was driven by ‘left wing loonies’ to 
borrow the phrase adopted by Samuels 123. For example the High Court’s 
decision to sanction a full Judicial Review made evident that the plaintifs had 
a credible case to be made and that the HPC had a case to defend.  The 
serious reception that Anne Milton, the Shadow Health Minister, gave to the 
concerns of the Alliance was a far cry from the characterisation of the Alliance 
as a disreputable minority.  
                                                          
123 Andrew Samuels (Chair of UKCP 2009-2011), interview by author, June 2014 
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HPC response to the Confer Conference  
Similar strategies explored in Chapter Six were reiterated by the HPC. For 
example, in response to the Confer Conference, the Chair of the HPC, Anna 
van der Gaag, projected an image of the struggle as one caused by 
superficial misunderstanding in which the antagonists in fact have shared the 
same values and aims. Writing in the HPC blog she expressed that there was 
broad agreement among attendees of the Confer Conference that there was 
a need for some form of regulation that went ‘beyond the status quo’ and that 
‘whatever form regulation in the future might take, it must, in the words of 
Darian Leader, “respect the diversity which exists within the field”’ (Gaag, 
2010). She goes on to state: 
Overwhelmingly [   ] I felt the discussions highlighted to me the mis-understanding and 
lack of accurate information about HPC regulation and the desire for further discussion 
and dissemination of facts. If we are to achieve this, we must pursue the facts and work 
harder to build trust on all sides’ (ibid).  
 
Again the disagreement is tacitly conceptualised as existing along a single 
epistemological plain, the implication being that a simple ascertaining of the 
facts would resolve the whole problem. This, in my view, lacks credibility 
given the abundant availability of facts during the struggle, not least because 
of the HPC’s laudable tendency to publish its policy documents, but also the 
Alliance’s extensive documentation of its own position and concerns. We 
have identified some aspects which tended towards ‘misunderstandings’ – 
such as over the phrase ‘evidence based practice’. But it seems clear that the 
conflict did not ‘reduce’ to such misunderstandings. 
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Anna van der Gaag claimed that another source of misunderstanding was 
‘the somewhat confused and therefore confusing discussions about the 
application of the criteria used by the HPC assessing readiness or otherwise 
of a profession for regulation’. This presumably refers to the HPC’s 
acceptance criteria for new professions (Health Professions Council, 2004),  
as discussed within Chapter Six: to recall, the HPC’s position is broadly 
‘quantitative’ in orientation as regards its ‘entry criteria’ for new professions. 
Furthermore, I argued that the HPC’s assurances about the autonomy of 
professions as regards how they test the efficacy of their practice does not 
square with the HPC’s strong levels of assurance, it itself provides, about the 
safety and effectiveness of practice. If discussions were confused and 
confusing, this seems like to have been partially due to the fact that the 
HPC’s position, quite aside from the regulation of counselling and 
psychotherapy, is considerably confused and somewhat contradictory.  
Another apparent misinformation, Anna van der Gaag claimed, was ‘the 
suggested lack of a contribution from the counselling and psychotherapy 
profession to the drafting of the current version of the Standards of 
Proficiency’. She also asserted that there was ‘the mistaken assertion that 
“user groups” were denied access to the PLG [Liaison Group]’. She seems to 
have reduced the struggle to an effect of the dissemination of these half-
truths and false hoods. The blog was arguably highly promotional, rather than 
analytic in this respect. The blog did not, for example, address the issue that 
only people predisposed to support the HPC as regulator (however reluctantly 
in many cases) were selected as members of the Liaison Group. The 
‘corrective’ sharpness of Van der Gaag’s comment in relation to ‘user group’ 
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access to the Liaison group was in contrast to a more complex picture in the 
light of Michael Guthrie’s, Jonathan Coe’s and Dianne Waller’s later 
acknowledgement that user groups were partially, but not adequately, 
represented in the Liaison Group.124 And the blog adopted a strategy used 
from early on in the struggle – the simple assertion that the HPC respects 
diversity - as opposed to a point by point or analytic engagement with the 
detailed critiques of the draft standards of proficiency presented to the HPC 
by Alliance members and organisations. One would perhaps not necessarily 
expect this level of detail in a blog, but it did not refer to places where this 
level of engagement, on the part of the HPC, occurred. Since there is, as far 
as I am aware, no place where this level of engagement did occur, any such 
reference could not be made.  
This strategy of assertion and near stonewalling of critical views (whether 
conscious or unconsciously enacted), as opposed to analytic engagement 
with opposed views, tended to diminish the possibility of opposition values 
gaining traction. To recall from Chapter Three, a hegemonic regime becomes 
more vulnerable to dissolution or reform when opposed values of the regime 
are positively articulated, making the contingency of the regime, and possible 
alternatives, more visible. Apart from disjunctions in norms and values 
between the Alliance and the HPC plans we explored in the last chapter – 
                                                          
124 Diane Waller (Chair of the HPC’s Professional Liaison Group for Counsellors and 
Psychotherapists, interview by author, June 2014.  
Michael Guthrie (Director of Policy and Standards, HPC), interview by author, June 2014. 
Jonathan Coe (Member of Witness and PLG representative of service users), interview by 
author,  
 
 
 
 
357 
 
namely concerning the standards of practice and training – there were 
moments within the ‘extra’ policy debate where divergences became more 
explicit. For example Seale’s reported statement, as noted above, that ‘if a 
practitioner receives money from a member of the public and does not offer a 
predictable healthcare outcome, they just shouldn’t be allowed to practise’ 
(College of Psychoanalysts UK, 2009a). This was arguably a ‘slip’, and so 
such private and additional meetings did provide useful information and 
indications to the Alliance as regards the general character of the HPC plans. 
Furthermore, the ‘just a misunderstanding strategy’ of the HPC, coupled with 
disavowal of differences between the position of the HPC and that of the 
Alliance, were increasingly challenged, however, within the more ‘neutral’ 
arenas. This was particularly so within the legal action, given the demand that 
points be addressed in some analytic detail. The HPC central strategy of ‘it is 
just a misunderstanding’ not only lacked credibility in factual terms, it was 
rhetorically also arguably rather negative and lacklustre. Lousada and 
Cooper’s ‘Shock of the Real’ (2010) intervention was a novel one in the pro-
HPC camp’s repertoire of narratives. Let us have a look at the rhetorical 
dimensions of this before looking at the political dynamics of the legal action.    
 
A new pro-HPC ideological narrative  
Lousada and Cooper (2010) characterise the history of relations between 
modalities within the field as having the hallmarks of a social system of 
defence against anxiety in which psychoanalysts, rather than more fully 
confronting their inadequacies and failings, project them down the ‘pecking 
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order’ into psychoanalytic psychotherapists, who in turn project their anxieties 
about their own inadequacies into counsellors. Lousada and Cooper 
suggested that those psychoanalysts who opposed the HPC plans are stuck 
in the past, attempting to sustain an arrogant and hubristic relation to other 
modalities of therapy. They suggest that such a positioning is doomed to 
failure; ‘many counselling trainings, whether psychodynamic or not, could not 
give a hoot about the British Psychoanalytic Society, or what its members 
might say or think’ (Lousada and Cooper, 2010:4). There is some accord here 
with Andrew Samuels’ claim, as mentioned within Chapter Six, that the 
‘sadistic hierarchy’ (Samuels, 2009b) within the field would have been 
radically diminished by HPC regulation.125 Lousada and Cooper also invert 
the placeholders of the Alliance’s dichotomisation between socially 
responsible therapists and self-interested ones, arguing, as already stated 
above, that the HPC could help facilitate ‘socially organised’ provision of 
psychological help to a greater number of people. This is in contrast to the 
‘indulgent individualism’ of those it is implied, opposed to the HPC plans. 
Lousada and Cooper’s analysis tends to eclipse, or fails to address, two key 
aspects of the field, and thereby overly sharpen the demarcation between the 
Alliance and BPC position. First, Cooper and Lousada (2010) equate public 
provision with socially organised provision as such, thereby eclipsing a central 
argument and ambition of some Alliance members to grow community-built 
and organised talking therapy networks in order to address what they see as 
the ‘scarcity’ of psychological knowledge and provision caused by professions 
                                                          
125 Andrew Samuels (Chair of UKCP 2009-2011), interview by author, June 2014. 
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(Postle, 2012). Lousada and Cooper seem to suggest that the HPC could be 
a figure head, or the pinnacle, of a ‘free market of ideas’ within the field (and 
that psychoanalysis should assume its place within the HPC among other 
therapies as distinct but equal); thereby tacitly adopting the HPC’s claim to 
‘approach neutrality’. Cooper and Lousada reproduce the HPC’s failure to 
demonstrate the latter, eclipsing the forensic critique of the HPC plans, 
offered by Alliance members, as imbued with healthcare norms, and which I 
have tended to re-describe as a calculative rationality i.e. transaction-based 
norms of practice. Cooper’s and Lousada’s position on ‘evidence based 
practice’ also seems somewhat ambiguous. They refer to other modalities 
having embraced the ‘politics of evidence’ and seem tacitly to take a sceptical 
position on the valorisation within NICE, and within government, of the 
empiricist approach to evaluating, providing, distribution and delivering 
‘treatments’; yet simultaneously they seem to say that political realism 
dictates that the game/politics must be played, and concessions be made in 
order to advance some form of psychoanalytic presence within the NHS. 
They seem to make a tacit political judgement that the valorisation of the 
‘empiricist paradigm’ within government and NHS circles is not something that 
the BPC can do anything about, mirroring the position taken back in 1996 (as 
described in Chapter Four) by Fonagy in ‘What works for Whom?, where he 
appears, or at least comes close, to fundamentally critiquing the validity the 
healthcare system’s empiricist approach, whilst simultaneously accepting and 
promoting it. Cooper and Lousada (2010) therefore arguably continue what 
either is, or is perilously close to, political cynicism. This is articulated in 
conjunction with a tacit ‘inevitability thesis’ which tends to rhetorically render 
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the BPC (and the rest of the field of the talking therapies) as fully external to 
the discursive practices i.e. complex of decisions which cement the ‘evidence 
based practice’/empiricist policy as ‘inevitable’. 
Let us now return finally to a more central aspect of the struggle – the legal 
action.  
 
The public/private-interest dichotomy in the view on the policy making 
process 
A strong dichotomisation between the HPC/public interest and the 
Alliance/self-interests, partially created, and was partially created by, the 
eclipse of possible private-interest motivations of the HPC in supporting HPC 
regulation of counsellors and psychotherapists. Possible private interests 
include increased jurisdiction and a large pool of practitioners from whom to 
collect membership fees. As noted above, personal careers, promotions and 
re-numerations are all interwoven with the fortunes of bureaucratic 
organisations. Again, the strong norm of operational independence of the 
HPC, and its role as low level policy maker cum-administrator, aided this 
eclipse. In short, as an independent, low level policy maker and administrator 
cum-regulator, it is simply not the HPC’s business to pass public comment on, 
or place into question, the fundamental parameters of its operation i.e. its 
political status. Having said that, however, according to the legal case made 
against the HPC, the HPC had abdicated from its legal duty – and in this 
sense had made a deeply political decision – to not extensively address the 
‘whether and by whom’ questions prior to making any recommendation to the 
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government about the regulatory needs of the field. The HPC had illegally, 
according to the case made against it, curtailed both its own role, and that of 
other stakeholders within the field, including practitioners and service users, 
in the development of the policy on the regulation of counsellors and 
psychotherapists. Regardless of what the merits and demerits of the legal 
case may be, we can perhaps say at a minimum that neither the Department 
of Health, nor the HPC itself, at any stage of the policy making process 
publicly addressed the possible conflicts of interests in the position of either 
the Government, or that of the HPC, in their decision to pursue the HPC 
plans. It is perhaps not possible to entirely eradicate ‘conflicts of interests’ – a 
Government is never, and can never, be entirely external to the effects of its 
own actions. The government is not ‘over and above’ the rest of society. But it 
is striking that this tension is was not acknowledged at all by the Government 
and the HPC, in sharp contrast to the foregrounding of the possibility of the 
regulator being ‘captured’ by the professions it regulates.  This rather adds to 
the sense that ‘professional dominance’ has tended to shift to ‘regulatory 
dominance’, where, in some quarters, where the idealisation of the 
professions has been supplanted by idealisation of the regulator.  
The rather heavy reliance on parliamentary scrutiny for democratic input as 
regards the fundamental coordinates of regulatory policy tacitly construes 
both the values of democracy and pluralism as rather ad-hoc to the ‘technical’ 
determination of what the best policy, rather than a deeper involvement of 
stakeholders within the policy making process itself. The Government 
tendency to draw a sharp dichotomy between professionals (and one might 
add service users) on the one hand, and Parliament as democratically 
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representative of a far greater field of people, not only renders ‘democratic’ 
input into the development of policy rather broad, abstract, and nebulous, but 
also fails to address issues as regards the degree of political 
representativeness achieved by the British First Past the Post electoral 
system.   
Before concluding this chapter, let us briefly examine the political logics 
involved in the Coalition Government’s decision to abandon the HPC plans.  
 
 
The abandonment of the HPC plans  
 
Ahead of announcing the policy ministers approached Andrew Samuels of the 
Alliance to see if a proposal of Assured Voluntary Regulation (AVR) would be 
acceptable as an alternative to the HPC plans. This was broadly though 
cautiously welcomed by the Alliance.  
The Command Paper stated:  
Reducing regulation is a key priority for the Coalition Government. By freeing society 
from unnecessary laws, the Government aims to create a better balance of 
responsibilities between the state, business, civil society and individuals, and to 
encourage people to take greater personal responsibility for their actions (Department of 
Health, 2011:5). 
 
Furthermore:  
For the overwhelming majority of occupational and professional groups which are not 
currently subject to statutory regulation and which are generally not considered to 
present a high level of risk to the public, but where recommendations that regulation 
should be introduced have been made (including those groups recommended by the 
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HPC for statutory regulation in the past, but not yet registered), the assumption will be 
that assured voluntary registration would be the preferred option (ibid:18). 
 
Nonetheless, in May 2011 the HPC made its somewhat ghostly final 
recommendations. Non-HPC members of the Liaison Group voted on each of 
the recommendations to be made. As regards the structure of the register, 
they recommended two protected titles for counsellors, one at level 5 and one 
at level 7, and one protected title for psychotherapy at level 7. The HPC noted 
that six members voted in favour of differentiation between counselling and 
psychotherapy, one voted against, and three abstained (Health Professions 
Council, 2011c), whilst everyone agreed that there would need to be further 
work on the Standards of Proficiency.  
Following the 2010 General Election and New Labour’s failure to form part of 
the Government, the broader political ideology changed significantly. The 
Conservative party, and to some extent the Liberal Democrats, were 
ideologically suspicious of the so called ‘nanny state’, instead preferring and 
emphasising personal responsibility and non-governmental solutions to 
societal problems.  To some extent ‘big government’ was now billed as a key 
political enemy. More specifically, following the largest banking and economic 
crisis in the UK since the 1930s depression, ‘profligate’ government spending 
(however misleading this may be) was cast either as the main culprit or as a 
key problem. It was against this ideological background that the Coalition 
Government’s decision to abandon the HPC plans, along with statutory 
regulation of other healthcare occupations, took place. The logic of cost-
effectiveness, as well as the norm of personal responsibility, as distinct from 
government led solutions, was expressly present in the rationale of the 2010 
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Command Paper Enabling Excellence (Department of Health, 2011). 
However, the HPC plans to regulate the talking therapies entered the stage 
as part of a crowd of policies, and they left the stage as part of a crowd. The 
government formal policy rationale for dropping the HPC plans no more 
explored the specificity of the field of the talking therapies than did the 
consultation papers and the 2007 Trust and Assurance White Paper, as 
explored in Chapter Five, which announced the policy. This ‘crowding’ of the 
policy decision made this scant consideration of the specificity of the needs of 
the field less visible, leaving, however, what Guthrie and Coe, for example, 
pointed out, was the regulatory anomaly (as far as government policy is 
concerned) of no compulsory regulation of a field in which private practice is 
often conducted on a one to one basis without any employer to oversee it.    
 
SUMMARY 
In this Chapter we have covered the period in which the HPC came under 
pressure from October 2009 onwards on several fronts, including legal action, 
from an insurgence of opposition within UKCP and BACP, and from the 
sympathetic ear given to the Alliance by the Conservative opposition in 
Parliament. The competing policy imaginaries were reiterated from the 
Alliance Conferences and the HPC’s initial statements. These were largely a 
reiteration of what we might call the HPC’s ‘have cake and eat it’ stance in 
claiming that it was neutral and diverse friendly, whilst simultaneously 
enforcing threshold standards applicable to all and in its own name also 
strongly assuring that practice is safe and effective. The Alliance reiterated its 
claim that the thresholds standards were in fact not universal. A detailed 
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examination of the new generic standards and the new draft of professions-
specific standard reveals that the ‘language game’ adopted is still 
transactional in character, adopting a form of ‘mastery’ incongruent with the 
more relational ‘language games’ adopted by many forms of talking therapy.  
In the light of the legal action I also focussed on competing imaginaries of the 
policy-making process. Whilst the HPC interpreted the law in a way that was 
consonant with a sharp demarcation between the government and the HPC 
(between high and lower level policy making), the plaintiffs’ interpretation of 
the law tended to be in keeping with a softer demarcation between the 
government and the HPC. I have argued that the legal action illuminates 
structural tensions and deficiencies within the policy-making process, namely 
a predisposition towards failure to adequately subject policy parameters to an 
ongoing scrutiny.   
I have also examined the key political and rhetorical strategies used by the 
pro and anti-HPC camps in their attempts to install, and defend their policy-
content and policy-process imaginaries, and attempts to contest those of their 
opponents. Again, both sides tended to reiterate previous strategies as 
regards the policy imaginaries, namely, on the part of the HPC, a ‘just a 
misunderstanding’ approach, and a reiteration by actors on the periphery of 
the main stream policy arena of a vociferous ‘problem minority’ narrative: this 
was especially in relation to the election of Andrew Samuels to the Chair of 
UKCP. However, the Alliance orchestrated effective counter-offensives 
against these strategies by pushing the debate about the plans into more 
‘neutral’ arenas, such as the Judicial Court, and the office of the Shadow 
Health Secretary within the House of Commons, thereby making the critiques 
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more visible. Cooper’s and Lousada’s text ‘shock of the real’ attempted to 
reinvigorate the HPC camp by broadening its political vision with an aim of 
greater societal equality and social justice, contra the Alliance, which they 
cast as an intellectually self-indulgent retreat from radical social provision.  
This text, however, was mainly directed at members of the BPC and did not 
seem to gain traction in the wider field.  
 
As regards the frontier within the Professional Liaison Group, the question of 
differentiation remained intractable despite much work, undermining 
significantly the credibility of the proposals from ‘within’ the project. The 
Alliance perspective and arguments to an extent dovetailed with the 
ideological outlook of the newly formed Coalition Government following the 
2010 General Election. This outlook included scepticism towards what the 
Government described as the ‘nanny state’, including New Labour’s instinct, 
they claimed, towards over regulation.  
 
Let me now bring the various strands of the thesis together within the 
concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
In this final chapter I seek to bring together different elements of the thesis, 
clarifying my account of the HPC struggle, as well further drawing out how 
this account contributes to the literature on regulation, as well as drawing out 
the implications for policy advice, and hegemonic-strategy for achieving a 
better regulatory environment both within the field of the talking therapies and 
more widely. The account of the HPC struggle that has emerged is two-fold. 
First, I have identified and delineated competing characterisations of the HPC 
plans by the HPC and the Alliance – as a ‘light touch’ way of dealing with a 
‘problem minority’ within the field, versus an ‘imperialist’ bid to reshape the 
field in accordance to consumerist and healthcare norms. Second, I have 
identified the key political and rhetorical strategies used by the pro and anti-
HPC camps to forward their competing respective aims of installing and 
derailing the HPC plans. Broadly speaking this has been the HPC’s strategies 
of marginalisation of opposition voices, and the Alliance’s counter-strategies 
to make their voices heard.  
 
The contours and contents of this account have been significantly shaped by 
the ‘prism’ of the poststructuralist logics approach, as outlined within Chapter 
Three. I have has also drawn significantly on literature, not only specifically on 
the HPC struggle, but also extensively from wider literature, which I reviewed 
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within Chapter Two. In this chapter the process of drawing out the 
implications of this case study for existing literature helps to further delineate 
the distinct dimensions of critique within my account, namely normative and 
ethico-ideological. The dimension of critique will also be foregrounded by 
another of my central aims within this chapter – to draw out the policy 
implications of my analysis. This will be in the form of tentative policy advice 
as regards the regulation of the talking therapies and to a limited extent the 
broader healthcare professions. Essentially this concerns the question of 
what kind of regulation we want for what kind of practice. Additionally it 
concerns what norms we want to govern the services and practices that are 
provided, and which norms we want governing how they are distributed.  I 
also focus on the lessons that can be drawn from my account of the HPC’s 
struggle as regards the policy making process. I echo the concerns made by 
Du Gay (2000) and King and Crewe (2013) about an overly sharp 
institutionalisation within government between policy-making and its 
administration.   
 
Before providing a summary of my thesis account, I would like first briefly to 
reiterate the broad set of policy dilemmas that were at play both within the 
HPC struggle and within the wider context of the regulation of the healthcare 
professions in which the HPC plans were embedded. In doing so I seek to 
reiterate the broad set of policy and practice problematics that my account 
speaks to. 
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KEY POLICY CONTOURS AND DILEMMAS   
 
The HPC struggle was driven and animated by a range of policy dilemmas 
and discourses within the talking therapies and wider professional fields. 
Accountability of practitioners and the safety and effectiveness of their 
practice is a key concern. Another key concern is sustaining diversity within 
the field and therefore public choice. In so far as these concerns can, and are, 
expressed as a dichotomy, there is a dilemma between the right of clients to 
protection and ‘quality service’ on the one hand, and both practitioner and 
client rights to freedom from unwarranted intrusions of the state on the other 
hand. As regards the issue of quality and public protection, a central problem 
identified in recent decades is that of ‘professional dominance’, including the 
tendency of professions and individual professionals to be often overly 
paternalistic, ‘arrogant’ and excessively cloistered, manifesting in a tendency 
to ‘close ranks’ when one of their members makes serious mistakes. Within 
the field of the talking therapies, understandings of the phenomenon and 
concept of client transference to the therapist seems, at times, to have been 
deployed to shore up the idealisation of traditional conceptualisations of 
professional expertise, rather more than contest them. Concerns about 
professional dominance are consonant with Malcolm Allen’s caution against 
looking back at the ‘heydays’ of professional autonomy and self-regulation 
within the statutory professions with rose tinted glasses. In my interview with 
him Allen stated: 
I grew up in the fifties when there was no audit culture. And what it meant, right, leave it 
to the professionals:  rampant old boys networks in the medical professionals: 
Untouchable canteen culture in the police service while they could fuck over everybody 
in site, whether they were gay, pakies, or whatever, leave it to the professionals […] No 
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bloody lights shone in on them. But that was the lack of an audit culture in the 50s and 
early 60s. So leave it to the professionals doesn't quite cut it with me 126 
 
The central policy response to the problem of professional dominance within 
recent decades has centred largely on challenging individual and collective 
professional autonomy. This has largely been done through by contesting 
professional ‘shelter’ from the market, as well as the degree of professional 
independence from government. A raft of regulatory measures, coupled with 
the introduction of ‘market logics’ have sought to make professions more 
responsive and accountable. Though perhaps most theorists and 
professionals recognise the problem, or at least potential problem, of 
professional dominance, many view the current dominant approaches to 
dealing with it as counter-productive in many respects. In relation to the 
talking therapies and healthcare, for example, to what extent have the 
government, quasi-markets and the regulator become the key sources of 
dominance? There is, for example, a concern that government, in the hunt for 
‘magic bullets’ to define and resolve key societal problems is fostering a 
tendency towards hubristic promises and assurances about what talking 
therapies and healthcare practices and services can do for both clients and 
society at large, whilst simultaneously and paradoxically – and therefore 
somewhat tragically - actually diminishing the substantive effectiveness of 
professional practice and services, lowering their ‘attunement’ (to borrow one 
of Mol’s terms) to the voice, so to speak, of the client or patient. It is arguably 
also diminishing the attractiveness of many public service professions to 
                                                          
126 Malcolm Allen (Chief Executive Officer of the BPC), interview by author, October 2014. 
See appendix A transcript P 461. 
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workers, contributing to quite severe retention and recruitment problems, 
even where pay is very good, across many of the public service and 
healthcare professions.  
 
Many professionals and theorists advocate more reflective, contextual, and 
relational ways of underpinning practice. The government drive for more 
‘acontextual’ forms of practice – for a heightened calculative rationality – 
within services often presents a strategic dilemma for those with a more 
‘relational’ and ‘contextual’ imaginary of practice and regulation. What do they 
do? Do they, for example, seek to avoid joining and/or extricate themselves 
as far as possible from such regimes? For some statutory professions, like 
medicine, which are regulated by ‘function’, this is not an option: but for other 
professions and practices, like the talking therapies to an extent there is the 
possibility of greater autonomy, which rather like Freud, one could somewhat 
romantically caricature as ‘splendid isolation’, in which a field, or at least 
some strands within it, can develop with less government interference. . The 
downside of this strategy is of course the possibility of the diminishment in 
wider influence and power, and the depletion in resources. Or, do the critics 
and sceptics seek to consolidate their position ‘within and against’ (to use 
Lousada and Cooper’s phrase) such regimes? These are some of the specific 
dilemmas faced by practitioners and institutions involved in the HPC struggle, 
and, to a significant extent, across the professions. My account of the HPC 
struggle has to extent been framed by these concerns, but it has also placed 
them under scrutiny. Let me now draw this out further.  
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SUMMARY OF THESIS ACCOUNT  
 
Approaching the HPC struggle through the ‘prism’ of the ‘logics’ theoretical 
research approach my account of the struggle emphasises both the social 
character of competing policy imaginaries – namely a transactional versus a 
relational one - through which the struggle was constituted, as well as the 
fundamental contingency of the struggle, identifying and foregrounding the 
political and rhetorical strategies used by the pro and anti-HPC camps in their 
attempts to make their respective policy imaginaries ‘win out’ in the battle to 
hegemonise the regulatory and practice terrain. The HPC plans, if they had 
been implemented, would have assimilated the talking therapies into a 
transactional healthcare and consumerist frame across the nodes of 
education and training, provision and distribution, and delivery within the field. 
The HPC contended that it had established universal standards of practice, 
and claimed that adherence to these by training schools and educational 
establishments, and by practitioners, would ensure that only safe and 
effective practice would be provided, distributed, and delivered, where any 
HPC registrant counsellors and psychotherapists are deployed. There is an 
overarching tendency within the HPC plans to view practitioners and practice 
as rendered safe and effective via a ‘top-down’ process of governance and 
regulation. The HPC, together with elite factions within the field of the talking 
therapies, established universal standards of practice, which the HPC were 
then to ‘police’ – a term used by the Department of Health (2007c). This 
mirrored the structure and governance within IAPT and the SfH programmes, 
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as well as the wider healthcare regime. I have identified significant 
divergences between the HPC plans and its associated projects. This is 
namely that IAPT, SfH and the wider healthcare regimes are all strongly 
predicated on empiricist research/random controlled trials. In this sense they 
have a more sharply defined transactionality. IAPT especially articulates a 
strong ‘predict and control’ discourse. However, the projected HPC regime 
embodied a regime with similar contours and logics. Professions regulated by 
the HPC are for example expected to demonstrate their effectiveness and 
safety through quantifying research methodologies. Drawing on wider 
literature and critical accounts by the Alliance, I have argued that this 
transactional regime tends towards hubristic and illusory assurances about 
the safety and effectiveness of practice. The plans are situated within a 
broader tradition, namely the so called classical/scientific strand of the 
Enlightenment, with an emphasis upon ‘prediction and control’ (Woolfolk R.L 
and Richardson F.C, 1984:778). The plans were also rooted within the so 
called rise of the regulatory state, coupled with ‘de-regulation’ across sectors 
of the economy, and the introduction of logics of the market within the 
professions.  A framing of practice in terms of technical rationality – practice 
as an application of general scientific claims to particular cases – dovetail with 
a consumer ethos in which treatments are tacitly seen as ‘products’ with 
contractually guaranteed properties and outcomes for the client-consumer. As 
Mol (2008) notes, the logics of the market is one way of attempting to 
democratise expertise.  
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In contrast, the more ‘contextual’ and ‘relational’ regime articulated by the 
Alliance, contends that practice poses inherent risks, and articulates a view of 
expertise, insight and knowledge as constituted within the therapist-client 
relationship, rather than as sanctioned from above – in a sharply 
differentiated node of governance and regulation, and/or realm of research. It 
is the practice itself which produces understanding. Broadly speaking the 
Alliance perspective is rooted in the more ‘romantic’ strand of the 
Enlightenment, placing an emphasis upon feeling, the irrational (Woolfolk R.L 
and Richardson F.C, 1984). It is also rooted within the history of field of the 
talking therapies where many traditions within the field have developed in 
counter-distinction and opposition to medical and psychiatric approaches. As 
suggested by Malcolm Allen the IAPT, SfH and HPC plans constituted a new 
‘zeitgeist’ within the talking therapies; an attempt to nudge all quarters of the 
field towards a more calculative and consumerist rationalities. This new 
zeitgeist was co-constituted by existing elements within healthcare, namely 
an array of practices captured by the concept of ‘clinical governance’ and the 
evidence based practice movement, factions within the field of the talking 
therapies, namely clinical psychology – especially its cognitive constituencies, 
including the BABCP, and factions within psychoanalysis associated with the 
BPC, namely Peter Fonagy and Anthony Bateman, and by the Government 
and , namely its ‘high modernism’ and its search for cost-effective 
interventions to improve social justice as well as its mission to address 
inefficiencies and  the problem of professional dominance and poor practice 
within public services.  
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My account has sought to highlight how the HPC proponents and opponents 
are protagonists within a struggle which is merely an epiphenomenon of an 
unfolding historical telos. Rather, I have sought to identify key ways in which 
the struggle was contingently constituted. The HPC plans were advanced 
largely through a complex of strategies which marginalised opposition 
concerns about the fundamentals of statutory regulation of the talking 
therapies – the so called ‘whether and by whom’ questions. Initially the plans 
were ‘swept along’ with wider regulatory reform of the healthcare professions.  
A strong top-down relation between empiricist research and a managerial 
elite on the one hand and ‘rank and file’ practitioners on the other was already 
significantly established and legitimated within healthcare professions. This 
position was consolidated by strategies which made the particularity of the 
regime less visible. For example the fact that the reforms were in effect 
deepening the contestation of more ‘contextual’ forms of healthcare practice 
is made less visible by rhetorical commitments to the importance of ‘patient-
centred’ care, and comments which valorise the majority of ‘extraordinary’ 
healthcare professionals in contradistinction to a problem minority. To an 
extent the relative consensus around the healthcare reforms (apart from a few 
specific issues, such as the planned change from a criminal to a civil standard 
of proof within fitness to practice cases) smoothed the early stages of the 
HPC’s route to statute. The government’s strong confidence in the so called 
evidence based practice movement, and its overall ‘standards approach’ 
seems to have made it confident that its new programmes – IAPT, SfH, and 
the HPC plans – would neutralise division and acrimony within the field of the 
talking therapies and bring the whole field of the psychological therapies up to 
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speed, so to speak, with the rest of the healthcare regime, helping to better 
utilise psychological expertise, protect the public, and meet its commitment to 
create greater parity within public services between physical and mental  
health. In Chapters Five and Seven I identified fantasmatic narratives in which 
both the evidence based practice movement and the regulatory state seem to 
be invested with quasi-religious meaning, somewhat paradoxically, in the 
form of a tacit belief that they are a total Enlightenment break from dogma, 
tradition and self-interest: power is seen as finally supplanted by truth. This 
fantasmatic narrative provides the HPC and evidence based practice 
movement with ‘affective grip’, namely by quelling anxiety associated with 
recognition of the fundamental and often very concrete ‘undecidability’ and 
precariousness of professional expertise and practice. This is where the 
motifs of safety and effectiveness come strongly into play. These narratives 
also seemed to have diminished the possibility of a more open conversation 
and debate, including forensic engagement with the arguments. These 
fantasmatic narratives, paradoxically, served to promote the HPC as the 
pinnacle of reason – of Enlightenment – whilst helping to shield from view, not 
only the HPC’s state of being ‘mired’ in relations of power, as well as in the 
‘muck’ of culture. Neither the HPC, SfH, nor the IAPT programme engaged 
with the Alliance or other bodies on concerns about the scientific approach 
and the philosophy underpinning these projects, despite the empiricist 
philosophies and scientific approach being contentious across much of the 
social sciences and humanities. Following widespread consternation within 
the field over the empiricist designs of IAPT and SfH, the HPC sought to 
distance itself from IAPT and SfH, foregrounding the HPC’s independent 
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status. The HPC adopted a narrow hegemonic approach, focussed on the 
motif of public protection, dealing with a small minority of practitioners. 
Additionally the HPC tended to claim that the dispute was fundamentally 
predicated on a misunderstanding – that the HPC plans are in fact ‘neutral’: 
only practitioners who abjectly fail would be challenged by the HPC.  
 
The route of the HPC plans towards statute was also aided by a policy 
making regime and process which is marked significantly by transactionality. 
The sharp institutional demarcation between the Department of Health and 
the HPC, based on the latter’s operational independence from Government, 
diminishes ‘to and fro’ between higher and lower levels of the policy making 
process, and also seems to have intensified institutional investment – in terms 
of time, resources, and culturally – in the HPC as the regulator to be.  
The Alliance, in contrast, challenged the ‘inevitability thesis’ partially by 
framing the policy dispute as a struggle over norms and values, often 
adopting a strong talking therapy exceptionalism argument, drawing an 
absolute difference between the talking therapies and healthcare practices. In 
a wider hegemonic strategy they cast the HPC plans as a metonym of wider 
forms of regulatory and market dominance within society. The Alliance, 
constituted by people from a wide range of traditions and schools within the 
lfield, were able to unite around the HPC plans as a ‘common enemy’, and 
around a broad notion of the talking therapies as relational rather than 
healthcare/transactional orientated (pertaining to the node of delivery), as well 
as the contention that the field is, notwithstanding this broad 
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conceptualisation of much of talking therapy practice, deeply pluralistic. This 
pertains to the node of provision and distribution.  
 
As regards the node of regulation, the Alliance was broadly united around the 
positive alternative programme of the practitioner full disclosure list system. 
This allowed for deep pluralism within the field, and therefore did not raise 
anxieties between competing schools of thought and practice about whether 
the system predisposed towards some more than others. The Alliance 
position was supported at times by a David and Goliath style fantasmatic 
narrative in which the HPC plans were an existential threat to the field, the 
HPC often characterised as representing a wider totalitarian threat. Largely 
excluded from the policy making process – at least as far as the parameters 
of the policy was concerned – Alliance members made their case in other 
institutional arenas, namely the Parliamentary offices of the Opposition Party, 
and the law courts. The ‘noise’ around the HPC plans generated by the 
Alliance, as Guthrie put it, the initial victory in the early stages of the Judicial 
Review for members of the Alliance, and the fact that the HPC’s Professional 
Liaison Group fell far short of full agreement on the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the 
plans, all dovetailed with the change of Government and its general political 
scepticism about what it called the ‘nanny state’ – including excess regulation, 
to provide conditions ripe for the Coalition’s decision to shelve the plans.  
Now let us look at this account in relation to existing literature.  
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REVISITING EXISTING LITERATURE  
 
Given that my account of the HPC struggle delineates between description, 
normative evaluation, and ethico-ideological critique, I structure the following 
discussion in relation to these facets. To recall from Chapter Three, 
description and evaluation attend to what is and ought to be the case, and 
ethico-ideological critique focusses on how it became the case, and how it 
might therefore be otherwise. Descriptive and normative policy analysis, 
without ethico-ideological critique, can often be either excessively idealistic or 
fatalistic; and ethico-ideological policy analysis, without express normative 
critique, can tend, at times, to be rather lacking in purpose or ‘mooring’. Let us 
begin with the descriptive and normative elements.     
 
Descriptive and normative analysis  
My account of the HPC struggle has drawn upon, and to an extent supports, 
aspects of Moran’s (2003) description of a shift towards ‘high modernism’: the 
contention that government has not been in retreat, but has in fact sought to 
extend its reach. This analysis has broad commonalities with House’s (2003) 
conceptualisation of regulation as a rejuvenated form of modernism. My 
account has also drawn upon, and to an extent corroborates, the 
restratification thesis (Chamberlain, 2010), and its description of increased 
differentiation within professions between managerial and research elites on 
the one hand, and ‘rank and file’ professionals on the other. This was evident 
to an extent within the projected HPC plans. The HPC draft Profession-
Specific standards were set by an elite faction within the field, in conjunction 
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with the HPC and its Generic Standards, and would have been owned and 
enforced by the HPC through regulatory practices. In the IAPT and Skills for 
Health projects this differentiation was sharper because the projects were 
based on empiricist research evidence.  
  
As regards normative critique, my account of the HPC struggle, however, is 
less consonant with Moran’s (2003) broad evaluative judgement that the rise 
of the regulator state is a form of democratisation to be celebrated. My 
account is more in keeping with Power’s (1999) view that the regulatory state 
tends towards creating ‘false assurance’, diminishing ‘public curiosity’, and is 
to an extent, consonant with Postle’s (2012) and House’s (2003) 
characterisation of the HPC plans and professionalization of the talking 
therapies more broadly, as a form of domination. To recall from Chapter Two, 
Moran (2003) and Maltby (2008) claim that the regulatory state is broadly 
conductive to the public good, challenging professional oligarchies through a 
raft of regulatory technologies such as the codification standards and 
competencies. This purportedly contests professional dominance by bringing 
an end to professional ‘mystique’ (caused for example through the use of 
language unfathomable to ‘lay’ people). Another key norm of the regulatory 
state is that of transparency – such as within the holding of fitness to practice 
hearings in public, thereby making it, they argue, more difficult for 
professionals to ‘close ranks’. There is one key way in which the HPC plans 
would likely to have been ‘democratising’, however. This concerns the 
contention, made by both HPC proponents and detractors (Samuels, 2009), 
(Lousada and Cooper, 2010), alike, that the plans would have challenged the 
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informal ‘sadistic hierarchy’ (Samuels, 2009) within the field of the talking 
therapies. Indeed this rather unofficial discourse was arguably a key attraction 
of the HPC plans for many within the field.  
 
However, a claim that the HPC plans would have been a challenge to 
professional oligarchies as such (rather than only some) would surely have to 
be predicated on the contention that HPC regulation would have been 
universal and objective in character: that is to say above the political ‘fray’. My 
account clearly does not support such a claim. The HPC plans were 
orientated as a regime of transactionality, and within its draft standards of 
practice, in its standards of education and training, and within its broad 
collective criteria for aspirant professions, projected the norms of heightened 
calculative rationalities, including healthcare and consumerist norms, across 
all nodes of the field. Moran (2003) and Maltby (2008) would perhaps regard 
transactionality and market logics as an effective way to democratise the 
professions, even if recognised as distinctive political programmes with some 
sectional interests (more on this below).   
 
But my close reading of the HPC and Alliance arguments, and immanent 
critique of them, and my view of the ontological ‘grain’ of practice as 
fundamentally relational, contextual, and iterative, as well as my importation 
of critiques of the evidence based practice movements, and, finally, my prior 
normative commitment to pluralism and democracy, have all guided me 
towards the view that market logics and heightened forms of transactional 
practice and regulation tend, in the round, to be damaging and ineffective 
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models for the democratisation of expertise. This is in keeping with Mol’s 
(2008) Schon’s (1983), and Fooks (2000) arguments against market logics 
and/or technical rationality as the predominant model basis for the 
professions.  
 
The HPC to an extent seem to have proffered a myth that the regulation can 
intervene without impacting practice. The projected likely impact of the HPC 
Standards of Proficiency is consonant with literature which highlights how 
regulatory technologies can reshape and distort services and practice (Power, 
1999), (Traynor, 1999). Indeed, in the case of the HPC plans, the planned 
imposition of a ‘universal’ set of standards – with a distinct transactional and 
consumer orientation – implied a process of standardisation. My analysis 
suggests that Alliance concerns that the HPC plans would have diminished 
diversity within the field are broadly credible, contra the relative confidence of 
Cooper and Lousada (2010) that HPC regulation would have provided a more 
level playing field for different modalities of therapy to take their place, side by 
side, and make their distinctive offers within the competitive market place.127 
 
Overall a close analysis of what would have been the likely impact of the HPC 
plans suggests that they could have exacerbated problems associated with 
transactional ways of framing and governing practice. The central one is the 
tendency towards contextual insensitivity and eschewal of the perspective 
                                                          
127 This also seems to be in tension with Andrew Samuels’ contention that HPC regulation would have 
challenged the ‘sadistic hierarchy’ within the field. Perhaps HPC regulation would have tended to 
cement an inversion of the existing cultural hierarchy within the field which Samuels (2009) and 
Lousada and Cooper (2010) refer to in which psychoanalytic orientated therapies project their own 
inadequacies down a perceived hierarchy of modalities, supplanting it to an extent with a consumer 
and transacational orientated therapies at the top tier.  
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and experience of both the practitioner and the client in each new ‘case’. My 
analysis of the HPC struggle suggests that, in one sense, strong proponents 
of the rise of the regulatory state such as Moran (2003) and Maltby (2008), 
and strong proponents of the random controlled trial, such as Chalmers 
(Hammersley, 2005) as above the ‘fray’ are correct: the regulatory state has 
made much of professional organisation and practice, across the nodes of 
governance and regulation, training, provision and distribution, and delivery, 
more true to what has often been taken to be the basis of their legitimation: 
that is the view that universities develop the knowledge and science – the 
general principles – which practitioners then apply in their practice to 
particular cases. To recall from Chapter Four this is how the professions 
originally won their position within the universities (Schon, 1983). The 
effective help given to clients by professions, in so far as they are helped, 
arguably is often significantly due to the fact that professionals, in practice, 
often tend to divagate from technical rationality. Furthermore they arguably 
tend to stray from, or reject, technical rationality outright because it just does 
not fit very well with the realities of the problems they face and address. 
Technical rationality in other words tends to cut against rather than with the 
ontological ‘grain’ of social reality. Furthermore, a range of work, such as Mol 
(2008), Corfield and Leader (2007), and Glynos (2012) suggest that, within 
the field of healthcare for instance, technical rationality and dominant 
biomedical perspectives do not fully capture or exhaust illness. Rather the 
biological closely intersects with, and both shapes and is shaped by, 
interpretative activities i.e. by social meaning. 128 
                                                          
128 See Glynos (2012) for example.  
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I would like now to briefly focus on how the more ethico-ideological dimension 
of my account relates to the broader literature. .  
 
 
Ethico-ideological critique  
 
A key aim within this thesis has been to foreground the contingency of the 
struggle, whilst also understanding why particular regulatory discourses ‘grip’ 
subjects. My analysis of the HPC struggle has drawn upon, and accords with, 
key aspects of the restratification thesis (Chamberlain, 2010).This is 
particularly the case in the claim that segments of a field are co-opted by 
government and its agencies in order to assist it in pushing through 
organisational reform. In the HPC struggle itself the Government co-opted 
elite factions within the field to push through the Government’s regulatory 
agenda. These co-opted elites did not fully ‘play ball’ in the way the HPC 
might have hoped however - Antrican’s decision, for example, to allow the 
‘dissenting voice’ section within the UKCP’s submission to the HPC Call for 
Ideas consultation, or Julian Lousada’s quelling of some attempts within the 
Professional Liaison Group to caricature the Alliance as the simple villain of 
the piece, and, most serious of all, the refusal, or incapability, of those around 
the Liaison Group table to come to an agreement about the ‘nuts and bolts’ of 
the plans. To an extent this observation of a degree of ‘push back’ is not 
entirely inconsistent with the restratification thesis. However, Chamberlain’s 
contention that medicine has retained its collective autonomy through 
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restratification does not apply to the field of talking therapies. This is partially 
because the talking therapies were, and are not, constituted as a statutory 
regulated field. In this sense the field does not enjoy the autonomy and power 
of this: rather individual segments within the field each enjoy levels of 
autonomy within a field which is more loosely, in so far as it is at all, 
constituted as a collective. But I also contend that the analysis of IAPT and 
SH tend to suggest that the restratificaiton thesis overestimates the retention 
or gain of collective autonomy. In the case of medicine the increased 
domination by the pharmaceutical industry, as evidenced by Healy (2013), 
seems to be substantially underplayed within the restratification account. Part 
and parcel of this, is the restratification thesis’s failure to address the 
significance of the changes in medical practice i.e. diminished contextual 
practice, concomitant with restratification. My analysis of the HPC plans and 
associated projects suggests that not only were the plans set to significantly 
restratify the field but that this would broadly diminish conditions conducive to 
robustly contextual and relational forms of talking therapy. In short the 
restratification thesis tends to focus on the changes within the formal relations 
within the node of governance and regulation, and somewhat neglects 
changes to the node of delivery i.e. the character of the treatment provided.  
The restratification thesis usefully helps to identify what we might call a 
discursive practice i.e. increased differentiation within the field – perhaps akin 
to the ‘logics of difference’ within the approach of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
and Glynos and Howarth’s (2007). However, Chamberlain (2010) does not 
identify these new relations as discursive practices, or as discourses. This 
leaves the theory vulnerable to the charge that it tacitly posits the changes as 
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‘over and above’ the rest of society – as driven by linear and progressive 
developments within medical science. Indeed there is a sense that the 
approach provides only a description of events rather than itself also being an 
intervention. There is within the writing of this tradition a tendency not to offer 
an adequately clear stance on the normative value (i.e. whether desirable or 
not) and of the ontological status (i.e. whether contingent or necessary) of the 
regulatory changes it describes. Consequently there is arguably a tendency 
towards tacit prescriptive endorsement of the changes masquerading as mere 
description. This is also, to recall from Chapter Two, a tendency within Waller 
and Guthrie’s (2012) account of the HPC struggle – where prescriptive policy 
advice masquerades as mere description of policy ‘trends’. Similarly there is a 
tendency within many accounts to render the emergence of particular 
regulatory technologies as necessary responses to fundamental changes 
within the social and organisational environment, such as public scandal, 
globalisation, fiscal crisis and the increased educational attainment of the 
population (e.g. Moran, 2003). They tend to eclipse the fact that regulatory 
policy and regulation are a complex of interpretative actions involving 
‘problem definition’ (Bachii, 2012) as well as the contingent forging of 
particular regulatory solutions – rather than others – to these problems. The 
HPC plans for instance were one possible contingent response out of any 
number of possible ones to what was construed to be the problem of public 
protection in relation to counselling and psychotherapy. The notion of 
regulatory changes being a necessary response to fiscal crisis or ‘external’ 
economic change is arguably a particularly powerful one (Hay and Watson, 
2003). This did not come expressly into play within the HPC struggle and the 
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associated projects, though such discourses tended to underpin them: for 
example the discourse of globalisation partially underpinned the shift towards 
multiple-professional teams within public services and the concomitant shift 
towards multiple-professional regulators. The rolling out of IAPT – especially 
its preference for short-term and focussed therapies, as well as its ‘stepped-
care’ approach – was partially legitimated through the concept of cost-
effectiveness, alongside side the concepts of ‘early intervention’ and 
prevention. Drawing on critiques of the evidence based practice movement, 
however, assessing the cost-effectiveness of a programme, or treatment, is 
evidently a highly interpretative, difficult and contentious task. To recall from 
Chapter Two, Healey (2013) claims, for example, that a colossal amount of 
tax payers money goes into the huge profit making pharmaceutical industry, 
in the purchase of new and patented, and therefore expensive, drugs, for 
which there is frequently very weak evidence of their effectiveness; or, worse, 
there is often considerable evidence that they cause harms to patients. This 
throws the constructed and often misleadingly ideological nature of the 
concept of ‘cost-effectiveness’ into sharp relief. My analysis of the healthcare 
reforms, along with the HPC plans, IAPT and SfH, as promoted by an 
Enlightenment narrative, often marked by fantasmatic narratives, is 
consonant with elements of Du Gay’s (2000) and Newman and Clarke (2009) 
analysis of the rhetorical strategies adopted to promote institutional reforms, 
namely the quasi-religious belief in a new organisational form to bring 
unparalleled success. This includes a tendency as Clarke et al put it to 
‘collapse spatial differences into time’ (Clarke et al, 2007:12). This is where 
organisational and cultural difference across companies, for example, or even 
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within the same company, are rhetorically temporalized, so as to construct 
one set of norms as ‘with the tide of history’, and the other as rendered 
defunct  by the tide of history. My account has shown that this strategy was 
evident within the HPC struggle to an extent. My analysis of the fantasmatic 
narratives involved within the HPC struggle has theorised why such denial of 
the contingency of the HPC plans, and possible alternatives, at times, 
affectively ‘grip’ subjects.  My analysis is consistent with, and supplements, 
literature which highlights the significance of ‘dramatic’ narratives within 
regulatory and professional struggles: for example Shedler’s (2015) 
identification of a ‘master’ narrative within the evidence based practice 
movement: ‘In the dark ages, therapists practiced untested, unscientific 
therapy. Science shows that evidence-based therapies are superior’ 
(2015:47). My account also arguably supplements Postle’s (2012) notion of 
‘trance induction’ as well as Power’s (1999) foregrounding of the affect of 
anxiety. Through the ‘prism’ of the ‘logics’ approach and its adaption of 
elements of Lacanian psychoanalysis I have deepened the theorisation of the 
role of affect within what we might refer to, rather generically, as fantasmatic 
Enlightenment narratives.  
 
Let us now briefly draw a few pointers from this analysis regarding policy 
advice. This helps to bring further to the foreground the evaluative and more 
prescriptive elements that are to an extent inscribed within my analysis.  
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POLICY ADVICE   
 
A key policy question which this case study speaks to is: how is it best to 
‘frame’ regimes and practice so as to tackle, diminish or avoid the problem of 
occupational or professional dominance, including lack of responsiveness to 
clients? Another related question is: what are the most effective ways of 
regaining, retaining and improving broad public trust in the field of the talking 
therapies and the public professions more broadly?  
 
Regulatory policy 
As regards the node of governance and regulation my analysis suggests that 
the Government’s shelving of the HPC plans was a good judgement call. If it 
were decided that statutory regulation of the field of counselling and 
psychotherapy was again to be pursued, the practitioner full disclosure list, as 
advocated by Postle (2003), the Maresfield Report (Arbours Association et al, 
2009), should, in my view, be given serious consideration. Its key advantages 
are that it allows deep pluralism, and does not seek to shape or structure the 
field or practice in accordance to any particular norms. In fact the system can 
encompass heightened transactional forms of therapy just as much as 
relational or contextual oriented therapies. It also has the advantage of 
bringing a practice of ‘audit’ into play in so far as it would institute a legal 
obligation for a practitioner to disclose any complaints held against them.  
And as the Maresfield Report suggests, the government should concentrate 
on making the law more accessible to individuals, rather than create a poor 
quasi-legal substitute of it through the HPC-style complaints system, which 
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affords less protection than the court system to clients and practitioners alike. 
I do think, however, that there are question marks over the practicality and the 
political desirability of regulation by function within the field of the talking 
therapies – though these are questions that have been largely outside the 
scope of this thesis. Another important advantage of the practitioner full 
disclosure system is its emphasis, as its name suggests, on the disclosure of 
information, including practitioners’ way of working, rather than on providing 
assurance about the safety and effectiveness of practice. This helps avoid the 
HPC’s tendency towards false assurance, to borrow Power’s(1999) phrase, 
and to help, in its place, foster greater public curiosity (again as Power puts it) 
about practices and services. An educational programme to make the public 
more aware of the character and inherent risks of different kinds of talking 
therapy, as suggested by the Maresfield Report (Arbours et al, 2009) would 
enhance this. This would arguably make the node of governance and 
regulation more congruent with more relational and contextual ways of 
framing practice, which, in turn, are more consonant with the ontological grain 
of practice - that each therapy is contextual – has unique elements, and is 
therefore experimental. This is in a similar sense to how Mol (2008) 
conceptualises medical practice as experimental. A process of trial and error 
is therefore seen as intrinsic to the process.).The HPC tendency to foster 
conditions ripe for a fantasmatic narrative in which a ‘problem minority’ of 
practitioners is imagined to be the only obstacle – and a merely empirical one 
- to fully assured and effective practice, not only seemed to provide the HPC 
plans with considerable affective ‘grip’ in some quarters, but it also 
simultaneously leans the regime towards the making of rather illusory claims 
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about the safety and effectiveness of services and practice. As Parker (2010) 
puts it:   
There is an illusion of safety guaranteed by equally illusory attempts to predict and 
control innovative human activity. The HPC website offers posters and window stickers 
which proclaim ‘you’re in safe hands: I’m regulated by the HPC’, and the message is 
that once you are with a practitioner on a register you will be safe and sound. This is a 
dangerously misleading message (6). 
 
 
Furthermore, the fantasmatic narrative which supports the HPC-style system 
means that in one sense if the abusive, ineffective and unsafe practitioner did 
not exist – if the ‘problem minority’ did not exist - then they would need to be 
invented. The prevalence of actual abusive practice, perhaps what we can 
refer to as abjectly or aberrantly bad practice (though this is ontologically 
always subject to historical and cultural definition and construction), has not 
been a focus of this thesis. The point I am making here is not that it does not 
exist, but that if it did not exist, then the HPC would need to invent it. There is 
therefore a risk that the heightened ‘assurance’ system ,and the fantasmatic 
narratives which support it, and which perhaps also help give rise to it, create 
conditions in which the emergence of abject forms of abusive practice are 
more, not less, likely to emerge. In short the abjectly abusive practitioner is 
required to take the role, in the fantasmatic narrative, of the contingent 
empirical obstacle to what is otherwise imagined to be the fully safe and 
effective practitioner and system. In reality, however, the regime is 
desperately dependent upon the notion of the abjectly abusive practitioner: it 
is that which ‘guarantees’ the ‘beatific’ HPC-registrant practitioners who are 
‘safe’ and ‘effective’ and free from contestation and uncertainty. This is 
arguably problematic as it is more likely to foster unconditional client or 
patient trust in practitioners, rather than a conditional trust based on curiosity 
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of the client or patient in the practice of the practitioner. 129 The node of 
regulation and, within organisations, the node of governance, should 
therefore be geared towards challenging such narratives. In order to do this a 
regulatory regime could seek to robustly set both practitioner and client 
expectations in the direction of what Schon (1983) refers to as reflective 
practice, and House (2003), and Fook (2000) refer to as postmodern practice, 
and which Mol (2008), within a medical context, as ‘attunement’ and 
‘doctoring’. These are ways of democratising expertise which not only 
acknowledge the precariousness and limits of expertise – including its 
ultimate inability to fully assure safety and effectiveness –, but also more 
robustly conceptualises, and finds room for, the client as an active agent 
within the process. This active role is not seen as limited to having a 
‘consumer-style’ choice between different practitioners and different 
treatments, but extends to an active role in shaping the actual ‘treatment’ and 
relationship. In one sense many talking therapies may be characterised as a 
‘prototype’ of such an approach given the tendency within the talking 
therapies to make the relationship between the client and practitioner the pure 
‘instrument’, so to speak, of the ‘treatment’. Ideally therefore the direction of 
influence between the healthcare regime and that of the talking therapies 
should arguably be more from the talking therapies to healthcare, rather than, 
as currently the case, the talking therapies taking on the more empiricist and 
heightened acontextual style and system of practice currently dominant within 
healthcare.  This would mean for example that within the professions more 
                                                          
129 See Janet Haney’s book ‘Regulation in action’ (2012) for an examination of how HPC style 
regulation can tend to overly dichotomise between safe and unsafe practitioners to the detriment of 
effective practice and regulation.  
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broadly the regulator should seek to soften the demarcation between the 
nodes of governance, provision, distribution and delivery, so that questions of 
‘standards’ and ‘quality’ – the character of the professional-client relationship, 
and the treatments produced, made available  and delivered – becomes 
something shaped, at least to a greater extent than currently the case, by the 
client and the professional within the specific context and set of exigencies in 
which they find themselves. Schon (1983) suggests that both the professional 
and the client need to give up the ‘mystique’ of expertise and move into a 
‘reflective contract’ in which the uncertainties of the work the client and the 
practitioner do together are acknowledged. The promise of hardened 
outcomes and of excessively standardised treatments, should, to an extent, 
be regarded as a threat to the capacity of the practitioner and client to 
experiment their way to an effective set of responses to the unique problems 
and challenges which present themselves. To be congruent with and to help 
facilitate such an approach to practice, regulatory practice should also place 
an emphasis upon reflective regulatory practices, in which the regulator is 
more contextually ‘attuned’ and has a ‘fuller’ conceptualisation of the 
practitioner (and of their clients) and/or organisation being regulated. This 
would help avoid ‘subsumptive’ tendencies, where regulators try to fit square 
pegs into round holes so to speak, as well as reduce the tendency of 
organisations becoming arbitrarily distracted from their main tasks (noted by 
Power, 1999, and Traynor,1999, for example), and thereby also help avoid 
excess homogenisation across organisations which diminishes the pluralism 
of expertise required for a pluralism of problems and issues.  Innovation in 
practice can therefore, to a greater extent, occur from the ‘ground up’, where 
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expertise emerging in practice feeds, in a more organic way, into the more 
abstract theoretical body of knowledge within a profession, as well as 
decisions at a more organisational level and political decisions at the policy 
level.   
In drawing this conclusion, I am not suggesting that audit practices should not 
be used at all, but that they should be used sparingly, and as an aid to more 
contextual and reflective forms of regulation, rather than seen as a straight 
forward ‘technical fix’ to the problem of professional dominance and 
accountability. They should also be used, I would suggest, with greater 
awareness of, and careful scrutiny of, the ways in which they are significant 
interventions within a field. The notion of ‘light touch’ regulation arguably 
tends towards being a myth. It is perhaps encouraging, in this frame at least, 
that there has been a shift towards the concept of ‘right touch’ regulation 
(CHRE, 2010). 
 
This leaves the node of provision and distribution – the norms governing 
which treatments and services are available and how they are distributed – 
left to be considered. As noted within Chapter Five, one of the attractions of a 
highly technical and standardised approach to governance and practice is 
that it addresses the problem of the so called ‘post-code’ lottery, and helps to 
objectively delimit and legitimate the provision and distribution of some 
treatments and services over others. However, the literature suggests that 
within IAPT, as well as medicine and healthcare more broadly, the NICE and 
empiricist system of controlled trials tends to be rather more objectifying than 
objective. It seems quite clear that the weight of empiricist evidence i.e. the 
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evidence from controlled trials, even when taken on its own terms, does not 
support the Government’s tendency to promote particular forms of talking 
therapies over others. This diminishes public choice, whilst simultaneously 
fostering hubristic expectations about psychological expertise. In a welcome 
development the evidence based medicine movement is currently reviewing 
its valorisation of the random control trial (Stirling, 2017). Scarcity of 
resources, and the apparent need for ‘cost-effectiveness’, and the need to 
constrain costs within an increasingly harsh competitive environment of the 
globalised world is a compelling reason often given for why the 
democratisation of the node of provision and distribution must be very limited. 
But to note, again, Healey’s (2013) critique of the pharmaceutical industry is a 
clear instance of where this is perhaps shown to be an over-simplistic and 
misleading framing of the problem, motivated at least in part by powerful 
institutional and economic interests. The dominance of medicine by the 
pharmaceutical industry, as noted by many, even by those quite favourable to 
the inherent qualities of the random controlled trial approach to research (for 
example see Goldacre, 2013), needs urgent attention. Within medicine it is 
perhaps the biggest barrier to both more evenly available and deeper forms of 
contextual practice, or, as Mol (2008) describes it, ‘doctoring’. My account of 
the HPC struggle suggests that, in some respects, attempts within the field of 
the talking therapies to ape the ‘hard’ science of medicine, and to adopt its 
valorisation of the controlled trial, contributed significantly to the impetus 
behind IAPT and SfH, and, albeit to a lesser extent, the HPC plans.     
For a key strand within the Alliance, namely the humanistic, anti-
professionalisation tradition within the field, as manifest for example in the 
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IPN, and the work of Postle (2012) and House (2003), Mowbray (1995), (as 
explored within Chapters Two and Four), it is important that the node of 
provision and distribution does not, as far as the talking therapies are 
concerned, involve bureaucratic or professional organisation. This is because 
they contend that such forms of organisation are inherently contrary to the 
ethos and practice of the talking therapies, largely because they encompass 
hierarchy within the organisation. This issue not been a strong focus of this 
thesis, as the focus on the struggle over the HPC plans does not afford the 
opportunity to directly ‘test’ the theories concerning the differentiations 
between voluntary/community organisations on the one hand, and 
bureaucratic and professional ones on the other. But, with Schon’s (1983) 
critique of sharp demarcations between anti-professional and professional 
forms of expertise, and Mol’s (2008) and Healy’s (2013) critique of what I 
refer to as highly transactional ways of doing medicine, and their exposition of 
more contextual ways of medical practice, in mind, it is my sense that the 
NHS can and should  play an important, though not all encompassing, role 
within the provision of talking therapies, where a more contextual system of 
governance and regulation is in place. Concerns about both the system of 
practice and influence of other stakeholders, such as the pharmaceutical 
industry’s influence on medicine, should to an extent be within the remit of the 
professional regulator, in conjunction with other stakeholders. This is 
particularly so because regulators do tend (and be seen) to ‘vouch’, not only 
for individual registrants, but for the profession or field as a whole. Indeed the 
HPC, as noted within Chapter six, has a legal responsibility to itself ensure 
that practice is safe and effective. In my view the latter requirement should 
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either be taken away, and a practitioner full disclosure system style system 
adopted, where decisions about what treatments are made available, are 
made at more localised levels, or, the HPC, and regulators like the General 
Medical Council (GMC), should carry out a more robust ‘meta-evaluation’ of 
how the professions they regulate determine what practices are deemed to be 
safe and effective enough to provide. Any such meta-evaluation should 
encompass the wealth of research evidence from both within and outside the 
empiricist tradition. It is perhaps through a much more robust inclusion of 
‘practice based evidence’, and through mechanisms by which the experience 
and knowledge of reflective practitioners and clients – as conceptualised by 
Schon, in which a client or patient is strongly seen as ‘active’ within the 
treatment, that professional dominance is best addressed, and the 
emergence in recent decades of a new ‘regulatory dominance’ addressed and 
avoided. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the various practices 
and organisational innovations which may make an institution more reflective, 
but the innovative governance and regulatory practices adopted by the 
Independent Practitioners Network – even though they tend to eschew such 
terminology – as well as the additional voluntary schemes that some 
therapeutic communities, funded and regulated as public services, participate 
in – such as the Royal College of Psychiatrists  ‘Community of communities’ 
for therapeutic communities 130- are perhaps good resources to draw upon.  
 
                                                          
130 A description can be found at the  following link: 
https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/workinpsychiatry/qualityimprovement/qualityandaccreditation/therapeu
ticcommunities/communityofcommunities.aspx 
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My account of the HPC struggle has focussed considerably on the policy 
making process, including, for example how the policy process both 
encompassed, and was shaped and supported by, rhetorical strategies of 
marginalisation. Now let me briefly draw from this account advice about the 
policy making process and structures.  
  
 
Policy making process  
 
One key way in which the HPC policy was arguably a ‘fiasco’ is that there 
were sufficient grounds for a legal case against it. To what extent was this a 
failure in individual decision making, and to what extent does it reflect more 
systematic or structural problems in the policy making process?  
There are a number of things that could reduce the likelihood of a similar 
policy fiasco. We can reasonably say that my account of the HPC struggle 
suggests that the (initial hearing of the) Judicial Review was the result of the 
HPC’s and Department of Health’s failure to robustly secure the legality of the 
policy-making process, along with the determination of a group of 
psychoanalytic organisations to challenge the legality of the process. The 
origins of the somewhat ‘foggy’ legality of the way that the policy making 
process was conducted can, to a significant extent, be located in the shift, 
which, to recall from Chapter Two, began with the ‘next steps’ civil service 
reform programme during the 1980s, and the sharpened institutionalisation of 
the division between policy making and its administration, consequently 
tending to diminish the ‘to and fro’ between them, and therefore the 
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effectiveness of the process. As Du Gay (2000) noted, this helped foster a 
‘can do’ attitude within the civil service, in contrast to a tradition of the civil 
service offering ‘frank and fearless’ advice on policy proposals.  The sharp 
demarcation between higher level policy making and low level policy 
making/administration helps to account for why the HPC development of the 
policy seemed so technocratic: divorcing the administrative arm of 
government from the democratic/political arm meant that the HPC was 
seeking a rational cum-technical, rather than a political, solution to the 
competing demands of different stakeholders. My account has of course 
suggests that this constitutes a political strategy – making the political 
decision to make the talking therapies more transactional orientated 
apparently a mere technocratic and rational process. It is a remarkable 
feature of the struggle that the HPC in effect insisted that a rational 
consensus – embodied with the supposed ‘universal’ threshold standards – 
underlay all the ‘surface’ conflict. The ‘success’ of this approach to political 
strategy and to the policy making process, however, as I have argued in the 
case of the HPC struggle, is predicated on excessive occlusion of diverse 
perspectives, especially those of many clients and practitioners, on the policy 
in question; a ‘blockage’ which, in the case of the HPC plans, helped to bring 
about a near-implementation of policy I have argued would likely have been 
broadly detrimental to the field of the talking therapies and the public interest. 
This case study therefore adds to the body of literature (e.g. Du Gay, 2000 
and King and Crewe, 2013), which raises concerns about the impact of the 
sharp demarcation between policy and its administration, including its 
tendency to impoverish the political and democratic character of the policy 
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making process in which relatively narrow and factional political interests tend 
to masquerade as techno-rational solutions to the problem at hand.  
 
 
Politico-hegemonic strategy 
 
A key suggestion as regards hegemonic strategy is intrinsic to my analysis 
and partially follows from the post-structuralist contention, as explored within 
Chapter Three, that research as such is an intervention of sorts. My 
suggestion is for a more middle path to be found between the Alliance 
tendency to adopt a position near to talking therapy ‘exceptionalism’ in its 
struggle to fend off being subsumed by transactional orientated and 
dominated healthcare regimes, and the supposedly more pragmatic 
embracement of the evidence based practice movement and more 
transactional ways of framing talking therapies practice and services of others 
in the field.. In one sense the position close to talking therapy exceptionalism 
may be deemed the most politically pragmatic because strong transactional 
ways of framing healthcare are so powerfully embedded, the best chance of 
keeping the talking therapies from such a regime is perhaps  to forcefully 
foreground the differences between the talking therapies and healthcare 
practices: demands for significant reform of the whole healthcare and 
pharmaceutical system raises the political stakes significantly, and therefore 
also the political and institutional barriers. The trouble with the talking therapy 
exceptionalism strategy, however, is arguably that, by creating a strong 
dichotomous relationship between healthcare and the talking therapies, it 
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helps to shore up the position and identity of highly acontextual/transactional 
discourses within healthcare, reinforcing the sharp frontier between 
healthcare and the talking therapies, which then poses a heightened 
‘imperialist’/scientistic threat, from the ‘outside’, to the more contextual 
orientated talking therapies. Another strategic possibility is that a more open 
stance within the field of the talking therapies towards what arguably are 
significant family resemblances between the talking therapies and more 
contextual and relational imaginaries of practice within healthcare may help 
grow alliances across the fields between those members of each that want 
greater depth in the contextual and relational framing of practice and its 
regulation.  Given the strength with which a highly transactional regime is 
currently cemented within medicine, this is admittedly probably a Herculean 
task and these are strategic dilemmas to which there are no easy answers.  
 
The HPC’s, IAPT’s and SfH’s attempt to reshape the field of the talking 
therapies in accordance with consumer and transactional norms is perhaps 
indicative of how strongly hegemonic - that is to say ‘naturalised’ – these 
norms are within contemporary culture and society. This is perhaps most 
evident in the apparent incredulity of the HPC, and some supporters of the 
plans, that the desirability of the contractual consumer norm and standards 
approach could be placed in question. In fact, even more than that, the HPC 
seemed unable to recognise these norms as forms of particularism to which 
there are credible alternatives.  Simultaneously, however, the case study 
suggests that these logics are not invulnerable, and that more contextual and 
relational conceptualisations of practice can, and often do, motivate 
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practitioners, especially (though not only) within the field of the talking 
therapies, and that it is possible for practitioners to organise and mobilise in 
the name of more relational and contextual norms of practice and regulation.  
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                                             APPENDIX A 
  
             TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH MALCOLM ALLEN 
 
Jon: You became Chief Executive Officer of the BPC in 
 
Julian was saying that that was the first appointment and was part of the professionalising of 
the BPC 
 
Malcolm: Yes I think that's right. The BPC had existed for about ten years prior to my 
appointment but had bumped along with a couple of administrators, so I was its first sort of 
you know high level kind of professional appointment in that sense. But I think, you've 
probably worked this out but I think it's just worth knowing that I think the BPC as organisation 
emerged out of the whole thing around potential psychotherapy regulation. So it all goes back 
to the rugby conference. I think without impending statutory regulation, as it was thought to 
be impending at the time, wrongly of course [laughs], but you know, probably the BPC would 
never have existed. So it came about because, on the whole psychoanalytic organisations, 
love nothing better than to be gloriously insulted. And probably would have stayed that way, 
so you'd have had the British Psychoanalytic Society just staying where it was. I think what 
generated them was a realisation that the profession might be statutorily regulated and 
thoughts that it had to organise itself to be in the best position to do that. So there were all 
sorts of conferences kicking around, way before my time. The famous one was the Rugby 
Conference. You'd need to check the facts on this. I may not get the facts dead on right, but I 
think there was this larger organisation that basically became the BABCP, the British 
Association for Counselling and psychotherapy. I think UKCP decided to separate itself at 
about the time of the Rugby Conference.  
 
Jon: The BPC was a breakaway from the UKCP?  
 
Malcolm; The UKCP was I think, but you'd have to double check this [...] was a sort of 
breakaway from the broader thing, which became BABCP, which was first the BAC, I think. It 
may have been messier than this. Anyway the first differentiation was the BABCP and the 
UKCP with the UKCP standing for something called psychotherapy as distinct from 
counselling. And then the BPC split from UKCP because it felt that psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy should be recognised as a distinct profession.  
 
Jon: And when you were appointed was that around the time of the psychological professions 
council proposal?  
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Malcom: OK absolutely I came in in September. That proposal emerged around about then. 
Now I can't remember exactly but it more or less emerged that autumn. And one of the very 
first things that I did was to go to a meeting where the proposal was launched.  
 
Jon: And that was a meeting with UKCP and the British psychological society, and the 
BABCP? I think I read an account, think it was Dennis Postle, I think he complained that it 
had been presented without consultation and that there was also a very short window before 
it was submitted to respond to it. What's your view of that?  
 
Malcolm: I don't quite know what that means. My memory is all but a bit vague about it to be 
honest. [pause] You know, at that point there was no, because after the rugby conference 
everybody had split, there was no unified forum, everybody was doing whatever they were 
doing. So there was no natural means of anybody consulting anybody else. To be honest. 
You know, somebody came up with this idea for basically, the notion of self-regulation. If 
we're going to be regulated let there be a psychotherapy specific regulatory body, so it wasn't 
self-regulation is was... if there is to be statutory regulation let it not be the health professions 
council, let it be, a profession specific body, statutory body like the GMC and the others, and 
like the HPC itself, but let's have our own body. That was the argument. Now I simply can't 
remember the sort of logistics of who wrote the proposal. It was presented. I don’t' remember 
there being some kind of time issue.  
 
Jon: And in what way was the BPC involved in it?  
 
Malcolm: Well funnily enough, I was new to all of this. I'd worked as an arts manager. This 
was a whole new world. I knew bugger all about any of it. So I went along to this meeting. It 
was like one of my first meetings. I thought bloody hell. When the proposal was presented, 
and I can't remember who presented it/. I think the work had been done primarily within the 
British Psychological Society, I think. I thought well ok, this seems quite sensible idea. So I 
took a report back to the BPC, and said well look this is all of the other bodies, BPS, BACP, 
UKCP, all seem to be up for this idea, sounds sensible doesn’t it I don't know. And actually to 
my surprise the BPC didn't want to play with the idea. My executive, I was the chief 
executive, I  
 
Jon: When you say executive do you mean a board?  
 
Malcolm: A board yes. There were two, it wasn’t called a board but it was effectively a board. 
There was a council meeting that met every whatever I don't know, several times a year. And 
there was an executive which met monthly, a and I think this was the executive, but I really 
can't remember> I think what was going on is that, I think when the BPC split from UCKP, it 
very much felt it could define a sort of quasi separate profession of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy. The BPC thought this. I mean to be quite frank. At the time I joined, it was a 
very arrogant organisation.  
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Jon: IN what way? 
 
Malcolm: It was it was rather contemptuous of everybody else within the field. I mean it, it 
was it had a kind of go it alone, and thought it had its own hotline to the department of health. 
All the world and its mother had a hotline to the department of health and felt that they were 
going to have their special place in the sun, and the BPC thought that to.  
 
Jon: And did they to an extent?  
 
Malcolm; No [laughs].  
 
Jon: Has it been the case previously 
 
Malcolm: no 
 
Jon: In some accounts that I’ve read there's perception that BPC members are more likely to 
have contracts within the NHS. There is more involvement within the NHS with the BPC 
members?  
 
Malcolm: I don't know that that's the case. It may have been more the case then than it is 
now. These days’ psychoanalytic psychotherapists feel totally marginalised in the NHS. I 
think this was probably true that at that time, in the mid-2000s, you know, there was still the 
kind of fag end of a kind of historic reality, but it was the fag end of it. And the reality of it of 
which was a fag end was probably during the fifties, sixties, during the sort of 50s 60s 70 80s 
right, there were quite a significant number of, very eminent psychiatrists who were also 
psychoanalysts.  
 
Jon: IS that not the case now? 
 
Malcolm: no, so in that sense it's probably true that there was a perception that the 
psychoanalytic profession had a kind of level of seniority but within the psychiatric profession 
within the NHS. I think that was probably true. But by 2000 we were at the fag end of that. All 
sorts of things had happened by then. (a) the psychiatric profession itself was under the cosh, 
so frankly psychiatry totally lost out to clinical psychology within the NHS. Psychiatrists were 
seen as bloody pill prescribers, not fit for much else [laughs]. Clinical psychology had become 
the more ascendant profession.  
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Jon: Because previously clinical psychology had been seen as almost assistants to 
psychiatry.  
 
Malcolm: Yes and that was changing. Increasingly more work and scope was given to clinical 
psychology. Psychiatrists were losing out basically; they were just seen as prescribers. What 
else were they fit for [laughs].  
 
Jon: And that's mainly the case now then is it?  
 
Malcolm: Yeah, I think it’s in a sense there was a sort of retreat of psychiatry from the sort of 
prominent place it had, I think it's probably retreated to a place where, it's held its own, 
obviously I think here, it's recognised that psychiatrists have a role to play. They're not god. 
Or some kind of special weird, mystical knowledge, but they've got a level of expertise.  
 
Jon: it's almost double edged then is it - there are positive aspects to it as well. There was an 
arrogance there - people or psychiatrists thinking that they're god sort of thing, but also a loss 
 
Malcolm: Yes. I think psychiatrists don't think that they think they're god anymore but think 
they're the bottom of the shit pile [laughs]. They do all this training for years and years and 
years.  
 
Jon: And clinical psychology is increasingly dominated by CBT 
 
Malcolm: yes, I mean, yes, guess generally that's probably more complicated than that 
 
Jon: There used to be an analytic strain within in it 
 
Malcolm: I think there still is. I don't think it's simple. I don't think that clinical psychology is a 
totally gun hoe bastion of CBT. I don't think it's true at all but probably. It's probably the case 
that as a profession clinical psychology has been more, has embraced the CBT thing more 
so than probably psychiatry did.  
 
Jon: You were saying that when you joined that the BPC was still a narrow organisation 
 
Malcolm: It didn’t feel the need to create a broader alliance between the psychotherapy 
bodies. It didn’t. And in fact what I made it my business to do, but we've, you can't [laughs] 
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we're not big enough. BPC was 12 hundred members, you’re not big enough to make any 
impact in the world and to be honest psychoanalysis now, ok it still holds sway in film studies, 
it does not, it is no longer seen as the great, the primary model for mental health treatment.  
 
Jon: Was it your view that one of the best ways of doing that was to engage with the proposal 
for the Psychological professions council?  
 
Malcolm: Ok, I personally, oh personally, I [pause] personally I probably wasn't sure, I think to 
be honest. I mean it felt generally a sensible proposal. The BPC I think, what they were 
adverse to wasn't the proposal as the proposal, it's that they just didn't want to be in an 
alliance with all this other lot. I remember the phrase used was some guy at the BPC 
executive said 'I think we should be just in with the dentists' - [laughs] -  
 
Jon: Who was that?  
 
Malcolm: I can't remember. OF course the reality was, what he was meaning is that I would 
rather be regulated by a sort of body like the HPC; this is what he meant by the dentists, 
because the dentists have their own regulatory council. So he got it wrong. But it was a sort 
of way of saying, look, let’s not fuck around with all this politicising, this is all just a political 
pissing about. There is a regulatory body. If we're going to be regulated, let's just keep it 
simple. - along with other health professions and don't fart arse around with all this politicking. 
And that's how they saw it. These were all, it's not that psychoanalytic psychotherapists were 
not political animals, and most of them were sort of you know 68ers and all the rest of it, but 
they saw this as just fucking around.  
 
Jon: And what was so horrendous about the idea of being regulated alongside other kinds of 
psychotherapy?  
 
Malcolm: I don't think it was the fact that it was horrendous, is I think, err [pause] I think there 
was just a suspicion that this was just all gunning back to the politics of the rugby conference. 
I think that was probably it. We just don't want to be in rooms arguing the toss with all these 
UKCP, BACP people.  
 
Jon: As if it would have been an attempt to undo as split that had been made in the first 
place?  
 
Malcolm: Yeah, I’m not even sure it was as thought out as that. I think it was just a general 
aversion to what people saw as a kind of amateur politicking.  
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Jon: And was it your sense that this view was shared by most of the membership of BPC?  
 
Malcolm: I think that's hard to estimate because I’m not really sure that the bulk of the 
membership of the BPC was very engaged with the whole question of it. I think the fact is 
that, the executive and the sort of leadership had to be everybody else just got on with their 
lives really. Now they knew that it was an important issue. I mean don't get me wrong, I think 
people saw it as an important issue but just weren't interested enough to get engaged with all 
the finer points of it. Well, you know we've got to be regulated; we’ll leave it to the executive 
to sort out the best possible thing. So we were alone, the BPC in not supporting the 
psychological professions council. Now the fact was that this was all very short lived anyway. 
Because what happened in February 2007 if my memory is right is that the labour 
government produced a green paper, I think it was a green paper.  
 
Jon: Do you know what's called because I have [....he means the white paper] [.....] 
 
Malcolm: [...] February 2007 there was the white paper. And the white paper following the 
foster review, very definitively said that psychology, psychotherapy and counselling should be 
statutorily regulated as a priority and that it will be HPC. So now, by this time, we had formed 
a little working alliance. And I was quite influential in this., it was all, it was what I wanted to 
do, build bridges, and I said look, despite the fact my organisation didn't support the 
psychological professions council we were keen to be involved in a kind of cross body, 
working together. 
 
Jon: what was it called?  
 
Malcolm: it was called 
 
Jon: was it called the psychological professions action group.  
 
Malcolm: I didn't think it was called that> I thought it was psychological professions alliance 
group. It may have been alliance group. Yeah I can't remember. But it was basically BACP, 
UKCP, BPC and for a time the BPS. Now later on, I think that the BABCP also joined in. Now 
the problem was that the situation with the psychologists was a bit complicated, Because 
what had happened is that statutory regulation sot of prior to all this was on the whole came 
about through the professions themselves wanting it. So the way HPC worked they didn't got 
out and grab professions they sat around and waited for professions to knock on their door 
we want to be statuary regulated please. We didn't have government's saying here we’re 
going to statutorily regulate - it was the opposite, so all the professions that HPC had brought 
under their statutory regulation were effectively professions that wanted it, and indeed had to 
prove to HPC that they were worthy of statutory regulation and there were criteria like they 
were a single profession, they were articulated standards, all this sort of thing. Now, the BPS 
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had put in an application to HPC to be statutorily regulated. [laughs] And they changed their 
minds 
 
Jon: did the government have any intention of regulating them? 
 
Malcolm: What happened is that this had gone on bloody since the 70s, so there was, in the 
late 70s this was all started by another Foster Report, which was the report on Scientology,  
 
Jon: And Sieghart 
 
 
Malcolm: And Foster in passing mentioned that psychotherapy which had a huge potential 
impact on people, didn't seem regulated, and this didn't seem to be a good idea. And various 
people pursued it, include John Alderdice who was himself a psychiatrists and 
psychoanalysts who basically promoting the idea of statutory regulation for psychotherapy. 
So the whole thing gained a bit of traction. I think at some point the DofH had been 
persuaded that it should be statutorily regulated, there was a woman in the Department of 
Health up in Leeds who was trying to make sense of it all, it was driving her completely 
around the bend, 
 
Jon: Who was that? Was it Rosalind Mead?  
 
Malcolm: Yes, and she was just [laughs] she was just like, everyone but everyone was going 
to bend her ear, and she was charged with the job of trying to come up with sensible 
proposals, where no matter what you said nobody was going to be happy. It's an impossible 
job and obviously she was just floundering and didn't know what to do about any of it. So of 
course everybody, including the BPC, was Rosalind Mead, Rosalind Mead, were ringing up 
every fortnight, saying how's it going. [laughs] 
 
Jon: Do you know why the BPS changed their mind?  
 
Malcolm: No, I don't really; I think there were different factions within BPS, and there was 
obviously a lot who thought it was a smart thing to do. [laughs]. Put an application in with the 
other lot not really knowing, though I’m probably exaggerating, but I don't really know, but 
then the other lot got the upper hand what fuck this then and asked for it to be withdrawn. 
This was all in the middle of the foster review going on, the HPC said, we’re not sure you can 
withdraw your application. In any case we're all waiting for the Foster review; nothing’s going 
to happen until the foster review says what it says, so let's just leave it. So it was the whole 
period of time where everyone was waiting for the foster report.  
447 
 
 
Jon: Did the BPC actually contribute to the Foster Report prior to it actually coming up with 
the report?  
 
Malcolm: Do you know I think we may have done, we may have put a submission in, probably 
saying that as far as we were concerned the HPC was as good a regulator as it might be. So 
basically we probably said we weren't particularly in favour of the PPC, I think.  
 
[....] 
 
 
Jon: Who do you think I should approach to get copies of these submissions?  
 
Malcolm: of our submissions, you could, ask the BPC office. The logistical reality is that, they 
were on my computer and, assuming they haven't thrown the computer away which they may 
have done. Obviously Gary is the chief executive so he won't know. Janice is one of the 
administrators.  
 
Jon: One of the things I’m trying to work out when the, because the HPC, the regulation of 
the talking therapies isn't even mentioned in the Foster Review.  
 
Malcolm: Ok, no, it is mentioned in the White Paper. I think you may be right. So what the 
foster review was designed to do was to. What the foster review was looking at the overall 
architecture of health regulation so there were nine statutory health regulators, GMC, the 
dentists, the nurses, blah blah blah, down to the HPC. So he was looking at the question is 
there a more efficient, this all seems a bit of a bit of mess, that was the general perception, I 
mean nine. There was also this kind of meta regulator called CHIRPY which actually became 
what is now the PSA 
 
Jon: I've not heard of that 
 
Malcolm: It's what CHRE was before. CHRE itself was called something which people called 
CHIRPY. IT was the regulators of the regulators, you had the regulators and then you had the 
regulators of the regulators [laughs slightly] 
 
Jon: But it seems that it was widely known that there was an intention ... was it known by 
word of mouth that there was a government intention for HPC to regulate the 
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psychotherapies. In terms of official documentation is appears out of know where in the white 
paper.  
 
Malcolm: That is a good question. I think that the perception probably, the months leading up 
to February 2007 I think that the general sense was the HPC was a possibility but not 
necessarily a given or even the most favoured option, it was definitely an option, 
 
Jon: By government 
 
Malcolm: I think by the profession generally. To a certain extent it was the simplest option. 
HPC was the odds and sods regulator, psychotherapy and counselling was clearly an odd 
and sod, so clearly a simple option for any government was to say, give it to the HPC. In a 
way it was sort of an obvious one, in a sense for no other reason that had to be an option 
because it was an obvious option not because governments had hinted that that's what it's 
going to do. It was keeping mum; Rosalind Mead didn't have a bloody clue about very much 
at all. I don't think it was a reading of the government's mind it was just that the HPC was an 
obvious option.  
 
Jon: The responses to the Foster Review, there were a lot of psychotherapeutic 
organisations that expressed opposition, and then the government's own responses of 
summaries acknowledges that  but then go ahead with the HPC plans anyway.  
 
Malcolm: Ok, so, basically, in the months leading up to February 2007, you obviously had, 
this sort of group pushing for the psychological professions council and I think genuinely 
believed that it might be a goer. So I think whilst that was on the table, probably that 
contained what later become the anti-regulatory opposition. I think I’m right in thinking that 
the anti-regulatory opposition hadn't crystallised yet as a force. I mean it was probably there 
bubbling around. I think the proposal for the stand alone profession specific probably kept 
people happy enough I think. I may be wrong but that's my memory of it. The white paper 
came along, we're going to do it, it's a priority and it's going to be the HPC. So I think that was 
the moment, so the psychological professions council people didn't quite know what to do 
then. So of course it made my job much easier because I was able to say, well look guys 
whatever we all think the government's planned its position it's gone through a review, this 
and that, now let's just get on and work with the HPC. Ok. So that was our position. Let's stop 
fucking around, government knows what it wants to do, it wants the HPC, let's make it work 
with the HPC. Of course that aligned very neatly with what the BPC wanted to do.  
 
Jon: I get a sense it was mainly the BPC that didn't want to be involved with the Partnership, 
rather than hesitancy or wish to exclude from the UKCP. 
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Malcolm: I was very keen that we did have an alliance grouping but not organised around a 
demand for a psychological professions council. I was for the grouping but not for the 
demand 
 
Jon: For what purpose for that group then?  
 
Malcolm: well [laughs slightly] that's a good question. To [pause long pause] I think at that 
point because there was a difference of view around the demand it was probably just to keep 
the dialogue open between us and we broadly speaking, all professional bodies including 
UKCP were formally of the view that they supported statutory regulation, and that they 
wanted the best possible form of it. Now we had a different view from everyone else about 
what the best form would be. But look we, had the psychological professions council proposal 
been taken up, BPC wouldn’t have gone to the wall against it, we'd have probably have said 
at that point, well ok, we'll go with that then. I think we had a sort of pragmatism about it.  
Jon: And you don't think the BPC in not joining initially was instrumental in the government 
not accepting the PPC proposal, the government was already... / 
 
Malcolm: Absolutely, yeah. I don't think at that point anybody had huge. I think the profession 
was such a bloody pig’s ear and so obviously a pig’s ear that no section of it really was taken 
seriously by government. I honest think that that was the case.  
 
Jon: A pigs ear in a sense of there being no...  
 
Malcolm: It just looked like a bloody shambles, I mean we were.  
 
Jon: IN a regulatory sense?  
 
Malcolm: In any sense. I don't think any section of the profession had the ear of government 
because we looked like a bloody shambles. That was the truth of it.  
 
Jon: Were there any positive reasons why the BPC, more positive reasons why they wanted 
to be regulated by the BPC?  
 
Malcolm: Not really no. I think you know, I think it was, it was just sort of, if this is going to 
happen let's just have the simplest the most elegant, the most clean cut version of regulation.  
 
Jon: But it was seen that is was just going to happen 
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Malcolm: Oh I think everybody but everybody assumed that there would be statutory 
regulation of one form or another at that point, absolutely yes. The working assumption was 
that it was coming, it was taking years and years and years to work out but sooner or later it 
would come. I think everybody thought that.  
 
Jon: And there's a general perception that BPC would try and create a monopoly through the 
skills for health and...  
 
Malcolm: it's just ridiculous. The BPC, I know that there were people around that thought the 
BPC had some magical access to the levers of power. We had no, we had nothing. We were 
as hopelessly un-influential as everyone else. Now we did have Alderdice. We had the ear of 
Alderdice, lord Alderdice, psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and was earlier on a real player, in an 
attempt to get through statutory regulation as a private members bill. But frankly by 2007, to 
be honest whilst Alderdice, I’m a great fan of John had all but no influence on this debate 
actually.  
 
Jon: I'm thinking mainly in terms of BPC's influence on the SfH project which was supposed 
to influence the process of the HPC PLG,, and  
 
Malcolm: Well it didn't. This is absolute illusion.  
 
Jon: Peter Fonagy and Mike Cooper primarily devised the draft standards of proficiency 
 
Malcolm: Ok you've leaped on a bit, so where are we, February 2007. So what then started to 
crystallise in the weeks and months after February 2007, it took a few weeks if not months for 
the people who were in favour of the psychological professions council to realise it was a no 
goer. It took a few weeks for that to sink in, but gradually it did. So in a sense, pragmatically 
people had lined up with the BPC position, not because they wanted to, but they realised that 
the only show in town was now the HPC. And that it was better rather than pissing around 
with other proposals that no one was going to take up, was to constructively engage with 
HPC, as our potential regulator, and that was our position, and became BACP's and indeed 
UKCP's position. Also, during those weeks and months, whilst the leaderships of those 
bodies basically decided it was time to constructively engage with HPC, the opposition to 
statutory regulation crystallised as a force. Now, the opposition, in my mind had two 
completely contradictory arguments. One argument was that we oppose statutory regulation 
completely. Basically, there were in its statements that effectively said we are against any 
form of statutory regulation. To a certain extent that was probably the heartbeat of the 
opposition. The way that the argument was actually constructed though wasn't that, it was a 
sort of moderate version of it, was that we are opposed to regulation by the HPC. Implying 
that if there was something else, that was, that, where did that leave another possible body 
like the original proposal, which would have been potentially a statutory regulator. Would they 
have then been happy with that or not?  
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Jon: They made a distinction between state and statutory regulation didn't they?  
 
Malcolm: Well, what does that mean?  
 
Jon: There argument is that a specialist, based on the model of the GMC, a statutory 
regulation, whereas with the HPC, there actually in control of what the standards are set for a 
profession.  
 
Malcolm: I can't see any structural position between the HPC and the GMC 
 
Jon: With the GMC isn't it the profession itself that is primarily still in control.  
 
Malcolm: well yes, alright but frankly these days, the pressure was on all regulatory bodies to 
have majority lay members, Ok I can accept that basically the provenance of the GMC, yes 
this was a self-regulatory body, underpinned by statutory regulation. But the actual reality 
was that over time, they took on lay members and all the rest of it. Also the HPC, you say, 
that the things were imposed, but they set up, the way the standards of proficiency were to be 
worked out, was to set up a professional liaison committee. No one else arguing the toss 
around the standards of the proficiency other than members of the profession. So yes, alright 
I can see that in some vague, originating way there was a difference between the GMC and 
the HPC, but to say that this was some deep structural difference between state and statutory 
regulation, and statutory regulation is just bloody verbal, it's just linguistic [..] magic. In effect 
in any kind of operating level there is no distinction between the two.  
 
Jon: So in your view that's one wrong argument of the opponents? 
 
Malcolm: It was wrong, it was incomprehensible. To me it was, it doesn't make sense 
[laughs].  
 
Jon: What about the argument that psychotherapy is not a healthcare practice?  
 
Malcolm: Well, I mean, it's not that that claim is incorrect, it's just kind of what do you do with 
it. Governments have, governments chop themselves up in certain ways, they have 
departments on the whole do education do military things do health food this that and the 
other. At the edges there are different ways of cutting it up, and you know, sometimes they do 
cut it up differently. Sometimes they give universities to the business department [laughs], 
other times they give universities to education. So you can chop things up in different ways, 
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and all governments have to decide about how you chop things up. Yes it's true that 
psychotherapy has dimensions to it which, probably in the main overlap with health concerns 
and operates in ways that sometimes, doesn't. I wouldn’t' want to go to the wall and say no 
psychotherapy is definitely our thing. But if you accept statutory regulation is either a good 
thing, or a necessary thing, or an inevitable thing, then it's going to sit somewhere and 
probably in the round health is about a sensible place as it can sit anywhere else. Where else 
would it sit the ministry of defence [laughs].  
 
Jon: One particular way of looking at it would be through. When I interviewed Andrew 
Samuels, he said that in one of the standards of proficiency, there was a passage that said 
the psychotherapy should make a diagnosis and then devise a treatment plan and then follow 
it... he actually suggested that you might have written that.  
 
Malcolm: This is what happened. When we got into the detail of working out the standards of 
proficiency, the big battle within the professional liaison committee wasn't about for or against 
statutory regulation, it was between BACP on the one hand and UKCP, BPC, and BABCP 
together on the other, and the argument was this. The BACP wanted complete non-
differentiation between counselling and psychotherapy whereas BPC, UKCP, and BABCP 
believed these were distinct professions with distinct standards of proficiency, and this was 
the big battle line within the standards, within the professional liaison group. The battle 
around for and against statutory regulation was going on somewhere else. So there were two 
battles going on if you like. So there was a battle against statutory regulation or against HPC 
regulation, and that was being fought by Andrew and the comrades. Within the PLG there 
was another battle going on about whether counselling and psychotherapy were to be 
merged or kept distinct. Ok. So this was the thing. Many of us don't forget BACP, ha 33 
thousand members, it leaves everyone else looking like nothing. But its numerical 
preponderance was not represented, and basically they didn't have very smart people 
operating in that committee. Neither did UKCP but that's another story. We had Fonagy 
[laughs ever so slightly]. And our other person was Julian, although Julian often didn't go and 
I went instead to quite a number of those meetings, and played a very active role. What we 
argued was. There was really quite a passionate debate around all this, with us saying, no 
these are distinct, the BACP saying no no they're not blah blah blah. And there was a 
sprinkling of people from the HPC and other committees who were members of the 
profession, who looked on with kind of fuck [laughs]. So what we agreed to do was we asked 
BACP to organise a meeting with whoever they wanted there to come up to define their own 
standards of proficiency. And we proposed that we convene a group to define, or to come up 
drafts standards of proficiency for psychotherapy. When those two drafts had happened to 
put them side by side and then to conduct the debate on the extent to which they were 
different.  
 
Jon: This is the BACP doing their own and the BPC doing their own.  
 
Malcolm: No, the BACP who led on drafting standards of proficiency for counselling and a 
combination of BPC, UKCP, and BABCP, together tried to draft standards of proficiency for 
psychotherapy, ok. Now, if you try to do that exercise, even UKCP realised this, but they 
would never acknowledge it, the only words and concepts, that ultimately distinguish 
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psychotherapy from counselling, are words and concepts that one one way or another derive 
from medicine. Clinician, pathology, treatment, and so we had what's her name, Joanne 
thingy Black.  
 
Jon: Carmen 
 
Malcolm: Carmen, yes, who was against the medical model, but when. So Carmen came up 
with any concept that distinguishes clinician. Carmen clinician, where does that come from. 
So you know, you try and do it, and try and, as soon as you try and eliminate any form of 
medical concept from psychotherapy you're left with something that's very hard to distinguish 
from counselling. Now does that make psychotherapy a purely medical model? No I don't 
think it does, but it's hard to say that it has, that is doesn't have commonalities with, if you 
like, with the tradition of healing, that goes back to hypocritise.  
 
Jon: Another dimension, it's quite interesting, responses to the call for ideas, and also draft 
standards from people in the profession, there was a disjunction between the organisations 
and individual members, and individual members didn't want to have a distinction between 
counselling and psychotherapy. Is that driven partly by many psychotherapists not wanting to 
be identified as psychotherapists that have a strong medical model?   
 
Malcolm: Well, ok, the trouble with people, of course, within the BPC, there are Jungians. 
Jungians would be the last people, or they'd be the first people to say, you know, it's not a 
medical model. So it's not like the BPC is full of medics, It absolutely isn't. So if you had a 
debate within the BPC, is psychotherapy, you know, is psychotherapy based on the medical 
model, you would probably get a majority of BPC people voting no. Ok, similarly within 
UKCP, would say no no no, we're not about medical model. But they are also adamant that 
they are not counsellors. But the only way, what I’m saying, the only way ultimately, you can 
differentiate counselling from psychotherapy is by some reference to the tradition of healing. 
Now whether you call that medicine, or whatever, whatever, whatever, you end up using 
words like clinician, pathology, words that in one way or another are connected to the 
tradition of medicine.  
 
Jon: And so did you approve of that draft that said about the treatment plan?  
 
Malcolm: You have to get hold of what happened. There was a ferocious debate within this 
group of people. They included UKCP, BABCP, BACP, and us; they are the draft standards 
of proficiency for psychotherapy. I honestly can't honestly remember whether that phrase 
ended up in it. It may have done, it may not have done. But it was a compromise and Carmen 
as much as anybody argued for as much elimination of medical concepts as was possible. 
Equally, she also had to have in mind, if we had in mind something that was too 
indistinguishable from counselling she would have lost the argument she was much more 
passionate about, that there was still a distinction between psychotherapy and counselling.  
 
454 
 
Jon: And why was she passionate about that?  
 
Malcolm: Because UKCP people are passionate about that - they profoundly believe that they 
are psychotherapists, and that psychotherapists are not counsellors.  
 
Jon: And do you think that's linked to conceptual and philosophical differences as well as 
issues of social closure -, concerning markets I suppose. The reality finding markets - that 
seems to be at play as well.  
 
Malcolm: Yeah, although you know, BACP will produce research saying that much more 
people are drawn to somebody that is called a counsellor than a psychotherapist. But 
whether that's true or not. But I think it's more of a status thing than a hard market analysis 
drive [laughs]. People are trained in psychotherapy think they are psychotherapists and they 
are not going to be called a counsellor. Or you know, said to be the same thing as a 
counsellor. I think it is to do with self-identity in very large part. Interesting though, BACP, 
commissioned a study. A public questionnaire about the difference, about whether there was 
a difference between counselling and psychotherapy, and the vast majority of people they 
surveyed said there was a difference. And I didn't get to learn about this until after the debate. 
Never once did they produce this report for us.  
 
Jon: Who didn't?  
 
Malcolm: the BACP 
 
Jon: Wow, right.  
 
Malcolm: The BACP own survey of the public, demonstratively showed that in the public mind 
over sixty, I can't something like over sixty percent of the public believed there was a 
difference between psychotherapists and counsellors. But they kept very quiet about this 
report.  
 
Jon: Why do you think there is that disjunction between member organisations and 
membership?  
 
Malcolm: I don't know if I buy that. What happened is that BACP galvanised their members to 
write in as individuals to say there is not distinction. I think that BACP, sorry start again. So 
BACP successfully galvanised their membership to write as individuals saying that there was 
no distinction. Now, BPC, UKCP, BABCP, were less successful in galvanising. I think that 
UKCP probably more than others. I doubt very much whether the UKCP membership would 
455 
 
have written in saying there's no distinction. I just don't believe that. Their membership will 
have said loud and clear there is a distinction. So I don't buy that, I think the reality was, that 
a very large number of individuals wrote in to say that there was no distinction, but that was 
BACP mobilising its membership. And the other organisations were not as successful in 
getting their individual members to write in. So I think there was a numerical disparity, but it 
wasn't that our memberships were saying different things from the leaderships, on that issue.  
 
Jon: Can you say something about the membership of SfH and PLG?  You said that there 
wasn't some kind of hotline to government, but there is the question of the BPC dominating 
the membership.  
 
Malcolm. I don't believe there was. Ok, so, ok, what there was a kind of zeitgeist, ok? So I 
think what there was, is probably for the first time, in a very long time, the notion of 
psychological therapies was, had a much higher profile within governmental circles, than it 
ever had had. That was going on. OK. So you know, psychological therapies was a hot topic. 
Not as hot as the Falklands war, or you know. But in the scale of things, and this is in large 
part due to Richard Layard, and the whole IAPT thing. So all of this was going on. Nothing to 
do with statutory regulation. So psychological therapies kind of had a positon on the stage 
within this sort of broader, governmental, policy making framework, ok. And because of that, 
there were all sorts of overlapping committees and there was stuff going on you know. So for 
example IAPT, there was an expert reference group. There was an education training 
committee. There were various committees going on around IAPT, and we were all arguing 
the toss around, the predominance of CBT - all the rest of it. There was a whole number of 
individuals, and I was one, you know, Sally Aldridge of BACP was another, who were turning 
up at all these bloody committees. All arguing our corner. So that I think was the, the context 
for all of this, ok. Now, many of us believed that this was a, an opportunity to really to put the 
sort of profile and status of psychotherapy as a profession firmly on the map, or you know, 
firmly in place. That was an ambition. It was an ambition that Peter Fonagy had, an ambition 
that I had. It was an ambition that various people had. There was IAPT going on, there was 
statutory regulation. I think a number of us believed that together, if we played this right, we 
would establish psychotherapy as an important valued modern profession. There was an 
ideological project going on if you like, of which Peter was very much a part and I was very 
much a part. It was to seize an opportunity to, yeah, to really place a modern profession of 
psychotherapy at the heart of things. So, yeah, there was an ideological project, and statutory 
regulation was part of the package.  
 
Jon: You could argue though that it was an attempt to make a certain form of psychotherapy 
into a well-established modern profession 
 
Malcolm: And what form of psychotherapy would that be? 
 
Jon: More manualised forms that Peter Fonagy developed. 
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Malcolm: Well, you know [exasperated, sighing].  
 
Jon: Or would the argument be that one gets a foot in the door and then develop more ... 
 
Malcolm; The trouble is that, I think, Peter will be the first to recognise that this kind of, you 
know, deeply finely grained  [inaudible] of competencies, I mean, lead to this encyclopaedic 
thing that became the sort of official SfH. What happens to it? Who reads it? It sits on a shelf. 
Has anyone read it in the last ten years?  
 
Jon: is it used at all?  
 
Malcolm: No [emphatically].  
 
Jon: One of the intentions was that it would be used to help develop job descriptions.  
 
Malcolm: That's bollocks. It doesn't work like that. You know, I, I wouldn't mind, I might be 
wrong, but I’d be amazed if more than ten people looked at those skills for health 
competencies in the last six, seven, eight years. I would be amazed.  
 
Jon: national occupational standards 
 
Malcolm: Yeah 
 
Jon: wow, Ok. What do think is motivating that then?  
 
Malcolm: Well, I don't honestly know how it came about, but as I say, it's part of the zeitgeist. 
OK right, ok, I do vaguely remember how it happened. Right, as part of the IAPT thing, right, 
part of Layard's argument which was successful is that, in order to combat, mild to moderate 
anxiety and depression we need to use evidence based therapy. Basically this is CBT. And 
you know if we spend loads of money. Or if we spend in his view a modest amount of money, 
then you know, it would all be paid for having not given out so many benefits, that was the 
Layard argument. Give people treatment, go back to work and save on benefits.  
 
Jon: Skills for health was supposed to support that? 
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Malcolm: No, no, no. Well, there was a connection; I’m a vague about this. The whole IAPT 
thing went ahead. And Layard was saying we need thousands, thousands of CBT therapists, 
we haven’t got them, and so we need to put training in place. And so the IAPT the 
commissioned all this CBT training for high intensity therapists, and what were then called 
low intensity therapists, which became well-being practitioners. So this is all commissioned, 
and that lead to a need for defined curricula for these trainings. Now, I think what then 
happened is that someone in the DH commissioned UCL, and particularly the bit that's the 
Pilling ones, to define sets of competencies for CBT, and that fed into the national curricula 
for the IAPT-CBT training. Now, obviously then what happened, and this I really just don’t 
know how it came about, but obviously conversations happened with SfH, who decided to 
commission a wider body of National Occupational Standards around psychotherapy.  
 
Jon: So they were overlapping.  
 
Malcolm: Now, so who had those conversations, how they came about, why SfH decided it 
was the right time, I don't know. I don't know. But, you know, the main contextual point is the 
zeitgeist point, psychotherapies were very much, centre stage, and so, I mean, there may 
have been all sorts of nudging and conversations, going on. I really don't know. But anyway, 
SfH decided to commission these NOS around four modalities, which were basically 
psychoanalysis-dynamic, family systemic, humanistic something or other, and I suppose it 
was CBT. I think that was it.  
 
Jon: I don't know if you've read the Maresfield report, and its account of SfH. Even though, 
they documented the SfH actions and quite clearly it seems that SfH were quite underhand in 
how they went about making appointment or justifying them. They actually acknowledged that 
it wasn't representative enough and they would do something about it and then they didn't do 
anything. There were lots of things, SfH seem to have failed to do what they claimed that they 
would do, and that was to, for better or for worse, to make those groups representative of 
different groups within the field.  
 
Malcolm: Yeah, I don't know, I won't, I mean, you know, that may be true. I think certainly that 
the exercise was led be Lord Alderdice and Peter Fonagy, and I think they probably, you 
know, had a fairly tough and impatient stance on it, that. I think they did take a bit of a view 
that there was a job to do. They were fucked if they were going to be arsed around with, you 
know, a whole bunch of people who were just against the whole exercise. They just wanted 
to get it. So I think they were probably a bit, you know, [laughs] kind of, they probably aired 
on the side of an unparticipativeness. Because they had a certain impatience to get the job 
done. They just knew what would happen, they'd end up arguing the toss and going around in 
circles with a bunch of people who actually didn't want this exercise to happen, and they were 
buggered if they were going to plisse around like that. I mean, you know, so possibly the 
process was not, was less than, perfect, in that sort of participative, democratic, 
representative way, but it was born out of an impatience to get the job done.  
 
Jon: Were you and Julian invited to join the PLG or did you apply? Did people apply?  
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Malcolm: Err, [long pause], I can't remember, obviously there was a working assumption that 
the, I mean, what. As I remember the HPC was very clear, that people were there as 
individuals and not as representatives. I think that's the theory. However, I think there was a 
kind of pragmatic acknowledgement on the part of HPC that certain organisations had to be 
around the table because it couldn't work in any other way. So I think there was a bit of fudge 
between you know where they there as individuals or were they there as representatives sort 
of thing. And I think broadly speaking, though strictly speaking; you couldn't be there, as it 
were, representing an organisation. The pragmatic reality was that all of the organisations 
were in in fact in quotes 'represented' around the table.  
 
Jon: It's hard to understand how they would be able to select without..  
 
Malcolm: yeah, I’m pretty sure that the BPC, would have been asked who they wished to, but 
probably nominate. I think the most we could do was to have nominated, we weren't there as 
a right. I think.  
 
Jon: And in terms of the PLG, do you think, you were close in reaching an agreement as to 
whether, if it hadn't been for a change of government and judicial review?  
 
Malcolm: I think, ha, yeah, by agreement, I have to say, agreement it wasn't a consensus. It 
was a majority agreement. And what happened is that the differential lobby to call it that won 
the argument. And BACP lost it. Simple. They lost it, they knew they lost it. They hated losing 
it, possibly, had it gone forward, then BACP might as an organisation have come out against 
HPC Registration because they had lost the argument around differentiation.  
 
Jon: The BACP position seems to be very variable. Not very long before - they actually made 
a statement that they were withdrawing their support.  
 
Malcolm: But I think it was because they lost the argument around differentiation. It was all to 
do with that, nothing to do with anything else. After the demise of psychological professions 
council their position was to be very supportive of constructive engagement with HPC. 
Absolutely they were, totally in favour of statutory regulation, they were happy, or broadly 
happy with HPC as the regulator. It was only when they lost the argument around 
differentiation did they start to get more critical.  
 
Jon: were there any specific criteria that BPC would have withdrawn support?  
 
Malcolm: Yeah, we hadn't articulated a sort of checklist but you know but by and large we 
took the view that, in the scheme of things seemed to be a sort of decent enough body, its 
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processes were. I actually, the process were some of the best I’ve seen in terms of 
transparency, openness, the way they published minutes. I thought they - as a body,  
 
Jon What about their fitness to practice and the fact that you can't have fitness to practice 
before the findings of a hearing?  
 
Malcolm: Err, well, it's true that HPC didn't have a formal mediation process. I think when that 
argument started to be put to them they acknowledged that and said, yes ok that's not an 
area they'd thought about, and I think had said they would be happy to think about it. And I 
think that they said that credibly, so yeah, you know, it probably was an area of weakness of 
whatever.  
 
Jon: Another area that opponents highlighted was the case of the psychologist, I’m not sure, 
David Cross [Malcolm Cross] who was, he was put through a very lengthy fitness to practice 
hearing on the basis of his behaviour at a private party.  
 
Malcolm: Oh ok, i vaguely remember that.  
 
Jon: And they actually found in their behaviour, but it didn't seem particularly like a victory to 
him because he'd gone through an awful ordeal.  
 
Malcolm: Well, [long pause].  
 
Jon: isn't there a danger that could lead to defensive practice, if the HPC is active in that 
sense, widely publicises, almost vilifies somebody just through publicity - it would lead to 
defensive practice.  
 
Malcolm: Well, you know, if you, ok if you have a complaints procedure, now the BPC had its 
own complaints procedure, and nothing about it was public at all. It took the view that it 
shouldn't be. Basically to protect the reputation of a practitioner until the dict, to call it that, 
had been reached. And that was the BPC's own way of doing it, and you know the HPC as a 
public body took a different view, which is that if you get a complaint. There's a stage one 
process to decide whether or not there is a case to answer. As I remember it that is not 
public. And that is protected. If it is decided there is a case to answer it goes to second stage, 
and at that point it is public.  
 
Jon: Is there any attempt of mediation in that first stage? 
 
460 
 
Malcolm: No, I don't think that there was. But I think this is the thing that the HPC is - took on 
board - that they would look at. I don't know if they ever did. But there was an issue there. 
Now, HPC would say as a public body, European legislation and all the rest of it and that has 
to be a sort of transparent publicly scrutinised process, and of course the down side of that is 
that it leaves a practitioner going through that process who might then be found not guilty or 
similar. Or the complaint is not upheld as has been publicly exposed. And that is I suppose 
the price of a regulatory system. Induvial practitioners subject to complaints.  
 
Jon: Opponents argue that it's very damaging to the complainant as well. They're very 
exposed, and are pushed into a very adversarial system.  
 
Malcolm: I mean, there are down sides, there's a price to pay for this what you might call 
public scrutiny. But there is also a price to pay for a kind of leave it to the professionals, we 
know what we're doing closed shop - too. And I, I know people bang on and on about the so 
called audit culture and all the rest of it, but I grew up in the fifties when there was no audit 
culture. And what it meant, right, leave it to the professionals, rampant, you know, old boys 
networks in the medical professionals. Untouchable canteen culture in the police service 
while they could fuck over everybody in site, whether they we gay, pakies, or whatever, leave 
it to the professionals. They knew what they were doing. No bloody lights shone in on them. 
But that was the lack of an audit culture in the 50s and early 60s. So leave it to the 
professionals doesn't quite cut it with me.  
 
Jon: So with the audit culture there is an element of meritocracy in challenging the old boy’s 
network?  
 
Malcolm: Well, how do you let the light in on self-interested professions? You know, you have 
to bloody well insist upon it. Sorry, we're opening the doors here. We are going to hold you 
accountable to the public for what you do. Now, that, it's not easy to get that right. And of 
course there is an opposite danger that making professionals overly accountable in a kind 
granular detail way, of course there is an opposite danger that they feel un-disrespected, you 
know, just a kind of a cog in a machine. This is a terribly difficult thing for societies to get 
right, I think. But just to sort of bang on about an audit culture, forgetting what a non-audit 
culture looks like is just too simplistic in my book. I mean look at the bloody bank crisis, where 
was the audit culture when we needed it.  
 
Jon: Well it was supposed to have been there wasn't it; arguably it shows that it was for who. 
And some people do argue that HPC trials are show trials really. And that the HCP doesn't 
regulate everyday practice as much as professional associations do. 
 
Malcolm: well, ok, it, I don't, I left the BPC when I left it, so. I'm an empiricist, if one looked at 
it over time, and found that, you know, really as a system of regulation is really just wasn't 
cutting it, then I would say, ok, then we judge this outfit not fit for practice. I wouldn't want to 
take a sort of non-empirical view on it and say, I’ve mad my mind up about HPC that it's 
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alright and I’m bloody well going to stick to it. But against the evidence, if the evidence is in 
that round that it really doesn't seem to be working, and there are case after case of 
ridiculous decisions and it's not really getting at the heart of where the problem is then of 
course but I would want to look at that against the evidence, not against a sort of fixed prior 
view against an ideological view of the HPC.  
 
Jon: A couple of questions if that's alright?  
 
Malcolm: Yeah.  
 
Jon: There was an account where Mick Cooper was reported to have said within the PLG I 
think, that service user views need to be taken into account. And that there was a major 
omission there.  
 
Malcolm: Yeah I would agree with that. I would utterly agree with that. 
 
Jon: So when people talk about service users, through mind...  
 
Malcolm: Well, whoever, there's loads of different ways of doing it, but I think basically the 
mental health profession and this organisation itself. We're working to change that, but have 
a very poor history of involving with lived experience of services and mental health issues, as 
co-designers and co-constructers of solutions, and I think the composition of the PLG 
reflected that, long standing structural weakness, it is absolutely true.  
 
Jon: And do think it's because it would seem to complicate the matter too much?  
 
Malcolm: no I think it was the default potion of most organisations at that point in time. There 
wasn't culture and tradition of involving service users. People just hadn't thought of it.  
 
Jon: So it's a very recent phenomenon then?  
 
Malcolm: It, its differential, it's been better in other fields, certain places. Certain organisations 
have bene much better at it than others. At the Tavi [Tavistock] we've been very poor until 
quite recently.  
 
Jon: And would you say that Jonathan Coe represented service user's views at all?  
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Malcolm: Well, Jonathan, [pause] you know, I mean, Jonathan had set up what was 
effectively an advocacy group on the part of people who had suffered abuse at the hands of 
psychotherapists. I always thought that Jonathan was a decent guy and he was coming from 
where he came from, he felt that he significant abuse had gone on and had effectively been 
covered up. And I thought he, he had an important voice. I wouldn't say, in a sense, 
represented the diversity of service users. But I think he represented a particular voice. And I 
always found Jonathan a very decent, thoughtful guy, who had important things to say.  
 
Jon: What like? What was he contributing that was distinctive?  
 
Malcolm: I don't think he was perusing a line. I think Jonathan believed passionately in 
statutory regulation. He thought that it wasn't necessarily the ultimate answer to historic 
questions of abuse by professionals, but he felt it was an important part of the jigsaw, and so 
that, but in a sense we were all signed up to that then. He wasn't generally; I think he wanted 
to see in place a fairly robust system of statutory regulation.  
 
Jon: There was that conflict between him and Darian Leader about the Manchester 
stakeholder meeting where Jonathan had introduce a former patient or client or whoever, and 
Darian later made the argument that there was something being replicated in the way that 
Jonathan was almost forcing her to represent  - I can't remember the exact details...  
 
 
Malcolm: I think I was in Manchester. I think this is the sort of Darian view that any patient 
that is put in front of an audience is going to enact certain or play out some kind of 
psychoanalytic scenario. The fact it - I can't remember the details of that specific thing. I 
couldn't see anything wrong with somebody that had obviously suffered abuse and coming 
along and bloody well saying so. [laughs] We had this debate in the BPC, all organisations. 
All psychotherapeutic organisations have a natural tendency to pathologise complaints. 
That's what they do. So someone has complained that their pathologising. And it took a long 
time to change the culture within the BPC to say, actually, some of the complaints are real 
and legitimate and the psychotherapist has been at fault. It's not all pathology guys. 
Sometimes psychotherapists do wrong things. And people are right to complain. Now the 
shift for the BPC was introducing lay members on panels. And out chair of ethics himself, 
who, to a certain extent was a bright guy, he was a brilliant Chair of ethics, himself said do 
you know Malcolm, I’ve come a long way because, whilst I wouldn't have been the kind of 
people that would have said that all complaints are pathology, nevertheless we all have a 
tendency to put complainants in that pathological box, and we all do it. And the big difference 
that was made when we had lay members, because they don't buy that shit. Lay members 
come along and say, and he. Actually the big difference is not necessarily what the lay 
members say but what the psychotherapists say because they realise that they can't get 
away with their bullshit in front of a lay member. His journey was a very interesting one. He 
believed that the introduction of lay members to complaints panels was the single most 
effective thing it did to make them more, fairer and saner. Just more grounded in reality rather 
than this psychotherapeutic fantasy world, where that anybody complains has pathology.  
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Jon In that particular case Leader wasn't saying that the abuse didn't happen but that it was 
being replicated by...  
 
Malcolm; Yeah but I think that's a classic form of a psychotherapist trying to pathologise away 
a confrontation with a reality that needs to be heard. So I think that's exactly the sort of old 
bollocks that therapists often come up with.  
 
Jon: A final question, though a broad one. I was wondering. Your background is in arts 
management isn't it. And my understanding is that there's an increasing instrumental 
philosophy in that. And that the arts, when they commission, they need to be shown to be 
adding something for the government achieving its broader policies.  
 
Malcolm: Yeah, I think that's by and large true. You know, now up until - to a certain extent 
many of the arguments came from the arts themselves. It wasn't some imposed thing. The 
arts have always struggled for money. Ok, so sometime in the, when was it. Kind of in the 
80s really, a lot of artists, realised that, there was money around, […..] 
[Ends] 
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 APPENDIX B 
 
      INTERVIEW GUIDE MALCOLM ALLEN 
 
Biographical Information 
Dean of Postgraduate Studies 
Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust 
January 2012 – Present (2 years 9 months)North London 
Strategic responsibility for postgraduate education and training programme 
Chief Executive Officer 
British Psychoanalytic Council 
September 2006 – December 2011 (5 years 4 months)North London 
UK-wide professional association for psychoanalytic & psychodynamic 
psychothotherapists 
 
Director, Capital Programme 
Arts Council England 
July 2004 – August 2006 (2 years 2 months)London, United Kingdom 
Managing National Lottery-funded capital investment programme 
Head of Assessment, Capital Programme 
Arts Council England 
July 1999 – June 2004 (5 years) 
Senior Lottery Officer 
Arts Council England 
January 1997 – June 1999 (2 years 6 months) 
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Director 
The Studio 
June 1992 – December 1996 (4 years 7 months) Beckenham 
Arts and media centre, incorporating multimedia studio 
Director 
Birmingham Media Development Agency 
August 1989 – May 1992 (2 years 10 months) Birmingham, United Kingdom 
 
Project consultant 
Broadway Cinema & Media Centre, Nottingham 
September 1987 – July 1989 (1 year 11 months)Nottingham 
Feasibility work and set up for the media centre 
 
 
Structure and Key Questions: 
Position and background: 
1. What’s the difference between the role of the Chair and the Chief Executive of the 
BPC?  
 
Pre-White Paper: 
 
2. What was BPC’s response to the Foster Review on The regulation of non-medical 
healthcare professions? Why was the BPC not involved in the so called Partnership 
Group (UKCP, BPC, BACP) and the Psychological Professions Council Proposal? Was 
the BPC already in support of the HPC?  
 
3. Why did the BPC support the HPC plans? Why did the BPC support the plans and 
SfH project to map National Occupational Standards, in contrast to its refusal to 
participate in project during the early 1990s to devise NVQ standards for 
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psychotherapy? The BPC actually took a lead in resisting these. The BPC had stated 
that the system was ‘flawed’ and the language of ‘competencies’ inappropriate for 
the process of analytic psychotherapy (see Balfour and Richards). If it is matter of 
pragmatism or realism – was there something more pressing or overwhelming 
about the HPC plans? Or did the BPC lack pragmatic attitude during the 1990s – 
was it simply stalling the inevitable? If it was inevitable – doesn’t the abandonment 
of the HPC plans demonstrate that in fact it wasn’t inevitable?  
 
What’s the BPC’s response to the charge of opportunism? Was it seeking to 
establish a monopoly within the field? Is it a ‘survivalist strategy’? One of the key 
attractions to many people within the field of the HPC plans was the view that it 
would contest a perceived hierarchy within the field with the BPC and 
psychoanalysis as superior. Given this, it seems reasonable to surmise that the BPC 
dominance of SfH and its links with HPC contributed considerably to the derailment 
of the plans. What’s your view on that?  
 
 
 
  Skills for Health Project to map NOS for Counselling and Psychotherapy:  
4. Were you personally involved in the SfH project?  
5. What is the influence of SfH in the provision of mental health services? What uses 
have the NOS been put to?  
6. As you’ll know, the perceived dominance of the BPC on the Skills for Health project 
created a lot of anxiety not only about that but also the HPC regulatory plans. 
Strong complaints were made to and against SfH about impropriety in the way they 
handled the section of members of the groups.  What’s your view on that? (see 
‘Skills for Health Impropriety’ sheet).  
7. When Denis Postle from the Independent Practitioners Network met with Marc 
Seale of the HPC, and expressed concerns about the relationship between SfH and 
the HPC plans, Marc Seale reportedly stated that [………..insert the quote – see 
therapy futures book]. Do you think that this assertion, repeatedly made by various 
people in favour of the HPC plans, was a very credible view? – especially also given 
that Peter Fonagy had such a prominent role in devising the definitions of 
psychotherapy and counselling for the PLG in the HPC.  
8. What is your view of ‘manualised’ forms of psychoanalytic treatment? In keeping 
with arguments that you and Cooper develop in ‘Borderline Welfare’ aren’t 
manualised treatments partially a retreat from disturbing knowledge and the 
complexities of in-depth relationship? (See quote A and Quote B).  
9. When I interviewed Nick Temple he described manualised psychoanalytic 
treatments, e.g. those developed by Peter Fonagy as ‘watered down versions of 
psychoanalysis’ and characterised them primarily as a necessary, if somewhat 
regretful, survival strategy for psychoanalysis i.e. to ensure that there is at least 
some form of psychodynamic treatment available within the NHS. Do you share 
that view?  
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Professional Liaison Group (PLG) 
10. Am I correct in thinking that you attended some of the PLG meetings? How would 
you describe your overall experience of the group? The impression created by 
external accounts was that it wasn’t a very creative group?  
11. What in your view is the difference between counselling and psychotherapy? You 
were reported to have reluctantly accepted a definition of counselling as ‘mental 
health well-being’.  Is that right? What is your objection to that?  
12. Mick Cooper is reported to have said that service-user views need to be taken into 
account in the process – and that this was a major omission. Were service-user 
views taken into account? Do you think that service users and the public generally 
want a regulatory system like the HPC?  
13. In responses to the HPC call for ideas as well as consultations on the PLG 
recommendations regarding the structure of the register – there were significant 
differences between the responses of individual practitioners and those of training 
and professional organisations. For example most individual practitioners were 
against structuring a distinction between counselling and psychotherapy in the 
register.      
14. [add question about the final recommendations and structure of the register]. 
15. How instrumental do you think the Allliance and opposition to the HPC plans from 
within the field instrumental in leading to the dropping of the plans?  
16. What’s your view of the current system of assured-voluntary regulation? Is it 
adequate?  
 
 
The HPC Generally 
17. What is your view of the fact that HPC fitness to practice hearings only allow 
mediation after the conclusion of a hearing? [draw on some of the critiques and 
figures drawn out by Haney].  
18. Do you wish that the HPC plans had been successful?  
 
IAPT and more general: Have you any dealings or specific knowledge with IAPT and public 
mental health services more generally? 
19. What is your view of IAPT? Is this a positive development in the provision of mental 
health services? How is it viewed within the field? How is moral in the mental 
health service field in relation to policy developments?  
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20. Has IAPT taken resources away from already existing mental health services, and 
psychotherapy services?  
21. What is the ‘New ways of working’ project and what impact has this had within the 
field? 
22. What kind of employer regulation or governance of counsellors and 
psychotherapists is current within the NHS and public services? Nick temple said 
that the system of revalidation of doctors and psychiatrists is largely a paper 
exercise that is more about creating the impression that the public are protected 
from another Harold Shipman, but that in reality someone like Shipman would 
probably be able to pass revalidation with flying colours.  
23. What’s the Savoy Partnership?  
Arts Council: I understand that previously you have worked for the Arts Council. It’s often 
claimed that funding for the arts has in the last few decades shifted towards an instrumental 
philosophy in which programmes must demonstrate how they will contribute to the aims of 
government policy –such as greater inclusion - in order to achieve funding. Is this true in 
your experience? If so, do you think there is a similar logic at play in the arts sector as there 
is in mental health service provision and the HPC regulatory plans of private 
psychotherapeutic practice?  
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                                               APPENDIX C 
 
                      SAMPLE RESEARCH INITATION LETTER  
 
 
 
 
        From: Jonathan Wildman 
                                     
To: Linda Mathews                               
 
Dear Linda Mathews, 
I am writing to invite you to take part in a research study. As a part-time Ph.D. 
student in the Department of Government at the University of Essex, I am currently 
conducting research, under the supervision of Dr Jason Glynos, on the regulation of 
the talking therapies. The focus of my research is on the 2006-2011 political and 
professional struggles around the attempt to institute the Health Professions Council 
as statutory regulator of the talking therapies.  
In the research I seek to illuminate the plurality of perspectives of different 
stakeholders involved within the struggle. Participation within the study would 
involve taking part in an in-depth interview, by telephone, which would explore your 
views on and involvement within this struggle and policy domain. I am particularly 
interested in your involvement with the PLG for Counselling and Psychotherapy, 
your experience of this group, and in the BABCP’s position on regulation, both then 
and currently.  
If you agree to participate, I shall send you an ‘interview guide’ (and accompanying 
consent form), in advance of the interview, highlighting potential areas of interest 
and discussion. You would, of course, be free to withdraw your consent to 
participate at any stage prior to the completion of the research.     
Please contact me at the above email address, or on the above telephone number, 
to let me know whether or not you are interested in taking part in the research, or if 
you have any questions about the study. I plan to send you a follow-up e-mail 
invitation too in a few weeks, in case this makes things easier. An interview would 
be arranged at a time that is convenient to you.  
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Jonathan Wildman 
